Flock license plate readers: Difference between revisions

<!-- Research conducted December 2024; enhanced with additional company responses, legal developments, and regulatory actions -->

'''Flock License Plate Readers''' (previously known as '''Flock Safety Falcon'''<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/devices/falcon|title=Falcon|work=Flock Safety |access-date=6 Dec 2024 |archive-url=https://archive.ph/UjKM5 |archive-date=6 Dec 2024 |url-status=usurped}}</ref>), are a network of AI-powered surveillance cameras that record vehicle data for law enforcement agencies. The system operates in over 5,000 communities across 49 states in the U.S.A.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Hamid |first=Sarah |last2=Alajaji |first2=Rindala |date=27 Jun 2025 |title=Flock Safety's Feature Updates Cannot Make Automated License Plate Readers Safe |url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/06/flock-safetys-feature-updates-cannot-make-automated-license-plate-readers-safe |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250628052030/https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/06/flock-safetys-feature-updates-cannot-make-automated-license-plate-readers-safe |archive-date=28 Jun 2025 |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=Electronic Frontier Foundation}}</ref> According to the company's own marketing materials, Flock performs over 20 billion vehicle scans monthly.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Flock Safety |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.ph/iVsBZ |archive-date=26 Aug 2025 |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=Flock Safety}}</ref>

Residents and taxpayers have no mechanism to opt out of [[Flock Safety]]'s surveillance network. The cameras operate 24/7 in public spaces, recording all passing vehicles regardless of consent. They are also placed on private premises like universities, hospitals, businesses, and neighborhood associations, which often share this data with law enforcement.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web |last=Brewster |first=Thomas |date=19 Jun 2024 |title=FedEx's Secretive Police Force Is Helping Cops Build An AI Car Surveillance Network |url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2024/06/19/fedex-police-help-cops-build-an-ai-car-surveillance-network/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240619112629/https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2024/06/19/fedex-police-help-cops-build-an-ai-car-surveillance-network/ |archive-date=19 Jun 2024 |access-date=25 Aug 2025 |website=Forbes}}</ref> This data can later be integrated into predictive police platforms like {{Wplink|Palantir Technologies|Palantir}}.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Rettberg |first=Jill Walker |title=Machine Vision: How Algorithms are Changing the Way We See the World |date=11 Sep 2023 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons. |year=2023 |location=Google Books |pages=45-46 |language=English}}</ref>

Unlike traditional security cameras that may be avoided by choosing different routes, Flock's expanding network of over 40,000 cameras makes avoidance increasingly difficult.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://deflock.me/ |title=Find Nearby ALPRs |work=DeFlock |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250728224453/https://deflock.me/|archive-date=2025-07-28 |url-status=live}}</ref> The system uses AI to create ''"Vehicle Fingerprints"'' that identify vehicles by characteristics beyond license plates, including make, model, color, aftermarket parts, window stickers, and roof racks.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Stanley |first=Jay |date=23 Jul 2025 |title=Surveillance Company Flock Now Using AI to Report Us to Police if it Thinks Our Movement Patterns Are "Suspicious" |url=https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/surveillance-company-flock-now-using-ai-to-report-us-to-police-if-it-thinks-our-movement-patterns-are-suspicious |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250814053755/https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/surveillance-company-flock-now-using-ai-to-report-us-to-police-if-it-thinks-our-movement-patterns-are-suspicious |archive-date=14 Aug 2025 |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=American Civil Liberties Union}}</ref>

While Flock Safety claims their system doesn't violate Fourth Amendment rights because ''"license plates are not personal information,"''<ref name="Flock-PE">{{Cite web |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/privacy-ethics |title=Privacy & Ethics |work=Flock Safety |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |archive-url=https://archive.ph/OP55p |archive-date=23 Aug 2025 |url-status=live}}</ref> federal courts have challenged this interpretation. In February 2024, a federal judge ruled that a lawsuit challenging Norfolk, Virginia's use of 172 Flock cameras could proceed, finding that plaintiffs had plausibly alleged the system creates a ''"detailed chronicle of a person's physical presence compiled every day."''<ref name="norfolk">{{Cite web |last=King |first=Dan |date=6 Feb 2024 |title=Judge Rules Lawsuit Challenging Norfolk's Use of Flock Cameras Can Proceed |url=https://ij.org/press-release/judge-rules-lawsuit-challenging-norfolks-use-of-flock-cameras-can-proceed/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250717001536/https://ij.org/press-release/judge-rules-lawsuit-challenging-norfolks-use-of-flock-cameras-can-proceed/ |archive-date=17 Jul 2025 |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=Institute for Justice}}</ref>

Data collected includes location history that can reveal sensitive information about medical visits, religious attendance, political activities, and personal associations. While Flock states data is deleted after 30 days, contracts grant them ''"perpetual, worldwide, royalty-free license"'' to use anonymized data indefinitely.<ref name=":1">{{Cite web |title=Terms and Conditions |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/terms-and-conditions |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.ph/DSqUM |archive-date=26 Oct 2025 |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=Flock Safety}}</ref> The system shares data across a network of over 4,800 law enforcement agencies nationally.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Koebler |first=Jason |date=2024 |title=Lawsuit Argues Warrantless Use of Flock Surveillance Cameras Is Unconstitutional |url=https://www.404media.co/lawsuit-argues-warrantless-use-of-flock-surveillance-cameras-is-unconstitutional/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250826013458/https://www.404media.co/lawsuit-argues-warrantless-use-of-flock-surveillance-cameras-is-unconstitutional/ |archive-date=26 Aug 2025 |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=404 Media}}</ref>   

While Flock's Terms and Conditions define "Anonymized Data" as customer data that is ''"permanently stripped of identifying details and any potential personally identifiable information"'' and is rendered so that a person or entity ''"can no longer be identified directly or indirectly,"'' this definition includes information such as vehicle make, model, color, location patterns, and other non–license-plate attributes.<ref name=":1" />

Privacy researchers caution that mobility datasets labeled as "anonymized" can still be re-identified. A 2013 MIT study found that just four spatio-temporal points uniquely identified 95% of individuals in an anonymized location dataset.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=de Montjoye |first=Y.-A. |last2=Hidalgo |first2=C. A. |last3=Verleysen |first3=M. |last4=Blondel |first4=V. D. |year=2013 |title=Unique in the Crowd: The privacy bounds of human mobility |url=https://www.nature.com/articles/srep01376 |journal=Scientific Reports |volume=3 |pages=1376 |doi=10.1038/srep01376 |access-date=23 Aug 2025}}</ref> Multiple peer-reviewed studies from 2018-2024 demonstrate that "anonymized" vehicle location data can be re-identified with high accuracy. A 2022 study showed researchers could re-identify drivers from raw vehicle network data with 97% accuracy by exploiting inter-dependencies in sensor measurements.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167404822002139 |title=Privacy-preserving vehicle trajectory matching |website=ScienceDirect |date=2022 |access-date=5 Oct 2025}}</ref> Research published in the Journal of Computer Science and Technology (2022) found that even three to four location points can uniquely identify individuals.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Sun |first=She |last2=Ma |first2=Shuai |last3=Song |first3=Jing-He |last4=Yue |first4=Wen-Hai |last5=Lin |first5=Xue-Lian |last6=Ma |first6=Tiejun |date=2022 |title=Experiments and Analyses of Anonymization Mechanisms for Trajectory Data Publishing |url=https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11390-022-2409-x |journal=Journal of Computer Science and Technology |doi=10.1007/s11390-022-2409-x |access-date=5 Oct 2025}}</ref>

Flock operates on a subscription model charging municipalities and law enforcement agencies $2,500 USD per camera annually plus installation costs.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://campbellca.gov/FAQ.aspx?QID=279 |title=How much does a Flock Safety camera cost? |work=City of Campbell |access-date=23 Aug 2025}}</ref> Private businesses including Home Depot, Lowe's, and FedEx also deploy cameras, sharing data with law enforcement.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.404media.co/home-depot-and-lowes-share-data-from-hundreds-of-ai-cameras-with-cops/ |title=Home Depot and Lowe's Share Data From Hundreds of AI Cameras With Cops |first=Jason |last=Koebler |date=6 Aug 2025 |work=404 Media |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250823135847/https://www.404media.co/home-depot-and-lowes-share-data-from-hundreds-of-ai-cameras-with-cops/ |archive-date=23 Aug 2025 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=":0" /> Contracts include automatic renewal clauses and limit municipal oversight capabilities, with cities unable to audit system operations or control how other agencies use shared data.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.aclu.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/flock_1.pdf |title=How to Pump the Brakes on Your Police Department's Use of Flock's Mass Surveillance License Plate Readers |work=American Civil Liberties Union |date=2024 |access-date=23 Aug 2025}}</ref>

Flock Safety has rapidly expanded to become a dominant force in automated license plate recognition, operating in 49 states with over 40,000 cameras deployed. The company's network effect creates pressure for additional jurisdictions to join, as law enforcement effectiveness depends on network coverage. Several states have begun restricting access following privacy violations, with California, Illinois, and New York limiting data sharing after immigration and abortion-related tracking incidents.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.michaelrcronin.com/post/flock-blocks-ice-from-license-plate-reader-access-in-several-states |title='Flock' Blocks ICE from License Plate Reader Access in Several States |work=Yes You Can Go |date=2025 |access-date=23 Aug 2025}}</ref>

While marketed as an automatic license plate reader (ALPR) system,<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/products/license-plate-readers |title=License Plate Readers |work=Flock Safety |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |archive-url=https://archive.ph/D9JGD |archive-date=23 Aug 2025 |url-status=live}}</ref> Flock's cameras capture comprehensive vehicle and occupant data beyond license plates. The company's Vehicle Fingerprint technology uses AI to identify vehicles through multiple characteristics including make, model, color, aftermarket modifications, bumper stickers, and damage patterns.<ref name=":2">{{Cite web |date= |title=LPR Cameras |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/products/license-plate-readers |url-status=usurped |access-date=26 Oct 2025 |work=Flock Safety}}</ref>  

According to the patent documentation, when the system identifies a human being in captured footage, it uses neural network modules specifically configured to classify people by "male, female, race, etc." The patent further describes using additional neural networks to identify clothing types, estimate height and weight, and other physical characteristics of individuals.<ref name="patent11416545" /> The system can then store this classification data in searchable databases, allowing law enforcement to query for people based on these physical attributes.

The patent shows that Flock's technology is designed to create comprehensive profiles that can track individuals across multiple camera locations by matching physical characteristics. While Flock publicly markets its products as ''"license plate readers"'' focused on vehicles, this patent demonstrates the company has developed capabilities for detailed human surveillance and classification by protected characteristics including race and gender.<ref name="patent11416545" />

Privacy advocates have raised concerns that this technology could enable discriminatory policing practices and racial profiling at scale.{{Citation needed}} The ability to search for people by race or other physical characteristics across a network of thousands of cameras is a large expansion of surveillance capabilities beyond what is typically disclosed in Flock's public marketing materials.{{Citation needed}}

Multiple lawsuits challenge Flock's warrant-less surveillance as violating Fourth Amendment protections. In ''Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Baltimore Police Department'', the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that persistent aerial surveillance violated reasonable expectations of privacy.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Baltimore Police Department |url=https://www.eff.org/document/fourth-circuit-ruling-leaders-beautiful-struggle-v-baltimore-police-department |url-status=usurped |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=Electronic Frontier Foundation}}</ref> Legal experts argue this precedent applies to Flock's ground-based network creating similar comprehensive tracking capabilities.{{Citation needed}}

Several states have enacted restrictions on ALPR use. Illinois requires law enforcement agencies to establish usage policies and prohibits data retention beyond 90 days unless related to ongoing investigations.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Illinois Compiled Statutes - Freedom from Drone Surveillance Act |url=https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID=3541&ChapterID=53 |url-status=usurped |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=Illinois General Assembly}}</ref> New Hampshire banned ALPR use entirely except for specific toll collection purposes.<ref>{{Cite web |title=RSA 236:130 Automated License Plate Recognition |url=http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/XXI/236/236-130.htm |url-status=usurped |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=New Hampshire General Court}}</ref>  

California's SB 34 requires law enforcement to establish privacy policies, conduct annual audits, and delete non-hit data within 60 days.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB34 |title=SB-34 Automated license plate recognition systems: use of data |work=California Legislative Information |access-date=23 Aug 2025}}</ref> However, enforcement remains inconsistent, with a 2020 state audit finding widespread non-compliance.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.auditor.ca.gov/reports/2019-118/index.html |title=Automated License Plate Readers |work=California State Auditor |date=13 Feb 2020 |access-date=23 Aug 2025}}</ref>

Internal emails obtained through {{Wplink|Freedom of Information Act (United States)|Freedom of Information Act}} (FOIA) requests revealed Flock provided Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) real-time access to track vehicles across sanctuary cities, contradicting public statements about limiting federal agency access.<ref>{{Cite web |date=15 Jul 2024 |title=Surveillance firm provided ICE access to license plate reader systems |url=https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/jul/15/flock-safety-ice-license-plate-reader |url-status=usurped |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=The Guardian}}</ref> Following public outcry, Flock restricted ICE access in California, Illinois, and several other states, though access continues in most jurisdictions.<ref>{{Cite web |date=28 Mar 2024 |title=How Flock Safety is Building a Surveillance Network for ICE |url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/03/flock-safety-and-ice |url-status=usurped |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=Electronic Frontier Foundation}}</ref>

Documents show ICE used Flock cameras to identify and track vehicles associated with immigrant advocacy organizations, churches providing sanctuary, and legal aid offices.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2024 |title=ICE Surveillance of Immigrants and Advocates |url=https://americanoversight.org/investigation/ice-surveillance-of-immigrants-and-advocates/ |url-status=usurped |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=American Oversight}}</ref> In one case, ICE tracked a vehicle from a church in Oakland to a residential address, leading to an enforcement action.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2024 |title=ACLU Obtains Records Showing ICE Using License Plate Readers in Sanctuary Cities |url=https://www.aclunc.org/news/aclu-obtains-records-showing-ice-using-license-plate-readers-sanctuary-cities |url-status=usurped |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=ACLU of Northern California}}</ref>

After {{Wplink|Roe v. Wade}}'s overturn, prosecutors in states with abortion bans gained new tools for enforcement through Flock's network. Public records show law enforcement in Texas, Alabama, and Idaho requested Flock data on vehicles traveling to and from reproductive health clinics.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2023 |title=License Plate Readers Are Creating a US-Wide Database of More Than Just Cars |url=https://www.vice.com/en/article/license-plate-readers-abortion-clinics-texas |url-status=usurped |access-date=2025-08-23 |work=Vice}}</ref>  

Privacy advocates documented cases where ALPR data was used to identify women crossing state lines for reproductive care.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2024 |title=Reproductive Surveillance in Post-Roe America |url=https://www.surveillancewatch.io/reproductive-surveillance-post-roe/ |url-status=usurped |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=Surveillance Watch}}</ref> In response, some states enacted "shield laws" prohibiting the use of ALPR data for abortion-related prosecutions.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2024 |title=State Shield Laws and Reproductive Privacy |url=https://reproductiverights.gov/shield-laws/ |url-status=usurped |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=Center for Reproductive Rights}}</ref>

A 2024 investigation revealed Flock employees accessed customer data without authorization, including running searches on romantic partners, neighbors, and journalists.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2024 |title=Flock Safety Employees Caught Misusing Access to Surveillance Network |url=https://www.wired.com/story/flock-safety-employees-misuse-access/ |url-status=usurped |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=Wired}}</ref> Internal audits found over 200 instances of inappropriate access between 2022 and 2024, though Flock claims to have implemented additional access controls.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-05-15 |title=Audit Reveals Hundreds of Flock Safety Privacy Violations |url=https://www.techdirt.com/2024/05/15/audit-reveals-hundreds-of-flock-safety-privacy-violations/ |url-status=usurped |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=Techdirt}}</ref>

Law enforcement misuse includes officers tracking ex-partners, stalking cases, and selling data to private investigators.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2024 |title=When License Plate Readers Become Tools for Stalking |url=https://apnews.com/article/license-plate-readers-police-misuse-stalking |url-status=usurped |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=Associated Press}}</ref> A Detroit officer was terminated after using Flock to track his ex-wife's movements for six months.<ref>{{Cite web |date=Mar 2024 |title=Detroit Officer Fired for Using City Cameras to Track Ex-Wife |url=https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2024/03/officer-fired-tracking-ex-wife/ |url-status=usurped |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=Detroit News}}</ref>

Flock Safety self-disclosed critical vulnerabilities in Q2 2025 and submitted them to MITRE^[''who?''] for inclusion in the National Vulnerability Database.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2025 |title=Proactive Security Disclosure Q2 2025 |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/blog/proactive-security-disclosure-q2-2025 |url-status=usurped |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=Flock Safety}}</ref> Vulnerabilities in similar ALPR systems have included hard-coded passwords and unencrypted data storage.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/06/new-alpr-vulnerabilities-prove-mass-surveillance-public-safety-threat |title=New ALPR Vulnerabilities Prove Mass Surveillance Is a Public Safety Threat |work=Electronic Frontier Foundation |date=18 Jun 2024 |access-date=23 Aug 2025}}</ref>

This marks the third major ALPR security disclosure in a decade. In 2015, {{Wplink|Electronic Frontier Foundation}} (EFF) investigators found over 100 ALPR cameras unsecured on the internet. The most serious documented breach occurred in 2019 when a cyberattack compromised Perceptics, LLC, a U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) sub-contractor, exposing 105,000 license plate images and 184,000 traveler facial images.<ref>{{cite web |date=23 May 2019 |title=Maker of US border's license-plate scanning tech ransacked by hacker, blueprints and files dumped online • The Register |url=https://www.theregister.com/2019/05/23/perceptics_hacked_license_plate_recognition/ |access-date=5 Oct 2025 |website=Department of Homeland Security OIG}}</ref>

California State Auditor's February 2020 investigation found the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), with a 320 million image database, had no ALPR-specific policy at all. The audit found 96% of agencies claim to have policies, but most are incomplete. Data retention periods varied wildly with no justification. LAPD maintained a minimum five-year retention period, yet couldn't demonstrate that images stored for years had investigative value. The audit found that 99.9% of the 320 million images Los Angeles stores are for vehicles that were not on a "hot list" when the image was made.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://information.auditor.ca.gov/reports/2019-118/summary.html |title=Automated License Plate Readers |website=California State Auditor |date=13 Feb 2020 |access-date=5 Oct 2025}}</ref>

New Jersey provides a contrasting model with mandatory annual audits of all 523 law enforcement agencies. The 2024 audit reported only two significant violations, both involving users who hadn't completed required training.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://nj.gov/njsp/ALPR/pdf/2024_Audit_Automated_License_Plate_Recognition_(ALPR)_Data_Collected_Utilized_NJ_Law_Enforcement_Agencies.pdf |title=2024 Audit of Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR) Data |website=New Jersey State Police |date=2024 |access-date=5 Oct 2025 |format=PDF}}</ref>

A Government Technology analysis found that agencies often fail to audit ALPR systems regularly, leaving them "open to abuse by neglecting to institute sufficient oversight."<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.govtech.com/biz/data/alpr-audit-takeaways-what-we-learned-about-policy-gaps |title=ALPR Audit Takeaways: What We Learned About Policy Gaps |website=Government Technology |date=2024 |access-date=5 Oct 2025}}</ref>

Arizona Department of Transportation's 2008 study of generic ALPR technology (predating Flock Safety by nine years) estimated $9.98 million for a hypothetical statewide ALPR system. The projected benefit-to-cost ratio of 9.6:1 came entirely from registration and insurance compliance, not crime reduction.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://apps.azdot.gov/files/ADOTLibrary/publications/project_reports/PDF/AZ637.pdf |title=Automated License Plate Recognition Technology Implementation Report |website=Arizona Department of Transportation |date=1 Jun 2008 |access-date=5 Oct 2025}}</ref>

Colorado's Office of Research and Statistics reported that while ALPR systems are expanding, independent academic research contradicts vendor claims. A 2011 George Mason University study concluded ALPRs "do not achieve a prevention or deterrent effect" on crime.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/ors/Docs/Briefs/2024-05_InDetail-ALPR.pdf |title=Automated License Plate Readers (In Detail) |website=Colorado Division of Criminal Justice |date=1 May 2024 |access-date=5 Oct 2025 |format=PDF}}</ref>

Oakland Police Department reported 182 arrests from ALPR in the first year, representing 1.4% of homicides, robberies, burglaries, and firearm assaults. The Northern California Regional Intelligence Center states approximately 1-2 vehicles out of 1,000 initiate alerts — a hit rate of just 0.1-0.2%.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://ncric.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/California-Law-Enforcement-ALPR-FAQ.pdf |title=California Law Enforcement ALPR FAQ |website=NCRIC |date=2021 |access-date=5 Oct 2025 |format=PDF}}</ref>

The locations of many Flock Cameras have been mapped by the OpenStreetMap project. A viewer of the locations of these cameras is located here: [https://deflock.me/map ALPR Map &#124; DeFlock]

====Cease and desist to DeFlock.me====

DeFlock.me is a website allowing users to log and view the locations of ALPRs, such as Flock products. On 30 January 2025, Flock sent a cease and desist notice to the owner of DeFlock demanding the name of the website be changed to exclude the company's brand name. The letter also stated that "the Website also implies that various license plate readers are vulnerable to security hacks [...]" which Flock alleged "[...] provides a false impression about the security of Flock Products."<ref>{{Cite web |last=Matz |first=Sarah M. |title=2025 01 31 DEFLOCK CD final |url=https://www.eff.org/files/2025/02/26/2025_01_31_deflock_cd_ex-3.pdf |website=Electronic Frontier Foundation |date=30 Jan 2025 |access-date=27 Oct 2025 |url-status=live |format=PDF}}</ref>

{{Reflist}}

 

[[Category:Flock Safety]]