Digital rights management: Difference between revisions
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'''[[wikipedia:Digital rights management|Digital rights management]]''' ('''DRM'''), alternatively known as '''digital restrictions management'''<ref>{{Cite web |last=Stallman |first=Richard |title=Opposing Digital Rights Mismanagement |url=https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/opposing-drm.en.html |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20251009050044/https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/opposing-drm.en.html |archive-date=9 Oct 2025}}</ref>, broadly refers to any kind of access control technology that is used to deliberately restrict the usage of media content or devices after the sale. It is typically used by a seller to protect their digital rights through prevention of unauthorized distribution or replication of their product. Implementations of DRM can range from very simple (such as a basic disc check) to extremely complex executable binary obfuscation (such as Denuvo) | '''[[wikipedia:Digital rights management|Digital rights management]]''' ('''DRM'''), alternatively known as '''digital restrictions management'''<ref>{{Cite web |last=Stallman |first=Richard |title=Opposing Digital Rights Mismanagement |url=https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/opposing-drm.en.html |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20251009050044/https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/opposing-drm.en.html |archive-date=9 Oct 2025}}</ref>, broadly refers to any kind of access control technology that is used to deliberately restrict the usage of media content or devices after the sale. It is typically used by a seller to protect their digital rights through prevention of unauthorized distribution or replication of their product. Implementations of DRM can range from very simple (such as a basic disc check) to extremely complex executable binary obfuscation (such as Denuvo) | ||
<blockquote> | <blockquote>''DRM creates a damaged good; it prevents you from doing what would be possible without it.'' – Defective by Design<ref>{{Cite web |title=What is DRM? |url=https://www.defectivebydesign.org/what_is_drm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260203202020/https://www.defectivebydesign.org/what_is_drm |archive-date=2026-02-03 |access-date=2026-02-06 |website=Defective by Design}}</ref></blockquote> | ||
==Why it is a problem== | ==Why it is a problem== | ||
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From 1996, DVDs began to feature the "Content Scramble System" (CSS), an encryption based DRM. CSS was successfully circumvented as early as 1999, less than five years after its introduction, partly due to the limited length of the 40-bit encryption key, which was used to comply with US government export regulations of the time.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Stevenson |first=Frank Andrew |date=27 Oct 1999 |title=[Livid-dev] Successfull attack on CSS algorithm |url=https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~dst/DeCSS/FrankStevenson/mail1.txt |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260114031245/https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~dst/DeCSS/FrankStevenson/mail1.txt |archive-date=2026-01-14 |access-date=2026-02-06 |website=Carnegie Mellon University School of Computer Science}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Stevenson |first=Frank A. |date=8 November 1999 |title=Cryptanalysis of Contents Scrambling System |url=http://www.dvd-copy.com/news/cryptanalysis_of_contents_scrambling_system.htm |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20000302000206/http://www.dvd-copy.com/news/cryptanalysis_of_contents_scrambling_system.htm |archive-date=2000-03-02 |access-date=2026-02-06 |website=DVD-Copy}}</ref> Following this, DVDs as well as HD-DVDs and Blu-Rays would implement other types of DRM, one of them being the "Advanced Access Content System".<ref>{{Cite web |title=Advanced Access Content System (AACS) |url=https://www.aacsla.com/specifications/specs091/AACS_Spec_Common_0.91.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070302130221/http://www.aacsla.com/specifications/specs091/AACS_Spec_Common_0.91.pdf |archive-date=2 Mar 2007 |access-date=20 Apr 2025}} | From 1996, DVDs began to feature the "Content Scramble System" (CSS), an encryption based DRM. CSS was successfully circumvented as early as 1999, less than five years after its introduction, partly due to the limited length of the 40-bit encryption key, which was used to comply with US government export regulations of the time.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Stevenson |first=Frank Andrew |date=27 Oct 1999 |title=[Livid-dev] Successfull attack on CSS algorithm |url=https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~dst/DeCSS/FrankStevenson/mail1.txt |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260114031245/https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~dst/DeCSS/FrankStevenson/mail1.txt |archive-date=2026-01-14 |access-date=2026-02-06 |website=Carnegie Mellon University School of Computer Science}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Stevenson |first=Frank A. |date=8 November 1999 |title=Cryptanalysis of Contents Scrambling System |url=http://www.dvd-copy.com/news/cryptanalysis_of_contents_scrambling_system.htm |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20000302000206/http://www.dvd-copy.com/news/cryptanalysis_of_contents_scrambling_system.htm |archive-date=2000-03-02 |access-date=2026-02-06 |website=DVD-Copy}}</ref> Following this, DVDs as well as HD-DVDs and Blu-Rays would implement other types of DRM, one of them being the "Advanced Access Content System".<ref>{{Cite web |title=Advanced Access Content System (AACS) |url=https://www.aacsla.com/specifications/specs091/AACS_Spec_Common_0.91.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070302130221/http://www.aacsla.com/specifications/specs091/AACS_Spec_Common_0.91.pdf |archive-date=2 Mar 2007 |access-date=20 Apr 2025}} | ||
</ref> When the first AACS processing key was similarly extracted, the AACS Licensing Administrator began issuing cease-and-desist letters to websites where the key was posted.<ref>{{Cite web |date=17 Apr 2007 |title=AACS licensor complains of posted key |url=https://lumendatabase.org/notices/21725 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20251207212919/https://lumendatabase.org/notices/21725 |archive-date=2025-12-07 |access-date=20 Apr 2025 |website=Lumen}}</ref> Another form of Blu-Ray DRM, [[Cinavia]], uses a form of audio watermarking that makes certain releases unplayable in devices that are not equipped to recognize it, a notable example being Sony's Playstation 3.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Ganesh |first=T. S. |date=21 Mar 2012 |title=Cinavia DRM: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Blu-ray’s Self-Destruction |url=https://www.anandtech.com/show/5693/cinavia-drm-how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-blurays-selfdestruction/2 |url-status=live |access-date=20 Apr 2025 |website=AnandTech |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20250708174835/https://www.anandtech.com/show/5693/cinavia-drm-how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-blurays-selfdestruction/2 |archive-date=8 Jul 2025}}</ref> | </ref> When the first AACS processing key was similarly extracted, the AACS Licensing Administrator began issuing cease-and-desist letters to websites where the key was posted.<ref>{{Cite web |date=17 Apr 2007 |title=AACS licensor complains of posted key |url=https://lumendatabase.org/notices/21725 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20251207212919/https://lumendatabase.org/notices/21725 |archive-date=2025-12-07 |access-date=20 Apr 2025 |website=Lumen}}</ref> Another form of Blu-Ray DRM, [[wikipedia:Cinavia |Cinavia]], uses a form of audio watermarking that makes certain releases unplayable in devices that are not equipped to recognize it, a notable example being Sony's Playstation 3.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Ganesh |first=T. S. |date=21 Mar 2012 |title=Cinavia DRM: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Blu-ray’s Self-Destruction |url=https://www.anandtech.com/show/5693/cinavia-drm-how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-blurays-selfdestruction/2 |url-status=live |access-date=20 Apr 2025 |website=AnandTech |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20250708174835/https://www.anandtech.com/show/5693/cinavia-drm-how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-blurays-selfdestruction/2 |archive-date=8 Jul 2025}}</ref> | ||
In the attempt of preventing video ripping via a capture card, modern displays, optical disc players, and computers use the [[wikipedia:High-bandwidth_Digital_Content_Protection|High-Definition Content Protection]] system to encrypt display signals.<ref>{{Cite web |title=About DCP |url=https://www.digital-cp.com/about_dcp |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260104104231/https://www.digital-cp.com/about_dcp |archive-date=2026-01-04 |access-date=20 Apr 2025 |website=Digital CP}}</ref> For example, [[Netflix stream-quality controversy|Netflix will refuse]] to stream content at the full resolution advertised for the plan if the user is not streaming through an HDCP compliant video card and display. | In the attempt of preventing video ripping via a capture card, modern displays, optical disc players, and computers use the [[wikipedia:High-bandwidth_Digital_Content_Protection|High-Definition Content Protection]] system to encrypt display signals.<ref>{{Cite web |title=About DCP |url=https://www.digital-cp.com/about_dcp |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260104104231/https://www.digital-cp.com/about_dcp |archive-date=2026-01-04 |access-date=20 Apr 2025 |website=Digital CP}}</ref> For example, [[Netflix stream-quality controversy|Netflix will refuse]] to stream content at the full resolution advertised for the plan if the user is not streaming through an HDCP compliant video card and display. | ||
For terrestrial over-the-air broadcast, in 2023 [[ATSC 3.0]] pilot stations across the United States started to encrypt their signals,<ref>{{Cite web |last=Seidman |first=Lon |date=15 May 2023 |title=Broadcasters Roll Out Restrictive DRM Encryption on ATSC 3.0 Broadcasts |url=https://blog.lon.tv/2023/05/15/broadcasters-roll-out-restrictive-drm-encryption-on-atsc-3-0-broadcasts/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260104092252/https://blog.lon.tv/2023/05/15/broadcasters-roll-out-restrictive-drm-encryption-on-atsc-3-0-broadcasts/ |archive-date=2026-01-04 |access-date=20 Apr 2025 |website=Lon.tv}}</ref> leaving those that bought ATSC 3.0 tuners that could not decrypt broadcasts unable to watch the newly encrypted channels. Those tuners that were later certified by the A3SA authority to decrypt signals also had potential restrictions placed as part of the DRM scheme, such as blocking recordings and remote tuner access.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Newman |first=Jared |date=28 Jul 2023 |title=NextGen TV’s DRM puts future of the over-the-air DVR in doubt |url=https://www.techhive.com/article/2009693/nextgen-tv-drm-puts-future-of-the-over-the-air-dvr-in-doubt.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20251213194219/https://www.techhive.com/article/2009693/nextgen-tv-drm-puts-future-of-the-over-the-air-dvr-in-doubt.html |archive-date=2025-12-13 |access-date=20 Apr 2025 |website=TechHive}}</ref> | For terrestrial over-the-air broadcast, in 2023 [[ATSC 3.0]] pilot stations across the United States started to encrypt their signals,<ref>{{Cite web |last=Seidman |first=Lon |date=15 May 2023 |title=Broadcasters Roll Out Restrictive DRM Encryption on ATSC 3.0 Broadcasts |url=https://blog.lon.tv/2023/05/15/broadcasters-roll-out-restrictive-drm-encryption-on-atsc-3-0-broadcasts/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260104092252/https://blog.lon.tv/2023/05/15/broadcasters-roll-out-restrictive-drm-encryption-on-atsc-3-0-broadcasts/ |archive-date=2026-01-04 |access-date=20 Apr 2025 |website=Lon.tv}}</ref> leaving those that bought ATSC 3.0 tuners that could not decrypt broadcasts unable to watch the newly encrypted channels. Those tuners that were later certified by the A3SA authority to decrypt signals also had potential restrictions placed as part of the DRM scheme, such as blocking recordings and remote tuner access.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Newman |first=Jared |date=28 Jul 2023 |title=NextGen TV’s DRM puts future of the over-the-air DVR in doubt |url=https://www.techhive.com/article/2009693/nextgen-tv-drm-puts-future-of-the-over-the-air-dvr-in-doubt.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20251213194219/https://www.techhive.com/article/2009693/nextgen-tv-drm-puts-future-of-the-over-the-air-dvr-in-doubt.html |archive-date=2025-12-13 |access-date=20 Apr 2025 |website=TechHive}}</ref> | ||
===Ebooks=== | |||
{{See also|Adobe Digital Editions' ebook DRM}} | |||
Arguably the most popular DRM system for ebooks historically is [[Adobe]]'s ADEPT (Adobe Digital Experience Protection Technology). There is also the open-source Readium DRM, [[Amazon]]'s Kindle DRM, [[Apple]]'s FairPlay DRM, EditionLink, EditionGuard and others.<ref>{{Cite web |date=20 Oct 2020 |author=EditionGuard |title=The Four Best eBook DRM Solutions |url=https://www.editionguard.com/learn/the-four-best-ebook-drm-solutions/ |url-status=live |website=editionguard.com |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260622171128/https://www.editionguard.com/learn/the-four-best-ebook-drm-solutions/ |archive-date=22 Jun 2026}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Understanding DRM for Ebooks: What You Need to Know |url=https://www.foglioprint.com/blog/digital-rights-management-for-ebooks |website=foglioprint.com |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260622171547/https://www.foglioprint.com/blog/digital-rights-management-for-ebooks |archive-date=22 Jun 2026}}</ref> | |||
===Audio content=== | ===Audio content=== | ||
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==Further reading== | ==Further reading== | ||
*[[Automotive digital restrictions management]] | *[[Automotive digital restrictions management]] | ||
*[https://blog.xot.nl/2012/04/12/analysing-adept-adobe-digital-experience-protection-technology/ Analysing ADEPT] | |||
===Types of DRM=== | ===Types of DRM=== | ||