<?xml version="1.0"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
	<id>https://consumerrights.wiki/api.php?action=feedcontributions&amp;feedformat=atom&amp;user=RalfSchooneveld</id>
	<title>Consumer Rights Wiki - User contributions [en]</title>
	<link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="https://consumerrights.wiki/api.php?action=feedcontributions&amp;feedformat=atom&amp;user=RalfSchooneveld"/>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://consumerrights.wiki/w/Special:Contributions/RalfSchooneveld"/>
	<updated>2026-04-29T07:35:58Z</updated>
	<subtitle>User contributions</subtitle>
	<generator>MediaWiki 1.44.0</generator>
	<entry>
		<id>https://consumerrights.wiki/index.php?title=DIW7022_mandatory_wireless_operation&amp;diff=41536</id>
		<title>DIW7022 mandatory wireless operation</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://consumerrights.wiki/index.php?title=DIW7022_mandatory_wireless_operation&amp;diff=41536"/>
		<updated>2026-03-06T18:35:45Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;RalfSchooneveld: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{SloppyAI}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{IncidentCargo&lt;br /&gt;
|Company=KPN&lt;br /&gt;
|StartDate=2024-01&lt;br /&gt;
|Status=Active&lt;br /&gt;
|ArticleType=Product&lt;br /&gt;
|Type=Accessibility, Health, Privacy&lt;br /&gt;
|Description=DIW7022 TV box requires mandatory Wi-Fi/Bluetooth operation; no wired/IR-only alternative available&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Background==&lt;br /&gt;
The DIW7022 is a television set-top box provided by KPN that operates using Wi-Fi (2.4 GHz and 5 GHz bands) and Bluetooth for network connectivity and remote pairing. As of 2026, there is no officially supported method to permanently disable wireless transmission or operate the device in a fully wired or infrared-only mode.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This mandatory RF operation has raised concerns regarding consumer control, health effects, and wireless privacy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Device identifiers observed on the tested unit:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Model: DIW7022&lt;br /&gt;
* Article number: 849054&lt;br /&gt;
* Serial number: 724088019282&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Incident: Mandatory wireless operation==&lt;br /&gt;
Customers are required to use the DIW7022 with active Wi-Fi and Bluetooth transmissions. Users who attempt to disable RF functions are unable to use the device for television services, effectively making wireless operation unavoidable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Wireless operating bands===&lt;br /&gt;
Community documentation and available device specifications indicate operation within the following RF ranges:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Wi-Fi bands:&lt;br /&gt;
* 2400 MHz – 2483.5 MHz (2.4 GHz band)&lt;br /&gt;
* 5150 MHz – 5850 MHz (5 GHz band)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bluetooth:&lt;br /&gt;
* 2400 MHz – 2483.5 MHz&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Additional channel breakdown commonly referenced in community documentation:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
2.4 GHz Wi-Fi  &lt;br /&gt;
* Channels 1–13 (2412–2472 MHz)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
5 GHz Wi-Fi  &lt;br /&gt;
* Channels 34–48 (5170–5240 MHz)  &lt;br /&gt;
* Channels 52–64 (5260–5320 MHz)  &lt;br /&gt;
* Channels 100–140 (5500–5700 MHz)  &lt;br /&gt;
* Channels 153–157 (5765–5865 MHz)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bluetooth range:&lt;br /&gt;
* 2402–2480 MHz&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These ranges correspond to the typical operating bands used by consumer Wi-Fi and Bluetooth devices in the European regulatory domain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Health concerns===&lt;br /&gt;
Wireless networking such as Wi-Fi uses electromagnetic fields (EMF) in the 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz ranges. Some scientific reviews suggest that long-term exposure to RF EMF may have biological effects, particularly in sensitive populations or individuals with pre-existing conditions such as diabetes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The BioInitiative Report, an extensive compilation of research on RF exposures, includes RF exposure color charts illustrating levels and potential biological thresholds that some researchers consider relevant for precautionary public health discussion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While mainstream regulatory bodies generally consider typical Wi-Fi exposure as below established safety limits, the presence of mandatory Wi-Fi transmission can be an issue for consumers seeking precautionary reduction of RF exposure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Privacy and “Wi-Fi radar” concerns===&lt;br /&gt;
Wi-Fi operates via electromagnetic waves in the 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz ranges. Because these waves can penetrate walls and reflect off surfaces, researchers have demonstrated that reflected RF signals can be reconstructed into spatial imagery — a technique sometimes referred to as “Wi-Fi radar.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Early work presented at an IEEE symposium in 2005 described ultra-wideband short-pulse imaging systems operating around 10 GHz for enhanced situational awareness in security and defense contexts. While this research is not specific to consumer set-top boxes, it illustrates that reflected RF fields can convey environmental information beyond simple connectivity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The concern among some privacy advocates is that continuous RF broadcasting from consumer devices like the DIW7022 contributes to a wireless environment where location and movement could — in theory under specialized measurement — be inferred from ambient Wi-Fi signals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Company’s response==&lt;br /&gt;
KPN has not provided an official non-RF alternative for the DIW7022 nor a timeline for introducing one. In community discussions, KPN representatives have acknowledged that wireless operation is required but have not offered a wired or IR-only mode.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Consumer response==&lt;br /&gt;
Consumers and privacy advocates have expressed frustration over mandatory RF exposure and lack of control over the device. Forum discussions document users seeking fully wired alternatives for accessibility, health precaution, or privacy reasons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Lawsuit==&lt;br /&gt;
As of 2026, there is no publicly documented litigation specifically addressing the DIW7022’s mandatory wireless operation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Update — 6 March 2026==&lt;br /&gt;
On 6 March 2026, an additional update was recorded regarding communication with KPN. A formal letter was sent requesting clarification regarding the mandatory wireless operation of the DIW7022 and the possibility of a wired or RF-disabled operating mode.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As of this date, no response has been received within the stated 14-day response period following the submission of the letter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Letter==&lt;br /&gt;
---Royal KPN N.V.&lt;br /&gt;
Wilhelminakade 123, 3072 AP Rotterdam, Netherlands&lt;br /&gt;
Mr. Joost Farwerck, Chief Executive Officer&lt;br /&gt;
CC: Ms. Marieke Snoep, Chief Consumer Market CC: Mr. J. Jongenelen, Data Protection Officer&lt;br /&gt;
12 February 2026&lt;br /&gt;
Subject: Formal Complaint – Mandatory Wireless Operation (DIW7022) and Mandatory Mobile-Based Two-Step Verification&lt;br /&gt;
Dear Mr. Farwerck,&lt;br /&gt;
This letter formally continues my complaints since 2024 regarding two structural policy decisions within KPN consumer services: (1) mandatory wireless operation of the DIW7022 television box and (2) mandatory mobile-based two-step verification without landline alternative.&lt;br /&gt;
These matters concern consumer configurability, accessibility, and security resilience.&lt;br /&gt;
DIW7022 - Wireless transmission (Wifi/Bluetooth)&lt;br /&gt;
The DIW7022 operates within the 2400–2483.5 MHz and 5150–5850 MHz bands (is the current assumption without documented records) and utilizes Bluetooth for remote pairing. My objection is not about regulatory compliance. It concerns the absence of user control and the mandatory nature of RF transmission.&lt;br /&gt;
There is currently no method to permanently disable Wifi and Bluetooth RF transmitters, nor is an infrared-only or fully wired remote alternative available. As currently implemented, receipt of television service requires active RF transmission from the device.&lt;br /&gt;
From a technical standpoint, a wired configuration is feasible. Comparable consumer devices have historically supported wired fallback operation despite integrated wireless hardware. For example, PlayStation 3 controllers (2008) were capable of operating via USB despite integrated Bluetooth functionality. Implementation would not require architectural redesign: USB input handling exists; firmware-level radio control flags could disable RF modules when wired mode is active; alternatively, IR fallback could be supported. This would represent a configuration choice rather than a hardware constraint.&lt;br /&gt;
If a fully wired, non-RF configuration exists, provide written technical documentation describing how it can be achieved (currently no solid evidence provided by the KPN Community). If it does not exist (which the current evidence implies), confirm in writing that wireless transmission is mandatory for operation of the DIW7022 and that customers are not offered a formal KPN brand non-RF alternative. Also confirm whether KPN has formally evaluated offering such a configuration and state the policy duration for maintaining mandatory wireless operation.&lt;br /&gt;
Two step verification&lt;br /&gt;
1&lt;br /&gt;
KPN currently mandates mobile SMS-based two-step verification. No landline voice alternative is offered. This excludes customers who do not use mobile phones.&lt;br /&gt;
Technically, SMS OTP and voice OTP share identical backend logic: OTP generation followed by channel selection and delivery transport. KPN already operates SMSC infrastructure, PSTN/VoIP voice systems, and customer identity databases. Implementing landline voice OTP requires TTS or recorded prompts, call routing and retry logic, and user preference storage. These are incremental integrations widely used in authentication systems and do not require fundamental network modification.&lt;br /&gt;
Security and resilience considerations support channel diversity. Security literature identifies SMS authentication as susceptible to SIM-swap and device compromise risks. A PSTN voice channel provides infrastructure separation and fallback capability. Dutch government services such as DigiD already use voice-based OTP, establishing national precedent. Neteller, international banking service, provides a SecureID pincode solution; acting as a 2nd factor. Ubi-keys can act as a 2nd factor. To name several.&lt;br /&gt;
February 2026 data breach affecting approximately 6.2 million customers at Odido, illustrate the practical risks of large-scale exposure of personal data. When identifying information becomes accessible to malicious actors, the likelihood of social engineering, SIM-swap attempts, and phishing increases. In such circumstances, reliance on a single mobile-based authentication channel reduces resilience. Channel diversification, including a landline voice OTP alternative, enhances operational robustness and mitigates dependency on a single attack surface.&lt;br /&gt;
If mobile SMS remains the only permitted second factor, confirm in writing that this is a deliberate policy decision rather than a technical constraint. Clarify whether landline voice OTP has been formally evaluated and, if rejected, on what basis.&lt;br /&gt;
This letter requests formal clarification of policy and technical feasibility.&lt;br /&gt;
Mandatory RF Transmission – Confirmation Request&lt;br /&gt;
Under Dutch consumer protection law, users are entitled to operate purchased hardware in a manner that does not expose them to mandatory RF transmissions or require ownership of additional devices. As currently implemented, the DIW7022 restricts consumer control over RF transmission.&lt;br /&gt;
I request a clear, unambiguous written statement confirming:&lt;br /&gt;
That the DIW7022 cannot operate without active RF transmission (WiFi or Bluetooth). That no wired or IR-only mode exists or is officially supported by KPN.&lt;br /&gt;
That this is a deliberate operational requirement rather than a technical limitation.&lt;br /&gt;
If a non-RF alternative will be evaluated or developed, the expected timeline for such an evaluation or update, and how customers will be notified&lt;br /&gt;
Under Articles 7:17 and 7:18 of the Dutch Civil Code, products must conform to the agreement and to the characteristics that a consumer may reasonably expect for normal use. Requiring mandatory RF operation without alternatives may fall short of these&lt;br /&gt;
2&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
expectations. Therefore, a formal statement on the current operational constraints and future policy is necessary.&lt;br /&gt;
If mandatory RF transmission is an inherent and non-optional characteristic of the DIW7022, please indicate where this operational requirement was clearly disclosed prior to contract conclusion and where it forms part of the agreed product specifications or applicable terms and conditions.&lt;br /&gt;
If refusal of mandatory wireless operation results in loss of service, this effectively leaves the consumer without a practical alternative. Please clarify whether mandatory RF transmission is considered an essential characteristic of the service and where this requirement was explicitly disclosed prior to contract formation.&lt;br /&gt;
I expect a formal written response to this complaint within 14 calendar days of receipt, addressing each of the above points separately.&lt;br /&gt;
I will continue to investigate and explore potential solutions independently. However, it is in KPN’s interest to provide clear and accurate technical guidance. Doing so ensures that any public discussion, troubleshooting documentation, or educational material I produce accurately reflects KPN’s policies and operational constraints.&lt;br /&gt;
Absent clarification, conclusions will necessarily be drawn based on observable system behavior.&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to the all the above, I would like to clarify the context of my interaction within the KPN Community. My access to the community has been temporarily suspended following discussions about the inability to fully disable wireless transmission functions on KPN-provided equipment. I wish to emphasize that my underlying concern relates strictly to product configurability and consumer control over hardware within my own home environment.&lt;br /&gt;
My request is not directed at individual employees or moderators, but at the technical design choices of the equipment and services provided. I therefore ask that my formal complaint be evaluated independently of any prior community moderation decisions, and strictly on the technical and contractual merits of the issue. A written response will clarify KPN’s position. The matter itself remains unresolved for as long as wireless transmission remains mandatory.&lt;br /&gt;
I would also like to note that my concerns outlined above are specific to the configurability and authentication matters described. In general, my experience with the reliability of KPN’s internet services has been positive, and I appreciate the stability of the (wired) network infrastructure (Thank you, Mr Farweck). My complaint is therefore directed at specific policy and design decisions rather than the overall quality of service delivery.&lt;br /&gt;
Sincerely,&lt;br /&gt;
Ralf Schooneveld&lt;br /&gt;
---&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Independent RF power testing==&lt;br /&gt;
Independent testing has been performed to evaluate the RF emissions of the DIW7022 television set-top box. Tests demonstrated the presence of RF transmission and explored basic shielding approaches that may reduce exposure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Measurement equipment===&lt;br /&gt;
Two RF measurement instruments were used:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
ENV-RD10 RF meter  &lt;br /&gt;
Measurement range: 400 MHz – 6 GHz  &lt;br /&gt;
Maximum display range: approximately 20 mW/m²&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
HF-35C RF meter by Gigahertz Solutions  &lt;br /&gt;
Measurement range: 800 MHz – 2700 MHz&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These instruments provide approximate broadband RF field measurements rather than detailed spectral analysis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Measured power density===&lt;br /&gt;
Peak measurements were recorded at approximately 30 cm distance from the device.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Baseline (device powered off):  &lt;br /&gt;
* 003 µW/m²&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Device powered on (no shielding):  &lt;br /&gt;
* 963 µW/m²&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Device powered on with shielding (4 mm aluminium barrier):  &lt;br /&gt;
* 401 µW/m²&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The shielding configuration reduced measured RF levels by approximately 58 percent under the test conditions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Measurement notes===&lt;br /&gt;
The ENV-RD10 meter was also used to confirm RF activity by placing the probe close to the device to verify that wireless transmission was active.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Because the ENV-RD10 meter saturates at approximately 20 mW/m² and the HF-35C has a limited frequency range, the measurements should be interpreted as approximate indicators rather than full RF spectrum analysis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Further controlled testing using laboratory instruments is planned.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Planned RF analysis instrumentation===&lt;br /&gt;
Further testing is planned using a vector network analyzer (VNA) and a metal waveguide measurement setup to better characterize RF emissions and shielding effectiveness up to approximately 6 GHz.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Planned equipment:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
NanoRFE VNA6000  &lt;br /&gt;
Estimated cost: €677.67  &lt;br /&gt;
Status: not yet financed&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Additional instrumentation is under development in the form of the Mk2 F-meter, a proposed RF measurement device intended to allow testing at significantly higher frequencies, potentially up to 110 GHz.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This device is intended to investigate whether emissions exist outside the commonly documented 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz Wi-Fi bands, particularly given the absence of publicly available detailed RF emission specifications for the DIW7022.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
CFPH&amp;amp;S Mk2 RF meter (prototype)  &lt;br /&gt;
Estimated cost: €2740 excluding VAT, shipping, and broker costs  &lt;br /&gt;
Status: fully financed and currently in development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===RF power test video===&lt;br /&gt;
* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=urSlUTO6EHM&amp;amp;t=27s&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==References==&lt;br /&gt;
* BioInitiative Working Group. BioInitiative Report — RF Color Charts.&lt;br /&gt;
* “Ultra-wideband high-resolution short pulse imaging radar,” IEEE Symposium historical proceedings (July 2005).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:KPN N.V.]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Consumer health issues]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Privacy issues]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Accessibility issues]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>RalfSchooneveld</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://consumerrights.wiki/index.php?title=Facebook_account_recovery_requires_mobile_phone_verification_with_limited_non-SMS_alternatives&amp;diff=39866</id>
		<title>Facebook account recovery requires mobile phone verification with limited non-SMS alternatives</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://consumerrights.wiki/index.php?title=Facebook_account_recovery_requires_mobile_phone_verification_with_limited_non-SMS_alternatives&amp;diff=39866"/>
		<updated>2026-02-26T04:47:42Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;RalfSchooneveld: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{IncidentCargo&lt;br /&gt;
|Company=Meta Platforms&lt;br /&gt;
|StartDate=2020&lt;br /&gt;
|Status=Active&lt;br /&gt;
|ArticleType=Service&lt;br /&gt;
|Type=Accessibility, Security, Privacy&lt;br /&gt;
|Description=Facebook account recovery requires mobile phone verification with limited non-SMS alternatives&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Summary==&lt;br /&gt;
Facebook account access and recovery procedures frequently require **mobile phone verification via SMS codes**, which can prevent access for users without mobile devices. Critics argue that reliance on mobile authentication excludes some users and restricts access to personal data and communications. Documentation from Meta and independent sources confirms that SMS verification is widely used as a primary account recovery mechanism. (Meta Help Center; Electronic Frontier Foundation)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Background==&lt;br /&gt;
Facebook is a social networking service operated by Meta Platforms Ireland Limited for users in the European Economic Area. The platform provides messaging, social networking, business communication, and identity services used by billions of people worldwide.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Account security systems on Facebook include **two-factor authentication (2FA)** and account recovery verification methods. These often rely on **one-time codes delivered by SMS to a registered mobile phone number**, particularly during suspicious login attempts or account recovery procedures. (Meta Help Center)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although alternative authentication methods such as authentication apps or security keys exist, these methods are not always available for account recovery or reactivation of locked accounts. (Meta Help Center)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Incident: Mandatory mobile verification for account access==&lt;br /&gt;
Facebook accounts may become inaccessible if the registered mobile phone number is unavailable. In such cases, users may be required to confirm identity through **SMS-based verification codes**, preventing access for individuals without a mobile phone.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Users who cannot receive SMS messages may be unable to:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Access personal messages and contacts  &lt;br /&gt;
* Restore locked or disabled accounts  &lt;br /&gt;
* Use associated Meta services such as Instagram  &lt;br /&gt;
* Maintain business communications&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Because Facebook and Instagram function as major communication platforms, loss of account access can result in significant social and economic disruption.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Security documentation from Meta confirms that phone numbers are commonly used to verify identity and secure accounts. (Meta Help Center)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Consumer advocates have criticized SMS-based authentication as both **less secure than hardware-based authentication** and potentially exclusionary for users without mobile phones. (Electronic Frontier Foundation)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The systemic use of mobile verification demonstrates that the issue is a **platform-wide policy rather than isolated incidents**.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Meta&#039;s response==&lt;br /&gt;
Meta states that phone-based verification helps protect accounts from unauthorized access and is widely accessible to users. The company provides documentation describing SMS verification as a primary authentication and recovery mechanism. (Meta Help Center)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Meta documentation indicates that additional authentication methods such as **authentication apps and security keys** may be available for some users, but these methods do not consistently replace mobile verification during account recovery. (Meta Help Center)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Meta has not published a clear policy guaranteeing a **non-mobile account recovery pathway** for users without access to a mobile phone.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Consumer response==&lt;br /&gt;
Users have reported difficulty recovering accounts without mobile phone access in public support forums and technical discussions. These reports describe situations where users are unable to regain access without obtaining a mobile phone number.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Privacy and digital rights organizations have also raised concerns about SMS authentication, noting both security limitations and accessibility concerns. (Electronic Frontier Foundation)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The reliance on mobile phones for authentication has been described by commentators as a form of **digital exclusion** for individuals who do not use mobile devices for medical, privacy, or economic reasons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Lawsuit==&lt;br /&gt;
As of 2026, no publicly documented court ruling specifically addresses mandatory mobile authentication for Facebook account access in the European Union.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, complaints regarding authentication and data access practices may be submitted to national data protection authorities under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==References==&lt;br /&gt;
* Meta Help Center. &amp;quot;Two-factor authentication and login approvals.&amp;quot;  &lt;br /&gt;
https://www.facebook.com/help/148233965247823&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Meta Help Center. &amp;quot;Recover your Facebook account.&amp;quot;  &lt;br /&gt;
https://www.facebook.com/help/105487009541643&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Electronic Frontier Foundation. &amp;quot;The Problems with SMS-based Two-Factor Authentication.&amp;quot;  &lt;br /&gt;
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/07/one-time-codes-arent-enough&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Meta Platforms]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Accessibility issues]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Security issues]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Privacy issues]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>RalfSchooneveld</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://consumerrights.wiki/index.php?title=Facebook_account_recovery_requires_mobile_phone_verification_with_limited_non-SMS_alternatives&amp;diff=39865</id>
		<title>Facebook account recovery requires mobile phone verification with limited non-SMS alternatives</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://consumerrights.wiki/index.php?title=Facebook_account_recovery_requires_mobile_phone_verification_with_limited_non-SMS_alternatives&amp;diff=39865"/>
		<updated>2026-02-26T04:47:25Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;RalfSchooneveld: {{IncidentCargo |Company=Meta Platforms |StartDate=2020 |Status=Active |ArticleType=Service |Type=Accessibility, Security, Privacy |Description=Facebook account recovery requires mobile phone verification with limited non-SMS alternatives }}  ==Summary== Facebook account access and recovery procedures frequently require **mobile phone verification via SMS codes**, which can prevent access for users without mobile devices. Critics argue that reliance on mobile authentication excludes some user...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{IncidentCargo&lt;br /&gt;
|Company=Facebook&lt;br /&gt;
|StartDate=2024-01&lt;br /&gt;
|Status=Active&lt;br /&gt;
|ProductLine=Accesibility, Security, Privacy&lt;br /&gt;
|ArticleType=Service&lt;br /&gt;
|Type=Accessibility, Security&lt;br /&gt;
|Description=Facebook account recovery requires mobile phone verification with limited non-SMS alternatives&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-Int}}&lt;br /&gt;
==Background==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-B}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==[Incident]==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-I}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===[Company]&#039;s response===&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-ComR}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Lawsuit==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-L}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Consumer response==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-ConR}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==References==&lt;br /&gt;
{{reflist}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-C}}&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>RalfSchooneveld</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://consumerrights.wiki/index.php?title=DIW7022_mandatory_wireless_operation&amp;diff=39582</id>
		<title>DIW7022 mandatory wireless operation</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://consumerrights.wiki/index.php?title=DIW7022_mandatory_wireless_operation&amp;diff=39582"/>
		<updated>2026-02-24T22:26:33Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;RalfSchooneveld: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{IncidentCargo&lt;br /&gt;
|Company=KPN&lt;br /&gt;
|StartDate=2024-01&lt;br /&gt;
|Status=Active&lt;br /&gt;
|ArticleType=Product&lt;br /&gt;
|Type=Accessibility, Health, Privacy&lt;br /&gt;
|Description=DIW7022 TV box requires mandatory Wi‑Fi/Bluetooth operation; no wired/IR‑only alternative available&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Background==&lt;br /&gt;
The DIW7022 is a television set‑top box provided by KPN that operates using Wi‑Fi (2.4 GHz and 5 GHz bands) and Bluetooth for network connectivity and remote pairing. As of 2026, there is no officially supported method to **permanently disable wireless transmission** or operate the device in a fully wired or infrared‑only mode. This mandatory RF operation has raised concerns regarding consumer control, health effects, and wireless privacy.  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Incident: Mandatory wireless operation==&lt;br /&gt;
Customers are required to use the DIW7022 with active Wi‑Fi and Bluetooth transmissions. Users who attempt to disable RF functions are unable to use the device for television services, effectively making wireless operation unavoidable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
### Health concerns&lt;br /&gt;
Wireless networking such as Wi‑Fi uses **electromagnetic fields (EMF)** in the 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz ranges. Some scientific reviews suggest that long‑term exposure to RF EMF may have biological effects, particularly in sensitive populations or individuals with pre‑existing conditions such as diabetes. The **BioInitiative Report**, an extensive compilation of research on RF exposures, includes *RF exposure color charts* illustrating levels and potential biological thresholds that some researchers consider relevant for precautionary public health discussion. (BioInitiative Report)  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While mainstream regulatory bodies generally consider typical Wi‑Fi exposure as below established safety limits, the presence of mandatory Wi‑Fi transmission can be an issue for consumers seeking **precautionary reduction of RF exposure** for health reasons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
### Privacy and “Wi‑Fi radar” concerns&lt;br /&gt;
Wi‑Fi operates via electromagnetic waves in the 2.4 and 5 GHz ranges. Because these waves can **penetrate walls and reflect off surfaces**, researchers have demonstrated that, with specialized equipment, reflected RF signals can be reconstructed into spatial imagery — a technique sometimes referred to as “Wi‑Fi radar.” Early work presented at an IEEE symposium in 2005 described **ultra‑wideband short‑pulse imaging systems** operating around 10 GHz for enhanced situational awareness in security and defense contexts. While this research is not specific to consumer set‑top boxes, it illustrates that reflected RF fields can convey environmental information beyond simple connectivity. (IEEE Symposium historical reference)  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The concern among some privacy advocates is that **continuous RF broadcasting** from consumer devices like the DIW7022 contributes to a wireless environment where location and movement could — in theory under specialized measurement — be inferred from ambient Wi‑Fi signals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Company’s response==&lt;br /&gt;
KPN has not provided an official **non‑RF alternative** for the DIW7022 nor a timeline for introducing one. In community discussions, KPN representatives have acknowledged that wireless operation is required but have not offered a wired or IR‑only mode.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Consumer response==&lt;br /&gt;
Consumers and privacy advocates have expressed frustration over mandatory RF exposure and lack of control over the device. Forum discussions document users seeking fully wired alternatives for **accessibility, health precaution, or privacy reasons**.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Lawsuit==&lt;br /&gt;
As of 2026, there is no publicly documented litigation specifically addressing the DIW7022’s mandatory wireless operation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==References==&lt;br /&gt;
* BioInitiative Working Group. *BioInitiative Report — RF Color Charts*. BioInitiative.org.  &lt;br /&gt;
* “Ultra‑wideband high‑resolution short pulse imaging radar,” IEEE Symposium historical proceedings (July 2005) — early research on RF imaging.  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:KPN N.V.]]  &lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Consumer health issues]]  &lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Privacy issues]]  &lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Accessibility issues]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>RalfSchooneveld</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://consumerrights.wiki/index.php?title=KPN_mandatory_SMS_authentication&amp;diff=39579</id>
		<title>KPN mandatory SMS authentication</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://consumerrights.wiki/index.php?title=KPN_mandatory_SMS_authentication&amp;diff=39579"/>
		<updated>2026-02-24T22:09:49Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;RalfSchooneveld: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{IncidentCargo&lt;br /&gt;
|Company=KPN&lt;br /&gt;
|StartDate=2024-01&lt;br /&gt;
|Status=Active&lt;br /&gt;
|ArticleType=Service&lt;br /&gt;
|Type=Accessibility, Security&lt;br /&gt;
|Description=SMS two-step verification; no landline or alternative 2FA option available&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Background==&lt;br /&gt;
KPN’s MijnKPN service provides customer access to billing, subscription management, and account settings for broadband, television, and mobile services. In 2024, KPN introduced **mandatory two-step verification (2FA)** to improve account security. While 2FA is a common security measure, KPN’s implementation relies exclusively on SMS messages to mobile phones, with **no officially supported landline, email, or hardware token alternatives**. ([Security.nl](https://beveiliging.headliner.nl/item/kpn-verplicht-2-stapsverificatie-in-augustus-voor-alle-klanten-securitynl-68159))&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Incident==&lt;br /&gt;
In early 2024, KPN began enforcing **mandatory SMS-based 2FA for all customers**. Users must enter a one-time code sent to their registered mobile number to access their accounts. Customers without mobile phones, non-Dutch mobile numbers, or with device issues cannot complete the authentication process, effectively restricting access.  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Community reports confirm that KPN support advises users in such cases to **obtain a local mobile device** or contact support to regain access. The policy has been systemically applied across the customer base, demonstrating it is a **corporate-wide requirement** rather than isolated incidents. ([KPN Community](https://community.kpn.com/kpn-id-en-mijnkpn-29/hoe-gebruik-ik-tweestapsverificatie-zonder-nederlands-telefoonnummer-639075))&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Company&#039;s response==&lt;br /&gt;
KPN has stated that SMS is the **most widely accessible method** for two-step verification and that **other authentication channels are being evaluated**. No public timeline has been provided for the rollout of alternatives such as **landline OTP, app-based authenticators, or hardware tokens**. ([Security.nl](https://beveiliging.headliner.nl/item/kpn-verplicht-2-stapsverificatie-in-augustus-voor-alle-klanten-securitynl-68159))&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Consumer response==&lt;br /&gt;
Community discussions and public forums indicate frustration among users who cannot use SMS, citing **restricted access, lack of alternatives, and reduced consumer autonomy**. Verified responses from KPN moderators confirm the requirement and advise users to acquire a mobile device to comply. The systemic nature of this policy has prompted consumer advocates to call for **multiple authentication channels** to enhance accessibility and security. ([KPN Community](https://community.kpn.com/online-veiligheid-25/mijnkpn-tweestapsverificatie-mfa-wordt-verplicht-wat-betekent-dit-voor-jou-637989))&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Lawsuit==&lt;br /&gt;
No publicly documented litigation regarding this policy has been reported as of 2026.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==References==&lt;br /&gt;
{{reflist}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:KPN N.V.]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Consumer security issues]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Accessibility issues]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>RalfSchooneveld</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://consumerrights.wiki/index.php?title=KPN_mandatory_SMS_authentication&amp;diff=39578</id>
		<title>KPN mandatory SMS authentication</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://consumerrights.wiki/index.php?title=KPN_mandatory_SMS_authentication&amp;diff=39578"/>
		<updated>2026-02-24T22:08:00Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;RalfSchooneveld: /* [Company]&amp;#039;s response */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{IncidentCargo&lt;br /&gt;
|Company=KPN&lt;br /&gt;
|StartDate=2024-01&lt;br /&gt;
|Status=Active&lt;br /&gt;
|ArticleType=Service&lt;br /&gt;
|Type=Accesibility, Security&lt;br /&gt;
|Description=SMS two-step verification; no landline or alternative 2FA option available&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-Int}}&lt;br /&gt;
==Background==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-B}}&lt;br /&gt;
KPN’s MijnKPN service provides customer access to billing, subscription management, and account settings for broadband, television, and mobile services. In 2024, KPN introduced mandatory two-step verification (2FA) to improve account security. While 2FA is a common security measure, KPN’s implementation relies exclusively on SMS messages to mobile phones, with no officially supported landline, email, or hardware token alternatives. (Security.nl&lt;br /&gt;
)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==[Incident]==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-I}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===[Company]&#039;s response===&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-ComR}}&lt;br /&gt;
In early 2024, KPN began enforcing mandatory SMS-based 2FA for all customers. Users must enter a one-time code sent to their registered mobile number to access their accounts. Customers without mobile phones, non-Dutch mobile numbers, or with device issues cannot complete the authentication process, effectively restricting access.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Community reports confirm that KPN support advises users in such cases to obtain a local mobile device or contact support to regain access. The policy has been systemically applied across the customer base, demonstrating it is a corporate-wide requirement rather than isolated incidents. (KPN Community&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
KPN’s response&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
KPN has stated that SMS is the most widely accessible method for two-step verification and that other authentication channels are being evaluated. No public timeline has been provided for the rollout of alternatives such as landline OTP, app-based authenticators, or hardware tokens. (Security.nl&lt;br /&gt;
)&lt;br /&gt;
Consumer response&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Community discussions and public forums indicate frustration among users who cannot use SMS, citing restricted access, lack of alternatives, and reduced consumer autonomy. Verified responses from KPN moderators confirm the requirement and advise users to acquire a mobile device to comply. The systemic nature of this policy has prompted consumer advocates to call for multiple authentication channels to enhance accessibility and security. (KPN Community&lt;br /&gt;
)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Lawsuit==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-L}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Consumer response==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-ConR}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==References==&lt;br /&gt;
{{reflist}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-C}}&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>RalfSchooneveld</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://consumerrights.wiki/index.php?title=KPN_mandatory_SMS_authentication&amp;diff=39577</id>
		<title>KPN mandatory SMS authentication</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://consumerrights.wiki/index.php?title=KPN_mandatory_SMS_authentication&amp;diff=39577"/>
		<updated>2026-02-24T22:07:29Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;RalfSchooneveld: /* [Company]&amp;#039;s response */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{IncidentCargo&lt;br /&gt;
|Company=KPN&lt;br /&gt;
|StartDate=2024-01&lt;br /&gt;
|Status=Active&lt;br /&gt;
|ArticleType=Service&lt;br /&gt;
|Type=Accesibility, Security&lt;br /&gt;
|Description=SMS two-step verification; no landline or alternative 2FA option available&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-Int}}&lt;br /&gt;
==Background==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-B}}&lt;br /&gt;
KPN’s MijnKPN service provides customer access to billing, subscription management, and account settings for broadband, television, and mobile services. In 2024, KPN introduced mandatory two-step verification (2FA) to improve account security. While 2FA is a common security measure, KPN’s implementation relies exclusively on SMS messages to mobile phones, with no officially supported landline, email, or hardware token alternatives. (Security.nl&lt;br /&gt;
)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==[Incident]==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-I}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===[Company]&#039;s response===&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-ComR}}&lt;br /&gt;
In early 2024, KPN began enforcing mandatory SMS-based 2FA for all customers. Users must enter a one-time code sent to their registered mobile number to access their accounts. Customers without mobile phones, non-Dutch mobile numbers, or with device issues cannot complete the authentication process, effectively restricting access.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Community reports confirm that KPN support advises users in such cases to obtain a local mobile device or contact support to regain access. The policy has been systemically applied across the customer base, demonstrating it is a corporate-wide requirement rather than isolated incidents. (KPN Community&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
KPN’s response&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
KPN has stated that SMS is the most widely accessible method for two-step verification and that other authentication channels are being evaluated. No public timeline has been provided for the rollout of alternatives such as landline OTP, app-based authenticators, or hardware tokens. (Security.nl&lt;br /&gt;
)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Lawsuit==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-L}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Consumer response==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-ConR}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==References==&lt;br /&gt;
{{reflist}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-C}}&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>RalfSchooneveld</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://consumerrights.wiki/index.php?title=KPN_mandatory_SMS_authentication&amp;diff=39576</id>
		<title>KPN mandatory SMS authentication</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://consumerrights.wiki/index.php?title=KPN_mandatory_SMS_authentication&amp;diff=39576"/>
		<updated>2026-02-24T22:05:44Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;RalfSchooneveld: /* [Incident] */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{IncidentCargo&lt;br /&gt;
|Company=KPN&lt;br /&gt;
|StartDate=2024-01&lt;br /&gt;
|Status=Active&lt;br /&gt;
|ArticleType=Service&lt;br /&gt;
|Type=Accesibility, Security&lt;br /&gt;
|Description=SMS two-step verification; no landline or alternative 2FA option available&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-Int}}&lt;br /&gt;
==Background==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-B}}&lt;br /&gt;
KPN’s MijnKPN service provides customer access to billing, subscription management, and account settings for broadband, television, and mobile services. In 2024, KPN introduced mandatory two-step verification (2FA) to improve account security. While 2FA is a common security measure, KPN’s implementation relies exclusively on SMS messages to mobile phones, with no officially supported landline, email, or hardware token alternatives. (Security.nl&lt;br /&gt;
)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==[Incident]==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-I}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===[Company]&#039;s response===&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-ComR}}&lt;br /&gt;
In early 2024, KPN began enforcing mandatory SMS-based 2FA for all customers. Users must enter a one-time code sent to their registered mobile number to access their accounts. Customers without mobile phones, non-Dutch mobile numbers, or with device issues cannot complete the authentication process, effectively restricting access.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Community reports confirm that KPN support advises users in such cases to obtain a local mobile device or contact support to regain access. The policy has been systemically applied across the customer base, demonstrating it is a corporate-wide requirement rather than isolated incidents. (KPN Community&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Lawsuit==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-L}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Consumer response==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-ConR}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==References==&lt;br /&gt;
{{reflist}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-C}}&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>RalfSchooneveld</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://consumerrights.wiki/index.php?title=KPN_mandatory_SMS_authentication&amp;diff=39575</id>
		<title>KPN mandatory SMS authentication</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://consumerrights.wiki/index.php?title=KPN_mandatory_SMS_authentication&amp;diff=39575"/>
		<updated>2026-02-24T22:05:13Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;RalfSchooneveld: /* Background */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{IncidentCargo&lt;br /&gt;
|Company=KPN&lt;br /&gt;
|StartDate=2024-01&lt;br /&gt;
|Status=Active&lt;br /&gt;
|ArticleType=Service&lt;br /&gt;
|Type=Accesibility, Security&lt;br /&gt;
|Description=SMS two-step verification; no landline or alternative 2FA option available&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-Int}}&lt;br /&gt;
==Background==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-B}}&lt;br /&gt;
KPN’s MijnKPN service provides customer access to billing, subscription management, and account settings for broadband, television, and mobile services. In 2024, KPN introduced mandatory two-step verification (2FA) to improve account security. While 2FA is a common security measure, KPN’s implementation relies exclusively on SMS messages to mobile phones, with no officially supported landline, email, or hardware token alternatives. (Security.nl&lt;br /&gt;
)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==[Incident]==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-I}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===[Company]&#039;s response===&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-ComR}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Lawsuit==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-L}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Consumer response==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-ConR}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==References==&lt;br /&gt;
{{reflist}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-C}}&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>RalfSchooneveld</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://consumerrights.wiki/index.php?title=KPN_mandatory_SMS_authentication&amp;diff=39574</id>
		<title>KPN mandatory SMS authentication</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://consumerrights.wiki/index.php?title=KPN_mandatory_SMS_authentication&amp;diff=39574"/>
		<updated>2026-02-24T22:03:30Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;RalfSchooneveld: The KPN mandatory SMS authentication policy requires all customers to use mobile-based two-step verification (2FA) for account access. No landline or alternative verification methods are officially supported, which limits accessibility for users without mobile devices and raises concerns about consumer choice and security resilience. The rollout began systemically in 2024 and affects all MijnKPN accounts.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{IncidentCargo&lt;br /&gt;
|Company=KPN&lt;br /&gt;
|StartDate=2024-01&lt;br /&gt;
|Status=Active&lt;br /&gt;
|ArticleType=Service&lt;br /&gt;
|Type=Accesibility, Security&lt;br /&gt;
|Description=SMS two-step verification; no landline or alternative 2FA option available&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-Int}}&lt;br /&gt;
==Background==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-B}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==[Incident]==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-I}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===[Company]&#039;s response===&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-ComR}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Lawsuit==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-L}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Consumer response==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-ConR}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==References==&lt;br /&gt;
{{reflist}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-C}}&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>RalfSchooneveld</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://consumerrights.wiki/index.php?title=DIW7022_mandatory_wireless_operation&amp;diff=39573</id>
		<title>DIW7022 mandatory wireless operation</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://consumerrights.wiki/index.php?title=DIW7022_mandatory_wireless_operation&amp;diff=39573"/>
		<updated>2026-02-24T21:54:13Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;RalfSchooneveld: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Incident&lt;br /&gt;
|Company=KPN N.V.&lt;br /&gt;
|StartDate=2024-01&lt;br /&gt;
|EndDate=&lt;br /&gt;
|Status=Active&lt;br /&gt;
|ProductLine=DIW7022&lt;br /&gt;
|Product=DIW7022&lt;br /&gt;
|ArticleType=Product&lt;br /&gt;
|Type=RF transmission,Accessibility&lt;br /&gt;
|Description=DIW7022 requires Wi-Fi/Bluetooth for operation; no wired or IR-only alternative available&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
DIW7022 (Sagemcom television box)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The DIW7022, a television set-top box provided by KPN N.V., has raised concerns over mandatory wireless operation. The device operates using Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, and there is currently no officially supported method to disable these transmitters or operate the device fully via wired or infrared (IR)-only connections.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This limitation has prompted consumer complaints related to health considerations, accessibility, and configurability of home hardware.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Overview&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The DIW7022 is intended to deliver digital television services to KPN customers. It includes integrated Wi-Fi (2.4 GHz and 5 GHz bands) and Bluetooth functionality to connect with remote controls and network services. Unlike similar consumer electronics, which often allow a wired fallback mode, the DIW7022 requires active RF transmission for basic operation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Consumer concerns&lt;br /&gt;
Mandatory wireless operation&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Users report that the DIW7022 cannot function without Wi-Fi or Bluetooth enabled. No wired alternative or IR-only remote option is officially provided. This limits user control over hardware and the ability to reduce radio frequency (RF) exposure in the home.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Accessibility and security&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mandatory wireless operation is tied to service access and mobile-based two-step verification. Customers without mobile devices are unable to complete authentication, creating potential exclusion for certain user groups.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Health considerations&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prolonged exposure to RF emissions has been a concern for some consumers. Although regulatory limits exist, some users prefer to minimize RF exposure. The DIW7022’s design prevents a fully non-RF setup, limiting options for health-conscious consumers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Responses and investigations&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A formal complaint regarding the mandatory wireless operation and mobile-only two-step verification was submitted to KPN N.V. in February 2026. The complaint requested:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Confirmation on whether the device can operate without active RF transmission&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Documentation of any non-RF alternative or planned evaluation&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Clarification of policy decisions versus technical constraints&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No official public response or solution has been provided as of this writing. The incident is documented on the Consumer Rights Wiki under DIW7022 mandatory wireless operation&lt;br /&gt;
.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Future considerations&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Comparable consumer devices often provide wired or non-RF operation, demonstrating that technical feasibility exists. Consumer advocates recommend that KPN consider non-RF or wired alternatives to enhance user choice, accessibility, and health-conscious usage.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
References&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Personal correspondence and complaint sent to KPN N.V., 12 February 2026.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Consumer reports and forum discussions on DIW7022 configurability (publicly available community statements).&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>RalfSchooneveld</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://consumerrights.wiki/index.php?title=DIW7022_mandatory_wireless_operation&amp;diff=39572</id>
		<title>DIW7022 mandatory wireless operation</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://consumerrights.wiki/index.php?title=DIW7022_mandatory_wireless_operation&amp;diff=39572"/>
		<updated>2026-02-24T21:52:09Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;RalfSchooneveld: Created page with &amp;quot;{{IncidentCargo |Company=KPN |StartDate=2024-01 }} {{Ph-I-Int}} ==Background== {{Ph-I-B}}  ==[Incident]== {{Ph-I-I}}  ===[Company]&amp;#039;s response=== {{Ph-I-ComR}}   ==Lawsuit== {{Ph-I-L}}   ==Consumer response== {{Ph-I-ConR}}   ==References== {{reflist}}  {{Ph-I-C}}&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{IncidentCargo&lt;br /&gt;
|Company=KPN&lt;br /&gt;
|StartDate=2024-01&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-Int}}&lt;br /&gt;
==Background==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-B}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==[Incident]==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-I}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===[Company]&#039;s response===&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-ComR}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Lawsuit==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-L}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Consumer response==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-ConR}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==References==&lt;br /&gt;
{{reflist}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Ph-I-C}}&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>RalfSchooneveld</name></author>
	</entry>
</feed>