Age verification: Difference between revisions

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The Online Safety Act is already exerting extraterritorial control through the age‑verification and validation changes it prompts, which are being implemented in the U.S. even though those companies customer bases are not at all subject to UK law, even Europeans that are also not under UK law are affected. This stems from the Act’s vague, overly broad language requiring companies to comply whenever users are located in the UK. Because the law effectively ignores national borders, non‑UK companies face only two options: geo‑block affected content for UK users or apply the same verification measures globally.

Geo‑blocking would severely disrupt services and business relationships that where already in place with UK customers before the Online Safety Act, so many companies choose to implement the changes for all users resulting in practical overreach beyond the UK. A reason for this is ~~Ofcoms~~<ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-01-31 |title=What is Ofcom? |url=https://www.ofcom.org.uk/about-ofcom/what-we-do/what-is-ofcom |url-status=live |access-date=2026-04-07 |website=[[Ofcom]]}}</ref> statutory powers to require platforms to use “accredited technology” to detect illegal content. As such systems would have to be implemented onto all the content this again would be an overreach of their ~~precieved~~ authorities. ~~Companys~~ that do not comply are already ~~beeing~~ fined for this.

Geo‑blocking would severely disrupt services and business relationships that where already in place with UK customers before the Online Safety Act, so many companies choose to implement the changes for all users resulting in practical overreach beyond the UK. A reason for this is Ofcom's<ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-01-31 |title=What is Ofcom? |url=https://www.ofcom.org.uk/about-ofcom/what-we-do/what-is-ofcom |url-status=live |access-date=2026-04-07 |website=[[Ofcom]]}}</ref> statutory powers to require platforms to use “accredited technology” to detect illegal content. As such systems would have to be implemented onto all the content this again would be an overreach of their perceived authorities. Companies that do not comply are already being fined for this.

Even if the UK Government has “paused” its demand for implementing “accredited ~~technologys”~~ there is no practical way to meet the vague requirement set out by Ofcom in the Online Safety Act. The proposal ignores that smaller companies would likely be forced to close under the financial burden of compliance, producing a sterilized market with reduced competition only firms with deep pockets can comply. That still does not prevent Ofcom from fining companies that fail to comply.

Even if the UK Government has “paused” its demand for implementing “accredited technologies” there is no practical way to meet the vague requirement set out by Ofcom in the Online Safety Act. The proposal ignores that smaller companies would likely be forced to close under the financial burden of compliance, producing a sterilized market with reduced competition only firms with deep pockets can comply. That still does not prevent Ofcom from fining companies that fail to comply.

Examples:

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===Inaccuracy===

~~Researches about~~ age verification software that estimates age via face scans are inaccurate, identifying children as adults or vice versa. These inaccurate estimations ~~might~~ lead to have to use more privacy-invasive methods like submitting a picture of a personal ID. ~~{{Citation needed}}~~

Research on age verification software that estimates age via face scans are often inaccurate, identifying children as adults or vice versa.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Ganel |first=Tzvi |date=2022-12-29 |title=Biases in human perception of facial age are present and more exaggerated in current AI technology |url=https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-27009-w |journal=Nature |volume=12 |issue=1 |pages=22519 |via=Springer Nature}}</ref> These inaccurate estimations could lead to have to use more privacy-invasive methods like submitting a picture of a personal ID.

===~~Questioned effectiveness~~===

===Effectiveness===

~~Recent studies evidenced practices done by~~ the Online Safety Act legislation are ~~poorly effective~~ as many users ~~managed to~~ reach to VPNs and ~~bypasses~~ in order to protect their privacy online {{~~Citation needed~~}}. ~~Children might~~ use their parents' IDs or credit cards to ~~circumvent the systems~~ and ~~have~~ access ~~to mature~~ content. ~~{{Citation needed}}~~

Enforcement of the Online Safety Act legislation are often ineffective as many users can reach to VPNs and other methods in order to protect their privacy online.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Jarvie |first=Chelsea |date= |title=Online Age Verification: Government Legislation, Supplier Responsibilization, and Public Perceptions |url=https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11429505/ |journal=PubMed Central |volume=11 |issue=9 |pages=1068 |via=National Library of Medicine}}</ref> E.g. children could trivially use their parents' IDs or credit cards to be falsely identified as an adult, and access restricted content.

===Limitation of control over owned devices===

Age verification ~~methods that are done~~ at the operating system level, ~~such~~ as ~~how it is done~~ on [[Apple introduces OS-level age verification|iOS]] in some regions, prevent the device owner, even ~~if they're an adult,~~ to freely use their device unless they ~~send~~ sensitive data online. This also ~~prevents~~ parents from configuring their children's devices to their liking or to create different profiles in case a device is used by multiple people.~~{{Citation needed}}~~

Age verification at the operating system level, as implemented on [[Apple introduces OS-level age verification|iOS]] in some regions<ref>{{Cite web |last= |first= |date=2026-05-28 |title=If you're asked to confirm that you’re an adult |url=https://support.apple.com/en-us/125662 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260506175439/https://support.apple.com/en-us/125662 |archive-date=2026-05-06 |access-date=2026-05-28 |website=Apple support}}</ref>, can prevent the device owner - even adults to freely use their device unless they submit sensitive data online. This can also prevent parents from configuring their children's devices to their liking or to create different profiles in case a device is used by multiple people.

===Threat to Free and Open Source Software (FOSS)===

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*'''Credit card check''': Less privacy-invasive than an ID check or a live selfie, but very problematic because of potential card theft if a data leak occurs.

*'''Behavior prediction''': Used by some social media to estimate the user's age by its behavior on the platform using algorithms.

==Examples==

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*[https://www.eff.org/pages/age-verification-bills-are-unconstitutional EFF explains how OS-level age-verification is unconstitutional]

*[https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/8250/all-info All Information (Except Text) for H.R.8250 - Parents Decide Act]

*[https://csa-scientist-open-letter.org/ageverif-Feb2026| Joint statement of scientists and researchers on Age Assurance - Open letter signed by academics, warning about age verification risks]

*[https://csa-scientist-open-letter.org/ageverif-Feb2026 Joint statement of scientists and researchers on Age Assurance - Open letter signed by academics, warning about age verification risks]

*[https://reclaimthenet.org/age-verification Say No to Online Age Verification at Reclaim The Net]

==See also==

@@ Line 20: / Line 20: @@
 The Online Safety Act is already exerting extraterritorial control through the age‑verification and validation changes it prompts, which are being implemented in the U.S. even though those companies customer bases are not at all subject to UK law, even Europeans that are also not under UK law are affected. This stems from the Act’s vague, overly broad language requiring companies to comply whenever users are located in the UK. Because the law effectively ignores national borders, non‑UK companies face only two options: geo‑block affected content for UK users or apply the same verification measures globally.
-Geo‑blocking would severely disrupt services and business relationships that where already in place with UK customers before the Online Safety Act, so many companies choose to implement the changes for all users resulting in practical overreach beyond the UK. A reason for this is Ofcoms<ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-01-31 |title=What is Ofcom? |url=https://www.ofcom.org.uk/about-ofcom/what-we-do/what-is-ofcom |url-status=live |access-date=2026-04-07 |website=[[Ofcom]]}}</ref> statutory powers to require platforms to use “accredited technology” to detect illegal content. As such systems would have to be implemented onto all the content this again would be an overreach of their precieved authorities. Companys that do not comply are already beeing fined for this.
+Geo‑blocking would severely disrupt services and business relationships that where already in place with UK customers before the Online Safety Act, so many companies choose to implement the changes for all users resulting in practical overreach beyond the UK. A reason for this is Ofcom's<ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-01-31 |title=What is Ofcom? |url=https://www.ofcom.org.uk/about-ofcom/what-we-do/what-is-ofcom |url-status=live |access-date=2026-04-07 |website=[[Ofcom]]}}</ref> statutory powers to require platforms to use “accredited technology” to detect illegal content. As such systems would have to be implemented onto all the content this again would be an overreach of their perceived authorities. Companies that do not comply are already being fined for this.
-Even if the UK Government has “paused” its demand for implementing “accredited technologys” there is no practical way to meet the vague requirement set out by Ofcom in the Online Safety Act. The proposal ignores that smaller companies would likely be forced to close under the financial burden of compliance, producing a sterilized market with reduced competition only firms with deep pockets can comply. That still does not prevent Ofcom from fining companies that fail to comply.
+Even if the UK Government has “paused” its demand for implementing “accredited technologies” there is no practical way to meet the vague requirement set out by Ofcom in the Online Safety Act. The proposal ignores that smaller companies would likely be forced to close under the financial burden of compliance, producing a sterilized market with reduced competition only firms with deep pockets can comply. That still does not prevent Ofcom from fining companies that fail to comply.
 Examples:
@@ Line 63: / Line 63: @@
 ===Inaccuracy===
-Researches about age verification software that estimates age via face scans are inaccurate, identifying children as adults or vice versa. These inaccurate estimations might lead to have to use more privacy-invasive methods like submitting a picture of a personal ID. {{Citation needed}}
+Research on age verification software that estimates age via face scans are often inaccurate, identifying children as adults or vice versa.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Ganel |first=Tzvi |date=2022-12-29 |title=Biases in human perception of facial age are present and more exaggerated in current AI technology |url=https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-27009-w |journal=Nature |volume=12 |issue=1 |pages=22519 |via=Springer Nature}}</ref> These inaccurate estimations could lead to have to use more privacy-invasive methods like submitting a picture of a personal ID.
-===Questioned effectiveness===
+===Effectiveness===
-Recent studies evidenced practices done by the Online Safety Act legislation are poorly effective as many users managed to reach to VPNs and bypasses in order to protect their privacy online {{Citation needed}}. Children might use their parents' IDs or credit cards to circumvent the systems and have access to mature content. {{Citation needed}}
+Enforcement of the Online Safety Act legislation are often ineffective as many users can reach to VPNs and other methods in order to protect their privacy online.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Jarvie |first=Chelsea |date= |title=Online Age Verification: Government Legislation, Supplier Responsibilization, and Public Perceptions |url=https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11429505/ |journal=PubMed Central |volume=11 |issue=9 |pages=1068 |via=National Library of Medicine}}</ref> E.g. children could trivially use their parents' IDs or credit cards to be falsely identified as an adult, and access restricted content.
 ===Limitation of control over owned devices===
-Age verification methods that are done at the operating system level, such as how it is done on [[Apple introduces OS-level age verification|iOS]] in some regions, prevent the device owner, even if they're an adult, to freely use their device unless they send sensitive data online. This also prevents parents from configuring their children's devices to their liking or to create different profiles in case a device is used by multiple people.{{Citation needed}}
+Age verification at the operating system level, as implemented on [[Apple introduces OS-level age verification|iOS]] in some regions<ref>{{Cite web |last= |first= |date=2026-05-28 |title=If you're asked to confirm that you’re an adult |url=https://support.apple.com/en-us/125662 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260506175439/https://support.apple.com/en-us/125662 |archive-date=2026-05-06 |access-date=2026-05-28 |website=Apple support}}</ref>, can prevent the device owner - even adults to freely use their device unless they submit sensitive data online. This can also prevent parents from configuring their children's devices to their liking or to create different profiles in case a device is used by multiple people.
 ===Threat to Free and Open Source Software (FOSS)===
@@ Line 82: / Line 82: @@
 *'''Credit card check''': Less privacy-invasive than an ID check or a live selfie, but very problematic because of potential card theft if a data leak occurs.
 *'''Behavior prediction''': Used by some social media to estimate the user's age by its behavior on the platform using algorithms.
 ==Examples==
@@ Line 99: / Line 98: @@
 *[https://www.eff.org/pages/age-verification-bills-are-unconstitutional EFF explains how OS-level age-verification is unconstitutional]
 *[https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/8250/all-info All Information (Except Text) for H.R.8250 - Parents Decide Act]
-*[https://csa-scientist-open-letter.org/ageverif-Feb2026| Joint statement of scientists and researchers on Age Assurance - Open letter signed by academics, warning about age verification risks]
+*[https://csa-scientist-open-letter.org/ageverif-Feb2026 Joint statement of scientists and researchers on Age Assurance - Open letter signed by academics, warning about age verification risks]
+*[https://reclaimthenet.org/age-verification Say No to Online Age Verification at Reclaim The Net]
 ==See also==