LinkedIn browser extension scanning - Revision history

Louis: cited each screenshot in its caption and spelled out which court case linkedin's statement refers to

2026-06-14T18:17:55Z

cited each screenshot in its caption and spelled out which court case linkedin's statement refers to

Louis: added screenshots of the bleepingcomputer testing, the munich ruling, the irish dpc fine, and the ganan complaint

2026-06-14T18:12:40Z

added screenshots of the bleepingcomputer testing, the munich ruling, the irish dpc fine, and the ganan complaint

← Older revision		Revision as of 18:12, 14 June 2026
Line 14:		Line 14:

	LinkedIn is a professional-networking service with more than one billion members.<ref name="tnw" /> [[Microsoft]] acquired the company in 2016 for $26.2 billion.<ref name="msft" /> The service has drawn regulatory scrutiny over its data handling before BrowserGate. In October 2024 the Irish Data Protection Commission fined LinkedIn 310 million euros, about $334 million, over processing personal data for targeted advertising without a valid legal basis.<ref name="tnw" />		LinkedIn is a professional-networking service with more than one billion members.<ref name="tnw" /> [[Microsoft]] acquired the company in 2016 for $26.2 billion.<ref name="msft" /> The service has drawn regulatory scrutiny over its data handling before BrowserGate. In October 2024 the Irish Data Protection Commission fined LinkedIn 310 million euros, about $334 million, over processing personal data for targeted advertising without a valid legal basis.<ref name="tnw" />

			[[File:LinkedIn BrowserGate Irish DPC fine.png\|thumb\|center\|upright=2.0\|The Irish Data Protection Commission's press release on its 310 million euro fine of LinkedIn Ireland, dated October 24, 2024.]]

	Browser extensions on Chromium-based browsers are addressed through fixed, enumerable identifiers. A web page can test whether a given extension is installed by attempting to load a file resource that the extension exposes under its known ID, & inferring the result from whether the load succeeds.<ref name="bleeping" />		Browser extensions on Chromium-based browsers are addressed through fixed, enumerable identifiers. A web page can test whether a given extension is installed by attempting to load a file resource that the extension exposes under its known ID, & inferring the result from whether the load succeeds.<ref name="bleeping" />
Line 24:		Line 26:

	BleepingComputer independently confirmed part of the claims through its own testing, during which it observed a JavaScript file with a randomized filename being loaded by LinkedIn's website.<ref name="bleeping" /> The total count of probed extensions came from the researchers rather than from BleepingComputer's own tally. The BrowserGate report counted 6,222 extensions, a figure repeated by PCMag & in the two lawsuits, while BleepingComputer's own testing found a script checking 6,236.<ref name="pcmag" /><ref name="bleeping" />		BleepingComputer independently confirmed part of the claims through its own testing, during which it observed a JavaScript file with a randomized filename being loaded by LinkedIn's website.<ref name="bleeping" /> The total count of probed extensions came from the researchers rather than from BleepingComputer's own tally. The BrowserGate report counted 6,222 extensions, a figure repeated by PCMag & in the two lawsuits, while BleepingComputer's own testing found a script checking 6,236.<ref name="pcmag" /><ref name="bleeping" />

			[[File:LinkedIn BrowserGate BleepingComputer verification.png\|thumb\|center\|upright=2.2\|BleepingComputer reported observing LinkedIn's scanning script and counting a check for 6,236 extensions, stating that it confirmed part of the BrowserGate findings through its own testing.]]

	== Discovery and disclosure ==		== Discovery and disclosure ==
Line 30:		Line 34:

	LinkedIn tied the report to a prior legal dispute. The company says the report stems from a dispute with the developer of a LinkedIn-related browser extension called Teamfluence, which LinkedIn restricted for violating its terms.<ref name="bleeping" /> The developer, Teamfluence Signal Systems OÜ, sought a preliminary injunction against LinkedIn Ireland Unlimited Company & LinkedIn Germany GmbH at the Regional Court of Munich in January 2026.<ref name="browsergate" /> In March 2026 the court dismissed the motion, finding that LinkedIn's actions did not constitute unlawful obstruction or discrimination.<ref name="cso" /><ref name="bleeping" />		LinkedIn tied the report to a prior legal dispute. The company says the report stems from a dispute with the developer of a LinkedIn-related browser extension called Teamfluence, which LinkedIn restricted for violating its terms.<ref name="bleeping" /> The developer, Teamfluence Signal Systems OÜ, sought a preliminary injunction against LinkedIn Ireland Unlimited Company & LinkedIn Germany GmbH at the Regional Court of Munich in January 2026.<ref name="browsergate" /> In March 2026 the court dismissed the motion, finding that LinkedIn's actions did not constitute unlawful obstruction or discrimination.<ref name="cso" /><ref name="bleeping" />

			[[File:LinkedIn BrowserGate Munich dismissal.png\|thumb\|center\|upright=2.2\|Fairlinked's BrowserGate page logs the January 2026 injunction filing against two LinkedIn entities and the Regional Court of Munich's dismissal of the motion on March 11, 2026.]]

	== Competitor-tool targeting ==		== Competitor-tool targeting ==
Line 54:		Line 60:

	Two separate class actions were filed against LinkedIn in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in early April 2026.<ref name="privacydaily" /><ref name="bloomberg" /> One, brought by Nicholas Farrell, is case No. 4:26-cv-02953.<ref name="privacydaily" /> The other, brought by Jeff Ganan, is case No. 5:26-cv-02968; the Ganan complaint was filed on April 6, 2026 by the Law Office of J.R. Howell & accused LinkedIn of running a ''covert browser surveillance system''.<ref name="privacydaily" /><ref name="ppc" />		Two separate class actions were filed against LinkedIn in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in early April 2026.<ref name="privacydaily" /><ref name="bloomberg" /> One, brought by Nicholas Farrell, is case No. 4:26-cv-02953.<ref name="privacydaily" /> The other, brought by Jeff Ganan, is case No. 5:26-cv-02968; the Ganan complaint was filed on April 6, 2026 by the Law Office of J.R. Howell & accused LinkedIn of running a ''covert browser surveillance system''.<ref name="privacydaily" /><ref name="ppc" />

			[[File:LinkedIn BrowserGate Ganan complaint.png\|thumb\|center\|upright=2.2\|PPC Land's account of the Ganan v. LinkedIn complaint, filed April 6, 2026 as case No. 5:26-cv-02968 by the Law Office of J.R. Howell.]]

	The complaints plead causes of action including the California Comprehensive Computer Data Access & Fraud Act, invasion of privacy under the California Constitution, intrusion upon seclusion, the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act, & California penal-code provisions covering the illegal use of a pen register or trap-and-trace device.<ref name="privacydaily" /> PCMag & Bloomberg Law reported on the same conduct underlying both suits.<ref name="pcmag" /><ref name="bloomberg" />		The complaints plead causes of action including the California Comprehensive Computer Data Access & Fraud Act, invasion of privacy under the California Constitution, intrusion upon seclusion, the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act, & California penal-code provisions covering the illegal use of a pen register or trap-and-trace device.<ref name="privacydaily" /> PCMag & Bloomberg Law reported on the same conduct underlying both suits.<ref name="pcmag" /><ref name="bloomberg" />

Louis: new page on linkedin's browser-extension scanning, the browsergate report, microsoft's response, and the two california class actions

2026-06-14T18:05:56Z

new page on linkedin's browser-extension scanning, the browsergate report, microsoft's response, and the two california class actions

New page

{{IncidentCargo
|Company=LinkedIn,Microsoft
|StartDate=2026-04-03
|EndDate=
|Status=Active
|ArticleType=Service
|Type=Privacy,Data Collection
|Description=LinkedIn's site scans Chromium browsers for thousands of installed extensions and harvests device data; two 2026 class actions
}}

'''BrowserGate''' is the name given to the April 2026 disclosure that [[LinkedIn]]'s website runs hidden JavaScript probing a visitor's Chromium-based browser for thousands of installed extensions while collecting device and browser data, with no entry in any consent dialog.<ref name="bleeping" /><ref name="tnw" /> The probe checks for extensions by trying to access file resources tied to specific extension IDs, a known detection technique, & it gathers details such as CPU core count, available memory, screen resolution, time zone, & battery status.<ref name="bleeping" /><ref name="ghacks" /> Two class actions followed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in April 2026, accusing LinkedIn & its owner [[Microsoft]] of covert surveillance; LinkedIn called the underlying report ''a house of cards built entirely upon a fabrication'' & said its Privacy Policy discloses extension scanning to detect abuse & protect site stability.<ref name="pcmag" /><ref name="privacydaily" />

== Background ==

LinkedIn is a professional-networking service with more than one billion members.<ref name="tnw" /> [[Microsoft]] acquired the company in 2016 for $26.2 billion.<ref name="msft" /> The service has drawn regulatory scrutiny over its data handling before BrowserGate. In October 2024 the Irish Data Protection Commission fined LinkedIn 310 million euros, about $334 million, over processing personal data for targeted advertising without a valid legal basis.<ref name="tnw" />

Browser extensions on Chromium-based browsers are addressed through fixed, enumerable identifiers. A web page can test whether a given extension is installed by attempting to load a file resource that the extension exposes under its known ID, & inferring the result from whether the load succeeds.<ref name="bleeping" />

== The scanning mechanism ==

LinkedIn's site loads JavaScript that checks for installed browser extensions by attempting to access file resources associated with a specific extension ID, the established method for detecting whether an extension is present.<ref name="bleeping" /> The same script collects device & browser telemetry: CPU core count, available memory, screen resolution, time zone, language settings, battery status, audio information, & storage features.<ref name="bleeping" /><ref name="ghacks" />

The technique works only on Chromium-based browsers, such as [[Google Chrome|Chrome]], [[Microsoft Edge|Edge]], Brave, & Opera. Firefox & Safari are not affected, because their browser architectures do not permit the same probing method.<ref name="tnw" /><ref name="safestate" /> LinkedIn loads the script under a randomized filename that it rotates, which frustrates blocking the script by its name alone.<ref name="bleeping" />

BleepingComputer independently confirmed part of the claims through its own testing, during which it observed a JavaScript file with a randomized filename being loaded by LinkedIn's website.<ref name="bleeping" /> The total count of probed extensions came from the researchers rather than from BleepingComputer's own tally. The BrowserGate report counted 6,222 extensions, a figure repeated by PCMag & in the two lawsuits, while BleepingComputer's own testing found a script checking 6,236.<ref name="pcmag" /><ref name="bleeping" />

== Discovery and disclosure ==

The report was published in early April 2026 by Fairlinked e.V., described by reporters as a European association of commercial LinkedIn users, & was dubbed BrowserGate, with findings posted at browsergate.eu.<ref name="tnw" /><ref name="cyberinsider" /> Mainstream technology press, including BleepingComputer, Tom's Hardware, & The Next Web, covered the report within days.<ref name="bleeping" /><ref name="toms" /><ref name="tnw" />

LinkedIn tied the report to a prior legal dispute. The company says the report stems from a dispute with the developer of a LinkedIn-related browser extension called Teamfluence, which LinkedIn restricted for violating its terms.<ref name="bleeping" /> The developer, Teamfluence Signal Systems OÜ, sought a preliminary injunction against LinkedIn Ireland Unlimited Company & LinkedIn Germany GmbH at the Regional Court of Munich in January 2026.<ref name="browsergate" /> In March 2026 the court dismissed the motion, finding that LinkedIn's actions did not constitute unlawful obstruction or discrimination.<ref name="cso" /><ref name="bleeping" />

== Competitor-tool targeting ==

According to the BrowserGate report, the probed extensions include sales-intelligence tools from Apollo, Lusha, & ZoomInfo that compete with LinkedIn's own products, & the report says LinkedIn scans more than 200 competing products in total.<ref name="toms" /> Tom's Hardware corroborated only a general growth trend in the scan list through public GitHub repositories, noting roughly 2,000 entries in 2025 & roughly 3,000 by February 2026.<ref name="toms" />

== Sensitive-category and scale claims ==

According to the BrowserGate report, the scan list grew from 38 extensions in 2017 to 6,222 by April 2026.<ref name="safestate" /> The report says the list includes extensions associated with religious practice, political affiliation, & neurodivergence, which it frames as enabling sensitive profiling.<ref name="safestate" /> LinkedIn says it does not use the data to infer sensitive information about members.<ref name="toms" /> The report further argues that the scanning implicates special-category personal data protections under the [[General Data Protection Regulation|GDPR]].<ref name="tnw" />

== LinkedIn's response ==

LinkedIn rejected the report & defended the scanning as a security measure. The company told PCMag that the report was without foundation & that the scanning is disclosed:

<blockquote>''This is a house of cards built entirely upon a fabrication. We do disclose that we scan for browser extensions in our Privacy Policy, in order to detect abuse and provide defense for site stability.''</blockquote><ref name="pcmag" />

LinkedIn also linked the report to that developer, telling PCMag:

<blockquote>''Unfortunately, this is a case of an individual who lost in the court of law, but is seeking to re-litigate in the court of public opinion without regard for accuracy.''</blockquote><ref name="pcmag" />

To The Next Web, the company said it looks for extensions ''that scrape data without members' consent or otherwise violate LinkedIn's Terms of Service'' to protect member privacy, data, & site stability.<ref name="tnw" /> LinkedIn's privacy policy states that it collects information about users' devices, including their web browser & add-ons.<ref name="mediapost" /> The BrowserGate report's position is that scanning thousands of specific third-party extensions without an explicit consent dialog is not meaningfully disclosed.<ref name="tnw" />

== Lawsuits ==

Two separate class actions were filed against LinkedIn in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in early April 2026.<ref name="privacydaily" /><ref name="bloomberg" /> One, brought by Nicholas Farrell, is case No. 4:26-cv-02953.<ref name="privacydaily" /> The other, brought by Jeff Ganan, is case No. 5:26-cv-02968; the Ganan complaint was filed on April 6, 2026 by the Law Office of J.R. Howell & accused LinkedIn of running a ''covert browser surveillance system''.<ref name="privacydaily" /><ref name="ppc" />

The complaints plead causes of action including the California Comprehensive Computer Data Access & Fraud Act, invasion of privacy under the California Constitution, intrusion upon seclusion, the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act, & California penal-code provisions covering the illegal use of a pen register or trap-and-trace device.<ref name="privacydaily" /> PCMag & Bloomberg Law reported on the same conduct underlying both suits.<ref name="pcmag" /><ref name="bloomberg" />

== See also ==

* [[LinkedIn]]
* [[Microsoft]]

== References ==
<references>
<ref name="bleeping">{{Cite web |last=Abrams |first=Lawrence |title=LinkedIn secretly scans for 6,000+ Chrome extensions, collects data |url=https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/linkedin-secretly-scans-for-6-000-plus-chrome-extensions-collects-data/ |website=BleepingComputer |date=2026-04-03 |access-date=2026-06-14}}</ref>
<ref name="toms">{{Cite web |title=LinkedIn scans visitors' browsers for over 6,000 Chrome extensions and collects device data |url=https://www.tomshardware.com/software/browsers/linkedin-scans-visitors-browsers-for-over-6000-chrome-extensions-and-collects-device-data |website=Tom's Hardware |date=2026-04-04 |access-date=2026-06-14}}</ref>
<ref name="tnw">{{Cite web |last=Dina |first=Cristian |title=LinkedIn is secretly scanning your browser for 6,000 extensions, and you weren't told |url=https://thenextweb.com/news/linkedin-browsergate-extension-scanning-privacy-fingerprint |website=The Next Web |date=2026-04-05 |access-date=2026-06-14}}</ref>
<ref name="pcmag">{{Cite web |last=Kan |first=Michael |title=LinkedIn Hit With Class-Action Lawsuits Over Browser-Extension Scanning |url=https://www.pcmag.com/news/linkedin-hit-with-class-action-lawsuits-over-browser-extension-scanning |website=PCMag |date=2026-04-07 |access-date=2026-06-14}}</ref>
<ref name="ghacks">{{Cite web |title=LinkedIn uses hidden JavaScript to scan for over 6000 Chrome extensions on visitors' browsers |url=https://www.ghacks.net/2026/04/04/linkedin-uses-hidden-javascript-to-scan-for-over-6000-chrome-extensions-on-visitors-browsers/ |website=Ghacks |date=2026-04-04 |access-date=2026-06-14}}</ref>
<ref name="privacydaily">{{Cite web |title=Class Actions Accuse LinkedIn of Scanning Browser Extensions, Sharing Data |url=https://privacy-daily.com/article/2026/04/08/class-actions-accuse-linkedin-of-scanning-browser-extensions-sharing-data-2604080026 |website=Privacy Daily |date=2026-04-08 |access-date=2026-06-14}}</ref>
<ref name="cyberinsider">{{Cite web |title=LinkedIn Faces Class Action Over Alleged Covert Scanning of Users' Browsers |url=https://cyberinsider.com/linkedin-faces-class-action-over-alleged-covert-scanning-of-users-browsers/ |website=CyberInsider |date=2026-04-07 |access-date=2026-06-14}}</ref>
<ref name="mediapost">{{Cite web |title=LinkedIn Hit With Privacy Suits Over Browser Scans |url=https://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/414135/linkedin-hit-with-privacy-suits-over-browser-scans.html |website=MediaPost |date=2026-04-08 |access-date=2026-06-14}}</ref>
<ref name="bloomberg">{{Cite web |title=LinkedIn Hit With Two Suits Over Browser Extension Tracking |url=https://news.bloomberglaw.com/litigation/linkedin-hit-with-two-suits-over-browser-extension-tracking |website=Bloomberg Law |date=2026-04-08 |access-date=2026-06-14}}</ref>
<ref name="cso">{{Cite web |title=Questions raised about how LinkedIn uses the petabytes of data it collects |url=https://www.csoonline.com/article/4156064/questions-raised-about-how-linkedin-uses-the-petabytes-of-data-it-collects.html |website=CSO Online |date=2026-04-08 |access-date=2026-06-14}}</ref>
<ref name="ppc">{{Cite web |title=LinkedIn hit with class action over hidden browser scan of 6,000 extensions |url=https://ppc.land/linkedin-hit-with-class-action-over-hidden-browser-scan-of-6-000-extensions/ |website=PPC Land |date=2026-04-08 |access-date=2026-06-14}}</ref>
<ref name="browsergate">{{Cite web |title=First court action over DMA access |url=https://browsergate.eu/updates/first-court-action-over-dma-access/ |website=BrowserGate (Fairlinked e.V.) |date=2026-03-11 |access-date=2026-06-14}}</ref>
<ref name="msft">{{Cite web |title=Microsoft to acquire LinkedIn |url=https://news.microsoft.com/2016/06/13/microsoft-to-acquire-linkedin/ |website=Microsoft News Center |date=2016-06-13 |access-date=2026-06-14}}</ref>
<ref name="safestate">{{Cite web |title=LinkedIn's BrowserGate Exposes Covert Scanning of 6,000 Extensions |url=https://www.safestate.com/post/linkedins-browsergate-exposes-covert-scanning-of-6000-extensions |website=SafeState |date=2026-04-15 |access-date=2026-06-14}}</ref>
</references>

[[Category:Incidents]]
[[Category:Privacy]]
[[Category:Data Collection]]
[[Category:2026 incidents]]

← Older revision		Revision as of 18:17, 14 June 2026
Line 13:		Line 13:
	== Background ==		== Background ==

	LinkedIn is a professional-networking service with more than one billion members.<ref name="tnw" /> [[Microsoft]] acquired the company in 2016 for $26.2 billion.<ref name="msft" /> The service has drawn regulatory scrutiny over its data handling before BrowserGate. In October 2024 the Irish Data Protection Commission fined LinkedIn 310 million euros, about $334 million, over processing personal data for targeted advertising without a valid legal basis.<ref name="tnw" />		LinkedIn is a professional-networking service with more than one billion members.<ref name="tnw" /> [[Microsoft]] acquired the company in 2016 for $26.2 billion.<ref name="msft" /> The service has drawn regulatory scrutiny over its data handling before BrowserGate. In October 2024 the Irish Data Protection Commission fined LinkedIn 310 million euros, about $334 million, over processing personal data for targeted advertising without a valid legal basis.<ref name="tnw" /><ref name="dpc" />

	[[File:LinkedIn BrowserGate Irish DPC fine.png\|thumb\|center\|upright=2.0\|The Irish Data Protection Commission's press release on its 310 million euro fine of LinkedIn Ireland, dated October 24, 2024.]]		[[File:LinkedIn BrowserGate Irish DPC fine.png\|thumb\|center\|upright=2.0\|The Irish Data Protection Commission's press release on its 310 million euro fine of LinkedIn Ireland, dated October 24, 2024.<ref name="dpc" />]]

	Browser extensions on Chromium-based browsers are addressed through fixed, enumerable identifiers. A web page can test whether a given extension is installed by attempting to load a file resource that the extension exposes under its known ID, & inferring the result from whether the load succeeds.<ref name="bleeping" />		Browser extensions on Chromium-based browsers are addressed through fixed, enumerable identifiers. A web page can test whether a given extension is installed by attempting to load a file resource that the extension exposes under its known ID, & inferring the result from whether the load succeeds.<ref name="bleeping" />
Line 27:		Line 27:
	BleepingComputer independently confirmed part of the claims through its own testing, during which it observed a JavaScript file with a randomized filename being loaded by LinkedIn's website.<ref name="bleeping" /> The total count of probed extensions came from the researchers rather than from BleepingComputer's own tally. The BrowserGate report counted 6,222 extensions, a figure repeated by PCMag & in the two lawsuits, while BleepingComputer's own testing found a script checking 6,236.<ref name="pcmag" /><ref name="bleeping" />		BleepingComputer independently confirmed part of the claims through its own testing, during which it observed a JavaScript file with a randomized filename being loaded by LinkedIn's website.<ref name="bleeping" /> The total count of probed extensions came from the researchers rather than from BleepingComputer's own tally. The BrowserGate report counted 6,222 extensions, a figure repeated by PCMag & in the two lawsuits, while BleepingComputer's own testing found a script checking 6,236.<ref name="pcmag" /><ref name="bleeping" />

	[[File:LinkedIn BrowserGate BleepingComputer verification.png\|thumb\|center\|upright=2.2\|BleepingComputer reported observing LinkedIn's scanning script and counting a check for 6,236 extensions, stating that it confirmed part of the BrowserGate findings through its own testing.]]		[[File:LinkedIn BrowserGate BleepingComputer verification.png\|thumb\|center\|upright=2.2\|BleepingComputer reported observing LinkedIn's scanning script and counting a check for 6,236 extensions, stating that it confirmed part of the BrowserGate findings through its own testing.<ref name="bleeping" />]]

	== Discovery and disclosure ==		== Discovery and disclosure ==
Line 35:		Line 35:
	LinkedIn tied the report to a prior legal dispute. The company says the report stems from a dispute with the developer of a LinkedIn-related browser extension called Teamfluence, which LinkedIn restricted for violating its terms.<ref name="bleeping" /> The developer, Teamfluence Signal Systems OÜ, sought a preliminary injunction against LinkedIn Ireland Unlimited Company & LinkedIn Germany GmbH at the Regional Court of Munich in January 2026.<ref name="browsergate" /> In March 2026 the court dismissed the motion, finding that LinkedIn's actions did not constitute unlawful obstruction or discrimination.<ref name="cso" /><ref name="bleeping" />		LinkedIn tied the report to a prior legal dispute. The company says the report stems from a dispute with the developer of a LinkedIn-related browser extension called Teamfluence, which LinkedIn restricted for violating its terms.<ref name="bleeping" /> The developer, Teamfluence Signal Systems OÜ, sought a preliminary injunction against LinkedIn Ireland Unlimited Company & LinkedIn Germany GmbH at the Regional Court of Munich in January 2026.<ref name="browsergate" /> In March 2026 the court dismissed the motion, finding that LinkedIn's actions did not constitute unlawful obstruction or discrimination.<ref name="cso" /><ref name="bleeping" />

	[[File:LinkedIn BrowserGate Munich dismissal.png\|thumb\|center\|upright=2.2\|Fairlinked's BrowserGate page logs the January 2026 injunction filing against two LinkedIn entities and the Regional Court of Munich's dismissal of the motion on March 11, 2026.]]		[[File:LinkedIn BrowserGate Munich dismissal.png\|thumb\|center\|upright=2.2\|Fairlinked's BrowserGate page logs the January 2026 injunction filing against two LinkedIn entities and the Regional Court of Munich's dismissal of the motion on March 11, 2026.<ref name="browsergate" />]]

	== Competitor-tool targeting ==		== Competitor-tool targeting ==
Line 51:		Line 51:
	<blockquote>''This is a house of cards built entirely upon a fabrication. We do disclose that we scan for browser extensions in our Privacy Policy, in order to detect abuse and provide defense for site stability.''</blockquote><ref name="pcmag" />		<blockquote>''This is a house of cards built entirely upon a fabrication. We do disclose that we scan for browser extensions in our Privacy Policy, in order to detect abuse and provide defense for site stability.''</blockquote><ref name="pcmag" />

	LinkedIn also ~~linked~~ the report to that developer~~, telling PCMag~~:		LinkedIn also tied the report to the Teamfluence dispute. It told PCMag that the report came from the developer whose extension LinkedIn had restricted & whose preliminary injunction the Regional Court of Munich dismissed:<ref name="bleeping" />

	<blockquote>''Unfortunately, this is a case of an individual who lost in the court of law, but is seeking to re-litigate in the court of public opinion without regard for accuracy.''</blockquote><ref name="pcmag" />		<blockquote>''Unfortunately, this is a case of an individual who lost in the court of law, but is seeking to re-litigate in the court of public opinion without regard for accuracy.''</blockquote><ref name="pcmag" />

			The ''court of law'' in that statement is the Munich injunction case, which the developer lost; the ''court of public opinion'' is the BrowserGate report & its press coverage.<ref name="bleeping" />

	To The Next Web, the company said it looks for extensions ''that scrape data without members' consent or otherwise violate LinkedIn's Terms of Service'' to protect member privacy, data, & site stability.<ref name="tnw" /> LinkedIn's privacy policy states that it collects information about users' devices, including their web browser & add-ons.<ref name="mediapost" /> The BrowserGate report's position is that scanning thousands of specific third-party extensions without an explicit consent dialog is not meaningfully disclosed.<ref name="tnw" />		To The Next Web, the company said it looks for extensions ''that scrape data without members' consent or otherwise violate LinkedIn's Terms of Service'' to protect member privacy, data, & site stability.<ref name="tnw" /> LinkedIn's privacy policy states that it collects information about users' devices, including their web browser & add-ons.<ref name="mediapost" /> The BrowserGate report's position is that scanning thousands of specific third-party extensions without an explicit consent dialog is not meaningfully disclosed.<ref name="tnw" />
Line 61:		Line 63:
	Two separate class actions were filed against LinkedIn in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in early April 2026.<ref name="privacydaily" /><ref name="bloomberg" /> One, brought by Nicholas Farrell, is case No. 4:26-cv-02953.<ref name="privacydaily" /> The other, brought by Jeff Ganan, is case No. 5:26-cv-02968; the Ganan complaint was filed on April 6, 2026 by the Law Office of J.R. Howell & accused LinkedIn of running a ''covert browser surveillance system''.<ref name="privacydaily" /><ref name="ppc" />		Two separate class actions were filed against LinkedIn in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in early April 2026.<ref name="privacydaily" /><ref name="bloomberg" /> One, brought by Nicholas Farrell, is case No. 4:26-cv-02953.<ref name="privacydaily" /> The other, brought by Jeff Ganan, is case No. 5:26-cv-02968; the Ganan complaint was filed on April 6, 2026 by the Law Office of J.R. Howell & accused LinkedIn of running a ''covert browser surveillance system''.<ref name="privacydaily" /><ref name="ppc" />

	[[File:LinkedIn BrowserGate Ganan complaint.png\|thumb\|center\|upright=2.2\|PPC Land's account of the Ganan v. LinkedIn complaint, filed April 6, 2026 as case No. 5:26-cv-02968 by the Law Office of J.R. Howell.]]		[[File:LinkedIn BrowserGate Ganan complaint.png\|thumb\|center\|upright=2.2\|PPC Land's account of the Ganan v. LinkedIn complaint, filed April 6, 2026 as case No. 5:26-cv-02968 by the Law Office of J.R. Howell.<ref name="ppc" />]]

	The complaints plead causes of action including the California Comprehensive Computer Data Access & Fraud Act, invasion of privacy under the California Constitution, intrusion upon seclusion, the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act, & California penal-code provisions covering the illegal use of a pen register or trap-and-trace device.<ref name="privacydaily" /> PCMag & Bloomberg Law reported on the same conduct underlying both suits.<ref name="pcmag" /><ref name="bloomberg" />		The complaints plead causes of action including the California Comprehensive Computer Data Access & Fraud Act, invasion of privacy under the California Constitution, intrusion upon seclusion, the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act, & California penal-code provisions covering the illegal use of a pen register or trap-and-trace device.<ref name="privacydaily" /> PCMag & Bloomberg Law reported on the same conduct underlying both suits.<ref name="pcmag" /><ref name="bloomberg" />
Line 85:		Line 87:
	<ref name="browsergate">{{Cite web \|title=First court action over DMA access \|url=https://browsergate.eu/updates/first-court-action-over-dma-access/ \|website=BrowserGate (Fairlinked e.V.) \|date=2026-03-11 \|access-date=2026-06-14}}</ref>		<ref name="browsergate">{{Cite web \|title=First court action over DMA access \|url=https://browsergate.eu/updates/first-court-action-over-dma-access/ \|website=BrowserGate (Fairlinked e.V.) \|date=2026-03-11 \|access-date=2026-06-14}}</ref>
	<ref name="msft">{{Cite web \|title=Microsoft to acquire LinkedIn \|url=https://news.microsoft.com/2016/06/13/microsoft-to-acquire-linkedin/ \|website=Microsoft News Center \|date=2016-06-13 \|access-date=2026-06-14}}</ref>		<ref name="msft">{{Cite web \|title=Microsoft to acquire LinkedIn \|url=https://news.microsoft.com/2016/06/13/microsoft-to-acquire-linkedin/ \|website=Microsoft News Center \|date=2016-06-13 \|access-date=2026-06-14}}</ref>
			<ref name="dpc">{{Cite web \|title=Irish Data Protection Commission fines LinkedIn Ireland €310 million \|url=https://www.dataprotection.ie/en/news-media/press-releases/irish-data-protection-commission-fines-linkedin-ireland-eu310-million \|website=Data Protection Commission \|date=2024-10-24 \|access-date=2026-06-14}}</ref>
	<ref name="safestate">{{Cite web \|title=LinkedIn's BrowserGate Exposes Covert Scanning of 6,000 Extensions \|url=https://www.safestate.com/post/linkedins-browsergate-exposes-covert-scanning-of-6000-extensions \|website=SafeState \|date=2026-04-15 \|access-date=2026-06-14}}</ref>		<ref name="safestate">{{Cite web \|title=LinkedIn's BrowserGate Exposes Covert Scanning of 6,000 Extensions \|url=https://www.safestate.com/post/linkedins-browsergate-exposes-covert-scanning-of-6000-extensions \|website=SafeState \|date=2026-04-15 \|access-date=2026-06-14}}</ref>
	</references>		</references>