Turkcell Superonline: Difference between revisions
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|Founded=2004 | |Founded=2004 | ||
|Industry=Telecommunications | |Industry=Telecommunications | ||
|Logo= | |Logo=Turkcell SuperOnline logo.png | ||
|ParentCompany= | |ParentCompany= | ||
|Type=Subsidiary | |Type=Subsidiary | ||
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In 2011, a hacktivist group called Telecomix claimed that Syria was using Blue Coat Systems products to censor the internet and these allegations were investigated by the US government. Citizen Lab's research has also provided evidence of Blue Coat devices being used for censorship and surveillance in countries like Turkey and Syria.<ref>[https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/10/blue-coat-acknowledges-syrian-government-use-its-products Blue Coat: Concern for Criminal Penalties, Not Human Rights] ([http://web.archive.org/web/20251018045713/https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/10/blue-coat-acknowledges-syrian-government-use-its-products Archived])</ref> | In 2011, a hacktivist group called Telecomix claimed that Syria was using Blue Coat Systems products to censor the internet and these allegations were investigated by the US government. Citizen Lab's research has also provided evidence of Blue Coat devices being used for censorship and surveillance in countries like Turkey and Syria.<ref>[https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/10/blue-coat-acknowledges-syrian-government-use-its-products Blue Coat: Concern for Criminal Penalties, Not Human Rights] ([http://web.archive.org/web/20251018045713/https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/10/blue-coat-acknowledges-syrian-government-use-its-products Archived])</ref> | ||
===Injecting ads into websites (2017)=== | ===Injecting ads into websites (2017)=== | ||
[[File: | [[File:Turkcell ads.png|thumb|369x369px|Picture Showing Superonline Ads which is injected into the website by ISP itself]] | ||
Superonline has been criticized for injecting various advertisements into its customers' web connections while they browse the internet, thereby forcing them to watch the advertisements. Requests for clarification to the company went unanswered. This incident was described as the first evidence of traffic monitoring and manipulation through deep packet inspection in Turkey.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Gözütok|first1=Ahmet|title=Turkcell Superonline kullanıcılarını reklam izlemeye mi zorluyor?|url=https://www.donanimhaber.com/operatorler--kurumsal-haberler/haberleri/Turkcell-Superonline-kullanicilarini-reklam-izlemeye-mi-zorluyor.htm|website=donanimhaber.com|access-date=19 June 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170619141204/https://www.donanimhaber.com/operatorler--kurumsal-haberler/haberleri/Turkcell-Superonline-kullanicilarini-reklam-izlemeye-mi-zorluyor.htm|archive-date=19 June 2017}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|last1=Yagiz|title=İddia: Superonline kullanıcılarına izinsiz reklam gösteriyor.|url=https://medium.com/@anonrig/i%CC%87ddia-superonline-kullan%C4%B1c%C4%B1lar%C4%B1na-izinsiz-reklam-g%C3%B6steriyor-ba555360424|website=medium.com|date=25 September 2016|access-date=19 June 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170619141143/https://medium.com/@anonrig/i%CC%87ddia-superonline-kullan%C4%B1c%C4%B1lar%C4%B1na-izinsiz-reklam-g%C3%B6steriyor-ba555360424|archive-date=19 June 2017}}</ref> This problem has since been fixed and the development of HTTPS technology has made it very difficult for this to happen again.<ref>[https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1xZPAw1uCdLqDz8F_Vz57DRvCNJTcCnPgtG7P-yeloUc/edit?usp=sharing Web Hacking Incident Database] ([http://web.archive.org/web/20250709004800/https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1xZPAw1uCdLqDz8F_Vz57DRvCNJTcCnPgtG7P-yeloUc/edit?usp=sharing Archived])</ref> | Superonline has been criticized for injecting various advertisements into its customers' web connections while they browse the internet, thereby forcing them to watch the advertisements. Requests for clarification to the company went unanswered. This incident was described as the first evidence of traffic monitoring and manipulation through deep packet inspection in Turkey.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Gözütok|first1=Ahmet|title=Turkcell Superonline kullanıcılarını reklam izlemeye mi zorluyor?|url=https://www.donanimhaber.com/operatorler--kurumsal-haberler/haberleri/Turkcell-Superonline-kullanicilarini-reklam-izlemeye-mi-zorluyor.htm|website=donanimhaber.com|access-date=19 June 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170619141204/https://www.donanimhaber.com/operatorler--kurumsal-haberler/haberleri/Turkcell-Superonline-kullanicilarini-reklam-izlemeye-mi-zorluyor.htm|archive-date=19 June 2017}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|last1=Yagiz|title=İddia: Superonline kullanıcılarına izinsiz reklam gösteriyor.|url=https://medium.com/@anonrig/i%CC%87ddia-superonline-kullan%C4%B1c%C4%B1lar%C4%B1na-izinsiz-reklam-g%C3%B6steriyor-ba555360424|website=medium.com|date=25 September 2016|access-date=19 June 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170619141143/https://medium.com/@anonrig/i%CC%87ddia-superonline-kullan%C4%B1c%C4%B1lar%C4%B1na-izinsiz-reklam-g%C3%B6steriyor-ba555360424|archive-date=19 June 2017}}</ref> This problem has since been fixed and the development of HTTPS technology has made it very difficult for this to happen again.<ref>[https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1xZPAw1uCdLqDz8F_Vz57DRvCNJTcCnPgtG7P-yeloUc/edit?usp=sharing Web Hacking Incident Database] ([http://web.archive.org/web/20250709004800/https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1xZPAw1uCdLqDz8F_Vz57DRvCNJTcCnPgtG7P-yeloUc/edit?usp=sharing Archived])</ref> | ||
===Applying Censorship during Earthquake Incident (2023)=== | ===Applying Censorship during Earthquake Incident (2023)=== | ||
On February 6, 2023, the company was criticized for internet outages at critical moments during the massive earthquakes centered in Kahramanmaraş, Turkey. Immediately after the earthquake disaster, the collapse of the internet infrastructure, which was critical for search and rescue operations and coordination, left both citizens and government agencies in a difficult situation. In the aftermath, Superonline was severely criticized for its lack of infrastructure resilience and emergency preparedness. | On February 6, 2023, the company was criticized for internet outages at critical moments during the massive earthquakes centered in Kahramanmaraş, Turkey. Immediately after the earthquake disaster, the collapse of the internet infrastructure, which was critical for search and rescue operations and coordination, left both citizens and government agencies in a difficult situation. In the aftermath, Superonline was severely criticized for its lack of infrastructure resilience and emergency preparedness. | ||
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===Disabling Root Accounts and Firmware Restrictions=== | ===Disabling Root Accounts and Firmware Restrictions=== | ||
[[File: | [[File:Turkcell router UI no options.png|thumb|Superonline Removes the Backup and Update Options from the Modem Interface]] | ||
Turkcell Superonline's decision to restrict or completely disable access to the root account on the modems it rents to its users has sparked controversy among users. Superonline does not allow the use of third party modems. The firmware of the modems provided by Superonline is often customized and restricted, preventing users from gaining root access via web interface, telnet or ssh. One of the main reasons for this is that modem firmware updates and management are centralized by Superonline. It is argued that this centralized management may become more difficult if users have root access. While some users have stated that they need root access to configure their modem's settings in more detail (for example QoS and Easy Setup features are removed from modem interface), to install alternative firmware (like OpenWRT or Asus Merlin Firmware), or to enable/disable certain features, they have encountered this restriction by Superonline. In particular, some modem models are reported to disable features such as backups and manual updates via files in order to make it more difficult to obtain the root password. Some modem models have also been reported to disable the ability to change the main DNS server.<ref>[https://wf.lavatech.top/ave/router-misadventures Router Misadventures: Dumping Superonline's ISP Fiber Router] ([http://web.archive.org/web/20251112022719/https://wf.lavatech.top/ave/router-misadventures Archived])</ref> | Turkcell Superonline's decision to restrict or completely disable access to the root account on the modems it rents to its users has sparked controversy among users. Superonline does not allow the use of third party modems. The firmware of the modems provided by Superonline is often customized and restricted, preventing users from gaining root access via web interface, telnet or ssh. One of the main reasons for this is that modem firmware updates and management are centralized by Superonline. It is argued that this centralized management may become more difficult if users have root access. While some users have stated that they need root access to configure their modem's settings in more detail (for example QoS and Easy Setup features are removed from modem interface), to install alternative firmware (like OpenWRT or Asus Merlin Firmware), or to enable/disable certain features, they have encountered this restriction by Superonline. In particular, some modem models are reported to disable features such as backups and manual updates via files in order to make it more difficult to obtain the root password. Some modem models have also been reported to disable the ability to change the main DNS server.<ref>[https://wf.lavatech.top/ave/router-misadventures Router Misadventures: Dumping Superonline's ISP Fiber Router] ([http://web.archive.org/web/20251112022719/https://wf.lavatech.top/ave/router-misadventures Archived])</ref> | ||
===Censorship Using Deep Packet Inspection=== | ===Censorship Using Deep Packet Inspection=== | ||
Superonline is one of the most active utilizers of deep packet inspection (DPI) technology among ISPs in Turkey, operating within a regulatory environment that Freedom House describes as systematically restricting online freedoms.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-net/2023 |title=Turkey: Freedom on the Net 2023 |website=Freedom House |publisher=Freedom House |date=10 October 2023 |access-date=3 June 2025 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260120013415/https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-net/2023 |archive-date=20 Jan 2026}}</ref> With this technology, Superonline applies content-based censorship by analyzing users' internet traffic in detail.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey |title=Turkey Overview |website=Freedom House |publisher=Freedom House |date=31 March 2025 |access-date=3 June 2025 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260107043428/https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey |archive-date=7 Jan 2026}}</ref> | Superonline is one of the most active utilizers of deep packet inspection (DPI) technology among ISPs in Turkey, operating within a regulatory environment that Freedom House describes as systematically restricting online freedoms.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-net/2023 |title=Turkey: Freedom on the Net 2023 |website=Freedom House |publisher=Freedom House |date=10 October 2023 |access-date=3 June 2025 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260120013415/https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-net/2023 |archive-date=20 Jan 2026}}</ref> With this technology, Superonline applies content-based censorship by analyzing users' internet traffic in detail.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey |title=Turkey Overview |website=Freedom House |publisher=Freedom House |date=31 March 2025 |access-date=3 June 2025 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260107043428/https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey |archive-date=7 Jan 2026}}</ref> | ||