Flock License Plate Readers: Difference between revisions

Residents & taxpayers have no mechanism to opt-out of Flock's surveillance network. The cameras operate 24/7 in public spaces, recording all passing vehicles regardless of consent. Unlike traditional security cameras that may be avoided by choosing different routes, Flock's expanding network of over 30,000 cameras makes avoidance increasingly difficult.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://deflock.me/|title=Find Nearby ALPRs|work=DeFlock|access-date=2025-08-23|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250728224453/https://deflock.me/|archive-date=2025-07-28|url-status=live}}</ref> The system uses AI to create ''"Vehicle Fingerprints"'' that identify vehicles by characteristics beyond license plates, including make, model, color, '''bumper stickers''', & roof racks.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/surveillance-company-flock-now-using-ai-to-report-us-to-police-if-it-thinks-our-movement-patterns-are-suspicious|title=Surveillance Company Flock Now Using AI to Report Us to Police if it Thinks Our Movement Patterns Are "Suspicious"|work=American Civil Liberties Union|date=2024|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref>

===== "Anonymized data" =====

Privacy researchers caution that mobility datasets labeled as "anonymized" can still be re-identified. A 2013 MIT study found that just four spatio-temporal points uniquely identified 95% of individuals in an anonymized location dataset.<ref>{{cite journal |last=de Montjoye |first=Y.-A. |last2=Hidalgo |first2=C. A. |last3=Verleysen |first3=M. |last4=Blondel |first4=V. D. |year=2013 |title=Unique in the Crowd: The privacy bounds of human mobility |url=https://www.nature.com/articles/srep01376 |journal=Scientific Reports |volume=3 |pages=1376 |doi=10.1038/srep01376 |access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> Civil liberties organizations such as the EFF & ACLU note that when detailed travel histories are retained, even without license plates. they're often able to be linked back to individuals when combined with other data sources.<ref>{{cite web |date=2025-06-01 |title=Flock Safety's Feature Updates Cannot Make Automated License Plate Readers Safe |url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/06/flock-safetys-feature-updates-cannot-make-automated-license-plate-readers-safe |access-date=2025-08-23 |website=Electronic Frontier Foundation}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |date=2024 |title=Surveillance Company Flock Now Using AI to Report Us to Police if it Thinks Our Movement Patterns Are "Suspicious" |url=https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/surveillance-company-flock-now-using-ai-to-report-us-to-police-if-it-thinks-our-movement-patterns-are-suspicious |access-date=2025-08-23 |website=American Civil Liberties Union}}</ref>

Flock Safety has rapidly expanded to become a dominant force in automated license plate recognition, operating in 49 states with over 30,000 cameras deployed. The company's network effect creates pressure for additional jurisdictions to join, as law enforcement effectiveness depends on network coverage. Several states have begun restricting access following privacy violations, with California, Illinois, and New York limiting data sharing after immigration and abortion-related tracking incidents.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.michaelrcronin.com/post/flock-blocks-ice-from-license-plate-reader-access-in-several-states|title='Flock' Blocks ICE from License Plate Reader Access in Several States|work=Yes You Can Go|date=2025|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref>

====== Cops stalking their ex: ======

In May 2025, Johnson County, Texas sheriff's deputies used Flock's network to track a woman suspected of self-managing an abortion. They conducting searches across multiple states including those where abortion is legal. The incident led Illinois officials to investigate and subsequently block 47+ out-of-state agencies from accessing Illinois ALPR data.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.dallasnews.com/news/national/2025/06/12/illinois-officials-investigate-data-shared-with-texas-sheriff-seeking-woman-who-had-abortion/|title=Illinois officials investigate data shared with Texas sheriff seeking woman who had abortion|work=The Dallas Morning News|date=2025-06-12|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref>

====== 0.02% effectiveness rate, low arrests: ======

Austin, Texas terminated its contract in July 2025 after an audit revealed "systematic compliance failures" and only 165 arrests from 113 million license plate scans (0.02% effectiveness rate).<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://cbsaustin.com/news/local/flock-ceo-responds-to-austin-backlash-as-city-contract-nears-expiration|title=Flock CEO responds to Austin backlash as city contract nears expiration|work=CBS Austin|date=2025|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref>

====== Held at gunpoint: ======

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency identified 7 critical vulnerabilities in Motorola ALPR systems similar to Flock's, including hardcoded passwords & unencrypted data storage.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/06/new-alpr-vulnerabilities-prove-mass-surveillance-public-safety-threat|title=New ALPR Vulnerabilities Prove Mass Surveillance Is a Public Safety Threat|work=Electronic Frontier Foundation|date=2024-06|access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref>