Flock license plate readers - Revision history

Rudxain: link ADB

2026-03-15T13:34:42Z

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	This represents one of several major security disclosures in the past decade. In 2015, the Electronic Frontier Foundation documented more than 100 ALPR cameras accessible on the open internet, often without passwords or proper configuration.<ref name=":4" /> A more serious documented breach occurred in 2019, when Perceptics, LLC, a subcontractor for U.S. Customs and Border Protection, exposed approximately 105,000 license plate images and 184,000 traveler facial images.<ref>{{Cite web \|title=Review of CBP's Major Cybersecurity Incident During a 2019 Biometric Pilot \|url=https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-09/OIG-20-71-Sep20.pdf \|archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260121195004/https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-09/OIG-20-71-Sep20.pdf \|archive-date=21 Jan 2026}}</ref>		This represents one of several major security disclosures in the past decade. In 2015, the Electronic Frontier Foundation documented more than 100 ALPR cameras accessible on the open internet, often without passwords or proper configuration.<ref name=":4" /> A more serious documented breach occurred in 2019, when Perceptics, LLC, a subcontractor for U.S. Customs and Border Protection, exposed approximately 105,000 license plate images and 184,000 traveler facial images.<ref>{{Cite web \|title=Review of CBP's Major Cybersecurity Incident During a 2019 Biometric Pilot \|url=https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-09/OIG-20-71-Sep20.pdf \|archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260121195004/https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-09/OIG-20-71-Sep20.pdf \|archive-date=21 Jan 2026}}</ref>

	In 2025 it has been discovered that the cameras run [[wikipedia:Android_Oreo\|Android 8.0 (Oreo)]] an operating system with 90 security vulnerabilities. The cameras also send data unencrypted and are easily tricked by stingrays. The compute boxes have easily accessible USB-c ports leaving the device vulnerable to rubber duckies. When the power button is pressed in a specific order the device emits a Wi-Fi hotspot that can be used to gain ~~adb~~ access.<ref>{{Cite web \|last=Benn \|first=Jordan \|date=2025-11-16 \|title=We Hacked Flock Safety Cameras in under 30 Seconds. \|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uB0gr7Fh6lY \|website=YouTube \|archive-url=https://preservetube.com/watch?v=uB0gr7Fh6lY \|archive-date=23 Feb 2026}}</ref>		In 2025 it has been discovered that the cameras run [[wikipedia:Android_Oreo\|Android 8.0 (Oreo)]] an operating system with 90 security vulnerabilities. The cameras also send data unencrypted and are easily tricked by stingrays. The compute boxes have easily accessible USB-c ports leaving the device vulnerable to rubber duckies. When the power button is pressed in a specific order the device emits a Wi-Fi hotspot that can be used to gain [[wikipedia:Android_Debug_Bridge\|ADB]] access.<ref>{{Cite web \|last=Benn \|first=Jordan \|date=2025-11-16 \|title=We Hacked Flock Safety Cameras in under 30 Seconds. \|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uB0gr7Fh6lY \|website=YouTube \|archive-url=https://preservetube.com/watch?v=uB0gr7Fh6lY \|archive-date=23 Feb 2026}}</ref>

	==Government accountability and oversight==		==Government accountability and oversight==

Venture18+: added archive URLs, properly added source dates, added author names, removed duplicate citations, added 'dead' URL-status tags, added 'registration' URL-access tag

2026-03-10T12:08:47Z

added archive URLs, properly added source dates, added author names, removed duplicate citations, added 'dead' URL-status tags, added 'registration' URL-access tag

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2026-02-23T04:59:17Z

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2026-02-22T23:43:18Z

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	MVPD officers also uncovered that “statewide lookup” had been turned on for all the city’s cameras since the program began. This feature has been turned off by the department on January 5, 2026. The MVPD plans to present a review of the ALPR pilot program to the City Council.		MVPD officers also uncovered that “statewide lookup” had been turned on for all the city’s cameras since the program began. This feature has been turned off by the department on January 5, 2026. The MVPD plans to present a review of the ALPR pilot program to the City Council.

	On February 2, 2026 Mountain View Police Chief Mike Canfield announced that all of the city's license plate cameras are being disabled, effective immediately.<ref>{{Cite web \|last=Margaretten \|first=Emily \|last2=Morgan \|first2=Zoe \|date=2026-01-30 \|title=Mountain View discovers unauthorized access to license plate data \|url=https://www.mv-voice.com/police/2026/01/30/amid-immigration-crackdown-mountain-view-discovers-unauthorized-access-to-license-plate-data/ \|url-status=live \|archive-url=https://~~archive~~.md/~~xjjvu~~ \|archive-date=2026~~-01-31~~ \|access-date=2026-02-07 \|website=Mountain View Voice}}</ref>		On February 2, 2026 Mountain View Police Chief Mike Canfield announced that all of the city's license plate cameras are being disabled, effective immediately.<ref>{{Cite web \|last=Margaretten \|first=Emily \|last2=Morgan \|first2=Zoe \|date=2026-01-30 \|title=Mountain View discovers unauthorized access to license plate data \|url=https://www.mv-voice.com/police/2026/01/30/amid-immigration-crackdown-mountain-view-discovers-unauthorized-access-to-license-plate-data/ \|url-status=live \|archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260222220813/https://www.mv-voice.com/police/2026/01/30/amid-immigration-crackdown-mountain-view-discovers-unauthorized-access-to-license-plate-data/ \|archive-date=22 Feb 2026\|access-date=2026-02-07 \|website=Mountain View Voice}}</ref>

	==Camera locations==		==Camera locations==

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2026-02-22T22:08:49Z

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← Older revision		Revision as of 22:08, 22 February 2026
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	\|Description=AI-powered automated license plate reader (ALPR) system that creates "Vehicle Fingerprints" by recording license plates, vehicle characteristics, and movement patterns for law enforcement use without individual consent or warrants.		\|Description=AI-powered automated license plate reader (ALPR) system that creates "Vehicle Fingerprints" by recording license plates, vehicle characteristics, and movement patterns for law enforcement use without individual consent or warrants.
	}}		}}
	'''Flock License Plate Readers''' (previously known as '''Flock Safety Falcon'''<ref>{{Cite web \|url=https://www.flocksafety.com/devices/falcon\|title=Falcon\|work=Flock Safety \|access-date=6 Dec 2024 \|archive-url=https://archive.ph/~~UjKM5~~ \|archive-date=~~6 Dec 2024~~ \|url-status=usurped}}</ref>), are a network of AI-powered surveillance cameras that record vehicle data for law enforcement agencies. The system operates in over 5,000 communities across 49 states in the U.S.A.<ref>{{Cite web \|last=Hamid \|first=Sarah \|last2=Alajaji \|first2=Rindala \|date=27 Jun 2025 \|title=Flock Safety's Feature Updates Cannot Make Automated License Plate Readers Safe \|url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/06/flock-safetys-feature-updates-cannot-make-automated-license-plate-readers-safe \|url-status=live \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250628052030/https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/06/flock-safetys-feature-updates-cannot-make-automated-license-plate-readers-safe \|archive-date=28 Jun 2025 \|access-date=23 Aug 2025 \|work=Electronic Frontier Foundation}}</ref> According to the company's own marketing materials, Flock performs over 20 billion vehicle scans monthly.<ref>{{Cite web \|title=Flock Safety \|url=https://www.flocksafety.com/ \|url-status=live \|archive-url=https://archive.ph/iVsBZ \|archive-date=26 Aug 2025 \|access-date=23 Aug 2025 \|work=Flock Safety}}</ref>		'''Flock License Plate Readers''' (previously known as '''Flock Safety Falcon'''<ref>{{Cite web \|url=https://www.flocksafety.com/devices/falcon\|title=Falcon\|work=Flock Safety \|access-date=6 Dec 2024 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260222220315/https://www.flocksafety.com/ \|archive-date=22 Feb 2026\|url-status=usurped}}</ref>), are a network of AI-powered surveillance cameras that record vehicle data for law enforcement agencies. The system operates in over 5,000 communities across 49 states in the U.S.A.<ref>{{Cite web \|last=Hamid \|first=Sarah \|last2=Alajaji \|first2=Rindala \|date=27 Jun 2025 \|title=Flock Safety's Feature Updates Cannot Make Automated License Plate Readers Safe \|url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/06/flock-safetys-feature-updates-cannot-make-automated-license-plate-readers-safe \|url-status=live \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250628052030/https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/06/flock-safetys-feature-updates-cannot-make-automated-license-plate-readers-safe \|archive-date=28 Jun 2025 \|access-date=23 Aug 2025 \|work=Electronic Frontier Foundation}}</ref> According to the company's own marketing materials, Flock performs over 20 billion vehicle scans monthly.<ref>{{Cite web \|title=Flock Safety \|url=https://www.flocksafety.com/ \|url-status=live \|archive-url=https://archive.ph/iVsBZ \|archive-date=26 Aug 2025 \|access-date=23 Aug 2025 \|work=Flock Safety}}</ref>

	==Consumer impact summary==		==Consumer impact summary==
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	====Privacy====		====Privacy====
	While Flock Safety claims their system doesn't violate Fourth Amendment rights because ''"license plates are not personal information,"''<ref name="Flock-PE">{{Cite web \|url=https://www.flocksafety.com/privacy-ethics \|title=Privacy & Ethics \|work=Flock Safety \|access-date=23 Aug 2025 \|archive-url=https://archive.ph/~~OP55p~~ \|archive-date=~~23 Aug 2025~~ \|url-status=live}}</ref> federal courts have challenged this interpretation. In February 2024, a federal judge ruled that a lawsuit challenging Norfolk, Virginia's use of 172 Flock cameras could proceed, finding that plaintiffs had plausibly alleged the system creates a ''"detailed chronicle of a person's physical presence compiled every day."''<ref name="norfolk">{{Cite web \|last=King \|first=Dan \|date=6 Feb 2024 \|title=Judge Rules Lawsuit Challenging Norfolk's Use of Flock Cameras Can Proceed \|url=https://ij.org/press-release/judge-rules-lawsuit-challenging-norfolks-use-of-flock-cameras-can-proceed/ \|url-status=live \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250717001536/https://ij.org/press-release/judge-rules-lawsuit-challenging-norfolks-use-of-flock-cameras-can-proceed/ \|archive-date=17 Jul 2025 \|access-date=23 Aug 2025 \|work=Institute for Justice}}</ref>		While Flock Safety claims their system doesn't violate Fourth Amendment rights because ''"license plates are not personal information,"''<ref name="Flock-PE">{{Cite web \|url=https://www.flocksafety.com/privacy-ethics \|title=Privacy & Ethics \|work=Flock Safety \|access-date=23 Aug 2025 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260222220436/https://www.flocksafety.com/privacy-ethics \|archive-date=22 Feb 2026\|url-status=live}}</ref> federal courts have challenged this interpretation. In February 2024, a federal judge ruled that a lawsuit challenging Norfolk, Virginia's use of 172 Flock cameras could proceed, finding that plaintiffs had plausibly alleged the system creates a ''"detailed chronicle of a person's physical presence compiled every day."''<ref name="norfolk">{{Cite web \|last=King \|first=Dan \|date=6 Feb 2024 \|title=Judge Rules Lawsuit Challenging Norfolk's Use of Flock Cameras Can Proceed \|url=https://ij.org/press-release/judge-rules-lawsuit-challenging-norfolks-use-of-flock-cameras-can-proceed/ \|url-status=live \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250717001536/https://ij.org/press-release/judge-rules-lawsuit-challenging-norfolks-use-of-flock-cameras-can-proceed/ \|archive-date=17 Jul 2025 \|access-date=23 Aug 2025 \|work=Institute for Justice}}</ref>

	Data collected includes location history that can reveal sensitive information about medical visits, religious attendance, political activities, and personal associations. While Flock states data is deleted after 30 days, contracts grant them ''"perpetual, worldwide, royalty-free license"'' to use anonymized data indefinitely.<ref name=":1">{{Cite web \|title=Terms and Conditions \|url=https://www.flocksafety.com/terms-and-conditions \|url-status=live \|archive-url=https://archive.ph/~~DSqUM~~ \|archive-date=~~26 Oct 2025~~ \|access-date=23 Aug 2025 \|work=Flock Safety}}</ref> The system shares data across a network of over 4,800 law enforcement agencies nationally.<ref>{{Cite web \|last=Koebler \|first=Jason \|date=2024 \|title=Lawsuit Argues Warrantless Use of Flock Surveillance Cameras Is Unconstitutional \|url=https://www.404media.co/lawsuit-argues-warrantless-use-of-flock-surveillance-cameras-is-unconstitutional/ \|url-status=live \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250826013458/https://www.404media.co/lawsuit-argues-warrantless-use-of-flock-surveillance-cameras-is-unconstitutional/ \|archive-date=26 Aug 2025 \|access-date=23 Aug 2025 \|work=404 Media}}</ref>		Data collected includes location history that can reveal sensitive information about medical visits, religious attendance, political activities, and personal associations. While Flock states data is deleted after 30 days, contracts grant them ''"perpetual, worldwide, royalty-free license"'' to use anonymized data indefinitely.<ref name=":1">{{Cite web \|title=Terms and Conditions \|url=https://www.flocksafety.com/terms-and-conditions \|url-status=live \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260222220541/https://www.flocksafety.com/legal/terms-and-conditions \|archive-date=22 Feb 2026\|access-date=23 Aug 2025 \|work=Flock Safety}}</ref> The system shares data across a network of over 4,800 law enforcement agencies nationally.<ref>{{Cite web \|last=Koebler \|first=Jason \|date=2024 \|title=Lawsuit Argues Warrantless Use of Flock Surveillance Cameras Is Unconstitutional \|url=https://www.404media.co/lawsuit-argues-warrantless-use-of-flock-surveillance-cameras-is-unconstitutional/ \|url-status=live \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250826013458/https://www.404media.co/lawsuit-argues-warrantless-use-of-flock-surveillance-cameras-is-unconstitutional/ \|archive-date=26 Aug 2025 \|access-date=23 Aug 2025 \|work=404 Media}}</ref>

	====="Anonymized Data"=====		====="Anonymized Data"=====
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	===Premise of a "license plate camera"===		===Premise of a "license plate camera"===
	While marketed as "license plate readers,"' Flock cameras use what the company calls "Vehicle Fingerprint" technology which tracks vehicles using characteristics beyond just license plates. The system catalogs vehicles based on numerous distinguishing features including make, model, color, bumper stickers, dents, damage patterns, roof racks, aftermarket modifications such as wheels or spoilers, window stickers, and even mismatching paint colors.<ref name=":2">{{Cite web \|date= \|title=LPR Cameras \|url=https://www.flocksafety.com/products/license-plate-readers \|url-status=usurped \|access-date=26 Oct 2025 \|work=Flock Safety}}</ref>. According to Flock's own marketing materials, the system can identify vehicles even when license plates cannot be captured, advertised as turning "images into actionable evidence — no plate required."<ref>{{Cite web \|title=License Plate Readers \|url=https://www.flocksafety.com/products/license-plate-readers \|url-status=live \|archive-url=https://archive.ph/~~D9JGD~~ \|archive-date=~~23 Aug 2025~~ \|access-date=23 Aug 2025 \|work=Flock Safety}}</ref>		While marketed as "license plate readers,"' Flock cameras use what the company calls "Vehicle Fingerprint" technology which tracks vehicles using characteristics beyond just license plates. The system catalogs vehicles based on numerous distinguishing features including make, model, color, bumper stickers, dents, damage patterns, roof racks, aftermarket modifications such as wheels or spoilers, window stickers, and even mismatching paint colors.<ref name=":2">{{Cite web \|date= \|title=LPR Cameras \|url=https://www.flocksafety.com/products/license-plate-readers \|url-status=usurped \|access-date=26 Oct 2025 \|work=Flock Safety}}</ref>. According to Flock's own marketing materials, the system can identify vehicles even when license plates cannot be captured, advertised as turning "images into actionable evidence — no plate required."<ref>{{Cite web \|title=License Plate Readers \|url=https://www.flocksafety.com/products/license-plate-readers \|url-status=live \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260222220218/https://www.flocksafety.com/products/license-plate-readers \|archive-date=22 Feb 2026\|access-date=23 Aug 2025 \|work=Flock Safety}}</ref>

	Flock claims this capability is ''"unique among ALPR systems"'' and allows law enforcement to search for vehicles based on these characteristics even without a visible license plate.		Flock claims this capability is ''"unique among ALPR systems"'' and allows law enforcement to search for vehicles based on these characteristics even without a visible license plate.
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	====='''Evanston, IL'''=====		====='''Evanston, IL'''=====
	Flock was ordered to remove 18 stationary cameras. The city put the contract with Flock on a 30-day termination notice on August 26. Flock Initially appeared to comply, removing 15 of the cameras by September 8. Later, Flock was caught reinstalling all of them by the following Tuesday without authorization from the city. The city of Evanston responded with a cease-and-desist order for Flock to remove the new and unauthorized camera equipment. Because Flock reinstalled the cameras without permission, Evanston was forced to cover the cameras with tape and bags to block them from potentially logging vehicle data.<ref>{{Cite web \|last=Harrison \|first=Alex \|date=2025-09-25 \|title=City covers Flock cameras while waiting for removal \|url=https://evanstonroundtable.com/2025/09/25/city-covers-up-flock-cameras-while-waiting-for-removal/ \|url-status=live \|archive-url=https://~~archive~~.ph/~~PD1qe~~ \|archive-date=~~2025-10-10~~ \|access-date=2025-10-10 \|website=Evanston Roundtable}}</ref>		Flock was ordered to remove 18 stationary cameras. The city put the contract with Flock on a 30-day termination notice on August 26. Flock Initially appeared to comply, removing 15 of the cameras by September 8. Later, Flock was caught reinstalling all of them by the following Tuesday without authorization from the city. The city of Evanston responded with a cease-and-desist order for Flock to remove the new and unauthorized camera equipment. Because Flock reinstalled the cameras without permission, Evanston was forced to cover the cameras with tape and bags to block them from potentially logging vehicle data.<ref>{{Cite web \|last=Harrison \|first=Alex \|date=2025-09-25 \|title=City covers Flock cameras while waiting for removal \|url=https://evanstonroundtable.com/2025/09/25/city-covers-up-flock-cameras-while-waiting-for-removal/ \|url-status=live \|archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260220002233/https://evanstonroundtable.com/2025/09/25/city-covers-up-flock-cameras-while-waiting-for-removal/ \|archive-date=20 Feb 2026\|access-date=2025-10-10 \|website=Evanston Roundtable}}</ref>

	===City rejections and terminations===		===City rejections and terminations===

Snarfblat: Citation/rewording of sentences about privacy advocates warning about racial profiling enabled by Flock cameras.

2026-02-20T14:47:58Z

Citation/rewording of sentences about privacy advocates warning about racial profiling enabled by Flock cameras.

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	The patent shows that Flock's technology is designed to create comprehensive profiles that can track individuals across multiple camera locations by matching physical characteristics. While Flock publicly markets its products as ''"license plate readers"'' focused on vehicles, this patent demonstrates the company has developed capabilities for detailed human surveillance and classification by protected characteristics including race and gender.<ref name="patent11416545" />		The patent shows that Flock's technology is designed to create comprehensive profiles that can track individuals across multiple camera locations by matching physical characteristics. While Flock publicly markets its products as ''"license plate readers"'' focused on vehicles, this patent demonstrates the company has developed capabilities for detailed human surveillance and classification by protected characteristics including race and gender.<ref name="patent11416545" />

	Privacy advocates have ~~raised concerns~~ that ~~this technology could~~ enable discriminatory policing ~~practices~~ and ~~racial profiling at scale~~.{{~~Citation needed~~}} ~~The ability to search for people by race or other physical characteristics across a network~~ of ~~thousands~~ of ~~cameras is a large expansion~~ of ~~surveillance~~ capabilities beyond ~~what is typically disclosed in Flock's public marketing materials~~.{{~~Citation needed~~}}		Privacy and civil-liberties advocates have warned that biometric/appearance-based identification and classification—especially along race and gender lines—can enable discriminatory policing and amplify harms from demographic bias and misidentification.<ref>{{Cite web \|title=How is Face Recognition Surveillance Technology Racist? \|website=American Civil Liberties Union \|date=2020-06-16 \|url=https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/how-is-face-recognition-surveillance-technology-racist \|access-date=2026-02-20}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web \|title=NIST Study Evaluates Effects of Race, Age, Sex on Face Recognition Software \|website=National Institute of Standards and Technology \|date=2019-12-19 \|url=https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2019/12/nist-study-evaluates-effects-race-age-sex-face-recognition-software \|access-date=2026-02-20}}</ref> In that context, the Flock Group patent’s explicit discussion of classifying people by attributes including “race” and “male/female” suggests capabilities that extend beyond vehicle identification.<ref>{{Cite web \|title=US11416545B1 - System and method for object based query of video content captured by a dynamic surveillance network \|website=Google Patents \|date=2022-08-16 \|url=https://patents.google.com/patent/US11416545B1 \|access-date=2026-02-20}}</ref>

	==Legal challenges==		==Legal challenges==

Keith: added changes from a user who got filter-blocked

2026-02-09T00:19:39Z

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	Oakland Police Department reported 182 arrests from ALPR in the first year, representing 1.4% of homicides, robberies, burglaries, and firearm assaults. The Northern California Regional Intelligence Center states approximately 1-2 vehicles out of 1,000 initiate alerts — a hit rate of just 0.1-0.2%.<ref>{{Cite web \|url=https://ncric.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/California-Law-Enforcement-ALPR-FAQ.pdf \|title=California Law Enforcement ALPR FAQ \|website=NCRIC \|date=2021 \|access-date=5 Oct 2025 \|format=PDF}}</ref>		Oakland Police Department reported 182 arrests from ALPR in the first year, representing 1.4% of homicides, robberies, burglaries, and firearm assaults. The Northern California Regional Intelligence Center states approximately 1-2 vehicles out of 1,000 initiate alerts — a hit rate of just 0.1-0.2%.<ref>{{Cite web \|url=https://ncric.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/California-Law-Enforcement-ALPR-FAQ.pdf \|title=California Law Enforcement ALPR FAQ \|website=NCRIC \|date=2021 \|access-date=5 Oct 2025 \|format=PDF}}</ref>

			===Mountain View Findings===

			The Mountain View Police Department became aware in early January in 2026 during a department-initiated audit that for a brief period in 2024 federal agencies accessed data from the first camera in operation in the city.

			“During the prior federal administration, from August to November 2024, several federal law enforcement agencies accessed Mountain View’s Flock Safety ALPR system for one camera via a 'nationwide' search setting that was turned on by Flock Safety. This setting was enabled without MVPD’s permission or knowledge. The federal agencies that accessed the one camera’s data include Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives offices in Kentucky and Nashville, TN; Langley Air Force Base in Virginia; the U.S. GSA Office of Inspector General; Lake Mead National Recreation Area in Nevada; and an Ohio Air Force Base. Flock Safety did not retain records for that time period, which means the vendor cannot determine whether searches of Mountain View’s data resulted in license plate information being shared.”<ref>{{Cite web \|date=2026-01-30 \|title=City Statement {{!}} City News {{!}} Mountain View, CA \|url=https://www.mountainview.gov/Home/Components/News/News/1203/284 \|url-status=live \|archive-url=https://archive.md/CDZ2Y \|archive-date=2026-02-07 \|access-date=2026-02-07 \|website=mountainview.gov}}</ref>

			MVPD officers also uncovered that “statewide lookup” had been turned on for all the city’s cameras since the program began. This feature has been turned off by the department on January 5, 2026. The MVPD plans to present a review of the ALPR pilot program to the City Council.

			On February 2, 2026 Mountain View Police Chief Mike Canfield announced that all of the city's license plate cameras are being disabled, effective immediately.<ref>{{Cite web \|last=Margaretten \|first=Emily \|last2=Morgan \|first2=Zoe \|date=2026-01-30 \|title=Mountain View discovers unauthorized access to license plate data \|url=https://www.mv-voice.com/police/2026/01/30/amid-immigration-crackdown-mountain-view-discovers-unauthorized-access-to-license-plate-data/ \|url-status=live \|archive-url=https://archive.md/xjjvu \|archive-date=2026-01-31 \|access-date=2026-02-07 \|website=Mountain View Voice}}</ref>

	==Camera locations==		==Camera locations==

Louis: /* Premise of a "license plate camera" */

2026-01-11T20:08:42Z

Premise of a "license plate camera"

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	===Premise of a "license plate camera"===		===Premise of a "license plate camera"===
	While marketed as "license plate readers,"' Flock cameras use what the company calls "Vehicle Fingerprint" technology which tracks vehicles using characteristics beyond just license plates. The system catalogs vehicles based on numerous distinguishing features including make, model, color, bumper stickers, dents, damage patterns, roof racks, aftermarket modifications such as wheels or spoilers, window stickers, and even mismatching paint colors.<ref>{{Cite web \|last=Harwell \|first=Drew \|date=2021-10-22 \|title=Flock license plate readers spark controversy in Golden, Colo. \|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/10/22/crime-suburbs-license-plate-readers/ \|access-date=2025-08-23 \|work=The Washington Post}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web \|title=Flock Safety ALPR \|url=https://www.campbellca.gov/1260/Flock-Safety-ALPR \|access-date=2025-08-23 \|work=City of Campbell}}</ref><ref name=":2">{{Cite web \|date= \|title=LPR Cameras \|url=https://www.flocksafety.com/products/license-plate-readers \|url-status=usurped \|access-date=26 Oct 2025 \|work=Flock Safety}}</ref>. According to Flock's own marketing materials, the system can identify vehicles even when license plates cannot be captured, advertised as turning "images into actionable evidence — no plate required."<ref>{{Cite web \|title=License Plate Readers \|url=https://www.flocksafety.com/products/license-plate-readers \|url-status=live \|archive-url=https://archive.ph/D9JGD \|archive-date=23 Aug 2025 \|access-date=23 Aug 2025 \|work=Flock Safety}}</ref>		While marketed as "license plate readers,"' Flock cameras use what the company calls "Vehicle Fingerprint" technology which tracks vehicles using characteristics beyond just license plates. The system catalogs vehicles based on numerous distinguishing features including make, model, color, bumper stickers, dents, damage patterns, roof racks, aftermarket modifications such as wheels or spoilers, window stickers, and even mismatching paint colors.<ref name=":2">{{Cite web \|date= \|title=LPR Cameras \|url=https://www.flocksafety.com/products/license-plate-readers \|url-status=usurped \|access-date=26 Oct 2025 \|work=Flock Safety}}</ref>. According to Flock's own marketing materials, the system can identify vehicles even when license plates cannot be captured, advertised as turning "images into actionable evidence — no plate required."<ref>{{Cite web \|title=License Plate Readers \|url=https://www.flocksafety.com/products/license-plate-readers \|url-status=live \|archive-url=https://archive.ph/D9JGD \|archive-date=23 Aug 2025 \|access-date=23 Aug 2025 \|work=Flock Safety}}</ref>

	Flock claims this capability is ''"unique among ALPR systems"'' and allows law enforcement to search for vehicles based on these characteristics even without a visible license plate.		Flock claims this capability is ''"unique among ALPR systems"'' and allows law enforcement to search for vehicles based on these characteristics even without a visible license plate.
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	Privacy advocates note that this expanded tracking capability makes the term ''"license plate reader"'' misleading, as Flock systems create detailed vehicle profiles that persist even without readable plates. It turns any distinguishing feature of a vehicle into a tracking identifier.<ref>{{Cite web \|title=Stop Flock \|url=https://www.stopflock.com/ \|access-date=2025-08-23 \|work=Stop Flock}}</ref>		Privacy advocates note that this expanded tracking capability makes the term ''"license plate reader"'' misleading, as Flock systems create detailed vehicle profiles that persist even without readable plates. It turns any distinguishing feature of a vehicle into a tracking identifier.<ref>{{Cite web \|title=Stop Flock \|url=https://www.stopflock.com/ \|access-date=2025-08-23 \|work=Stop Flock}}</ref>


	==Patent for person identification by race and physical characteristics==		==Patent for person identification by race and physical characteristics==

Louis: added menasha wisconsin case

2026-01-11T18:15:22Z

added menasha wisconsin case

@@ Line 104: / Line 104: @@
 In May 2025, Johnson County, Texas sheriff's deputies used Flock's network to track a woman suspected of self-managing an abortion. They conducted searches across 83,000+ Flock cameras nationwide with the explicit reason: "had an abortion, search for female." The search accessed cameras across multiple states including those where abortion is legal. The incident led Illinois officials to investigate and subsequently block 47+ out-of-state agencies from accessing Illinois ALPR data.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.dallasnews.com/news/texas/2025/06/13/after-finding-fetal-remains-north-texas-cops-used-camera-network-to-search-for-woman/|title=After finding fetal remains, North Texas cops used camera network to search for woman|work=The Dallas Morning News|date=2025-06-13|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/05/she-got-abortion-so-texas-cop-used-83000-cameras-track-her-down|title=She Got an Abortion. So A Texas Cop Used 83,000 Cameras to Track Her Down|website=Electronic Frontier Foundation|date=2025-05-15|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref>
 ===Federal agency access===
 Immigration and Customs Enforcement maintains a $6.1 million contract giving 9,000+ ICE officers access to the Vigilant Solutions ALPR database containing over 5 billion location data points.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.aclu.org/news/immigrants-rights/documents-reveal-ice-using-driver-location-data|title=Documents Reveal ICE Using Driver Location Data From Local Police for Deportations|website=ACLU|date=2024|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> The Drug Enforcement Administration operates a National License Plate Reader Program with over 10,000 license plate readers shared throughout the United States. 404 Media revealed over 4,000 searches by local and state police for federal immigration enforcement purposes, despite Flock having no formal ICE contract.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.404media.co/ice-taps-into-nationwide-ai-enabled-camera-network-data-shows/|title=ICE Taps into Nationwide AI-Enabled Camera Network, Data Shows|work=404 Media|date=2025|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> A DEA agent was found using an Illinois police officer's credentials to conduct unauthorized immigration searches.<ref name="dea" />

Dreadhawk177: Updated number of cameras from "over 40,000" to "over 100,000" using eyesonflock.com as a source. While the 40k (and recent grown number) was based on mapped cameras, eyesonflock.com uses public audits to find a more accurate number.

2025-12-09T16:05:40Z

Updated number of cameras from "over 40,000" to "over 100,000" using eyesonflock.com as a source. While the 40k (and recent grown number) was based on mapped cameras, eyesonflock.com uses public audits to find a more accurate number.

← Older revision		Revision as of 16:05, 9 December 2025
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	Residents and taxpayers have no mechanism to opt out of [[Flock Safety]]'s surveillance network. The cameras operate 24/7 in public spaces, recording all passing vehicles regardless of consent. They are also placed on private premises like universities, hospitals, businesses, and neighborhood associations, which often share this data with law enforcement.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web \|last=Brewster \|first=Thomas \|date=19 Jun 2024 \|title=FedEx's Secretive Police Force Is Helping Cops Build An AI Car Surveillance Network \|url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2024/06/19/fedex-police-help-cops-build-an-ai-car-surveillance-network/ \|url-status=live \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240619112629/https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2024/06/19/fedex-police-help-cops-build-an-ai-car-surveillance-network/ \|archive-date=19 Jun 2024 \|access-date=25 Aug 2025 \|website=Forbes}}</ref> This data can later be integrated into predictive police platforms like {{Wplink\|Palantir Technologies\|Palantir}}.<ref>{{Cite book \|last=Rettberg \|first=Jill Walker \|title=Machine Vision: How Algorithms are Changing the Way We See the World \|date=11 Sep 2023 \|publisher=John Wiley & Sons. \|year=2023 \|location=Google Books \|pages=45-46 \|language=English}}</ref>		Residents and taxpayers have no mechanism to opt out of [[Flock Safety]]'s surveillance network. The cameras operate 24/7 in public spaces, recording all passing vehicles regardless of consent. They are also placed on private premises like universities, hospitals, businesses, and neighborhood associations, which often share this data with law enforcement.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web \|last=Brewster \|first=Thomas \|date=19 Jun 2024 \|title=FedEx's Secretive Police Force Is Helping Cops Build An AI Car Surveillance Network \|url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2024/06/19/fedex-police-help-cops-build-an-ai-car-surveillance-network/ \|url-status=live \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240619112629/https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2024/06/19/fedex-police-help-cops-build-an-ai-car-surveillance-network/ \|archive-date=19 Jun 2024 \|access-date=25 Aug 2025 \|website=Forbes}}</ref> This data can later be integrated into predictive police platforms like {{Wplink\|Palantir Technologies\|Palantir}}.<ref>{{Cite book \|last=Rettberg \|first=Jill Walker \|title=Machine Vision: How Algorithms are Changing the Way We See the World \|date=11 Sep 2023 \|publisher=John Wiley & Sons. \|year=2023 \|location=Google Books \|pages=45-46 \|language=English}}</ref>

	Unlike traditional security cameras that may be avoided by choosing different routes, Flock's expanding network of over 40,000 cameras makes avoidance increasingly difficult.<ref>{{Cite web \|url=https://~~deflock~~.me/ \|~~title=Find Nearby ALPRs \|work=DeFlock \|access~~-~~date~~=~~23 Aug 2025~~ \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/~~20250728224453~~/https://~~deflock~~.me/\|archive-date=2025-07-28 \|~~url~~-~~status~~=~~live~~}}</ref> The system uses AI to create ''"Vehicle [[Device fingerprint\|Fingerprints]]"'' that identify vehicles by characteristics beyond license plates, including make, model, color, aftermarket parts, window stickers, and roof racks.<ref>{{Cite web \|last=Stanley \|first=Jay \|date=23 Jul 2025 \|title=Surveillance Company Flock Now Using AI to Report Us to Police if it Thinks Our Movement Patterns Are "Suspicious" \|url=https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/surveillance-company-flock-now-using-ai-to-report-us-to-police-if-it-thinks-our-movement-patterns-are-suspicious \|url-status=live \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250814053755/https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/surveillance-company-flock-now-using-ai-to-report-us-to-police-if-it-thinks-our-movement-patterns-are-suspicious \|archive-date=14 Aug 2025 \|access-date=23 Aug 2025 \|work=American Civil Liberties Union}}</ref>		Unlike traditional security cameras that may be avoided by choosing different routes, Flock's expanding network of over 100,000 cameras makes avoidance increasingly difficult.<ref>{{Cite web \|title=Eyes On Flock \|url=https://eyesonflock.com/ \|url-status=live \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20251008230140/https://eyesonflock.com/ \|archive-date=2025-10-08 \|access-date=9 Dec 2025 \|work=Eyes On Flock}}</ref> The system uses AI to create ''"Vehicle [[Device fingerprint\|Fingerprints]]"'' that identify vehicles by characteristics beyond license plates, including make, model, color, aftermarket parts, window stickers, and roof racks.<ref>{{Cite web \|last=Stanley \|first=Jay \|date=23 Jul 2025 \|title=Surveillance Company Flock Now Using AI to Report Us to Police if it Thinks Our Movement Patterns Are "Suspicious" \|url=https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/surveillance-company-flock-now-using-ai-to-report-us-to-police-if-it-thinks-our-movement-patterns-are-suspicious \|url-status=live \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250814053755/https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/surveillance-company-flock-now-using-ai-to-report-us-to-police-if-it-thinks-our-movement-patterns-are-suspicious \|archive-date=14 Aug 2025 \|access-date=23 Aug 2025 \|work=American Civil Liberties Union}}</ref>

	====Privacy====		====Privacy====