Flock License Plate Readers: Difference between revisions
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→Illegal Camera Installations: Added information on an illegal camera installation in Evanston where the city was forced to cover the cameras. Provided and added a citation with a live URL and archived page. |
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While Flock defines anonymized data as customer data that is ''"permanently stripped of identifying details and any potential personally identifiable information"'' and is rendered so that a person or entity ''"can no longer be identified directly or indirectly,"'' this definition includes information such as vehicle make, model, color, location patterns, and other non–license-plate attributes.<ref>{{cite web |date=2025-07-22 |title=Terms and Conditions |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/legal/terms-and-conditions |access-date=2025-08-23 |website=Flock Safety}}</ref> | While Flock defines anonymized data as customer data that is ''"permanently stripped of identifying details and any potential personally identifiable information"'' and is rendered so that a person or entity ''"can no longer be identified directly or indirectly,"'' this definition includes information such as vehicle make, model, color, location patterns, and other non–license-plate attributes.<ref>{{cite web |date=2025-07-22 |title=Terms and Conditions |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/legal/terms-and-conditions |access-date=2025-08-23 |website=Flock Safety}}</ref> | ||
Privacy researchers caution that mobility datasets labeled as "anonymized" can still be re-identified. A 2013 MIT study found that just four spatio-temporal points uniquely identified 95% of individuals in an anonymized location dataset.<ref>{{cite journal |last=de Montjoye |first=Y.-A. |last2=Hidalgo |first2=C. A. |last3=Verleysen |first3=M. |last4=Blondel |first4=V. D. |year=2013 |title=Unique in the Crowd: The privacy bounds of human mobility |url=https://www.nature.com/articles/srep01376 |journal=Scientific Reports |volume=3 |pages=1376 |doi=10.1038/srep01376 |access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> Multiple peer-reviewed studies from 2018-2024 demonstrate that "anonymized" vehicle location data can be re-identified with high accuracy. A 2022 study showed researchers could re-identify drivers from raw vehicle network data with 97% accuracy by exploiting interdependencies in sensor measurements.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167404822002139|title=Privacy-preserving vehicle trajectory matching|website=ScienceDirect|date=2022|access-date=2025- | Privacy researchers caution that mobility datasets labeled as "anonymized" can still be re-identified. A 2013 MIT study found that just four spatio-temporal points uniquely identified 95% of individuals in an anonymized location dataset.<ref>{{cite journal |last=de Montjoye |first=Y.-A. |last2=Hidalgo |first2=C. A. |last3=Verleysen |first3=M. |last4=Blondel |first4=V. D. |year=2013 |title=Unique in the Crowd: The privacy bounds of human mobility |url=https://www.nature.com/articles/srep01376 |journal=Scientific Reports |volume=3 |pages=1376 |doi=10.1038/srep01376 |access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> Multiple peer-reviewed studies from 2018-2024 demonstrate that "anonymized" vehicle location data can be re-identified with high accuracy. A 2022 study showed researchers could re-identify drivers from raw vehicle network data with 97% accuracy by exploiting interdependencies in sensor measurements.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167404822002139|title=Privacy-preserving vehicle trajectory matching|website=ScienceDirect|date=2022|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> Research published in the Journal of Computer Science and Technology (2022) found that even 3-4 location points can uniquely identify individuals.<ref>{{cite journal|url=https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11390-022-2409-x|title=Experiments and Analyses of Anonymization Mechanisms for Trajectory Data Publishing|journal=Journal of Computer Science and Technology|date=2022|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | ||
====Business model==== | ====Business model==== | ||
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In February 2025, Chief Judge Mark S. Davis of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Norfolk's motion to dismiss a landmark Fourth Amendment lawsuit. The case involves two residents whose vehicles were tracked 526 times in 4.5 months and 849 times over the same period, figures revealed in a September 2025 court filing.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/virginia-police-used-flock-cameras-track-driver-safety-lawsuit-surveil-rcna230399|title=Virginia police used Flock cameras to track driver 526 times in 4 months, lawsuit says|work=NBC News|date=2025-09-18|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> Norfolk installed 172 Flock Safety cameras in 2023 at a cost of $430,000-$516,000 annually. Police Chief Mark Talbot stated the goal was making it ''"difficult to drive anywhere of any distance without running into a camera somewhere."''<ref name="norfolk" /> | In February 2025, Chief Judge Mark S. Davis of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Norfolk's motion to dismiss a landmark Fourth Amendment lawsuit. The case involves two residents whose vehicles were tracked 526 times in 4.5 months and 849 times over the same period, figures revealed in a September 2025 court filing.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/virginia-police-used-flock-cameras-track-driver-safety-lawsuit-surveil-rcna230399|title=Virginia police used Flock cameras to track driver 526 times in 4 months, lawsuit says|work=NBC News|date=2025-09-18|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> Norfolk installed 172 Flock Safety cameras in 2023 at a cost of $430,000-$516,000 annually. Police Chief Mark Talbot stated the goal was making it ''"difficult to drive anywhere of any distance without running into a camera somewhere."''<ref name="norfolk" /> | ||
Judge Davis's ruling relied on ''Carpenter v. United States'', the 2018 Supreme Court decision requiring warrants for historical cell phone location data. The court found Norfolk's ALPR network "notably similar" to the surveillance the Supreme Court deemed unconstitutional. However, courts remain divided. In November 2024, Senior U.S. District Judge Robert E. Payne in the same district denied a motion to suppress Flock evidence, holding that three vehicle snapshots don't constitute "persistent surveillance" requiring a warrant.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://valawyersweekly.com/2024/11/11/mosaic-theory-rejected-flock-camera-evidence-does-not-violate-fourth-amendment/|title='Mosaic theory' rejected: Flock camera evidence does not violate Fourth Amendment|website=Virginia Lawyers Weekly|date=2024-11-11|access-date=2025- | Judge Davis's ruling relied on ''Carpenter v. United States'', the 2018 Supreme Court decision requiring warrants for historical cell phone location data. The court found Norfolk's ALPR network "notably similar" to the surveillance the Supreme Court deemed unconstitutional. However, courts remain divided. In November 2024, Senior U.S. District Judge Robert E. Payne in the same district denied a motion to suppress Flock evidence, holding that three vehicle snapshots don't constitute "persistent surveillance" requiring a warrant.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://valawyersweekly.com/2024/11/11/mosaic-theory-rejected-flock-camera-evidence-does-not-violate-fourth-amendment/|title='Mosaic theory' rejected: Flock camera evidence does not violate Fourth Amendment|website=Virginia Lawyers Weekly|date=2024-11-11|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | ||
Virginia state courts show similar disagreement. Norfolk Circuit Court Judge Jamilah LeCruise granted a suppression motion in May 2024, finding that the breadth of Flock cameras covering Norfolk requires a warrant.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.govtech.com/public-safety/virginia-judge-rejects-alpr-evidence-without-warrant|title=Virginia Judge Rejects ALPR Evidence Without Warrant|website=Government Technology|date=2024-05-15|access-date=2025- | Virginia state courts show similar disagreement. Norfolk Circuit Court Judge Jamilah LeCruise granted a suppression motion in May 2024, finding that the breadth of Flock cameras covering Norfolk requires a warrant.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.govtech.com/public-safety/virginia-judge-rejects-alpr-evidence-without-warrant|title=Virginia Judge Rejects ALPR Evidence Without Warrant|website=Government Technology|date=2024-05-15|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> Yet three other Norfolk circuit court judges denied similar motions in 2024. | ||
===State regulatory landscape=== | ===State regulatory landscape=== | ||
Only 16 states have enacted any form of ALPR regulation as of 2024 according to University of Michigan research.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://stpp.fordschool.umich.edu/news/2023/automated-license-plate-readers-widely-used-subject-abuse|title=Automated License Plate Readers widely used, subject to abuse|website=University of Michigan|date=2023|access-date=2025- | Only 16 states have enacted any form of ALPR regulation as of 2024 according to University of Michigan research.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://stpp.fordschool.umich.edu/news/2023/automated-license-plate-readers-widely-used-subject-abuse|title=Automated License Plate Readers widely used, subject to abuse|website=University of Michigan|date=2023|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> Virginia enacted House Bill 2724 in 2025 creating annual reporting requirements.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://vscc.virginia.gov/Annual%20Reports/2024%20VSCC%20Annual%20Report%20-Law%20Enforcement%20Use%20of%20ALPR.pdf|title=2024 VSCC Annual Report - Law Enforcement Use of ALPR|website=Virginia State Crime Commission|date=2024|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> Illinois Public Act 103-0540 explicitly prohibits use for reproductive healthcare punishment and immigration investigations.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/103/103-0540.htm|title=Public Act 103-0540|website=Illinois General Assembly|date=2024|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | ||
==Other surveillance products== | ==Other surveillance products== | ||
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====Illinois audit findings (2024-2025)==== | ====Illinois audit findings (2024-2025)==== | ||
Illinois Secretary of State Alexi Giannoulias announced in late August 2024 that Flock Safety violated state law by allowing U.S. Customs and Border Protection to access Illinois license plate data for immigration enforcement.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.flocksafety.com/blog/flock-safetys-response-to-illinois-lpr-data-use-and-out-of-state-sharing-concerns|title=Flock Safety's Response to Illinois LPR Data Use and Out-of-State Sharing Concerns|website=Flock Safety|date=2024-08-25|access-date=2025- | Illinois Secretary of State Alexi Giannoulias announced in late August 2024 that Flock Safety violated state law by allowing U.S. Customs and Border Protection to access Illinois license plate data for immigration enforcement.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.flocksafety.com/blog/flock-safetys-response-to-illinois-lpr-data-use-and-out-of-state-sharing-concerns|title=Flock Safety's Response to Illinois LPR Data Use and Out-of-State Sharing Concerns|website=Flock Safety|date=2024-08-25|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> The audit of 12 local law enforcement agencies revealed unauthorized pilot programs with CBP and Homeland Security Investigations, violating Illinois law prohibiting data sharing for immigration enforcement, gender-affirming care investigations, and abortion-related matters. Following the audit, 47 out-of-state agencies were removed from access to Illinois data.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.govtech.com/biz/flock-pledges-changes-after-illinois-data-sharing-accusation|title=Flock Pledges Changes After Illinois Data-Sharing Accusation|website=Government Technology|date=2024-08-15|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | ||
Mount Prospect, Illinois reported 262 immigration-related license plate reader searches in just the first few months of 2025. A Palos Heights detective shared Flock login credentials with a DEA agent who conducted 28 unauthorized searches of Oak Park ALPR data explicitly labeled "immigration violation."<ref name="dea">{{Cite web|url=https://unraveledpress.com/a-dea-agent-used-an-illinois-police-officers-flock-license-plate-reader-password-for-unauthorized-immigration-enforcement-searches/|title=DEA agent used Illinois cop's Flock license plate reader password for immigration enforcement searches|work=Unraveled Press|date=2025|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> | Mount Prospect, Illinois reported 262 immigration-related license plate reader searches in just the first few months of 2025. A Palos Heights detective shared Flock login credentials with a DEA agent who conducted 28 unauthorized searches of Oak Park ALPR data explicitly labeled "immigration violation."<ref name="dea">{{Cite web|url=https://unraveledpress.com/a-dea-agent-used-an-illinois-police-officers-flock-license-plate-reader-password-for-unauthorized-immigration-enforcement-searches/|title=DEA agent used Illinois cop's Flock license plate reader password for immigration enforcement searches|work=Unraveled Press|date=2025|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> | ||
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California passed Senate Bill 34<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://calmatters.digitaldemocracy.org/bills/ca_201520160sb34|title=Senate Bill 34|access-date=2025-08-27}}</ref> in 2015 to limit how California police departments can use and share data collected from these cameras with other state's and federal law enforcement agencies. These limits have been found to be violated on several occasions with little enforcement or consequences for the misusing departments<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://sfstandard.com/2025/07/23/california-police-sharing-flock-license-plate-data/|access-date=2025-08-27|title=California cops are breaking surveillance laws|website=San Francisco Standard|date=2025-07-23}}</ref>. | California passed Senate Bill 34<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://calmatters.digitaldemocracy.org/bills/ca_201520160sb34|title=Senate Bill 34|access-date=2025-08-27}}</ref> in 2015 to limit how California police departments can use and share data collected from these cameras with other state's and federal law enforcement agencies. These limits have been found to be violated on several occasions with little enforcement or consequences for the misusing departments<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://sfstandard.com/2025/07/23/california-police-sharing-flock-license-plate-data/|access-date=2025-08-27|title=California cops are breaking surveillance laws|website=San Francisco Standard|date=2025-07-23}}</ref>. | ||
A 2023 EFF investigation found 71 California police agencies in 22 counties illegally shared data with out-of-state law enforcement. San Francisco Police Department alone allowed 1.6 million illegal searches by out-of-state agencies from 2024-2025.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://sfstandard.com/2025/09/08/sfpd-flock-alpr-ice-data-sharing/|title=SFPD let Georgia, Texas cops illegally search city surveillance data on behalf of ICE|website=San Francisco Standard|date=2025-09-08|access-date=2025- | A 2023 EFF investigation found 71 California police agencies in 22 counties illegally shared data with out-of-state law enforcement. San Francisco Police Department alone allowed 1.6 million illegal searches by out-of-state agencies from 2024-2025.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://sfstandard.com/2025/09/08/sfpd-flock-alpr-ice-data-sharing/|title=SFPD let Georgia, Texas cops illegally search city surveillance data on behalf of ICE|website=San Francisco Standard|date=2025-09-08|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> The California Attorney General filed the first enforcement action against the City of El Cajon in 2025 for sharing with 26 states.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-bonta-sues-el-cajon-illegally-sharing-license-plate-data-out|title=Attorney General Bonta Sues El Cajon for Illegally Sharing License Plate Data|website=California DOJ|date=2025|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | ||
===False positive incidents=== | ===False positive incidents=== | ||
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In Española, New Mexico, 21-year-old Jaclynn Gonzales and her 12-year-old sister were held at gunpoint and handcuffed after Flock's system mistook a "2" for a "7" on their license plate, falsely flagging their vehicle as stolen.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2023-09-28 |title=License plate cover leads to traffic stop mishap |url=https://www.koat.com/article/espanola-police-license-plate-stolen-cover-traffic-stop/45361740|website=KOAT|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2025 |title=Flock Safety: Eroding Your Privacy & Keeping You Safe with Surveillance |url=https://redact.dev/blog/flock-safety-lpr-privacy-surveillance/ |access-date=2025-08-23 |work=Redact}}</ref> | In Española, New Mexico, 21-year-old Jaclynn Gonzales and her 12-year-old sister were held at gunpoint and handcuffed after Flock's system mistook a "2" for a "7" on their license plate, falsely flagging their vehicle as stolen.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2023-09-28 |title=License plate cover leads to traffic stop mishap |url=https://www.koat.com/article/espanola-police-license-plate-stolen-cover-traffic-stop/45361740|website=KOAT|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2025 |title=Flock Safety: Eroding Your Privacy & Keeping You Safe with Surveillance |url=https://redact.dev/blog/flock-safety-lpr-privacy-surveillance/ |access-date=2025-08-23 |work=Redact}}</ref> | ||
ALPR systems often misread license plates according to multiple investigations, leading to hardship & legal trouble for innocent civilians.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/11/human-toll-alpr-errors|title=The Human Toll of ALPR Errors|website=Electronic Frontier Foundation|date=2024-11-15|access-date=2025- | ALPR systems often misread license plates according to multiple investigations, leading to hardship & legal trouble for innocent civilians.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/11/human-toll-alpr-errors|title=The Human Toll of ALPR Errors|website=Electronic Frontier Foundation|date=2024-11-15|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | ||
===Law enforcement stalking incidents=== | ===Law enforcement stalking incidents=== | ||
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In October 2022, Kechi, Kansas Police Lieutenant Victor Heiar was arrested and later pleaded guilty to computer crimes and stalking after using Flock cameras to track his estranged wife's movements over four months.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.kwch.com/2022/10/31/kechi-police-lieutenant-arrested-using-police-technology-stalk-wife/|title=Kechi police lieutenant arrested for using police technology to stalk wife|work=KWCH|date=2022-10-31|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> In a separate Kansas incident, Sedgwick Police Chief Lee Nygaard accessed Flock data 164 times to track his ex-girlfriend before resigning after admitting to the misuse.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.yahoo.com/news/kansas-police-chief-used-flock-093300946.html|title=Kansas police chief used Flock license plate cameras 164 times to track ex-girlfriend|work=Yahoo News|date=2025|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> | In October 2022, Kechi, Kansas Police Lieutenant Victor Heiar was arrested and later pleaded guilty to computer crimes and stalking after using Flock cameras to track his estranged wife's movements over four months.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.kwch.com/2022/10/31/kechi-police-lieutenant-arrested-using-police-technology-stalk-wife/|title=Kechi police lieutenant arrested for using police technology to stalk wife|work=KWCH|date=2022-10-31|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> In a separate Kansas incident, Sedgwick Police Chief Lee Nygaard accessed Flock data 164 times to track his ex-girlfriend before resigning after admitting to the misuse.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.yahoo.com/news/kansas-police-chief-used-flock-093300946.html|title=Kansas police chief used Flock license plate cameras 164 times to track ex-girlfriend|work=Yahoo News|date=2025|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> | ||
Multiple other documented cases include Las Vegas Metro Officer Christopher Young arrested in December 2023 for stalking his ex-fiancée using police databases, and Riverside County Deputy Eric Piscatella pleading guilty in February 2024 to seven counts of misusing sheriff's department databases to stalk a woman he met at Coachella.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.fox5vegas.com/2024/02/16/las-vegas-police-officer-arrested-reportedly-stalking-ex-fiancee/?outputType=amp|title=Las Vegas police officer arrested for reportedly stalking ex-fiancée|website=FOX5 Vegas|date=2024-02-16|access-date=2025- | Multiple other documented cases include Las Vegas Metro Officer Christopher Young arrested in December 2023 for stalking his ex-fiancée using police databases, and Riverside County Deputy Eric Piscatella pleading guilty in February 2024 to seven counts of misusing sheriff's department databases to stalk a woman he met at Coachella.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.fox5vegas.com/2024/02/16/las-vegas-police-officer-arrested-reportedly-stalking-ex-fiancee/?outputType=amp|title=Las Vegas police officer arrested for reportedly stalking ex-fiancée|website=FOX5 Vegas|date=2024-02-16|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | ||
===Abortion and reproductive healthcare tracking=== | ===Abortion and reproductive healthcare tracking=== | ||
In May 2025, Johnson County, Texas sheriff's deputies used Flock's network to track a woman suspected of self-managing an abortion. They conducted searches across 83,000+ Flock cameras nationwide with the explicit reason: "had an abortion, search for female." The search accessed cameras across multiple states including those where abortion is legal. The incident led Illinois officials to investigate and subsequently block 47+ out-of-state agencies from accessing Illinois ALPR data.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.dallasnews.com/news/texas/2025/06/13/after-finding-fetal-remains-north-texas-cops-used-camera-network-to-search-for-woman/|title=After finding fetal remains, North Texas cops used camera network to search for woman|work=The Dallas Morning News|date=2025-06-13|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/05/she-got-abortion-so-texas-cop-used-83000-cameras-track-her-down|title=She Got an Abortion. So A Texas Cop Used 83,000 Cameras to Track Her Down|website=Electronic Frontier Foundation|date=2025-05-15|access-date=2025- | In May 2025, Johnson County, Texas sheriff's deputies used Flock's network to track a woman suspected of self-managing an abortion. They conducted searches across 83,000+ Flock cameras nationwide with the explicit reason: "had an abortion, search for female." The search accessed cameras across multiple states including those where abortion is legal. The incident led Illinois officials to investigate and subsequently block 47+ out-of-state agencies from accessing Illinois ALPR data.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.dallasnews.com/news/texas/2025/06/13/after-finding-fetal-remains-north-texas-cops-used-camera-network-to-search-for-woman/|title=After finding fetal remains, North Texas cops used camera network to search for woman|work=The Dallas Morning News|date=2025-06-13|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/05/she-got-abortion-so-texas-cop-used-83000-cameras-track-her-down|title=She Got an Abortion. So A Texas Cop Used 83,000 Cameras to Track Her Down|website=Electronic Frontier Foundation|date=2025-05-15|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | ||
===Federal agency access=== | ===Federal agency access=== | ||
Immigration and Customs Enforcement maintains a $6.1 million contract giving 9,000+ ICE officers access to the Vigilant Solutions ALPR database containing over 5 billion location data points.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.aclu.org/news/immigrants-rights/documents-reveal-ice-using-driver-location-data|title=Documents Reveal ICE Using Driver Location Data From Local Police for Deportations|website=ACLU|date=2024|access-date=2025- | Immigration and Customs Enforcement maintains a $6.1 million contract giving 9,000+ ICE officers access to the Vigilant Solutions ALPR database containing over 5 billion location data points.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.aclu.org/news/immigrants-rights/documents-reveal-ice-using-driver-location-data|title=Documents Reveal ICE Using Driver Location Data From Local Police for Deportations|website=ACLU|date=2024|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> The Drug Enforcement Administration operates a National License Plate Reader Program with over 10,000 license plate readers shared throughout the United States. 404 Media revealed over 4,000 searches by local and state police for federal immigration enforcement purposes, despite Flock having no formal ICE contract.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.404media.co/ice-taps-into-nationwide-ai-enabled-camera-network-data-shows/|title=ICE Taps into Nationwide AI-Enabled Camera Network, Data Shows|work=404 Media|date=2025|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> A DEA agent was found using an Illinois police officer's credentials to conduct unauthorized immigration searches.<ref name="dea" /> | ||
===Illegal Camera Installations=== | ===Illegal Camera Installations=== | ||
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In Illinois, a Flock representative allegedly threatened a Department of Transportation official with police pressure when questioned about permit applications.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Uprise RI Staff |date=2024-10-23 |title=As Flock Surveillance Cameras Proliferate in Rhode Island, Lawsuit Challenges Their Legality |url=https://upriseri.com/as-flock-surveillance-cameras-proliferate-in-rhode-island-lawsuit-challenges-their-legality/ |url-status=live |access-date=2025-08-25 |website=UPRISE RI}}</ref> | In Illinois, a Flock representative allegedly threatened a Department of Transportation official with police pressure when questioned about permit applications.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Uprise RI Staff |date=2024-10-23 |title=As Flock Surveillance Cameras Proliferate in Rhode Island, Lawsuit Challenges Their Legality |url=https://upriseri.com/as-flock-surveillance-cameras-proliferate-in-rhode-island-lawsuit-challenges-their-legality/ |url-status=live |access-date=2025-08-25 |website=UPRISE RI}}</ref> | ||
===== '''In Evanston:''' ===== | |||
Flock was ordered to remove 18 stationary cameras. The city put the contract with Flock on a 30-day termination notice on August 26. Flock Initially appeared to comply, removing 15 of the cameras by September 8. Later, <u>Flock was caught reinstalling all of them by the following Tuesday without authorization from the city.</u> | |||
The city of Evanston responded with a cease-and-desist order for Flock to remove the new and unauthorized camera equipment. | |||
Because Flock reinstalled the cameras without permission, <u>Evanston was forced to cover the cameras with tape and bags to block them from potentially logging vehicle data.</u> | |||
This situation is particularly absurd, as the city was left with little choice but to physically shield the cameras due to Flock’s unauthorized action, and outright noncompliance with the wishes of the city. | |||
Flock appears apprehensive to comply and remove the hardware, with a representative of flock stating: | |||
“We continue to be optimistic that we will have the opportunity to have a constructive dialogue to address the City’s concerns and resume our successful partnership making Evanston safer” | |||
While it is clear that flock wishes to continue their contract, this does not address the wishes of the city. In this regard, A Flock spokesperson stated: “the cameras are not active and will be uninstalled” | |||
This raises concerns, as <u>it is unclear why flock chose to incur costs to install</u> <u>unauthorized inactive cameras after the initial request for removal.</u> Additionally, it is not possible, or remains extremely difficult and costly for the city to independently verify that the ‘inactive’ cameras are truly disabled. | |||
It remains unclear if there is concrete financial incentive for flock to partake in these possibly illegal or otherwise unethical actions. | |||
More physical cameras are ostensibly capable of creating more data, which is collected in aggregate by flock, and selectively shared with other clients. Additional data could create a clear value proposition for certain flock services, and thus effects the desirability of the services provided by flock, and potentially, the price which flock can expect to charge for their services.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Harrison |first=Alex |date=September 25th, 2025 |title=City covers Flock cameras while waiting for removal |url=https://evanstonroundtable.com/2025/09/25/city-covers-up-flock-cameras-while-waiting-for-removal/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.ph/PD1qe |archive-date=2025-10-10 |access-date=2025-10-10 |website=Evanston Roundtable}}</ref> | |||
===City rejections and terminations=== | ===City rejections and terminations=== | ||
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===Sedona termination=== | ===Sedona termination=== | ||
Sedona, Arizona became the first Arizona city to completely terminate its Flock Safety contract in September 2025 after citizen backlash. The city had installed 11 cameras in June 2025 without prior public notice at a cost of $51,146 for the first year. The council voted 5-1 to pause the program, then unanimously 7-0 on September 9 to permanently terminate after Flock CEO Garrett Langley admitted the company had been sharing data with federal agencies. Vice Mayor Holli Ploog called Flock "not an honorable company" for the conflicting data-sharing claims.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://westvalleyfamilies.substack.com/p/sedona-pulls-the-plug-on-flock-safety|title=Sedona Pulls the Plug on Flock Safety|website=West Valley Families|date=2025-09-10|access-date=2025- | Sedona, Arizona became the first Arizona city to completely terminate its Flock Safety contract in September 2025 after citizen backlash. The city had installed 11 cameras in June 2025 without prior public notice at a cost of $51,146 for the first year. The council voted 5-1 to pause the program, then unanimously 7-0 on September 9 to permanently terminate after Flock CEO Garrett Langley admitted the company had been sharing data with federal agencies. Vice Mayor Holli Ploog called Flock "not an honorable company" for the conflicting data-sharing claims.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://westvalleyfamilies.substack.com/p/sedona-pulls-the-plug-on-flock-safety|title=Sedona Pulls the Plug on Flock Safety|website=West Valley Families|date=2025-09-10|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.knau.org/knau-and-arizona-news/2025-09-11/sedona-council-permanently-ends-license-plate-camera-program|title=Sedona council permanently ends license plate camera program|website=KNAU|date=2025-09-11|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | ||
===Other Arizona deployments=== | ===Other Arizona deployments=== | ||
Flagstaff deployed 32 Flock cameras in summer 2024 at a cost of $143,100 annually. By September 2025, a petition signed by 25+ residents demanded cancellation.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.kjzz.org/fronteras-desk/2025-09-01/after-sedona-paused-flock-safety-camera-system-flagstaff-is-considering-the-same-issue|title=After Sedona paused Flock Safety camera system, Flagstaff is considering the same issue|website=KJZZ|date=2025-09-01|access-date=2025- | Flagstaff deployed 32 Flock cameras in summer 2024 at a cost of $143,100 annually. By September 2025, a petition signed by 25+ residents demanded cancellation.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.kjzz.org/fronteras-desk/2025-09-01/after-sedona-paused-flock-safety-camera-system-flagstaff-is-considering-the-same-issue|title=After Sedona paused Flock Safety camera system, Flagstaff is considering the same issue|website=KJZZ|date=2025-09-01|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | ||
University of Arizona contracted with Flock in February 2025 for 54 ALPR cameras at $160,000 annually. Students and faculty launched a "Deflock Tucson" campaign citing concerns about tracking international students and potential data sharing with federal immigration authorities.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://azluminaria.org/2025/09/15/ua-students-and-faculty-question-use-of-flock-safety-cameras-on-campus/|title=UA students and faculty question use of Flock Safety cameras on campus|website=AZ Luminaria|date=2025-09-15|access-date=2025- | University of Arizona contracted with Flock in February 2025 for 54 ALPR cameras at $160,000 annually. Students and faculty launched a "Deflock Tucson" campaign citing concerns about tracking international students and potential data sharing with federal immigration authorities.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://azluminaria.org/2025/09/15/ua-students-and-faculty-question-use-of-flock-safety-cameras-on-campus/|title=UA students and faculty question use of Flock Safety cameras on campus|website=AZ Luminaria|date=2025-09-15|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | ||
Casa Grande approved a $10 million "Safe City Initiative" in September 2025 including 100 license plate readers. Chief Mark McCrory reported the current 22 license plate readers led to 212 stolen vehicles identified and 168 arrests.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.inmaricopa.com/we-mapped-all-flock-cameras/|title=We mapped the city's Flock cameras|website=InMaricopa|date=2025|access-date=2025- | Casa Grande approved a $10 million "Safe City Initiative" in September 2025 including 100 license plate readers. Chief Mark McCrory reported the current 22 license plate readers led to 212 stolen vehicles identified and 168 arrests.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.inmaricopa.com/we-mapped-all-flock-cameras/|title=We mapped the city's Flock cameras|website=InMaricopa|date=2025|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | ||
Despite documented deployments across Arizona including Phoenix, Mesa, Chandler, Scottsdale, Tempe, Surprise, Youngtown, Litchfield Park, and Yuma, the state has no ALPR-specific regulation.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://azmirror.com/2019/07/08/how-do-automated-license-plate-readers-work/|title=How do automated license plate readers work?|website=Arizona Mirror|date=2019-07-08|access-date=2025- | Despite documented deployments across Arizona including Phoenix, Mesa, Chandler, Scottsdale, Tempe, Surprise, Youngtown, Litchfield Park, and Yuma, the state has no ALPR-specific regulation.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://azmirror.com/2019/07/08/how-do-automated-license-plate-readers-work/|title=How do automated license plate readers work?|website=Arizona Mirror|date=2019-07-08|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | ||
==Security vulnerabilities== | ==Security vulnerabilities== | ||
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===State audit findings=== | ===State audit findings=== | ||
California State Auditor's February 2020 investigation found Los Angeles Police Department, with a 320 million image database, had no ALPR-specific policy at all. The audit found 96% of agencies claim to have policies, but most are incomplete. Data retention periods varied wildly with no justification. LAPD maintained a minimum five-year retention period, yet couldn't demonstrate that images stored for years had investigative value. The audit found that 99.9% of the 320 million images Los Angeles stores are for vehicles that were not on a hot list when the image was made.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://information.auditor.ca.gov/reports/2019-118/summary.html|title=Automated License Plate Readers|website=California State Auditor|date=2020-02|access-date=2025- | California State Auditor's February 2020 investigation found Los Angeles Police Department, with a 320 million image database, had no ALPR-specific policy at all. The audit found 96% of agencies claim to have policies, but most are incomplete. Data retention periods varied wildly with no justification. LAPD maintained a minimum five-year retention period, yet couldn't demonstrate that images stored for years had investigative value. The audit found that 99.9% of the 320 million images Los Angeles stores are for vehicles that were not on a hot list when the image was made.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://information.auditor.ca.gov/reports/2019-118/summary.html|title=Automated License Plate Readers|website=California State Auditor|date=2020-02-13|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | ||
New Jersey provides a contrasting model with mandatory annual audits of all 523 law enforcement agencies. The 2024 audit reported only two significant violations, both involving users who hadn't completed required training.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://nj.gov/njsp/ALPR/pdf/2024_Audit_Automated_License_Plate_Recognition_(ALPR)_Data_Collected_Utilized_NJ_Law_Enforcement_Agencies.pdf|title=2024 Audit of Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR) Data|website=New Jersey State Police|date=2024|access-date=2025- | New Jersey provides a contrasting model with mandatory annual audits of all 523 law enforcement agencies. The 2024 audit reported only two significant violations, both involving users who hadn't completed required training.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://nj.gov/njsp/ALPR/pdf/2024_Audit_Automated_License_Plate_Recognition_(ALPR)_Data_Collected_Utilized_NJ_Law_Enforcement_Agencies.pdf|title=2024 Audit of Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR) Data|website=New Jersey State Police|date=2024|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | ||
A Government Technology analysis found that agencies often fail to audit ALPR systems regularly, leaving them "open to abuse by neglecting to institute sufficient oversight."<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.govtech.com/biz/data/alpr-audit-takeaways-what-we-learned-about-policy-gaps|title=ALPR Audit Takeaways: What We Learned About Policy Gaps|website=Government Technology|date=2024|access-date=2025- | A Government Technology analysis found that agencies often fail to audit ALPR systems regularly, leaving them "open to abuse by neglecting to institute sufficient oversight."<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.govtech.com/biz/data/alpr-audit-takeaways-what-we-learned-about-policy-gaps|title=ALPR Audit Takeaways: What We Learned About Policy Gaps|website=Government Technology|date=2024|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | ||
===Cost-benefit analysis=== | ===Cost-benefit analysis=== | ||
Arizona Department of Transportation's 2008 study of generic ALPR technology (predating Flock Safety by nine years) estimated $9.98 million for a hypothetical statewide ALPR system. The projected benefit-to-cost ratio of 9.6:1 came entirely from registration and insurance compliance, not crime reduction.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://apps.azdot.gov/files/ADOTLibrary/publications/project_reports/PDF/AZ637.pdf|title=Automated License Plate Recognition Technology Implementation Report|website=Arizona Department of Transportation|date=2008-06|access-date=2025- | Arizona Department of Transportation's 2008 study of generic ALPR technology (predating Flock Safety by nine years) estimated $9.98 million for a hypothetical statewide ALPR system. The projected benefit-to-cost ratio of 9.6:1 came entirely from registration and insurance compliance, not crime reduction.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://apps.azdot.gov/files/ADOTLibrary/publications/project_reports/PDF/AZ637.pdf|title=Automated License Plate Recognition Technology Implementation Report|website=Arizona Department of Transportation|date=2008-06-01|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | ||
Colorado's Office of Research and Statistics reported that while ALPR systems are expanding, independent academic research contradicts vendor claims. A 2011 George Mason University study concluded ALPRs "do not achieve a prevention or deterrent effect" on crime.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/ors/Docs/Briefs/2024-05_InDetail-ALPR.pdf|title=Automated License Plate Readers (In Detail)|website=Colorado Division of Criminal Justice|date=2024-05|access-date=2025- | Colorado's Office of Research and Statistics reported that while ALPR systems are expanding, independent academic research contradicts vendor claims. A 2011 George Mason University study concluded ALPRs "do not achieve a prevention or deterrent effect" on crime.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/ors/Docs/Briefs/2024-05_InDetail-ALPR.pdf|title=Automated License Plate Readers (In Detail)|website=Colorado Division of Criminal Justice|date=2024-05-01|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | ||
Oakland Police Department reported 182 arrests from ALPR in the first year, representing 1.4% of homicides, robberies, burglaries, and firearm assaults. The Northern California Regional Intelligence Center states approximately 1-2 vehicles out of 1,000 initiate alerts—a hit rate of just 0.1-0.2%.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://ncric.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/California-Law-Enforcement-ALPR-FAQ.pdf|title=California Law Enforcement ALPR FAQ|website=NCRIC|date=2021|access-date=2025- | Oakland Police Department reported 182 arrests from ALPR in the first year, representing 1.4% of homicides, robberies, burglaries, and firearm assaults. The Northern California Regional Intelligence Center states approximately 1-2 vehicles out of 1,000 initiate alerts—a hit rate of just 0.1-0.2%.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://ncric.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/California-Law-Enforcement-ALPR-FAQ.pdf|title=California Law Enforcement ALPR FAQ|website=NCRIC|date=2021|access-date=2025-10-05}}</ref> | ||
==Camera locations== | ==Camera locations== | ||