Flock license plate readers: Difference between revisions
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|Description=AI-powered automated license plate reader (ALPR) system that creates "Vehicle Fingerprints" by recording license plates, vehicle characteristics, and movement patterns for law enforcement use without individual consent or warrants. | |Description=AI-powered automated license plate reader (ALPR) system that creates "Vehicle Fingerprints" by recording license plates, vehicle characteristics, and movement patterns for law enforcement use without individual consent or warrants. | ||
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'''Flock License Plate Readers''' (previously known as '''Flock Safety Falcon'''<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/devices/falcon| | '''Flock License Plate Readers''' (previously known as '''Flock Safety Falcon'''<ref>{{Cite web |title=Falcon |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/devices/falcon |url-status=usurped |archive-url=https://archive.ph/UjKM5 |archive-date=6 Dec 2024 |access-date=6 Dec 2024 |work=Flock Safety}}</ref>), are a network of AI-powered surveillance cameras that record vehicle data for law enforcement agencies. The system operates in over 5,000 communities across 49 states in the U.S.A.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Hamid |first=Sarah |last2=Alajaji |first2=Rindala |date=27 Jun 2025 |title=Flock Safety's Feature Updates Cannot Make Automated License Plate Readers Safe |url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/06/flock-safetys-feature-updates-cannot-make-automated-license-plate-readers-safe |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250628052030/https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/06/flock-safetys-feature-updates-cannot-make-automated-license-plate-readers-safe |archive-date=28 Jun 2025 |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=Electronic Frontier Foundation}}</ref> According to the company's own marketing materials, Flock performs over 20 billion vehicle scans monthly.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Flock Safety |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/yDtD1 |archive-date=7 March 2026 |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=Flock Safety}}</ref> | ||
==Consumer impact summary== | ==Consumer impact summary== | ||
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====Privacy==== | ====Privacy==== | ||
While Flock Safety claims their system doesn't violate Fourth Amendment rights because ''"license plates are not personal information,"''<ref name="Flock-PE">{{Cite web |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/privacy-ethics | | While Flock Safety claims their system doesn't violate Fourth Amendment rights because ''"license plates are not personal information,"''<ref name="Flock-PE">{{Cite web |title=Privacy & Ethics |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/privacy-ethics |url-status=usurped |archive-url=https://archive.ph/OP55p |archive-date=23 Aug 2025 |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=Flock Safety}}</ref> federal courts have challenged this interpretation. In February 2024, a federal judge ruled that a lawsuit challenging Norfolk, Virginia's use of 172 Flock cameras could proceed, finding that plaintiffs had plausibly alleged the system creates a ''"detailed chronicle of a person's physical presence compiled every day."''<ref name="norfolk">{{Cite web |last=King |first=Dan |date=6 Feb 2024 |title=Judge Rules Lawsuit Challenging Norfolk's Use of Flock Cameras Can Proceed |url=https://ij.org/press-release/judge-rules-lawsuit-challenging-norfolks-use-of-flock-cameras-can-proceed/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250717001536/https://ij.org/press-release/judge-rules-lawsuit-challenging-norfolks-use-of-flock-cameras-can-proceed/ |archive-date=17 Jul 2025 |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=Institute for Justice}}</ref> | ||
Data collected includes location history that can reveal sensitive information about medical visits, religious attendance, political activities, and personal associations. While Flock states data is deleted after 30 days, contracts grant them ''"perpetual, worldwide, royalty-free license"'' to use anonymized data indefinitely.<ref name=":1">{{Cite web |title=Terms and Conditions |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/terms-and-conditions |url-status= | Data collected includes location history that can reveal sensitive information about medical visits, religious attendance, political activities, and personal associations. While Flock states data is deleted after 30 days, contracts grant them ''"perpetual, worldwide, royalty-free license"'' to use anonymized data indefinitely.<ref name=":1">{{Cite web |title=Terms and Conditions |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/terms-and-conditions |url-status=deviated |archive-url=https://archive.ph/dGV0l |archive-date=9 June 2023 |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=Flock Safety}}</ref> The system shares data across a network of over 4,800 law enforcement agencies nationally.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Koebler |first=Jason |date=2024 |title=Lawsuit Argues Warrantless Use of Flock Surveillance Cameras Is Unconstitutional |url=https://www.404media.co/lawsuit-argues-warrantless-use-of-flock-surveillance-cameras-is-unconstitutional/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250826013458/https://www.404media.co/lawsuit-argues-warrantless-use-of-flock-surveillance-cameras-is-unconstitutional/ |archive-date=26 Aug 2025 |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=404 Media}}</ref> | ||
====="Anonymized Data"===== | ====="Anonymized Data"===== | ||
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===Premise of a "license plate camera"=== | ===Premise of a "license plate camera"=== | ||
While marketed as "license plate readers,"' Flock cameras use what the company calls "Vehicle Fingerprint" technology which tracks vehicles using characteristics beyond just license plates. The system catalogs vehicles based on numerous distinguishing features including make, model, color, bumper stickers, dents, damage patterns, roof racks, aftermarket modifications such as wheels or spoilers, window stickers, and even mismatching paint colors.<ref name=":2">{{Cite web |date= |title=LPR Cameras |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/products/license-plate-readers |url-status=usurped | While marketed as "license plate readers,"' Flock cameras use what the company calls "Vehicle Fingerprint" technology which tracks vehicles using characteristics beyond just license plates. The system catalogs vehicles based on numerous distinguishing features including make, model, color, bumper stickers, dents, damage patterns, roof racks, aftermarket modifications such as wheels or spoilers, window stickers, and even mismatching paint colors.<ref name=":2">{{Cite web |date= |title=LPR Cameras |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/products/license-plate-readers |url-status=usurped |archive-url=https://archive.ph/YWYB6 |archive-date=25 Aug 2025 |access-date=26 Oct 2025 |work=Flock Safety}}</ref>. According to Flock's own marketing materials, the system can identify vehicles even when license plates cannot be captured, advertised as turning "images into actionable evidence — no plate required."<ref>{{Cite web |title=License Plate Readers |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/products/license-plate-readers |url-status=usurped |archive-url=https://archive.ph/YWYB6 |archive-date=25 Aug 2025 |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=Flock Safety}}</ref> | ||
Flock claims this capability is ''"unique among ALPR systems"'' and allows law enforcement to search for vehicles based on these characteristics even without a visible license plate. | Flock claims this capability is ''"unique among ALPR systems"'' and allows law enforcement to search for vehicles based on these characteristics even without a visible license plate. | ||
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====Illinois audit findings (2024-2025)==== | ====Illinois audit findings (2024-2025)==== | ||
Illinois Secretary of State Alexi Giannoulias announced in late August 2024 that Flock Safety violated state law by allowing U.S. Customs and Border Protection to access Illinois license plate data for immigration enforcement.<ref>{{cite web| | Illinois Secretary of State Alexi Giannoulias announced in late August 2024 that Flock Safety violated state law by allowing U.S. Customs and Border Protection to access Illinois license plate data for immigration enforcement.<ref>{{cite web |date=2024-08-25 |title=Flock Safety's Response to Illinois LPR Data Use and Out-of-State Sharing Concerns |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/blog/flock-safetys-response-to-illinois-lpr-data-use-and-out-of-state-sharing-concerns |url-status=live |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/XNzcS |archive-date=5 May 2026 |access-date=2025-10-05 |website=Flock Safety}}</ref> The audit of 12 local law enforcement agencies revealed unauthorized pilot programs with CBP and Homeland Security Investigations, violating Illinois law prohibiting data sharing for immigration enforcement, gender-affirming care investigations, and abortion-related matters. Following the audit, 47 out-of-state agencies were removed from access to Illinois data.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.govtech.com/biz/flock-pledges-changes-after-illinois-data-sharing-accusation|title=Flock Pledges Changes After Illinois Data-Sharing Accusation|website=Government Technology|date=2024-08-15|access-date=2025-10-05 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260220002252/https://www.govtech.com/biz/flock-pledges-changes-after-illinois-data-sharing-accusation |archive-date=20 Feb 2026}}</ref> | ||
Mount Prospect, Illinois reported 262 immigration-related license plate reader searches in just the first few months of 2025. A Palos Heights detective shared Flock login credentials with a DEA agent who conducted 28 unauthorized searches of Oak Park ALPR data explicitly labeled "immigration violation."<ref name="dea">{{Cite web|url=https://unraveledpress.com/a-dea-agent-used-an-illinois-police-officers-flock-license-plate-reader-password-for-unauthorized-immigration-enforcement-searches/|title=DEA agent used Illinois cop's Flock license plate reader password for immigration enforcement searches|work=Unraveled Press|date=2025|access-date=2025-08-23 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260218115628/https://unraveledpress.com/a-dea-agent-used-an-illinois-police-officers-flock-license-plate-reader-password-for-unauthorized-immigration-enforcement-searches/ |archive-date=18 Feb 2026}}</ref> | Mount Prospect, Illinois reported 262 immigration-related license plate reader searches in just the first few months of 2025. A Palos Heights detective shared Flock login credentials with a DEA agent who conducted 28 unauthorized searches of Oak Park ALPR data explicitly labeled "immigration violation."<ref name="dea">{{Cite web|url=https://unraveledpress.com/a-dea-agent-used-an-illinois-police-officers-flock-license-plate-reader-password-for-unauthorized-immigration-enforcement-searches/|title=DEA agent used Illinois cop's Flock license plate reader password for immigration enforcement searches|work=Unraveled Press|date=2025|access-date=2025-08-23 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260218115628/https://unraveledpress.com/a-dea-agent-used-an-illinois-police-officers-flock-license-plate-reader-password-for-unauthorized-immigration-enforcement-searches/ |archive-date=18 Feb 2026}}</ref> | ||
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In Illinois, a Flock representative allegedly threatened a Department of Transportation official with police pressure when questioned about permit applications.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Uprise RI Staff |date=2024-10-23 |title=As Flock Surveillance Cameras Proliferate in Rhode Island, Lawsuit Challenges Their Legality |url=https://upriseri.com/as-flock-surveillance-cameras-proliferate-in-rhode-island-lawsuit-challenges-their-legality/ |url-status=live |access-date=2025-08-25 |website=UPRISE RI |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20241101064737/https://upriseri.com/as-flock-surveillance-cameras-proliferate-in-rhode-island-lawsuit-challenges-their-legality/ |archive-date=1 Nov 2024}}</ref> | In Illinois, a Flock representative allegedly threatened a Department of Transportation official with police pressure when questioned about permit applications.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Uprise RI Staff |date=2024-10-23 |title=As Flock Surveillance Cameras Proliferate in Rhode Island, Lawsuit Challenges Their Legality |url=https://upriseri.com/as-flock-surveillance-cameras-proliferate-in-rhode-island-lawsuit-challenges-their-legality/ |url-status=live |access-date=2025-08-25 |website=UPRISE RI |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20241101064737/https://upriseri.com/as-flock-surveillance-cameras-proliferate-in-rhode-island-lawsuit-challenges-their-legality/ |archive-date=1 Nov 2024}}</ref> | ||
===== | =====Evanston, IL===== | ||
Flock was ordered to remove 18 stationary cameras. The city put the contract with Flock on a 30-day termination notice on August 26. Flock Initially appeared to comply, removing 15 of the cameras by September 8. Later, Flock was caught reinstalling all of them by the following Tuesday without authorization from the city. The city of Evanston responded with a cease-and-desist order for Flock to remove the new and unauthorized camera equipment. Because Flock reinstalled the cameras without permission, Evanston was forced to cover the cameras with tape and bags to block them from potentially logging vehicle data.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Harrison |first=Alex |date=2025-09-25 |title=City covers Flock cameras while waiting for removal |url=https://evanstonroundtable.com/2025/09/25/city-covers-up-flock-cameras-while-waiting-for-removal/ |url-status=live |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260220002233/https://evanstonroundtable.com/2025/09/25/city-covers-up-flock-cameras-while-waiting-for-removal/ |archive-date=20 Feb 2026|access-date=2025-10-10 |website=Evanston Roundtable}}</ref> | Flock was ordered to remove 18 stationary cameras. The city put the contract with Flock on a 30-day termination notice on August 26. Flock Initially appeared to comply, removing 15 of the cameras by September 8. Later, Flock was caught reinstalling all of them by the following Tuesday without authorization from the city. The city of Evanston responded with a cease-and-desist order for Flock to remove the new and unauthorized camera equipment. Because Flock reinstalled the cameras without permission, Evanston was forced to cover the cameras with tape and bags to block them from potentially logging vehicle data.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Harrison |first=Alex |date=2025-09-25 |title=City covers Flock cameras while waiting for removal |url=https://evanstonroundtable.com/2025/09/25/city-covers-up-flock-cameras-while-waiting-for-removal/ |url-status=live |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260220002233/https://evanstonroundtable.com/2025/09/25/city-covers-up-flock-cameras-while-waiting-for-removal/ |archive-date=20 Feb 2026|access-date=2025-10-10 |website=Evanston Roundtable}}</ref> | ||
===City rejections and terminations=== | ===City rejections and terminations=== | ||
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==Security vulnerabilities== | ==Security vulnerabilities== | ||
In 2025, Flock Safety reported security vulnerabilities in its devices and submitted them to MITRE for inclusion in the National Vulnerability Database, including issues such as hard-coded credentials and improper access controls.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-05-05 |title=Gunshot Detection and License Plate Reader Security Alert |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/blog/gunshot-detection-and-license-plate-reader-security-alert | | In 2025, Flock Safety reported security vulnerabilities in its devices and submitted them to MITRE for inclusion in the National Vulnerability Database, including issues such as hard-coded credentials and improper access controls.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-05-05 |title=Gunshot Detection and License Plate Reader Security Alert |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/blog/gunshot-detection-and-license-plate-reader-security-alert |url-status=live |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/2DEQv |archive-date=5 May 2026 |website=Flock Safety}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-10-02 |title=CVE-2025-59403 : The Flock Safety Android Collins application (aka com.flocksafety.android.collin |url=https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2025-59403/ |website=CVEdetails.com |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20251207014907/https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2025-59403/ |archive-date=7 Dec 2025}}</ref> Similar security concerns have affected other ALPR systems, including exposure of default passwords and unencrypted data storage.<ref name=":4">{{Cite web |last=Quintin |first=Cooper |date=28 Oct 2015 |title=License Plate Readers Exposed! How Public Safety Agencies Responded to Major Vulnerabilities in Vehicle Surveillance Tech |url=https://www.eff.org/ur/deeplinks/2015/10/license-plate-readers-exposed-how-public-safety-agencies-responded-massive |website=Electronic Frontier Foundation |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20251210130106/https://www.eff.org/ur/deeplinks/2015/10/license-plate-readers-exposed-how-public-safety-agencies-responded-massive |archive-date=10 Dec 2025}}</ref> | ||
This represents one of several major security disclosures in the past decade. In 2015, the Electronic Frontier Foundation documented more than 100 ALPR cameras accessible on the open internet, often without passwords or proper configuration.<ref name=":4" /> A more serious documented breach occurred in 2019, when Perceptics, LLC, a subcontractor for U.S. Customs and Border Protection, exposed approximately 105,000 license plate images and 184,000 traveler facial images.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Review of CBP's Major Cybersecurity Incident During a 2019 Biometric Pilot |url=https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-09/OIG-20-71-Sep20.pdf |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260121195004/https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-09/OIG-20-71-Sep20.pdf |archive-date=21 Jan 2026}}</ref> | This represents one of several major security disclosures in the past decade. In 2015, the Electronic Frontier Foundation documented more than 100 ALPR cameras accessible on the open internet, often without passwords or proper configuration.<ref name=":4" /> A more serious documented breach occurred in 2019, when Perceptics, LLC, a subcontractor for U.S. Customs and Border Protection, exposed approximately 105,000 license plate images and 184,000 traveler facial images.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Review of CBP's Major Cybersecurity Incident During a 2019 Biometric Pilot |url=https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-09/OIG-20-71-Sep20.pdf |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260121195004/https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-09/OIG-20-71-Sep20.pdf |archive-date=21 Jan 2026}}</ref> | ||
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====Cease and desist to DeFlock.me==== | ====Cease and desist to DeFlock.me==== | ||
DeFlock.me is a website allowing users to log and view the locations of ALPRs, such as Flock products. On 30 January 2025, Flock sent a cease and desist notice to the owner of DeFlock demanding the name of the website be changed to exclude the company's brand name. The letter also stated that "the Website also implies that various license plate readers are vulnerable to security hacks [...]" which Flock alleged "[...] provides a false impression about the security of Flock Products."<ref>{{Cite web |last=Matz |first=Sarah M. |title=2025 01 31 DEFLOCK CD final |url=https://www.eff.org/files/2025/02/26/2025_01_31_deflock_cd_ex-3.pdf |website=Electronic Frontier Foundation |date=30 Jan 2025 |access-date=27 Oct 2025 |url-status=live |format=PDF |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20251020035804/https://www.eff.org/files/2025/02/26/2025_01_31_deflock_cd_ex-3.pdf |archive-date=20 Oct 2025}}</ref> | DeFlock.org (formerly DeFlock.me) is a website allowing users to log and view the locations of ALPRs, such as Flock products. On 30 January 2025, Flock sent a cease and desist notice to the owner of DeFlock demanding the name of the website be changed to exclude the company's brand name. The letter also stated that "the Website also implies that various license plate readers are vulnerable to security hacks [...]" which Flock alleged "[...] provides a false impression about the security of Flock Products."<ref>{{Cite web |last=Matz |first=Sarah M. |title=2025 01 31 DEFLOCK CD final |url=https://www.eff.org/files/2025/02/26/2025_01_31_deflock_cd_ex-3.pdf |website=Electronic Frontier Foundation |date=30 Jan 2025 |access-date=27 Oct 2025 |url-status=live |format=PDF |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20251020035804/https://www.eff.org/files/2025/02/26/2025_01_31_deflock_cd_ex-3.pdf |archive-date=20 Oct 2025}}</ref> | ||
==External links== | ==External links== | ||
*[https://deflock. | *[https://deflock.org/ DeFlock live map of active ALPRs] | ||
*[https://www.noalprs.org/ No ALPRS movement in United States] | *[https://www.noalprs.org/ No ALPRS movement in United States] | ||
*[https://plateprivacy.com/ The Plate Privacy Project] | *[https://plateprivacy.com/ The Plate Privacy Project] | ||