Consumer Rights Wiki - User contributions [en]

Imgur

2026-02-20T15:58:01Z

Snarfblat: /* Mass layoffs damaging functionality */ Added citation for claim that Imgur had layoffs after being acquired by MediaLab.

{{CompanyCargo
| Description = Imgur is a media company and image sharing platform - originally founded by Alan Schaaf, it is now bought and owned by MediaLab AI, Inc.
| Founded = 2009
| Industry = Media Hosting
| Logo = Imgur.svg
| ParentCompany = MediaLab AI, Inc.
| Type = Private
| Website = https://imgur.com/
}}
'''{{Wplink|Imgur}}''' is both a media company and image sharing platform turned social media platform founded by Alan Schaaf in 2009. The platform was initially intended to act as a format for users on [[Reddit]] to share images. It has been owned by MediaLab AI, Inc. since its acquisition in 2021.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2021 |title=Celebrating Imgur's Next Chapter |url=https://imgur.com/gallery/celebrating-imgurs-next-chapter-We6yCM2 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.is/rPEUq |archive-date=2025-07-12 |access-date=2025-07-12 |website=imgur}}</ref>

==Consumer impact summary==
===User Freedom===
Users can upload content to the platform, however it cannot be used as a content delivery network (CDN) as per their TOS,<ref name=":02">{{Cite web |date=November 28, 2022 |title=Imgur TOS |url=https://imgur.com/tos |url-status=live |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20230113071334/https://imgur.com/tos |archive-date=Jan 13, 2023 |access-date=March 3, 2025 |website=Imgur.com}}</ref> despite its initial purpose being as such.
===User Privacy===
Automatically collects device information, which includes device ID (for mobile devices), operating system, IP address. Uses technology such as tracking cookies to improve the "server's interaction with your device" alongside third-party advertisements.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Privacy Policy |url=https://imgur.com/privacy |access-date=13 Aug 2025 |website=Imgur}}</ref>
===Business Model===
Imgur gains revenue via advertisements seen by consumers. Payment is provided by the companies which pay for advertising space on Imgur’s website.
===Market Control===
There is limited competition in the web-empowered photo-sharing field, which allows Imgur to dominate.

==Incidents==
This is a list of all consumer protection incidents this company is involved in. Any incidents not mentioned here can be found in the [[:Category:{{FULLPAGENAME}}|{{PAGENAME}} category]].

===Binding arbitration (Nov 28, 2021)===
Shortly after [[MediaLab]] acquired Imgur in 2021 they updated their TOS<ref name=":02" /> to include a [[Forced arbitration|binding arbitration]] notice:<blockquote>These Terms contain a binding arbitration provision and class action waiver terms. Unless you opt out or there is a suit in small claims court, you and we agree to submit disputes to a neutral arbitrator and not to sue in court in front of a judge or jury.</blockquote>

===Advertising overload===
<blockquote>Further Reading: [[Advertising overload]]</blockquote>
[[File:Ad_Overload_Imgur.png|thumb|An example of how frequent advertisements are for users on Imgur. Via: https://imgur.com/gallery/too-many-ads-9vzuP7x]]
While initially introduced as a method for keeping the platform up amid increasing server costs since the 2010s,<ref>{{Cite news |last=Imgur staff |date=Apr 4, 2016 |title=About Ads on Imgur |url=https://blog.imgur.com/2016/04/04/ads-and-the-apps/ |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160912072231/https://blog.imgur.com/2016/04/04/ads-and-the-apps/ |archive-date=Sep 12, 2016 |access-date=Mar 5, 2025 |work=Imgur blog}}</ref> for nearly a decade, users have been complaining about a large amount of advertisements on both the website and especially the mobile app.<ref>https://imgur.com/gallery/so-many-ads-J39ioLs</ref><ref name=":1">https://imgur.com/gallery/i-keep-getting-pop-ups-whole-browsing-on-phone-9kBpBWP</ref><ref>https://imgur.com/gallery/no-wonder-we-have-so-many-trouble-with-ads-on-imgur-NgB8lVO</ref>

Their negligence to also moderate advertisements has also led to ads of dubious quality to also be seen on both the website and mobile app.<ref>{{Cite news |last=arandompenguin |date=Jul 3, 2016 |title=Imgur and Ads: A Controversy |url=https://imgur.com/gallery/imgur-ads-controversy-8Mk43 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250305205210/https://imgur.com/gallery/imgur-ads-controversy-8Mk43 |archive-date=Mar 5, 2025 |access-date=Mar 4, 2025 |work=Imgur}}</ref> Additionally malicious advertisers historically took advantage of unmitigated JavaScript vulnerabilities to cause their advertisements to immediately redirect a user's browser to their website,<ref name=":1" /> with one user reporting being redirected to a phishing website.<ref>{{Cite web |last=BaldBandit |first= |date=Jul 2, 2016 |title=This is not acceptable. |url=https://imgur.com/gallery/this-is-not-acceptable-dMytYzc |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250305202630/https://imgur.com/gallery/this-is-not-acceptable-dMytYzc |archive-date=Mar 5, 2025 |access-date=Mar 5, 2025 |website=imgur}}</ref>

===Removal of anonymous images (2023)===
In April 2023, Imgur notified users they will start removing explicit pornographic images and ones uploaded anonymously on May 15.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Purdy |first=Kevin |date=Apr 20, 2023 |title=Hosting site Imgur will remove explicit and anonymous content next month |url=https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2023/04/hosting-site-imgur-will-remove-explicit-and-anonymous-content-next-month/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230420171637/https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2023/04/hosting-site-imgur-will-remove-explicit-and-anonymous-content-next-month/ |archive-date=Apr 20, 2023 |access-date=Mar 5, 2025 |work=Ars Technica}}</ref> The reason stated was due to these being "old, unused, and inactive content", though artistic nudity was not affected by these changes.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Moon |first=Mariella |date=Apr 20, 2023 |title=Imgur to ban explicit images and delete uploads not tied to an account |url=https://www.engadget.com/imgur-to-ban-explicit-images-and-delete-uploads-not-tied-to-an-account-122537118.html?guccounter=1 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241225023935/https://www.engadget.com/imgur-to-ban-explicit-images-and-delete-uploads-not-tied-to-an-account-122537118.html |archive-date=Dec 25, 2024 |access-date=Mar 5, 2025 |work=engadget}}</ref> Some users on [[Reddit]] mentioned this move as "a full [[Tumblr]]", with others calling Imgur "completely dead" after this change is implemented.<ref>{{Cite news |last=u/RamonaLittle |date=Apr 20, 2023 |title=Imgur has announced that they will be "removing old, unused, and inactive content that is not tied to a user account from our platform." This means that a *huge* number of images linked from reddit will become dead links. |url=https://www.reddit.com/r/TheoryOfReddit/comments/12tinfp/imgur_has_announced_that_they_will_be_removing/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230427010856/https://old.reddit.com/r/TheoryOfReddit/comments/12tinfp/imgur_has_announced_that_they_will_be_removing/ |archive-date=Apr 27, 2023 |access-date=Mar 5, 2025 |work=Reddit}}</ref>

===Child data usage (2025)===
On March 3, 2025, it was reported that Imgur, along with [[Reddit]] and [[TikTok]] were being investigated by the [[British Information Commissioner’s Office]] (ICO).<ref>{{Cite news |last=Landi |first=Martyn |date=Mar 3, 2025 |title=TikTok and others investigated over use of children’s data |url=https://www.irishexaminer.com/world/arid-41585470.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250305214845/https://www.irishexaminer.com/world/arid-41585470.html |archive-date=Mar 5, 2025 |access-date=Mar 5, 2025 |work=Irish Examiner |ref=Landi-2025-article-1}}</ref> [[Reddit]] and Imgur allegedly tailored the experience for children aged 13-17 by estimating or verifying their age.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Landi |first=Martyn |date=Mar 3, 2025 |title=TikTok, Reddit and Imgur investigated over the use of children's data |url=https://uk.news.yahoo.com/tiktok-reddit-imgur-investigated-over-092202216.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250305215130/https://consent.yahoo.com/v2/collectConsent?sessionId=2_cc-session_f472bd30-fd21-4964-be45-27dbac0d4610 |archive-date=Mar 5, 2025 |access-date=Mar 5, 2025 |work=Machester Evening News via Yahoo |ref=Landi-2025-article-2}}</ref>

===Mass layoffs damaging functionality===
When Imgur was acquired by [[MediaLab AI, Inc.|MediaLab]], it subsequently underwent significant staff cuts, including layoffs affecting its human moderation and other operations teams.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Imgur protest covers the front page in anti-MediaLab memes |website=Engadget |date=2025-08-25 |url=https://www.engadget.com/apps/imgur-protest-covers-the-front-page-in-anti-medialab-memes-225502091.html |access-date=2026-02-20}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Imgur's Community Is In Full Revolt Against Its Owner |website=Slashdot |date=2025-08-28 |url=https://tech.slashdot.org/story/25/08/28/1816210/imgurs-community-is-in-full-revolt-against-its-owner |access-date=2026-02-20}}</ref> This has led to users on the platform facing features frequently breaking, and with the firing of its community management in July 2025,<ref>{{Cite web |last=Nelson |first=Travis |date=Aug 26, 2025 |title=A little story about a site called Imgur. |url=https://bsky.app/profile/sigirides.bsky.social/post/3lxcjdm7ouk2v |access-date=Aug 30, 2025 |website=BlueSky}}</ref> the platform additionally had its transparency eliminated, eventually causing mass-revolts in late August 2025, when the notification feature on the platform was left non-functioning for 3 days.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Washenko |first=Anna |date=Aug 25, 2025 |title=Imgur protest covers the front page in anti-MediaLab memes |url=https://www.engadget.com/apps/imgur-protest-covers-the-front-page-in-anti-medialab-memes-225502091.html |access-date=Aug 26, 2025 |work=Engadget}}</ref><ref name=":0">{{Cite news |last=Galt |first=Matthew |date=Aug 28, 2025 |title=Imgur's Community Is In Full Revolt Against Its Owner |url=https://www.404media.co/imgurs-community-is-in-full-revolt-against-its-owner/ |access-date=Aug 30, 2025 |work=404 Media}}</ref> Instead of communicating with the community about the problem, the remaining moderation instead punished users on the platform.<ref name=":0" /> Protest content published to platform has ranged from images of John Oliver to not safe for work content.<ref name=":0" />

==See also==

*[[MediaLab AI, Inc.]]
*[[Reddit]]
*[[Social media platform]]

==References==
<references />
[[Category:{{PAGENAME}}]]

Flock license plate readers

2026-02-20T14:47:58Z

Snarfblat: Citation/rewording of sentences about privacy advocates warning about racial profiling enabled by Flock cameras.

{{ProductCargo
|Company=Flock Safety
|ProductLine=Flock Safety Falcon
|ReleaseYear=2017
|InProduction=Yes
|ArticleType=Product
|Category=Cameras, Security, Surveillance
|Logo=Flock License plate readers (LPR).png
|Website=https://www.flocksafety.com/products/license-plate-readers
|Description=AI-powered automated license plate reader (ALPR) system that creates "Vehicle Fingerprints" by recording license plates, vehicle characteristics, and movement patterns for law enforcement use without individual consent or warrants.
}}
'''Flock License Plate Readers''' (previously known as '''Flock Safety Falcon'''<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/devices/falcon|title=Falcon|work=Flock Safety |access-date=6 Dec 2024 |archive-url=https://archive.ph/UjKM5 |archive-date=6 Dec 2024 |url-status=usurped}}</ref>), are a network of AI-powered surveillance cameras that record vehicle data for law enforcement agencies. The system operates in over 5,000 communities across 49 states in the U.S.A.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Hamid |first=Sarah |last2=Alajaji |first2=Rindala |date=27 Jun 2025 |title=Flock Safety's Feature Updates Cannot Make Automated License Plate Readers Safe |url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/06/flock-safetys-feature-updates-cannot-make-automated-license-plate-readers-safe |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250628052030/https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/06/flock-safetys-feature-updates-cannot-make-automated-license-plate-readers-safe |archive-date=28 Jun 2025 |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=Electronic Frontier Foundation}}</ref> According to the company's own marketing materials, Flock performs over 20 billion vehicle scans monthly.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Flock Safety |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.ph/iVsBZ |archive-date=26 Aug 2025 |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=Flock Safety}}</ref>

==Consumer impact summary==
====Freedom====
Residents and taxpayers have no mechanism to opt out of [[Flock Safety]]'s surveillance network. The cameras operate 24/7 in public spaces, recording all passing vehicles regardless of consent. They are also placed on private premises like universities, hospitals, businesses, and neighborhood associations, which often share this data with law enforcement.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web |last=Brewster |first=Thomas |date=19 Jun 2024 |title=FedEx's Secretive Police Force Is Helping Cops Build An AI Car Surveillance Network |url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2024/06/19/fedex-police-help-cops-build-an-ai-car-surveillance-network/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240619112629/https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2024/06/19/fedex-police-help-cops-build-an-ai-car-surveillance-network/ |archive-date=19 Jun 2024 |access-date=25 Aug 2025 |website=Forbes}}</ref> This data can later be integrated into predictive police platforms like {{Wplink|Palantir Technologies|Palantir}}.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Rettberg |first=Jill Walker |title=Machine Vision: How Algorithms are Changing the Way We See the World |date=11 Sep 2023 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons. |year=2023 |location=Google Books |pages=45-46 |language=English}}</ref>

Unlike traditional security cameras that may be avoided by choosing different routes, Flock's expanding network of over 100,000 cameras makes avoidance increasingly difficult.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Eyes On Flock |url=https://eyesonflock.com/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20251008230140/https://eyesonflock.com/ |archive-date=2025-10-08 |access-date=9 Dec 2025 |work=Eyes On Flock}}</ref> The system uses AI to create ''"Vehicle [[Device fingerprint|Fingerprints]]"'' that identify vehicles by characteristics beyond license plates, including make, model, color, aftermarket parts, window stickers, and roof racks.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Stanley |first=Jay |date=23 Jul 2025 |title=Surveillance Company Flock Now Using AI to Report Us to Police if it Thinks Our Movement Patterns Are "Suspicious" |url=https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/surveillance-company-flock-now-using-ai-to-report-us-to-police-if-it-thinks-our-movement-patterns-are-suspicious |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250814053755/https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/surveillance-company-flock-now-using-ai-to-report-us-to-police-if-it-thinks-our-movement-patterns-are-suspicious |archive-date=14 Aug 2025 |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=American Civil Liberties Union}}</ref>

====Privacy====
While Flock Safety claims their system doesn't violate Fourth Amendment rights because ''"license plates are not personal information,"''<ref name="Flock-PE">{{Cite web |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/privacy-ethics |title=Privacy & Ethics |work=Flock Safety |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |archive-url=https://archive.ph/OP55p |archive-date=23 Aug 2025 |url-status=live}}</ref> federal courts have challenged this interpretation. In February 2024, a federal judge ruled that a lawsuit challenging Norfolk, Virginia's use of 172 Flock cameras could proceed, finding that plaintiffs had plausibly alleged the system creates a ''"detailed chronicle of a person's physical presence compiled every day."''<ref name="norfolk">{{Cite web |last=King |first=Dan |date=6 Feb 2024 |title=Judge Rules Lawsuit Challenging Norfolk's Use of Flock Cameras Can Proceed |url=https://ij.org/press-release/judge-rules-lawsuit-challenging-norfolks-use-of-flock-cameras-can-proceed/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250717001536/https://ij.org/press-release/judge-rules-lawsuit-challenging-norfolks-use-of-flock-cameras-can-proceed/ |archive-date=17 Jul 2025 |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=Institute for Justice}}</ref>

Data collected includes location history that can reveal sensitive information about medical visits, religious attendance, political activities, and personal associations. While Flock states data is deleted after 30 days, contracts grant them ''"perpetual, worldwide, royalty-free license"'' to use anonymized data indefinitely.<ref name=":1">{{Cite web |title=Terms and Conditions |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/terms-and-conditions |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.ph/DSqUM |archive-date=26 Oct 2025 |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=Flock Safety}}</ref> The system shares data across a network of over 4,800 law enforcement agencies nationally.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Koebler |first=Jason |date=2024 |title=Lawsuit Argues Warrantless Use of Flock Surveillance Cameras Is Unconstitutional |url=https://www.404media.co/lawsuit-argues-warrantless-use-of-flock-surveillance-cameras-is-unconstitutional/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250826013458/https://www.404media.co/lawsuit-argues-warrantless-use-of-flock-surveillance-cameras-is-unconstitutional/ |archive-date=26 Aug 2025 |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=404 Media}}</ref>

====="Anonymized Data"=====
While Flock's Terms and Conditions define "Anonymized Data" as customer data that is ''"permanently stripped of identifying details and any potential personally identifiable information"'' and is rendered so that a person or entity ''"can no longer be identified directly or indirectly,"'' this definition includes information such as vehicle make, model, color, location patterns, and other non–license-plate attributes.<ref name=":1" />

Privacy researchers caution that mobility datasets labeled as "anonymized" can still be re-identified. A 2013 MIT study found that just four spatio-temporal points uniquely identified 95% of individuals in an anonymized location dataset.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=de Montjoye |first=Y.-A. |last2=Hidalgo |first2=C. A. |last3=Verleysen |first3=M. |last4=Blondel |first4=V. D. |year=2013 |title=Unique in the Crowd: The privacy bounds of human mobility |url=https://www.nature.com/articles/srep01376 |journal=Scientific Reports |volume=3 |pages=1376 |doi=10.1038/srep01376 |access-date=23 Aug 2025}}</ref> Multiple peer-reviewed studies from 2018-2024 demonstrate that "anonymized" vehicle location data can be re-identified with high accuracy. A 2022 study showed researchers could re-identify drivers from raw vehicle network data with 97% accuracy by exploiting inter-dependencies in sensor measurements.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167404822002139 |title=Privacy-preserving vehicle trajectory matching |website=ScienceDirect |date=2022 |access-date=5 Oct 2025}}</ref> Research published in the Journal of Computer Science and Technology (2022) found that even three to four location points can uniquely identify individuals.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Sun |first=She |last2=Ma |first2=Shuai |last3=Song |first3=Jing-He |last4=Yue |first4=Wen-Hai |last5=Lin |first5=Xue-Lian |last6=Ma |first6=Tiejun |date=2022 |title=Experiments and Analyses of Anonymization Mechanisms for Trajectory Data Publishing |url=https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11390-022-2409-x |journal=Journal of Computer Science and Technology |doi=10.1007/s11390-022-2409-x |access-date=5 Oct 2025}}</ref>

====Business model====
Flock operates on a subscription model charging municipalities and law enforcement agencies $2,500 USD per camera annually plus installation costs.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://campbellca.gov/FAQ.aspx?QID=279 |title=How much does a Flock Safety camera cost? |work=City of Campbell |access-date=23 Aug 2025}}</ref> Private businesses including Home Depot, Lowe's, and FedEx also deploy cameras, sharing data with law enforcement.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.404media.co/home-depot-and-lowes-share-data-from-hundreds-of-ai-cameras-with-cops/ |title=Home Depot and Lowe's Share Data From Hundreds of AI Cameras With Cops |first=Jason |last=Koebler |date=6 Aug 2025 |work=404 Media |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250823135847/https://www.404media.co/home-depot-and-lowes-share-data-from-hundreds-of-ai-cameras-with-cops/ |archive-date=23 Aug 2025 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=":0" /> Contracts include automatic renewal clauses and limit municipal oversight capabilities, with cities unable to audit system operations or control how other agencies use shared data.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.aclu.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/flock_1.pdf |title=How to Pump the Brakes on Your Police Department's Use of Flock's Mass Surveillance License Plate Readers |work=American Civil Liberties Union |date=2024 |access-date=23 Aug 2025}}</ref>

====Market control====
Flock Safety has rapidly expanded to become a dominant force in automated license plate recognition, operating in 49 states with over 40,000 cameras deployed. The company's network effect creates pressure for additional jurisdictions to join, as law enforcement effectiveness depends on network coverage. Several states have begun restricting access following privacy violations, with California, Illinois, and New York limiting data sharing after immigration and abortion-related tracking incidents.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.michaelrcronin.com/post/flock-blocks-ice-from-license-plate-reader-access-in-several-states |title='Flock' Blocks ICE from License Plate Reader Access in Several States |work=Yes You Can Go |date=2025 |access-date=23 Aug 2025}}</ref>

===Premise of a "license plate camera"===
While marketed as "license plate readers,"' Flock cameras use what the company calls "Vehicle Fingerprint" technology which tracks vehicles using characteristics beyond just license plates. The system catalogs vehicles based on numerous distinguishing features including make, model, color, bumper stickers, dents, damage patterns, roof racks, aftermarket modifications such as wheels or spoilers, window stickers, and even mismatching paint colors.<ref name=":2">{{Cite web |date= |title=LPR Cameras |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/products/license-plate-readers |url-status=usurped |access-date=26 Oct 2025 |work=Flock Safety}}</ref>. According to Flock's own marketing materials, the system can identify vehicles even when license plates cannot be captured, advertised as turning "images into actionable evidence — no plate required."<ref>{{Cite web |title=License Plate Readers |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/products/license-plate-readers |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.ph/D9JGD |archive-date=23 Aug 2025 |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=Flock Safety}}</ref>

Flock claims this capability is ''"unique among ALPR systems"'' and allows law enforcement to search for vehicles based on these characteristics even without a visible license plate.

This technology changes the nature of the surveillance from license plate reading to comprehensive vehicle tracking. A person could still be tracked by the unique combination of their vehicle's physical characteristics. The Electronic Frontier Foundation warns that these ''"vehicle fingerprints"'' could flag vehicles based on political bumper stickers, revealing ''"information on the political or social views of the driver,"'' or economic indicators like rust or damage, potentially "endangering anyone who might not feel the need (or have the income required) to keep their car in perfect shape."<ref>{{Cite web |date=2020-09-14 |title=Things to Know Before Your Neighborhood Installs an Automated License Plate Reader |url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/09/flock-license-plate-reader-homeowners-association-safe-problems |access-date=2025-08-23 |work=Electronic Frontier Foundation}}</ref>

Privacy advocates note that this expanded tracking capability makes the term ''"license plate reader"'' misleading, as Flock systems create detailed vehicle profiles that persist even without readable plates. It turns any distinguishing feature of a vehicle into a tracking identifier.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Stop Flock |url=https://www.stopflock.com/ |access-date=2025-08-23 |work=Stop Flock}}</ref>

==Patent for person identification by race and physical characteristics==
A U.S. Patent granted to Flock Group Inc. in August 2022 reveals the company has developed and patented technology to identify and classify people based on race, gender, and other physical characteristics.<ref name="patent11416545">{{Cite web |url=https://patentimages.storage.googleapis.com/77/9a/03/7b3b26499077d4/US11416545.pdf |title=System and Method for Object Based Query of Video Content Captured by a Dynamic Surveillance Network |website=United States Patent and Trademark Office |date=16 Aug 2022 |access-date=21 Jan 2025 |format=PDF |first1=Garrett |last1=Langley |first2=Matt |last2=Feury }}</ref> Patent US 11,416,545 B1 describes a system that goes beyond vehicle identification to analyze human subjects captured in surveillance footage.

According to the patent documentation, when the system identifies a human being in captured footage, it uses neural network modules specifically configured to classify people by "male, female, race, etc." The patent further describes using additional neural networks to identify clothing types, estimate height and weight, and other physical characteristics of individuals.<ref name="patent11416545" /> The system can then store this classification data in searchable databases, allowing law enforcement to query for people based on these physical attributes.

The patent shows that Flock's technology is designed to create comprehensive profiles that can track individuals across multiple camera locations by matching physical characteristics. While Flock publicly markets its products as ''"license plate readers"'' focused on vehicles, this patent demonstrates the company has developed capabilities for detailed human surveillance and classification by protected characteristics including race and gender.<ref name="patent11416545" />

Privacy and civil-liberties advocates have warned that biometric/appearance-based identification and classification—especially along race and gender lines—can enable discriminatory policing and amplify harms from demographic bias and misidentification.<ref>{{Cite web |title=How is Face Recognition Surveillance Technology Racist? |website=American Civil Liberties Union |date=2020-06-16 |url=https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/how-is-face-recognition-surveillance-technology-racist |access-date=2026-02-20}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=NIST Study Evaluates Effects of Race, Age, Sex on Face Recognition Software |website=National Institute of Standards and Technology |date=2019-12-19 |url=https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2019/12/nist-study-evaluates-effects-race-age-sex-face-recognition-software |access-date=2026-02-20}}</ref> In that context, the Flock Group patent’s explicit discussion of classifying people by attributes including “race” and “male/female” suggests capabilities that extend beyond vehicle identification.<ref>{{Cite web |title=US11416545B1 - System and method for object based query of video content captured by a dynamic surveillance network |website=Google Patents |date=2022-08-16 |url=https://patents.google.com/patent/US11416545B1 |access-date=2026-02-20}}</ref>

==Legal challenges==

===Washington state judge declares Flock footage as public records ''(6 Nov 2025)''===
An Oregon resident filed public records requests at various police departments in the state of Washington regarding information collected from Flock cameras. The cities of Stanwood and Sedro-Woolley filed a motion to reject the resident's request, with their attorney stating that publicizing Flock footage may be a violation of privacy that could lead to stalking.

Some exemptions are given to deny public records request, particularly due to investigations. However, the judge dismissed the motion, declaring that the camera footage was "so broad and indiscriminate" with no distinction between criminal activity and casual civilian activity that the data had to be released to the public.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Ingalls |first=Chris |date=6 Nov 2025 |title=Judge orders police to release surveillance camera data, raising privacy questions |url=https://www.king5.com/article/news/investigations/investigators/judge-orders-washington-police-release-surveillance-camera-data-privacy-questions/281-c2037d52-6afb-4bf7-95ad-0eceaf477864 |access-date=8 Nov 2025 |website=KING5}}</ref><ref name=":5">{{Cite web |last=Peterson |first=Jenna |date=6 Nov 2025 |title=Judge denies request to exempt Flock footage from Public Records Act |url=https://www.heraldnet.com/news/judge-denies-request-to-exempt-flock-footage-from-public-records-act/ |access-date=8 Nov 2025 |website=Herald Net}}</ref>

The judge stated:<ref name=":5" /><blockquote>“I do think that the information at stake does have serious privacy implications, but that’s not the analysis for the intelligence information exemption,” she said. “You also have to make a finding that this is specific intelligence information that is compiled by investigative or law enforcement agencies, and the information that’s being compiled here does not relate to a specific case or investigation. The public already knows that these cameras exist and are operated. Many of them are in sight. The information does not disclose particular methods or procedures for gathering or evaluating intelligence information.” </blockquote>

===Norfolk federal lawsuit ''(February 2025)''===
In February 2025, Chief Judge Mark S. Davis of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Norfolk's motion to dismiss a landmark Fourth Amendment lawsuit. The case involves two residents whose vehicles were tracked 526 times in 4.5 months and 849 times over the same period, figures revealed in a September 2025 court filing.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/virginia-police-used-flock-cameras-track-driver-safety-lawsuit-surveil-rcna230399|title=Virginia police used Flock cameras to track driver 526 times in 4 months, lawsuit says|work=NBC News|date=2025-09-18|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> Norfolk installed 172 Flock Safety cameras in 2023 at a cost of $430,000-$516,000 annually. Police Chief Mark Talbot stated the goal was making it ''"difficult to drive anywhere of any distance without running into a camera somewhere."''<ref name="norfolk" />

Judge Davis's ruling relied on ''Carpenter v. United States'', the 2018 Supreme Court decision requiring warrants for historical cell phone location data. The court found Norfolk's ALPR network "notably similar" to the surveillance the Supreme Court deemed unconstitutional. However, courts remain divided. In November 2024, Senior U.S. District Judge Robert E. Payne in the same district denied a motion to suppress Flock evidence, holding that three vehicle snapshots don't constitute "persistent surveillance" requiring a warrant.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://valawyersweekly.com/2024/11/11/mosaic-theory-rejected-flock-camera-evidence-does-not-violate-fourth-amendment/|title='Mosaic theory' rejected: Flock camera evidence does not violate Fourth Amendment|website=Virginia Lawyers Weekly|date=2024-11-11|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref>

Virginia state courts show similar disagreement. Norfolk Circuit Court Judge Jamilah LeCruise granted a suppression motion in May 2024, finding that the breadth of Flock cameras covering Norfolk requires a warrant.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.govtech.com/public-safety/virginia-judge-rejects-alpr-evidence-without-warrant|title=Virginia Judge Rejects ALPR Evidence Without Warrant|website=Government Technology|date=2024-05-15|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> Yet three other Norfolk circuit court judges denied similar motions in 2024.

===State regulatory landscape===
Only 16 states have enacted any form of ALPR regulation as of 2024 according to University of Michigan research.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://stpp.fordschool.umich.edu/news/2023/automated-license-plate-readers-widely-used-subject-abuse|title=Automated License Plate Readers widely used, subject to abuse|website=University of Michigan|date=2023|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> Virginia enacted House Bill 2724 in 2025 creating annual reporting requirements.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://vscc.virginia.gov/Annual%20Reports/2024%20VSCC%20Annual%20Report%20-Law%20Enforcement%20Use%20of%20ALPR.pdf|title=2024 VSCC Annual Report - Law Enforcement Use of ALPR|website=Virginia State Crime Commission|date=2024|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> Illinois Public Act 103-0540 explicitly prohibits use for reproductive healthcare punishment and immigration investigations.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/103/103-0540.htm|title=Public Act 103-0540|website=Illinois General Assembly|date=2024|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref>

Illinois prohibits law enforcement agencies from sharing ALPR data with other jurisdictions in relation to a person's immigration status.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Public Act 103-0540 |url=https://www.ilga.gov/documents/legislation/publicacts/103/PDF/103-0540.pdf |url-status=usurped |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=Illinois General Assembly}}</ref> New Hampshire requires a three-minute purge of data from ALPR use with the exception of ongoing investigations. <ref>{{Cite web |title=261:75-b Use of Number Plate Scanning Devices Regulated. |url=https://law.justia.com/codes/new-hampshire/title-xxi/chapter-261/section-261-75-b/ |url-status=usurped |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=New Hampshire General Court}}</ref>

California’s SB 34 requires public agencies using ALPR systems to implement usage and privacy policies as well as limits to data sharing. <ref name=":3">{{Cite web |url=https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB34 |title=SB-34 Automated license plate recognition systems: use of data |work=California Legislative Information |access-date=23 Aug 2025}}</ref> However, enforcement remains inconsistent, with a 2020 state audit finding widespread non-compliance.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.auditor.ca.gov/reports/2019-118/index.html |title=Automated License Plate Readers |work=California State Auditor |date=13 Feb 2020 |access-date=23 Aug 2025}}</ref>

==Notable incidents==

====Illinois audit findings (2024-2025)====
Illinois Secretary of State Alexi Giannoulias announced in late August 2024 that Flock Safety violated state law by allowing U.S. Customs and Border Protection to access Illinois license plate data for immigration enforcement.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.flocksafety.com/blog/flock-safetys-response-to-illinois-lpr-data-use-and-out-of-state-sharing-concerns|title=Flock Safety's Response to Illinois LPR Data Use and Out-of-State Sharing Concerns|website=Flock Safety|date=2024-08-25|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> The audit of 12 local law enforcement agencies revealed unauthorized pilot programs with CBP and Homeland Security Investigations, violating Illinois law prohibiting data sharing for immigration enforcement, gender-affirming care investigations, and abortion-related matters. Following the audit, 47 out-of-state agencies were removed from access to Illinois data.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.govtech.com/biz/flock-pledges-changes-after-illinois-data-sharing-accusation|title=Flock Pledges Changes After Illinois Data-Sharing Accusation|website=Government Technology|date=2024-08-15|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref>

Mount Prospect, Illinois reported 262 immigration-related license plate reader searches in just the first few months of 2025. A Palos Heights detective shared Flock login credentials with a DEA agent who conducted 28 unauthorized searches of Oak Park ALPR data explicitly labeled "immigration violation."<ref name="dea">{{Cite web|url=https://unraveledpress.com/a-dea-agent-used-an-illinois-police-officers-flock-license-plate-reader-password-for-unauthorized-immigration-enforcement-searches/|title=DEA agent used Illinois cop's Flock license plate reader password for immigration enforcement searches|work=Unraveled Press|date=2025|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref>

====California violations (2015-2025)====
California passed Senate Bill 34<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://calmatters.digitaldemocracy.org/bills/ca_201520160sb34|title=Senate Bill 34|access-date=2025-08-27}}</ref> in 2015 to limit how California police departments can use and share data collected from these cameras with other state's and federal law enforcement agencies. These limits have been found to be violated on several occasions with little enforcement or consequences for the misusing departments<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://sfstandard.com/2025/07/23/california-police-sharing-flock-license-plate-data/|access-date=2025-08-27|title=California cops are breaking surveillance laws|website=San Francisco Standard|date=2025-07-23}}</ref>.

A 2023 EFF investigation found 71 California police agencies in 22 counties illegally shared data with out-of-state law enforcement. San Francisco Police Department alone allowed 1.6 million illegal searches by out-of-state agencies from 2024-2025.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://sfstandard.com/2025/09/08/sfpd-flock-alpr-ice-data-sharing/|title=SFPD let Georgia, Texas cops illegally search city surveillance data on behalf of ICE|website=San Francisco Standard|date=2025-09-08|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> The California Attorney General filed the first enforcement action against the City of El Cajon in 2025 for sharing with 26 states.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-bonta-sues-el-cajon-illegally-sharing-license-plate-data-out|title=Attorney General Bonta Sues El Cajon for Illegally Sharing License Plate Data|website=California DOJ|date=2025|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref>

===False positive incidents===

====Families detained at gunpoint====
In Española, New Mexico, 21-year-old Jaclynn Gonzales and her 12-year-old sister were held at gunpoint and handcuffed after Flock's system mistook a "2" for a "7" on their license plate, falsely flagging their vehicle as stolen.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2023-09-28 |title=License plate cover leads to traffic stop mishap |url=https://www.koat.com/article/espanola-police-license-plate-stolen-cover-traffic-stop/45361740|website=KOAT|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2025 |title=Flock Safety: Eroding Your Privacy & Keeping You Safe with Surveillance |url=https://redact.dev/blog/flock-safety-lpr-privacy-surveillance/ |access-date=2025-08-23 |work=Redact}}</ref>

ALPR systems often misread license plates according to multiple investigations, leading to hardship & legal trouble for innocent civilians.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/11/human-toll-alpr-errors|title=The Human Toll of ALPR Errors|website=Electronic Frontier Foundation|date=2024-11-15|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref>

===Law enforcement stalking incidents===

In October 2022, Kechi, Kansas Police Lieutenant Victor Heiar was arrested and later pleaded guilty to computer crimes and stalking after using Flock cameras to track his estranged wife's movements over four months.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.kwch.com/2022/10/31/kechi-police-lieutenant-arrested-using-police-technology-stalk-wife/|title=Kechi police lieutenant arrested for using police technology to stalk wife|work=KWCH|date=2022-10-31|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> In a separate Kansas incident, Sedgwick Police Chief Lee Nygaard accessed Flock data 164 times to track his ex-girlfriend before resigning after admitting to the misuse.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.yahoo.com/news/kansas-police-chief-used-flock-093300946.html|title=Kansas police chief used Flock license plate cameras 164 times to track ex-girlfriend|work=Yahoo News|date=2025|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref>

Multiple other documented cases include Las Vegas Metro Officer Christopher Young arrested in December 2023 for stalking his ex-fiancée using police databases, and Riverside County Deputy Eric Piscatella pleading guilty in February 2024 to seven counts of misusing sheriff's department databases to stalk a woman he met at Coachella.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.fox5vegas.com/2024/02/16/las-vegas-police-officer-arrested-reportedly-stalking-ex-fiancee/?outputType=amp|title=Las Vegas police officer arrested for reportedly stalking ex-fiancée|website=FOX5 Vegas|date=2024-02-16|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref>

===Abortion and reproductive healthcare tracking===
In May 2025, Johnson County, Texas sheriff's deputies used Flock's network to track a woman suspected of self-managing an abortion. They conducted searches across 83,000+ Flock cameras nationwide with the explicit reason: "had an abortion, search for female." The search accessed cameras across multiple states including those where abortion is legal. The incident led Illinois officials to investigate and subsequently block 47+ out-of-state agencies from accessing Illinois ALPR data.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.dallasnews.com/news/texas/2025/06/13/after-finding-fetal-remains-north-texas-cops-used-camera-network-to-search-for-woman/|title=After finding fetal remains, North Texas cops used camera network to search for woman|work=The Dallas Morning News|date=2025-06-13|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/05/she-got-abortion-so-texas-cop-used-83000-cameras-track-her-down|title=She Got an Abortion. So A Texas Cop Used 83,000 Cameras to Track Her Down|website=Electronic Frontier Foundation|date=2025-05-15|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref>

Investigations and court records show that some law enforcement officers have misused Flock Safety automated license plate reader (ALPR) systems for personal, non-investigative purposes, including stalking romantic partners or monitoring civilians. These incidents highlight weaknesses & lack of internal oversight, & the reliance on post-hoc audits rather than real-time safeguards.

In Menasha, Wisconsin, police officer Cristian Morales was charged in January 2026 with misconduct in office after allegedly using the department’s Flock ALPR system to track his ex-girlfriend.<ref>{{cite news |title=Menasha police officer accused of using license plate recognition system to track his ex |work=FOX 11 News |date=2026-01-09 |url=https://fox11online.com/news/crime/menasha-police-officer-accused-of-using-license-plate-recognition-system-to-track-his-ex}}</ref> Prosecutors alleged Morales conducted five unauthorized searches of his ex-partner’s vehicle in October 2025. According to the criminal complaint, Morales admitted he knew the searches were improper and cited “desperation and bad judgment.” He was placed on administrative leave, prohibited from accessing Flock systems, and released on a $10,000 cash bond pending further proceedings.<ref>{{cite news |title=Menasha police officer accused of using license plate recognition system to track his ex |work=FOX 11 News |date=2026-01-09}}</ref> Court records also show a related civil filing seeking a temporary restraining order in a domestic abuse case.<ref>{{cite news |title=Menasha police officer accused of using license plate recognition system to track his ex |work=FOX 11 News |date=2026-01-09}}</ref>

The Menasha case matches what is becoming a national pattern. In Kansas, Kechi Police Lieutenant Victor Heiar pleaded guilty in 2022 to computer crimes & stalking after using Flock cameras to monitor his estranged wife’s movements over several months.<ref>{{cite news |title=Kechi police lieutenant arrested for using police technology to stalk wife |work=KWCH |date=2022-10-31 |url=https://www.kwch.com/2022/10/31/kechi-police-lieutenant-arrested-using-police-technology-stalk-wife/}}</ref> In another Kansas incident, Sedgwick Police Chief Lee Nygaard admitted in 2025 to accessing Flock ALPR data more than 160 times to track his ex-girlfriend and her new partner, resulting in his resignation and loss of police certification.<ref>{{cite news |title=Kansas police chief used Flock license plate cameras to track ex-girlfriend |work=Yahoo News |date=2025 |url=https://www.yahoo.com/news/kansas-police-chief-used-flock-093300946.html}}</ref>

More cases involving other surveillance systems show a similar misuse. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police officer Christopher Young was arrested in 2023 for stalking his ex-fiancée using police databases, and in California, Riverside County deputy Eric Piscatella pleaded guilty in 2024 to multiple counts of misusing sheriff’s department databases to stalk a woman he met while off duty.<ref>{{cite news |title=Las Vegas police officer arrested for reportedly stalking ex-fiancée |work=FOX5 Vegas |date=2024-02-16 |url=https://www.fox5vegas.com/2024/02/16/las-vegas-police-officer-arrested-reportedly-stalking-ex-fiancee/}}</ref>

Oversight reviews & civil liberties organizations have noted that ALPR systems enable quick searches of historical vehicle location data across wide geographic areas. This reduces practical barriers to stalking & increases the risk of abuse by authorized users. While Flock & participating agencies rely on usage policies & access logs, many cases show misuse was detected only after complaints or later audits rather than through proactive safeguards.<ref>{{cite web |title=Automated License Plate Readers widely used, subject to abuse |work=University of Michigan |date=2023 |url=https://stpp.fordschool.umich.edu/news/2023/automated-license-plate-readers-widely-used-subject-abuse}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=ALPR Audit Takeaways: What We Learned About Policy Gaps |work=Government Technology |date=2024 |url=https://www.govtech.com/biz/data/alpr-audit-takeaways-what-we-learned-about-policy-gaps}}</ref>

===Federal agency access===
Immigration and Customs Enforcement maintains a $6.1 million contract giving 9,000+ ICE officers access to the Vigilant Solutions ALPR database containing over 5 billion location data points.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.aclu.org/news/immigrants-rights/documents-reveal-ice-using-driver-location-data|title=Documents Reveal ICE Using Driver Location Data From Local Police for Deportations|website=ACLU|date=2024|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> The Drug Enforcement Administration operates a National License Plate Reader Program with over 10,000 license plate readers shared throughout the United States. 404 Media revealed over 4,000 searches by local and state police for federal immigration enforcement purposes, despite Flock having no formal ICE contract.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.404media.co/ice-taps-into-nationwide-ai-enabled-camera-network-data-shows/|title=ICE Taps into Nationwide AI-Enabled Camera Network, Data Shows|work=404 Media|date=2025|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> A DEA agent was found using an Illinois police officer's credentials to conduct unauthorized immigration searches.<ref name="dea" />

===Illegal Camera Installations===
In South Carolina, Flock installed over 200 cameras without authorization, leading to a statewide moratorium on new installations.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Ferrara |first=David |date=2024-03-11 |title=A company installed license plate cameras without permission. SC agency wants clear rules |url=https://www.postandcourier.com/news/alpr-cameras-south-carolina-flock-safety-license-plate-readers/article_787a262a-dbd2-11ee-a901-634acead588b.html |url-status=live |access-date=2025-08-25 |website=The Post and Courier}}</ref>

In Illinois, a Flock representative allegedly threatened a Department of Transportation official with police pressure when questioned about permit applications.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Uprise RI Staff |date=2024-10-23 |title=As Flock Surveillance Cameras Proliferate in Rhode Island, Lawsuit Challenges Their Legality |url=https://upriseri.com/as-flock-surveillance-cameras-proliferate-in-rhode-island-lawsuit-challenges-their-legality/ |url-status=live |access-date=2025-08-25 |website=UPRISE RI}}</ref>

====='''Evanston, IL'''=====
Flock was ordered to remove 18 stationary cameras. The city put the contract with Flock on a 30-day termination notice on August 26. Flock Initially appeared to comply, removing 15 of the cameras by September 8. Later, Flock was caught reinstalling all of them by the following Tuesday without authorization from the city. The city of Evanston responded with a cease-and-desist order for Flock to remove the new and unauthorized camera equipment. Because Flock reinstalled the cameras without permission, Evanston was forced to cover the cameras with tape and bags to block them from potentially logging vehicle data.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Harrison |first=Alex |date=2025-09-25 |title=City covers Flock cameras while waiting for removal |url=https://evanstonroundtable.com/2025/09/25/city-covers-up-flock-cameras-while-waiting-for-removal/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.ph/PD1qe |archive-date=2025-10-10 |access-date=2025-10-10 |website=Evanston Roundtable}}</ref>

===City rejections and terminations===

Multiple cities have rejected or terminated Flock contracts following privacy concerns and effectiveness issues:

'''0.2% effectiveness rate, low arrests:''' Austin, Texas terminated its contract in July 2025 after an audit revealed "systematic compliance failures" and only 165 arrests from 113 million license plate scans (0.146% effectiveness rate).<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://cbsaustin.com/news/local/flock-ceo-responds-to-austin-backlash-as-city-contract-nears-expiration|title=Flock CEO responds to Austin backlash as city contract nears expiration|work=CBS Austin|date=2025-06-21|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref>

Denver City Council unanimously rejected a $666,000 contract extension in May 2025 following revelations of 1,400+ ICE-related searches in Colorado data.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://denverite.com/2025/05/05/denver-rejects-flock-camera-license-plate-readers/|title=Denver rejects $666,000 extension for license-plate surveillance cameras after backlash|work=Denverite|date=2025-05-05|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref>

San Marcos, Texas voted 5-2 to deny camera expansion after discovering no required audits had been conducted since 2022.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Velez |first=Abigail |date=2025-06-04 |title=San Marcos City Council votes to deny flock camera expansion after hours of heated debate |url=https://cbsaustin.com/news/local/san-marcos-city-council-votes-to-deny-flock-camera-expansion-after-hours-of-heated-debate |access-date=2025-08-23 |work=CBS Austin}}</ref>

Oak Park, Illinois terminated their contract entirely following the Illinois investigation into illegal data sharing.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.oakpark.com/2025/08/07/oak-park-terminates-flock-license-plate-reader-contract/|title=Oak Park terminates Flock license plate reader contract|work=Wednesday Journal|date=2025-08-07|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref>

===Arizona deployments===
Sedona, Arizona became the first Arizona city to completely terminate its Flock Safety contract in September 2025 after citizen backlash. The city had installed 11 cameras in June 2025 without prior public notice at a cost of $51,146 for the first year. The council voted 5-1 to pause the program, then unanimously 7-0 on September 9 to permanently terminate after Flock CEO Garrett Langley admitted the company had been sharing data with federal agencies. Vice Mayor Holli Ploog called Flock "not an honorable company" for the conflicting data-sharing claims.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://westvalleyfamilies.substack.com/p/sedona-pulls-the-plug-on-flock-safety|title=Sedona Pulls the Plug on Flock Safety|website=West Valley Families|date=2025-09-10|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.knau.org/knau-and-arizona-news/2025-09-11/sedona-council-permanently-ends-license-plate-camera-program|title=Sedona council permanently ends license plate camera program|website=KNAU|date=2025-09-11|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref>

Flagstaff deployed 32 Flock cameras in summer 2024 at a cost of $143,100 annually. By September 2025, a petition signed by 25+ residents demanded cancellation.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.kjzz.org/fronteras-desk/2025-09-01/after-sedona-paused-flock-safety-camera-system-flagstaff-is-considering-the-same-issue|title=After Sedona paused Flock Safety camera system, Flagstaff is considering the same issue|website=KJZZ|date=2025-09-01|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref>

University of Arizona contracted with Flock in February 2025 for 54 ALPR cameras at $160,000 annually. Students and faculty launched a "Deflock Tucson" campaign citing concerns about tracking international students and potential data sharing with federal immigration authorities.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://azluminaria.org/2025/09/15/ua-students-and-faculty-question-use-of-flock-safety-cameras-on-campus/|title=UA students and faculty question use of Flock Safety cameras on campus|website=AZ Luminaria|date=2025-09-15|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref>

Casa Grande approved a $10 million "Safe City Initiative" in September 2025 including 100 license plate readers. Chief Mark McCrory reported the current 22 license plate readers led to 212 stolen vehicles identified and 168 arrests.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.inmaricopa.com/we-mapped-all-flock-cameras/|title=We mapped the city's Flock cameras|website=InMaricopa|date=2025|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref>

Despite documented deployments across Arizona including Phoenix, Mesa, Chandler, Scottsdale, Tempe, Surprise, Youngtown, Litchfield Park, and Yuma, the state has no ALPR-specific regulation.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://azmirror.com/2019/07/08/how-do-automated-license-plate-readers-work/|title=How do automated license plate readers work?|website=Arizona Mirror|date=2019-07-08|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref>

==Security vulnerabilities==
In 2025, Flock Safety reported security vulnerabilities in its devices and submitted them to MITRE for inclusion in the National Vulnerability Database, including issues such as hard-coded credentials and improper access controls.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-05-05 |title=Gunshot Detection and License Plate Reader Security Alert |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/blog/gunshot-detection-and-license-plate-reader-security-alert |website=Flock Safety}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-10-02 |title=CVE-2025-59403 : The Flock Safety Android Collins application (aka com.flocksafety.android.collin |url=https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2025-59403/ |website=CVEdetails.com}}</ref> Similar security concerns have affected other ALPR systems, including exposure of default passwords and unencrypted data storage.<ref name=":4">{{Cite web |last=Quintin |first=Cooper |date=28 Oct 2015 |title=License Plate Readers Exposed! How Public Safety Agencies Responded to Major Vulnerabilities in Vehicle Surveillance Tech |url=https://www.eff.org/ur/deeplinks/2015/10/license-plate-readers-exposed-how-public-safety-agencies-responded-massive |website=Electronic Frontier Foundation}}</ref>

This represents one of several major security disclosures in the past decade. In 2015, the Electronic Frontier Foundation documented more than 100 ALPR cameras accessible on the open internet, often without passwords or proper configuration.<ref name=":4" /> A more serious documented breach occurred in 2019, when Perceptics, LLC, a subcontractor for U.S. Customs and Border Protection, exposed approximately 105,000 license plate images and 184,000 traveler facial images.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Review of CBP's Major Cybersecurity Incident During a 2019 Biometric Pilot |url=https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-09/OIG-20-71-Sep20.pdf}}</ref>

In 2025 it has been discovered that the cameras run [[wikipedia:Android_Oreo|Android 8.0 (Oreo)]] an operating system with 90 security vulnerabilities. The cameras also send data unencrypted and are easily tricked by stingrays. The compute boxes have easily accessible USB-c ports leaving the device vulnerable to rubber duckies. When the power button is pressed in a specific order the device emits a Wi-Fi hotspot that can be used to gain adb access.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Benn |first=Jordan |date=2025-11-16 |title=We Hacked Flock Safety Cameras in under 30 Seconds. |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uB0gr7Fh6lY |website=YouTube}}</ref>

==Government accountability and oversight==

===State audit findings===
California State Auditor's February 2020 investigation found the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), with a 320 million image database, had no ALPR-specific policy at all. The audit found 96% of agencies claim to have policies, but most are incomplete. Data retention periods varied wildly with no justification. LAPD maintained a minimum five-year retention period, yet couldn't demonstrate that images stored for years had investigative value. The audit found that 99.9% of the 320 million images Los Angeles stores are for vehicles that were not on a "hot list" when the image was made.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://information.auditor.ca.gov/reports/2019-118/summary.html |title=Automated License Plate Readers |website=California State Auditor |date=13 Feb 2020 |access-date=5 Oct 2025}}</ref>

New Jersey provides a contrasting model with mandatory annual audits of all 523 law enforcement agencies. The 2024 audit reported only two significant violations, both involving users who hadn't completed required training.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://nj.gov/njsp/ALPR/pdf/2024_Audit_Automated_License_Plate_Recognition_(ALPR)_Data_Collected_Utilized_NJ_Law_Enforcement_Agencies.pdf |title=2024 Audit of Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR) Data |website=New Jersey State Police |date=2024 |access-date=5 Oct 2025 |format=PDF}}</ref>

A Government Technology analysis found that agencies often fail to audit ALPR systems regularly, leaving them "open to abuse by neglecting to institute sufficient oversight."<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.govtech.com/biz/data/alpr-audit-takeaways-what-we-learned-about-policy-gaps |title=ALPR Audit Takeaways: What We Learned About Policy Gaps |website=Government Technology |date=2024 |access-date=5 Oct 2025}}</ref>

===Cost-benefit analysis===
Arizona Department of Transportation's 2008 study of generic ALPR technology (predating Flock Safety by nine years) estimated $9.98 million for a hypothetical statewide ALPR system. The projected benefit-to-cost ratio of 9.6:1 came entirely from registration and insurance compliance, not crime reduction.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://apps.azdot.gov/files/ADOTLibrary/publications/project_reports/PDF/AZ637.pdf |title=Automated License Plate Recognition Technology Implementation Report |website=Arizona Department of Transportation |date=1 Jun 2008 |access-date=5 Oct 2025}}</ref>

Colorado's Office of Research and Statistics reported that while ALPR systems are expanding, independent academic research contradicts vendor claims. A 2011 George Mason University study concluded ALPRs "do not achieve a prevention or deterrent effect" on crime.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/ors/Docs/Briefs/2024-05_InDetail-ALPR.pdf |title=Automated License Plate Readers (In Detail) |website=Colorado Division of Criminal Justice |date=1 May 2024 |access-date=5 Oct 2025 |format=PDF}}</ref>

Oakland Police Department reported 182 arrests from ALPR in the first year, representing 1.4% of homicides, robberies, burglaries, and firearm assaults. The Northern California Regional Intelligence Center states approximately 1-2 vehicles out of 1,000 initiate alerts — a hit rate of just 0.1-0.2%.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://ncric.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/California-Law-Enforcement-ALPR-FAQ.pdf |title=California Law Enforcement ALPR FAQ |website=NCRIC |date=2021 |access-date=5 Oct 2025 |format=PDF}}</ref>

===Mountain View Findings===

The Mountain View Police Department became aware in early January in 2026 during a department-initiated audit that for a brief period in 2024 federal agencies accessed data from the first camera in operation in the city.

“During the prior federal administration, from August to November 2024, several federal law enforcement agencies accessed Mountain View’s Flock Safety ALPR system for one camera via a 'nationwide' search setting that was turned on by Flock Safety. This setting was enabled without MVPD’s permission or knowledge. The federal agencies that accessed the one camera’s data include Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives offices in Kentucky and Nashville, TN; Langley Air Force Base in Virginia; the U.S. GSA Office of Inspector General; Lake Mead National Recreation Area in Nevada; and an Ohio Air Force Base. Flock Safety did not retain records for that time period, which means the vendor cannot determine whether searches of Mountain View’s data resulted in license plate information being shared.”<ref>{{Cite web |date=2026-01-30 |title=City Statement {{!}} City News {{!}} Mountain View, CA |url=https://www.mountainview.gov/Home/Components/News/News/1203/284 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.md/CDZ2Y |archive-date=2026-02-07 |access-date=2026-02-07 |website=mountainview.gov}}</ref>

MVPD officers also uncovered that “statewide lookup” had been turned on for all the city’s cameras since the program began. This feature has been turned off by the department on January 5, 2026. The MVPD plans to present a review of the ALPR pilot program to the City Council.

On February 2, 2026 Mountain View Police Chief Mike Canfield announced that all of the city's license plate cameras are being disabled, effective immediately.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Margaretten |first=Emily |last2=Morgan |first2=Zoe |date=2026-01-30 |title=Mountain View discovers unauthorized access to license plate data |url=https://www.mv-voice.com/police/2026/01/30/amid-immigration-crackdown-mountain-view-discovers-unauthorized-access-to-license-plate-data/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.md/xjjvu |archive-date=2026-01-31 |access-date=2026-02-07 |website=Mountain View Voice}}</ref>

==Camera locations==
The locations of many Flock Cameras have been mapped by the OpenStreetMap project. A viewer of the locations of these cameras is located here: [https://deflock.me/map ALPR Map | DeFlock]

====Cease and desist to DeFlock.me====
DeFlock.me is a website allowing users to log and view the locations of ALPRs, such as Flock products. On 30 January 2025, Flock sent a cease and desist notice to the owner of DeFlock demanding the name of the website be changed to exclude the company's brand name. The letter also stated that "the Website also implies that various license plate readers are vulnerable to security hacks [...]" which Flock alleged "[...] provides a false impression about the security of Flock Products."<ref>{{Cite web |last=Matz |first=Sarah M. |title=2025 01 31 DEFLOCK CD final |url=https://www.eff.org/files/2025/02/26/2025_01_31_deflock_cd_ex-3.pdf |website=Electronic Frontier Foundation |date=30 Jan 2025 |access-date=27 Oct 2025 |url-status=live |format=PDF}}</ref>

==External links==
*[https://deflock.me/ DeFlock live map of active ALPRs]
*[https://www.noalprs.org/ No ALPRS movement in United States]
*[https://plateprivacy.com/ The Plate Privacy Project]
*[https://eyesonflock.com/ Eyes On Flock]
*[https://wiki.alprwatch.org/index.php/Main_Page ALPR Watch Wiki]

==References==
{{Reflist}}

[[Category:Automatic license plate readers]]
[[Category:Flock Safety]]

ReCAPTCHA

2026-02-20T14:31:05Z

Snarfblat: Cited and reworded claim about Google making reCAPTCHA succeed more often on Chromium-based browsers.

{{ProductCargo
|ArticleType=
|Category=Software, CAPTCHA
|Company=Google
|Description=
|InProduction=Yes
|Logo=ReCAPTCHA.svg
|ProductLine=
|ReleaseYear=2007
|Website=https://google.com/recaptcha
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{{lowercase title}}
[[wikipedia:ReCAPTCHA|'''reCAPTCHA''']] was acquired by [[Google]] in 2009 and has since been used to protect websites from [[wikipedia:Internet_bot|botting]], crowdsource transcription work, and to mass train Google's other technical ventures such as artificial intelligence.<ref>{{Cite web |last=von Ahn |first=Luis |last2=Cathcart |first2=Will |date=16 Sep 2009 |title=Teaching computers to read: Google acquires reCAPTCHA |url=https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2009/09/teaching-computers-to-read-google.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090917225140/https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2009/09/teaching-computers-to-read-google.html |archive-date=17 Sep 2009 |website=Google Blog}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |author=|title= Google recaptcha intro on using reCaptcha to improve automation |url=https://www.google.com/recaptcha/intro/?hl=es/index.html#:~:text=Every%20time%20our%20CAPTCHAs%20are,and%20solve%20hard%20AI%20problems. |website=google.com |access-date=2025-02-15}}</ref> Google faced criticism over this crowdsourcing and training for using unpaid labor from millions of daily users around the world, even sparking an ultimately unsuccessful class action lawsuit in Massachusetts in 2015, with the court dismissing the amount of time spent by each user completing a CAPTCHA as "something for which [no] reasonable consumer would expect to receive compensation".<ref>{{Cite web |date=22 Jan 2015 |title=Civil Action No. 15-10160-MGM |url=https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1904&context=historical |website=United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=3 Feb 2016 |title=Case No. 15-cv-03751-JSC |url=https://casetext.com/case/rojas-lozano-ex-rel-all-other-persons-similarly-situated-v-google-inc |website=United States District Court for the Northern District of California}}</ref>

A video published by YouTube channel CHUPPL sparked renewed controversy with a video released in December 2024. The video cites and details how reCAPTCHA [[wikipedia:Doxing|doxxes]] users and how resulting user data can end up in the hands of the US government for unknown purposes, claiming exploitation of an intentional loophole in Google's terms of service allowing them to transmit user device and application data under the guise of "general security purposes."<ref>{{Cite web |last=CHUPPL |date=5 Dec 2024 |title=Why reCAPTCHA is Spyware |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VTsBP21-XpI |via=YouTube}}</ref> User data allegedly began being collected in 2014, when Google deployed reCAPTCHA v2, specifically the “No CAPTCHA reCAPTCHA” i.e. "the checkbox CAPTCHA," which primarily uses [[wikipedia:HTTP_cookie|cookies]] to whitelist users who reCAPTCHA identifies as humans. This opens up additional security vulnerabilities as once a user is identified as a human, a bot can take over and be given unrestricted access to all sites using reCAPTCHA without having to fill a CAPTCHA itself.<ref>{{Cite web |last=homakov |date=4 Dec 2014 |title=The No CAPTCHA problem |url=https://homakov.blogspot.com/2014/12/the-no-captcha-problem.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141204133024/https://homakov.blogspot.com/2014/12/the-no-captcha-problem.html |archive-date=4 Dec 2014 |via=Blogger}}</ref>

The type of cookies collected includes, but is not limited to:<ref name=":0">{{Cite web |last=O'Reilly |first=Lara |date=20 Feb 2015 |title=Google's new CAPTCHA security login raises 'legitimate privacy concerns' |url=https://www.businessinsider.com/google-no-captcha-adtruth-privacy-research-2015-2 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150222100003/https://www.businessinsider.com/google-no-captcha-adtruth-privacy-research-2015-2 |archive-date=22 Feb 2015 |website=Business Insider}}</ref>

*Screen size and resolution, date, language, browser plug-ins, and all Javascript objects
*IP address
*CSS information from the page you are on
*A count of mouse and touch events

This digital fingerprinting is nearly inescapable even for privacy focused consumers since, as of November 2024, reCAPTCHA is employed in 84% of all websites.<ref>{{Cite web |title=CAPTCHA Usage Distribution in the Top 1 Million Sites |url=https://trends.builtwith.com/widgets/captcha |website=BuiltWith}}</ref><blockquote>"The implication is that Google isn’t just looking to identify whether you’re a human with its No CAPTCHA, but potentially exactly ''which human'' you are." - Lara O'Reilly<ref name=":0" /></blockquote>A 2023 study collected data on newly admitted students to UC Irvine's School of Information & Computer Sciences over 13 months and concludes that reCAPTCHA does not provide real security for Google's client websites and has, over its 13 years of existence, cost users an estimated 819 million hours equating to nearly $6 billion USD in wages and 134 petabytes of bandwidth corresponding to 7.5 million pounds of CO<sub>2</sub>. The study further estimated Google's direct profits from reCAPTCHA to be "$888 billion USD from cookies and $8.75-32.3 billion USD per each sale of their total labeled data set."<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal |last=Searles |first=Andrew |last2=Prapty |first2=Renascence Tarafder |last3=Tsudik |first3=Gene |date=21 Nov 2023 |title=Dazed & Confused: A Large-Scale Real-World User Study of reCAPTCHAv2 |url=https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.10911 |journal=Preprint}}</ref><blockquote>"It can be concluded that the true purpose of reCAPTCHAv2 is as a tracking cookie farm for advertising profit masquerading as a security service." - Searles, Prapty, and Tsudik<ref name=":1" /></blockquote>Some commentators have alleged that reCAPTCHA’s risk scoring and challenge behavior can differ by browser, with Chrome/Chromium users sometimes reporting fewer challenges than users of other browsers.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Google's reCAPTCHA test has been tricked by artificial intelligence |website=The Register |date=2019-06-28 |url=https://www.theregister.com/2019/06/28/google_recaptcha_favoring_google/ |access-date=2026-02-20}}</ref> Users of a Hacker News forum concluded that reCAPTCHA likely attributes a lower reputation score to users with privacy-focused applications and extensions running, thus [[Firefox]] users were assigned CAPTCHAs to solve at a higher rate and difficulty.<ref>{{Cite web |last=kojoru |date=10 Jun 2019 |title=Google's Captcha in Firefox vs. in Chrome |url=https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20147015 |via=Y Combinator}}</ref>

reCAPTCHA v3, the "Invisible reCAPTCHA," launched in 2017 with the goal of never interrupting legitimate human users.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Verger |first=Rob |date=11 Mar 2017 |title=Google just made the internet a tiny bit less annoying |url=https://www.popsci.com/google-invisible-recaptcha/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241123014232/https://www.popsci.com/google-invisible-recaptcha/ |archive-date=23 Nov 2024 |website=Populair Science}}</ref> This version works completely in the background using cookies to apply a reputation scored on a scale from 0.0 to 1.0, with the latter indicating high confidence a user is human.<ref>{{Cite web |title=reCAPTCHA v3 |url=https://developers.google.com/recaptcha/docs/v3 |website=Google for Developers}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=reCAPTCHA v3 score detector |url=https://antcpt.com/score_detector/}}</ref> A 2019 study on hacking version 3 revealed that reCAPTCHA assigned low scores to simulated users using [[TOR browser]] and that browsers with an active Google account connected received higher scores as compared to browsers without a Google account connected.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Akrout |first=Ismail |last2=Feriani |first2=Amal |last3=Akrout |first3=Mohamed |date=18 Apr 2019 |title=Hacking Google reCAPTCHA v3 using Reinforcement Learning |url=https://arxiv.org/pdf/1903.01003 |journal=Preprint}}</ref> Technology consultant Marcos Perona observed similar results and experienced low reputation scores when using a [[VPN]], too. Google recommends implementing reCAPTCHA v3 in the background of all client webpages, so that it collects user data prior to it needing to determine if the user is a bot.<ref name=":2">{{Cite web |last=Schwab |first=Katharine |date=27 Jun 2019 |title=Google’s new reCAPTCHA has a dark side |url=https://www.fastcompany.com/90369697/googles-new-recaptcha-has-a-dark-side |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190627144558/https://www.fastcompany.com/90369697/googles-new-recaptcha-has-a-dark-side |archive-date=27 Jun 2019 |website=Fast Company}}</ref><blockquote>"Because reCaptcha v3 is likely to be on every page of a website, if you’re signed into your Google account there’s a chance Google is getting data about every single webpage you go to that is embedded with reCaptcha v3—and there many be no visual indication on the site that it’s happening, beyond a small reCaptcha logo hidden in the corner" - Katharine Schwab<ref name=":2" />[[File:Invisible-reCaptcha-in-Corner.png|thumb|375px|reCAPTCHA logo in corner of webpage indicating user's behaviors are being analyzed.]]</blockquote>

reCAPTCHA's shortcomings as summarized by one of their direct competitors, DataDome:<ref>{{Cite web |date=20 Aug 2022 |title=ReCAPTCHA v2 vs. v3: Efficient bot protection? |url=https://datadome.co/guides/captcha/recaptchav2-recaptchav3-efficient-bot-protection/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240211073038/https://datadome.co/guides/captcha/recaptchav2-recaptchav3-efficient-bot-protection/ |archive-date=11 Feb 2024 |website=Data Dome}}</ref>

*Degrade the user experience.
*Can lead to high false positives and false negatives.
*Fail to be privacy compliant with GDPR, the foundational global privacy standard.
*Leverage [...] users’ data for their organization’s advertising purposes.
*Are easily bypassed with CAPTCHA farms and advanced bots.
*Provide no real feedback mechanisms (pass/fail is not enough information to refine your security).

==See also==

*[[CAPTCHA]]
*[[DataDome]]
*[[hCAPTCHA]]
*[[Privacy Pass]]

==References==
<references />
[[Category:CAPTCHA]]
[[Category:Google]]
[[Category:Data collection]]