Flock License Plate Readers: Difference between revisions
Added a lawsuit header, overview of IJ.org’s suit against FLOC |
→Illegal Camera Installations: Added information on an illegal camera installation in Evanston where the city was forced to cover the cameras. Provided and added a citation with a live URL and archived page. |
||
| (20 intermediate revisions by 12 users not shown) | |||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
<!-- Research conducted December 2025; enhanced with additional company responses, legal developments, and regulatory actions --> | |||
{{ProductCargo | {{ProductCargo | ||
|Company=Flock Safety | |Company=Flock Safety | ||
| Line 10: | Line 11: | ||
|Description=AI-powered automated license plate reader (ALPR) system that creates "Vehicle Fingerprints" by recording license plates, vehicle characteristics, and movement patterns for law enforcement use without individual consent or warrants. | |Description=AI-powered automated license plate reader (ALPR) system that creates "Vehicle Fingerprints" by recording license plates, vehicle characteristics, and movement patterns for law enforcement use without individual consent or warrants. | ||
}} | }} | ||
'''Flock License Plate Readers''' (previously known as '''Flock Safety Falcon'''<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.flocksafety.com/devices/falcon|title=Falcon|work=Flock Safety|access-date=2024-12-06|archive-url=https://archive.ph/UjKM5|archive-date=2024-12-06|url-status=dead}}</ref>), are a network of AI-powered surveillance cameras that record vehicle data for law enforcement agencies. The system operates in over 5,000 communities across 49 U.S. states | '''Flock License Plate Readers''' (previously known as '''Flock Safety Falcon'''<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.flocksafety.com/devices/falcon|title=Falcon|work=Flock Safety|access-date=2024-12-06|archive-url=https://archive.ph/UjKM5|archive-date=2024-12-06|url-status=dead}}</ref>), are a network of AI-powered surveillance cameras that record vehicle data for law enforcement agencies. The system operates in over 5,000 communities across 49 U.S. states.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/06/flock-safetys-feature-updates-cannot-make-automated-license-plate-readers-safe|title=Flock Safety's Feature Updates Cannot Make Automated License Plate Readers Safe|work=Electronic Frontier Foundation|date=2025-06-27|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> According to the company's own marketing materials, Flock performs over 20 billion vehicle scans monthly.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.flocksafety.com/|title=Flock Safety|work=Flock Safety|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> | ||
== | ==Consumer impact summary== | ||
====Freedom==== | ====Freedom==== | ||
Residents and taxpayers have no mechanism to opt out of Flock's surveillance network. The cameras operate 24/7 in public spaces, recording all passing vehicles regardless of consent. Unlike traditional security cameras that may be avoided by choosing different routes, Flock's expanding network of over 40,000 cameras makes avoidance increasingly difficult.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://deflock.me/|title=Find Nearby ALPRs|work=DeFlock|access-date=2025-08-23|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250728224453/https://deflock.me/|archive-date=2025-07-28|url-status=live}}</ref> The system uses AI to create ''"Vehicle Fingerprints"'' that identify vehicles by characteristics beyond license plates, including make, model, color, aftermarket parts, window stickers, and roof racks.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/surveillance-company-flock-now-using-ai-to-report-us-to-police-if-it-thinks-our-movement-patterns-are-suspicious|title=Surveillance Company Flock Now Using AI to Report Us to Police if it Thinks Our Movement Patterns Are "Suspicious"|work=American Civil Liberties Union|date=2024|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> | Residents and taxpayers have no mechanism to opt out of [[Flock Safety]]'s surveillance network. The cameras operate 24/7 in public spaces, recording all passing vehicles regardless of consent. They are also placed on private premises like universities, hospitals, businesses, and neighborhood associations, which often share this data with law enforcement.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web |last=Brewster |first=Thomas |date=2024-06-19 |title=FedEx's Secretive Police Force Is Helping Cops Build An AI Car Surveillance Network |url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2024/06/19/fedex-police-help-cops-build-an-ai-car-surveillance-network/ |url-status=live |access-date=2025-08-25 |website=Forbes}}</ref> This data can later be integrated into predictive police platforms like Palantir.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Rettberg |first=Jill Walker |title=Machine Vision: How Algorithms are Changing the Way We See the World |date=September 11, 2023 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons. |year=2023 |location=Google Books |pages=45-46 |language=English}}</ref> | ||
Unlike traditional security cameras that may be avoided by choosing different routes, Flock's expanding network of over 40,000 cameras makes avoidance increasingly difficult.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://deflock.me/|title=Find Nearby ALPRs|work=DeFlock|access-date=2025-08-23|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250728224453/https://deflock.me/|archive-date=2025-07-28|url-status=live}}</ref> The system uses AI to create ''"Vehicle Fingerprints"'' that identify vehicles by characteristics beyond license plates, including make, model, color, aftermarket parts, window stickers, and roof racks.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/surveillance-company-flock-now-using-ai-to-report-us-to-police-if-it-thinks-our-movement-patterns-are-suspicious|title=Surveillance Company Flock Now Using AI to Report Us to Police if it Thinks Our Movement Patterns Are "Suspicious"|work=American Civil Liberties Union|date=2024|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> | |||
====Privacy==== | ====Privacy==== | ||
While Flock Safety claims their system doesn't violate Fourth Amendment rights because ''"license plates are not personal information,"''<ref name="Flock-PE">{{Cite web|url=https://www.flocksafety.com/privacy-ethics|title=Privacy & Ethics|work=Flock Safety|access-date=2025-08-23|archive-url=https://archive.ph/OP55p|archive-date=2025-08-23|url-status=live}}</ref> federal courts have challenged this interpretation. In February 2024, a federal judge ruled that a lawsuit challenging Norfolk, Virginia's use of 172 Flock cameras could proceed, finding that plaintiffs had plausibly alleged the system creates a ''"detailed chronicle of a person's physical presence compiled every day."''<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://ij.org/press-release/judge-rules-lawsuit-challenging-norfolks-use-of-flock-cameras-can-proceed/|title=Judge Rules Lawsuit Challenging Norfolk's Use of Flock Cameras Can Proceed|work=Institute for Justice|date=2024-02-01|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> | While Flock Safety claims their system doesn't violate Fourth Amendment rights because ''"license plates are not personal information,"''<ref name="Flock-PE">{{Cite web|url=https://www.flocksafety.com/privacy-ethics|title=Privacy & Ethics|work=Flock Safety|access-date=2025-08-23|archive-url=https://archive.ph/OP55p|archive-date=2025-08-23|url-status=live}}</ref> federal courts have challenged this interpretation. In February 2024, a federal judge ruled that a lawsuit challenging Norfolk, Virginia's use of 172 Flock cameras could proceed, finding that plaintiffs had plausibly alleged the system creates a ''"detailed chronicle of a person's physical presence compiled every day."''<ref name="norfolk">{{Cite web|url=https://ij.org/press-release/judge-rules-lawsuit-challenging-norfolks-use-of-flock-cameras-can-proceed/|title=Judge Rules Lawsuit Challenging Norfolk's Use of Flock Cameras Can Proceed|work=Institute for Justice|date=2024-02-01|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> | ||
Data collected includes location history that can reveal sensitive information about medical visits, religious attendance, political activities, and personal associations. While Flock states data is deleted after 30 days, contracts grant them ''"perpetual, worldwide, royalty-free license"'' to use anonymized data indefinitely.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.flocksafety.com/terms-and-conditions|title=Terms and Conditions|work=Flock Safety|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> The system shares data across a network of over 4,800 law enforcement agencies nationally.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.404media.co/lawsuit-argues-warrantless-use-of-flock-surveillance-cameras-is-unconstitutional/|title=Lawsuit Argues Warrantless Use of Flock Surveillance Cameras Is Unconstitutional|work=404 Media|date=2024|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> | Data collected includes location history that can reveal sensitive information about medical visits, religious attendance, political activities, and personal associations. While Flock states data is deleted after 30 days, contracts grant them ''"perpetual, worldwide, royalty-free license"'' to use anonymized data indefinitely.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.flocksafety.com/terms-and-conditions|title=Terms and Conditions|work=Flock Safety|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> The system shares data across a network of over 4,800 law enforcement agencies nationally.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.404media.co/lawsuit-argues-warrantless-use-of-flock-surveillance-cameras-is-unconstitutional/|title=Lawsuit Argues Warrantless Use of Flock Surveillance Cameras Is Unconstitutional|work=404 Media|date=2024|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> | ||
| Line 24: | Line 27: | ||
While Flock defines anonymized data as customer data that is ''"permanently stripped of identifying details and any potential personally identifiable information"'' and is rendered so that a person or entity ''"can no longer be identified directly or indirectly,"'' this definition includes information such as vehicle make, model, color, location patterns, and other non–license-plate attributes.<ref>{{cite web |date=2025-07-22 |title=Terms and Conditions |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/legal/terms-and-conditions |access-date=2025-08-23 |website=Flock Safety}}</ref> | While Flock defines anonymized data as customer data that is ''"permanently stripped of identifying details and any potential personally identifiable information"'' and is rendered so that a person or entity ''"can no longer be identified directly or indirectly,"'' this definition includes information such as vehicle make, model, color, location patterns, and other non–license-plate attributes.<ref>{{cite web |date=2025-07-22 |title=Terms and Conditions |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/legal/terms-and-conditions |access-date=2025-08-23 |website=Flock Safety}}</ref> | ||
Privacy researchers caution that mobility datasets labeled as "anonymized" can still be re-identified. A 2013 MIT study found that just four spatio-temporal points uniquely identified 95% of individuals in an anonymized location dataset.<ref>{{cite journal |last=de Montjoye |first=Y.-A. |last2=Hidalgo |first2=C. A. |last3=Verleysen |first3=M. |last4=Blondel |first4=V. D. |year=2013 |title=Unique in the Crowd: The privacy bounds of human mobility |url=https://www.nature.com/articles/srep01376 |journal=Scientific Reports |volume=3 |pages=1376 |doi=10.1038/srep01376 |access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> | Privacy researchers caution that mobility datasets labeled as "anonymized" can still be re-identified. A 2013 MIT study found that just four spatio-temporal points uniquely identified 95% of individuals in an anonymized location dataset.<ref>{{cite journal |last=de Montjoye |first=Y.-A. |last2=Hidalgo |first2=C. A. |last3=Verleysen |first3=M. |last4=Blondel |first4=V. D. |year=2013 |title=Unique in the Crowd: The privacy bounds of human mobility |url=https://www.nature.com/articles/srep01376 |journal=Scientific Reports |volume=3 |pages=1376 |doi=10.1038/srep01376 |access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> Multiple peer-reviewed studies from 2018-2024 demonstrate that "anonymized" vehicle location data can be re-identified with high accuracy. A 2022 study showed researchers could re-identify drivers from raw vehicle network data with 97% accuracy by exploiting interdependencies in sensor measurements.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167404822002139|title=Privacy-preserving vehicle trajectory matching|website=ScienceDirect|date=2022|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> Research published in the Journal of Computer Science and Technology (2022) found that even 3-4 location points can uniquely identify individuals.<ref>{{cite journal|url=https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11390-022-2409-x|title=Experiments and Analyses of Anonymization Mechanisms for Trajectory Data Publishing|journal=Journal of Computer Science and Technology|date=2022|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | ||
====Business model==== | ====Business model==== | ||
Flock operates on a subscription model charging municipalities and law enforcement agencies $2,500 per camera annually plus installation costs.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://campbellca.gov/FAQ.aspx?QID=279|title=How much does a Flock Safety camera cost?|work=City of Campbell|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> Private businesses including Home Depot | Flock operates on a subscription model charging municipalities and law enforcement agencies $2,500 per camera annually plus installation costs.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://campbellca.gov/FAQ.aspx?QID=279|title=How much does a Flock Safety camera cost?|work=City of Campbell|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> Private businesses including Home Depot, Lowe's, and FedEx also deploy cameras, sharing data with law enforcement.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.404media.co/home-depot-and-lowes-share-data-from-hundreds-of-ai-cameras-with-cops/|title=Home Depot and Lowe's Share Data From Hundreds of AI Cameras With Cops|first=Jason|last=Koebler|date=2025-08-06|work=404Media|access-date=2025-08-23|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250823135847/https://www.404media.co/home-depot-and-lowes-share-data-from-hundreds-of-ai-cameras-with-cops/|archive-date=2025-08-23|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=":0" /> Contracts include automatic renewal clauses and limit municipal oversight capabilities, with cities unable to audit system operations or control how other agencies use shared data.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.aclu.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/flock_1.pdf|title=How to Pump the Brakes on Your Police Department's Use of Flock's Mass Surveillance License Plate Readers|work=ACLU|date=2024|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> | ||
====Market control==== | ====Market control==== | ||
| Line 37: | Line 40: | ||
These are often referred to as license plate cameras, which creates a fundamental misunderstanding of the product's capabilities. | These are often referred to as license plate cameras, which creates a fundamental misunderstanding of the product's capabilities. | ||
While marketed as "License Plate Readers," Flock's cameras use what the company calls "''Vehicle Fingerprint"'' technology that tracks vehicles using characteristics beyond just license plates. According to Flock's own marketing materials, the system can identify vehicles even when license plates cannot be captured, advertised as turning ''"images into actionable evidence — no plate required."''<ref>{{Cite web |title=LPR Cameras |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/products/lpr-cameras |access-date=2025-08-23 |work=Flock Safety}}</ref> | While marketed as ''"License Plate Readers,"'' Flock's cameras use what the company calls "''Vehicle Fingerprint"'' technology that tracks vehicles using characteristics beyond just license plates. According to Flock's own marketing materials, the system can identify vehicles even when license plates cannot be captured, advertised as turning ''"images into actionable evidence — no plate required."''<ref>{{Cite web |title=LPR Cameras |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/products/lpr-cameras |access-date=2025-08-23 |work=Flock Safety}}</ref> | ||
[[File:No plate, still works.png|alt=Taken from Flock's marketing materials on their website. Their cameras are advertised as not needing a license plate to work due to vehicle fingerprinting technology; demonstrating that this is far more than just a "license plate camera" |thumb|Taken from Flock's marketing materials on their website. Their cameras are advertised as not needing a license plate to work due to vehicle fingerprinting technology; demonstrating that this is far more than just a "license plate camera" <ref>{{Cite web |title=LPR Cameras |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/products/license-plate-readers}}</ref>]] | [[File:No plate, still works.png|alt=Taken from Flock's marketing materials on their website. Their cameras are advertised as not needing a license plate to work due to vehicle fingerprinting technology; demonstrating that this is far more than just a "license plate camera" |thumb|Taken from Flock's marketing materials on their website. Their cameras are advertised as not needing a license plate to work due to vehicle fingerprinting technology; demonstrating that this is far more than just a "license plate camera" <ref>{{Cite web |title=LPR Cameras |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/products/license-plate-readers}}</ref>]] | ||
The system catalogs vehicles based on numerous distinguishing features including make, model, color, bumper stickers, dents, damage patterns, roof racks, aftermarket modifications such as wheels or spoilers, window stickers, and even mismatching paint colors.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Harwell |first=Drew |date=2021-10-22 |title=Flock license plate readers spark controversy in Golden, Colo. |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/10/22/crime-suburbs-license-plate-readers/ |access-date=2025-08-23 |work=The Washington Post}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Flock Safety ALPR |url=https://www.campbellca.gov/1260/Flock-Safety-ALPR |access-date=2025-08-23 |work=City of Campbell}}</ref> Flock claims this capability is ''"unique among ALPR systems"'' & allows law enforcement to search for vehicles based on these characteristics even without a visible license plate. | The system catalogs vehicles based on numerous distinguishing features including make, model, color, bumper stickers, dents, damage patterns, roof racks, aftermarket modifications such as wheels or spoilers, window stickers, and even mismatching paint colors.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Harwell |first=Drew |date=2021-10-22 |title=Flock license plate readers spark controversy in Golden, Colo. |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/10/22/crime-suburbs-license-plate-readers/ |access-date=2025-08-23 |work=The Washington Post}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Flock Safety ALPR |url=https://www.campbellca.gov/1260/Flock-Safety-ALPR |access-date=2025-08-23 |work=City of Campbell}}</ref> Flock claims this capability is ''"unique among ALPR systems"'' & allows law enforcement to search for vehicles based on these characteristics even without a visible license plate. | ||
| Line 44: | Line 47: | ||
Privacy advocates note that this expanded tracking capability makes the term ''"license plate reader"'' misleading, as Flock systems create detailed vehicle profiles that persist even without readable plates. It turns any distinguishing feature of a vehicle into a tracking identifier.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Stop Flock |url=https://www.stopflock.com/ |access-date=2025-08-23 |work=Stop Flock}}</ref> | Privacy advocates note that this expanded tracking capability makes the term ''"license plate reader"'' misleading, as Flock systems create detailed vehicle profiles that persist even without readable plates. It turns any distinguishing feature of a vehicle into a tracking identifier.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Stop Flock |url=https://www.stopflock.com/ |access-date=2025-08-23 |work=Stop Flock}}</ref> | ||
==Constitutional and legal challenges== | |||
===Norfolk federal lawsuit=== | |||
In February 2025, Chief Judge Mark S. Davis of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Norfolk's motion to dismiss a landmark Fourth Amendment lawsuit. The case involves two residents whose vehicles were tracked 526 times in 4.5 months and 849 times over the same period, figures revealed in a September 2025 court filing.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/virginia-police-used-flock-cameras-track-driver-safety-lawsuit-surveil-rcna230399|title=Virginia police used Flock cameras to track driver 526 times in 4 months, lawsuit says|work=NBC News|date=2025-09-18|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> Norfolk installed 172 Flock Safety cameras in 2023 at a cost of $430,000-$516,000 annually. Police Chief Mark Talbot stated the goal was making it ''"difficult to drive anywhere of any distance without running into a camera somewhere."''<ref name="norfolk" /> | |||
Judge Davis's ruling relied on ''Carpenter v. United States'', the 2018 Supreme Court decision requiring warrants for historical cell phone location data. The court found Norfolk's ALPR network "notably similar" to the surveillance the Supreme Court deemed unconstitutional. However, courts remain divided. In November 2024, Senior U.S. District Judge Robert E. Payne in the same district denied a motion to suppress Flock evidence, holding that three vehicle snapshots don't constitute "persistent surveillance" requiring a warrant.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://valawyersweekly.com/2024/11/11/mosaic-theory-rejected-flock-camera-evidence-does-not-violate-fourth-amendment/|title='Mosaic theory' rejected: Flock camera evidence does not violate Fourth Amendment|website=Virginia Lawyers Weekly|date=2024-11-11|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | |||
Virginia state courts show similar disagreement. Norfolk Circuit Court Judge Jamilah LeCruise granted a suppression motion in May 2024, finding that the breadth of Flock cameras covering Norfolk requires a warrant.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.govtech.com/public-safety/virginia-judge-rejects-alpr-evidence-without-warrant|title=Virginia Judge Rejects ALPR Evidence Without Warrant|website=Government Technology|date=2024-05-15|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> Yet three other Norfolk circuit court judges denied similar motions in 2024. | |||
===State regulatory landscape=== | |||
Only 16 states have enacted any form of ALPR regulation as of 2024 according to University of Michigan research.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://stpp.fordschool.umich.edu/news/2023/automated-license-plate-readers-widely-used-subject-abuse|title=Automated License Plate Readers widely used, subject to abuse|website=University of Michigan|date=2023|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> Virginia enacted House Bill 2724 in 2025 creating annual reporting requirements.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://vscc.virginia.gov/Annual%20Reports/2024%20VSCC%20Annual%20Report%20-Law%20Enforcement%20Use%20of%20ALPR.pdf|title=2024 VSCC Annual Report - Law Enforcement Use of ALPR|website=Virginia State Crime Commission|date=2024|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> Illinois Public Act 103-0540 explicitly prohibits use for reproductive healthcare punishment and immigration investigations.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/103/103-0540.htm|title=Public Act 103-0540|website=Illinois General Assembly|date=2024|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | |||
==Other surveillance products== | |||
=====Flock Aerodome "Drone as First Responder"===== | |||
Flock Safety also offers an all-in-one drone product which integrates into the Flock AI Surveillance Network as well as local law enforcement's Computer Aided Dispatch software. The Drones are outfitted with live video cameras, thermal imaging, night vision, and potentially other sensors, and are capable of self-launching and self-navigating.<sup>[https://www.flocksafety.com/products/flock-aerodome]</sup> Flock Safety cites following potential use-cases: <blockquote>Drones are stationed across your service area, ready to respond instantly... Deploy from the dock to geo-coordinates of 911 calls, LPR hits, gunshot detection, or manually by the operator... Control multiple drones and docks with a single operator, providing continuous air support for the entire city.</blockquote>Rahul Sidhu, VP of Aviation at Flock Safety, works directly with FAA officials and actively lobbies Congress to gain favorable legislation which seeks to expand Flock Safety's surveillance network and further diminish citizen privacy. [https://www.flocksafety.com/blog/flock-commends-legislators-on-introduction-of-drone-act-of-2025][https://www.flocksafety.com/blog/jon-mcbride-joins-flock-safety][https://www.police1.com/drones/calif-pd-secures-first-faa-waiver-to-operate-dfr-program-at-400-feet-citywide] | |||
==Incidents== | ==Incidents== | ||
====== | ===Data sharing violations=== | ||
In Española, New Mexico, 21-year-old Jaclynn Gonzales and her 12-year-old sister were held at gunpoint and handcuffed after Flock's system mistook a "2" for a "7" on their license plate, falsely flagging their vehicle as stolen.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2023-09-28 |title=License plate cover leads to traffic stop mishap |url=https://www.koat.com/article/espanola-police-license-plate-stolen-cover-traffic-stop/45361740}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2025 |title=Flock Safety: Eroding Your Privacy & Keeping You Safe with Surveillance |url=https://redact.dev/blog/flock-safety-lpr-privacy-surveillance/ |access-date=2025-08-23 |work=Redact}}</ref> | |||
====Illinois audit findings (2024-2025)==== | |||
Illinois Secretary of State Alexi Giannoulias announced in late August 2024 that Flock Safety violated state law by allowing U.S. Customs and Border Protection to access Illinois license plate data for immigration enforcement.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.flocksafety.com/blog/flock-safetys-response-to-illinois-lpr-data-use-and-out-of-state-sharing-concerns|title=Flock Safety's Response to Illinois LPR Data Use and Out-of-State Sharing Concerns|website=Flock Safety|date=2024-08-25|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> The audit of 12 local law enforcement agencies revealed unauthorized pilot programs with CBP and Homeland Security Investigations, violating Illinois law prohibiting data sharing for immigration enforcement, gender-affirming care investigations, and abortion-related matters. Following the audit, 47 out-of-state agencies were removed from access to Illinois data.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.govtech.com/biz/flock-pledges-changes-after-illinois-data-sharing-accusation|title=Flock Pledges Changes After Illinois Data-Sharing Accusation|website=Government Technology|date=2024-08-15|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | |||
Mount Prospect, Illinois reported 262 immigration-related license plate reader searches in just the first few months of 2025. A Palos Heights detective shared Flock login credentials with a DEA agent who conducted 28 unauthorized searches of Oak Park ALPR data explicitly labeled "immigration violation."<ref name="dea">{{Cite web|url=https://unraveledpress.com/a-dea-agent-used-an-illinois-police-officers-flock-license-plate-reader-password-for-unauthorized-immigration-enforcement-searches/|title=DEA agent used Illinois cop's Flock license plate reader password for immigration enforcement searches|work=Unraveled Press|date=2025|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> | |||
====California violations (2015-2025)==== | |||
California passed Senate Bill 34<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://calmatters.digitaldemocracy.org/bills/ca_201520160sb34|title=Senate Bill 34|access-date=2025-08-27}}</ref> in 2015 to limit how California police departments can use and share data collected from these cameras with other state's and federal law enforcement agencies. These limits have been found to be violated on several occasions with little enforcement or consequences for the misusing departments<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://sfstandard.com/2025/07/23/california-police-sharing-flock-license-plate-data/|access-date=2025-08-27|title=California cops are breaking surveillance laws|website=San Francisco Standard|date=2025-07-23}}</ref>. | |||
A 2023 EFF investigation found 71 California police agencies in 22 counties illegally shared data with out-of-state law enforcement. San Francisco Police Department alone allowed 1.6 million illegal searches by out-of-state agencies from 2024-2025.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://sfstandard.com/2025/09/08/sfpd-flock-alpr-ice-data-sharing/|title=SFPD let Georgia, Texas cops illegally search city surveillance data on behalf of ICE|website=San Francisco Standard|date=2025-09-08|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> The California Attorney General filed the first enforcement action against the City of El Cajon in 2025 for sharing with 26 states.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-bonta-sues-el-cajon-illegally-sharing-license-plate-data-out|title=Attorney General Bonta Sues El Cajon for Illegally Sharing License Plate Data|website=California DOJ|date=2025|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | |||
===False positive incidents=== | |||
====Families detained at gunpoint==== | |||
In Española, New Mexico, 21-year-old Jaclynn Gonzales and her 12-year-old sister were held at gunpoint and handcuffed after Flock's system mistook a "2" for a "7" on their license plate, falsely flagging their vehicle as stolen.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2023-09-28 |title=License plate cover leads to traffic stop mishap |url=https://www.koat.com/article/espanola-police-license-plate-stolen-cover-traffic-stop/45361740|website=KOAT|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2025 |title=Flock Safety: Eroding Your Privacy & Keeping You Safe with Surveillance |url=https://redact.dev/blog/flock-safety-lpr-privacy-surveillance/ |access-date=2025-08-23 |work=Redact}}</ref> | |||
ALPR systems often misread license plates according to multiple investigations, leading to hardship & legal trouble for innocent civilians.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/11/human-toll-alpr-errors|title=The Human Toll of ALPR Errors|website=Electronic Frontier Foundation|date=2024-11-15|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | |||
===Law enforcement stalking incidents=== | |||
In October 2022, Kechi, Kansas Police Lieutenant Victor Heiar was arrested and later pleaded guilty to computer crimes and stalking after using Flock cameras to track his estranged wife's movements over four months.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.kwch.com/2022/10/31/kechi-police-lieutenant-arrested-using-police-technology-stalk-wife/|title=Kechi police lieutenant arrested for using police technology to stalk wife|work=KWCH|date=2022-10-31|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> In a separate Kansas incident, Sedgwick Police Chief Lee Nygaard accessed Flock data 164 times to track his ex-girlfriend before resigning after admitting to the misuse.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.yahoo.com/news/kansas-police-chief-used-flock-093300946.html|title=Kansas police chief used Flock license plate cameras 164 times to track ex-girlfriend|work=Yahoo News|date=2025|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> | |||
Multiple other documented cases include Las Vegas Metro Officer Christopher Young arrested in December 2023 for stalking his ex-fiancée using police databases, and Riverside County Deputy Eric Piscatella pleading guilty in February 2024 to seven counts of misusing sheriff's department databases to stalk a woman he met at Coachella.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.fox5vegas.com/2024/02/16/las-vegas-police-officer-arrested-reportedly-stalking-ex-fiancee/?outputType=amp|title=Las Vegas police officer arrested for reportedly stalking ex-fiancée|website=FOX5 Vegas|date=2024-02-16|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | |||
===Abortion and reproductive healthcare tracking=== | |||
In May 2025, Johnson County, Texas sheriff's deputies used Flock's network to track a woman suspected of self-managing an abortion. They conducted searches across 83,000+ Flock cameras nationwide with the explicit reason: "had an abortion, search for female." The search accessed cameras across multiple states including those where abortion is legal. The incident led Illinois officials to investigate and subsequently block 47+ out-of-state agencies from accessing Illinois ALPR data.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.dallasnews.com/news/texas/2025/06/13/after-finding-fetal-remains-north-texas-cops-used-camera-network-to-search-for-woman/|title=After finding fetal remains, North Texas cops used camera network to search for woman|work=The Dallas Morning News|date=2025-06-13|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/05/she-got-abortion-so-texas-cop-used-83000-cameras-track-her-down|title=She Got an Abortion. So A Texas Cop Used 83,000 Cameras to Track Her Down|website=Electronic Frontier Foundation|date=2025-05-15|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | |||
===Federal agency access=== | |||
Immigration and Customs Enforcement maintains a $6.1 million contract giving 9,000+ ICE officers access to the Vigilant Solutions ALPR database containing over 5 billion location data points.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.aclu.org/news/immigrants-rights/documents-reveal-ice-using-driver-location-data|title=Documents Reveal ICE Using Driver Location Data From Local Police for Deportations|website=ACLU|date=2024|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> The Drug Enforcement Administration operates a National License Plate Reader Program with over 10,000 license plate readers shared throughout the United States. 404 Media revealed over 4,000 searches by local and state police for federal immigration enforcement purposes, despite Flock having no formal ICE contract.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.404media.co/ice-taps-into-nationwide-ai-enabled-camera-network-data-shows/|title=ICE Taps into Nationwide AI-Enabled Camera Network, Data Shows|work=404 Media|date=2025|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> A DEA agent was found using an Illinois police officer's credentials to conduct unauthorized immigration searches.<ref name="dea" /> | |||
===Illegal Camera Installations=== | |||
In South Carolina, Flock installed over 200 cameras without authorization, leading to a statewide moratorium on new installations.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Ferrara |first=David |date=2024-03-11 |title=A company installed license plate cameras without permission. SC agency wants clear rules |url=https://www.postandcourier.com/news/alpr-cameras-south-carolina-flock-safety-license-plate-readers/article_787a262a-dbd2-11ee-a901-634acead588b.html |url-status=live |access-date=2025-08-25 |website=The Post and Courier}}</ref> | |||
In Illinois, a Flock representative allegedly threatened a Department of Transportation official with police pressure when questioned about permit applications.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Uprise RI Staff |date=2024-10-23 |title=As Flock Surveillance Cameras Proliferate in Rhode Island, Lawsuit Challenges Their Legality |url=https://upriseri.com/as-flock-surveillance-cameras-proliferate-in-rhode-island-lawsuit-challenges-their-legality/ |url-status=live |access-date=2025-08-25 |website=UPRISE RI}}</ref> | |||
===== '''In Evanston:''' ===== | |||
Flock was ordered to remove 18 stationary cameras. The city put the contract with Flock on a 30-day termination notice on August 26. Flock Initially appeared to comply, removing 15 of the cameras by September 8. Later, <u>Flock was caught reinstalling all of them by the following Tuesday without authorization from the city.</u> | |||
The city of Evanston responded with a cease-and-desist order for Flock to remove the new and unauthorized camera equipment. | |||
Because Flock reinstalled the cameras without permission, <u>Evanston was forced to cover the cameras with tape and bags to block them from potentially logging vehicle data.</u> | |||
This situation is particularly absurd, as the city was left with little choice but to physically shield the cameras due to Flock’s unauthorized action, and outright noncompliance with the wishes of the city. | |||
Flock appears apprehensive to comply and remove the hardware, with a representative of flock stating: | |||
“We continue to be optimistic that we will have the opportunity to have a constructive dialogue to address the City’s concerns and resume our successful partnership making Evanston safer” | |||
While it is clear that flock wishes to continue their contract, this does not address the wishes of the city. In this regard, A Flock spokesperson stated: “the cameras are not active and will be uninstalled” | |||
This raises concerns, as <u>it is unclear why flock chose to incur costs to install</u> <u>unauthorized inactive cameras after the initial request for removal.</u> Additionally, it is not possible, or remains extremely difficult and costly for the city to independently verify that the ‘inactive’ cameras are truly disabled. | |||
It remains unclear if there is concrete financial incentive for flock to partake in these possibly illegal or otherwise unethical actions. | |||
More physical cameras are ostensibly capable of creating more data, which is collected in aggregate by flock, and selectively shared with other clients. Additional data could create a clear value proposition for certain flock services, and thus effects the desirability of the services provided by flock, and potentially, the price which flock can expect to charge for their services.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Harrison |first=Alex |date=September 25th, 2025 |title=City covers Flock cameras while waiting for removal |url=https://evanstonroundtable.com/2025/09/25/city-covers-up-flock-cameras-while-waiting-for-removal/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.ph/PD1qe |archive-date=2025-10-10 |access-date=2025-10-10 |website=Evanston Roundtable}}</ref> | |||
===City rejections and terminations=== | |||
Multiple cities have rejected or terminated Flock contracts following privacy concerns and effectiveness issues: | Multiple cities have rejected or terminated Flock contracts following privacy concerns and effectiveness issues: | ||
'''0.2% effectiveness rate, low arrests:''' Austin, Texas terminated its contract in July 2025 after an audit revealed "systematic compliance failures" and only 165 arrests from 113 million license plate scans (0.146% effectiveness rate).<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://cbsaustin.com/news/local/flock-ceo-responds-to-austin-backlash-as-city-contract-nears-expiration|title=Flock CEO responds to Austin backlash as city contract nears expiration|work=CBS Austin|date=2025-06-21|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> | |||
Austin, Texas terminated its contract in July 2025 after an audit revealed "systematic compliance failures" and only 165 arrests from 113 million license plate scans (0. | |||
Denver City Council unanimously rejected a $666,000 contract extension in May 2025 following revelations of 1,400+ ICE-related searches in Colorado data.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://denverite.com/2025/05/05/denver-rejects-flock-camera-license-plate-readers/|title=Denver rejects $666,000 extension for license-plate surveillance cameras after backlash|work=Denverite|date=2025-05-05|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> | Denver City Council unanimously rejected a $666,000 contract extension in May 2025 following revelations of 1,400+ ICE-related searches in Colorado data.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://denverite.com/2025/05/05/denver-rejects-flock-camera-license-plate-readers/|title=Denver rejects $666,000 extension for license-plate surveillance cameras after backlash|work=Denverite|date=2025-05-05|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> | ||
| Line 76: | Line 136: | ||
Oak Park, Illinois terminated their contract entirely following the Illinois investigation into illegal data sharing.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.oakpark.com/2025/08/07/oak-park-terminates-flock-license-plate-reader-contract/|title=Oak Park terminates Flock license plate reader contract|work=Wednesday Journal|date=2025-08-07|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> | Oak Park, Illinois terminated their contract entirely following the Illinois investigation into illegal data sharing.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.oakpark.com/2025/08/07/oak-park-terminates-flock-license-plate-reader-contract/|title=Oak Park terminates Flock license plate reader contract|work=Wednesday Journal|date=2025-08-07|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> | ||
=== | ==Arizona deployments== | ||
=== | ===Sedona termination=== | ||
The | Sedona, Arizona became the first Arizona city to completely terminate its Flock Safety contract in September 2025 after citizen backlash. The city had installed 11 cameras in June 2025 without prior public notice at a cost of $51,146 for the first year. The council voted 5-1 to pause the program, then unanimously 7-0 on September 9 to permanently terminate after Flock CEO Garrett Langley admitted the company had been sharing data with federal agencies. Vice Mayor Holli Ploog called Flock "not an honorable company" for the conflicting data-sharing claims.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://westvalleyfamilies.substack.com/p/sedona-pulls-the-plug-on-flock-safety|title=Sedona Pulls the Plug on Flock Safety|website=West Valley Families|date=2025-09-10|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.knau.org/knau-and-arizona-news/2025-09-11/sedona-council-permanently-ends-license-plate-camera-program|title=Sedona council permanently ends license plate camera program|website=KNAU|date=2025-09-11|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | ||
==Camera | ===Other Arizona deployments=== | ||
Flagstaff deployed 32 Flock cameras in summer 2024 at a cost of $143,100 annually. By September 2025, a petition signed by 25+ residents demanded cancellation.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.kjzz.org/fronteras-desk/2025-09-01/after-sedona-paused-flock-safety-camera-system-flagstaff-is-considering-the-same-issue|title=After Sedona paused Flock Safety camera system, Flagstaff is considering the same issue|website=KJZZ|date=2025-09-01|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | |||
University of Arizona contracted with Flock in February 2025 for 54 ALPR cameras at $160,000 annually. Students and faculty launched a "Deflock Tucson" campaign citing concerns about tracking international students and potential data sharing with federal immigration authorities.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://azluminaria.org/2025/09/15/ua-students-and-faculty-question-use-of-flock-safety-cameras-on-campus/|title=UA students and faculty question use of Flock Safety cameras on campus|website=AZ Luminaria|date=2025-09-15|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | |||
Casa Grande approved a $10 million "Safe City Initiative" in September 2025 including 100 license plate readers. Chief Mark McCrory reported the current 22 license plate readers led to 212 stolen vehicles identified and 168 arrests.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.inmaricopa.com/we-mapped-all-flock-cameras/|title=We mapped the city's Flock cameras|website=InMaricopa|date=2025|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | |||
Despite documented deployments across Arizona including Phoenix, Mesa, Chandler, Scottsdale, Tempe, Surprise, Youngtown, Litchfield Park, and Yuma, the state has no ALPR-specific regulation.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://azmirror.com/2019/07/08/how-do-automated-license-plate-readers-work/|title=How do automated license plate readers work?|website=Arizona Mirror|date=2019-07-08|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | |||
==Security vulnerabilities== | |||
Flock Safety self-disclosed critical vulnerabilities in Q2 2025 and submitted them to MITRE for inclusion in the National Vulnerability Database.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.flocksafety.com/blog/proactive-security-disclosure-q2-2025|title=Proactive Security Disclosure Q2 2025|work=Flock Safety|date=2025|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> Vulnerabilities in similar ALPR systems have included hardcoded passwords and unencrypted data storage.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/06/new-alpr-vulnerabilities-prove-mass-surveillance-public-safety-threat|title=New ALPR Vulnerabilities Prove Mass Surveillance Is a Public Safety Threat|work=Electronic Frontier Foundation|date=2024-06-18|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> | |||
This marks the third major ALPR security disclosure in a decade. In 2015, EFF investigators found over 100 ALPR cameras unsecured on the internet. The most serious documented breach occurred in 2019 when a cyberattack compromised Perceptics, LLC, a CBP subcontractor, exposing 105,000 license plate images and 184,000 traveler facial images.<ref>{{cite web |date=2019-05-23 |title=Maker of US border's license-plate scanning tech ransacked by hacker, blueprints and files dumped online • The Register |url=https://www.theregister.com/2019/05/23/perceptics_hacked_license_plate_recognition/ |access-date=2025-10-05 |website=Department of Homeland Security OIG}}</ref> | |||
==Government accountability and oversight== | |||
===State audit findings=== | |||
California State Auditor's February 2020 investigation found Los Angeles Police Department, with a 320 million image database, had no ALPR-specific policy at all. The audit found 96% of agencies claim to have policies, but most are incomplete. Data retention periods varied wildly with no justification. LAPD maintained a minimum five-year retention period, yet couldn't demonstrate that images stored for years had investigative value. The audit found that 99.9% of the 320 million images Los Angeles stores are for vehicles that were not on a hot list when the image was made.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://information.auditor.ca.gov/reports/2019-118/summary.html|title=Automated License Plate Readers|website=California State Auditor|date=2020-02-13|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | |||
New Jersey provides a contrasting model with mandatory annual audits of all 523 law enforcement agencies. The 2024 audit reported only two significant violations, both involving users who hadn't completed required training.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://nj.gov/njsp/ALPR/pdf/2024_Audit_Automated_License_Plate_Recognition_(ALPR)_Data_Collected_Utilized_NJ_Law_Enforcement_Agencies.pdf|title=2024 Audit of Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR) Data|website=New Jersey State Police|date=2024|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | |||
A Government Technology analysis found that agencies often fail to audit ALPR systems regularly, leaving them "open to abuse by neglecting to institute sufficient oversight."<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.govtech.com/biz/data/alpr-audit-takeaways-what-we-learned-about-policy-gaps|title=ALPR Audit Takeaways: What We Learned About Policy Gaps|website=Government Technology|date=2024|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | |||
===Cost-benefit analysis=== | |||
Arizona Department of Transportation's 2008 study of generic ALPR technology (predating Flock Safety by nine years) estimated $9.98 million for a hypothetical statewide ALPR system. The projected benefit-to-cost ratio of 9.6:1 came entirely from registration and insurance compliance, not crime reduction.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://apps.azdot.gov/files/ADOTLibrary/publications/project_reports/PDF/AZ637.pdf|title=Automated License Plate Recognition Technology Implementation Report|website=Arizona Department of Transportation|date=2008-06-01|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | |||
Colorado's Office of Research and Statistics reported that while ALPR systems are expanding, independent academic research contradicts vendor claims. A 2011 George Mason University study concluded ALPRs "do not achieve a prevention or deterrent effect" on crime.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/ors/Docs/Briefs/2024-05_InDetail-ALPR.pdf|title=Automated License Plate Readers (In Detail)|website=Colorado Division of Criminal Justice|date=2024-05-01|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | |||
Oakland Police Department reported 182 arrests from ALPR in the first year, representing 1.4% of homicides, robberies, burglaries, and firearm assaults. The Northern California Regional Intelligence Center states approximately 1-2 vehicles out of 1,000 initiate alerts—a hit rate of just 0.1-0.2%.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://ncric.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/California-Law-Enforcement-ALPR-FAQ.pdf|title=California Law Enforcement ALPR FAQ|website=NCRIC|date=2021|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | |||
==Camera locations== | |||
The locations of many Flock Cameras have been mapped by the OpenStreetMap project. A viewer of the locations of these cameras is located here: https://deflock.me/map | The locations of many Flock Cameras have been mapped by the OpenStreetMap project. A viewer of the locations of these cameras is located here: https://deflock.me/map | ||
==References== | ==References== | ||
| Line 94: | Line 180: | ||
*[https://deflock.me/ DeFlock live map of active ALPRs] | *[https://deflock.me/ DeFlock live map of active ALPRs] | ||
*[https://www.noalprs.org/ No ALPRS movement in United States] | *[https://www.noalprs.org/ No ALPRS movement in United States] | ||
*[https://plateprivacy.com/ The Plate Privacy Project] | |||
*[https://eyesonflock.com/ Eyes On Flock] | |||
*[https://wiki.alprwatch.org/index.php/Main_Page ALPR Watch Wiki] | |||
[[Category: | [[Category:Surveillance]] | ||
[[Category:Privacy violations]] | |||
[[Category:Law enforcement technology]] | |||
[[Category:Fourth Amendment issues]] | |||
[[Category:Data security]] | |||