Microsoft: Difference between revisions
mNo edit summary |
|||
| Line 24: | Line 24: | ||
===US Department of Justice, U.S. v. Microsoft Corp. (1998-2001)=== | ===US Department of Justice, U.S. v. Microsoft Corp. (1998-2001)=== | ||
In a major antitrust case brought by the ''US Department of Justice'', ''U.S. v.'' Microsoft Corp'''''.''','' 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001)<ref name=":5">{{Cite web |date=2001-06-28 |title=U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) |url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/253/34/576095/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110413112825/https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/253/34/576095/ |archive-date=2011-04-13 |access-date=2025-08-19 |website=JUSTIA U.S. Law}}</ref>, Microsoft argued that there was no barrier to entry in the market they operated in. A central issue at that time was whether Microsoft could bundle the web browser ''Internet Explorer'' with the Microsoft Windows operating system. The District Court stated the following in the court case:<blockquote>"The District Court condemned a number of provisions in Microsoft's agreements licensing Windows to OEMs, because it found that Microsoft's imposition of those provisions (like many of Microsoft's other actions at issue in this case) serves to reduce usage share of ''Netscape''<nowiki/>'s browser and, hence, protect Microsoft's operating system monopoly."</blockquote>The court specifically identified three main license restrictions for | In a major antitrust case brought by the ''US Department of Justice'', ''U.S. v.'' Microsoft Corp'''''.''','' 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001)<ref name=":5">{{Cite web |date=2001-06-28 |title=U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) |url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/253/34/576095/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110413112825/https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/253/34/576095/ |archive-date=2011-04-13 |access-date=2025-08-19 |website=JUSTIA U.S. Law}}</ref>, Microsoft argued that there was no barrier to entry in the market they operated in. A central issue at that time was whether Microsoft could bundle the web browser ''Internet Explorer'' with the Microsoft Windows operating system. The District Court stated the following in the court case:<blockquote>"The District Court condemned a number of provisions in Microsoft's agreements licensing Windows to OEMs, because it found that Microsoft's imposition of those provisions (like many of Microsoft's other actions at issue in this case) serves to reduce usage share of ''Netscape''<nowiki/>'s browser and, hence, protect Microsoft's operating system monopoly."</blockquote>The court specifically identified three main license restrictions for original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) that were considered problematic: | ||
#The prohibition upon the removal of desktop icons, folders, and Start menu entries | #The prohibition upon the removal of desktop icons, folders, and Start menu entries | ||
| Line 32: | Line 32: | ||
The case was eventually settled<ref>[https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/503541/dl "Final judgment of US v. Microsoft"] - justice.gov - accessed 2025-01-29 ([http://web.archive.org/web/20250713154704/https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/503541/dl Archived])</ref><ref>[https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/373/1199/474311/ "Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Ex Rel., Appellant, v. Microsoft Corporation"] - law.justia.com - accessed 2025-01-29 ([http://web.archive.org/web/20250813044241/https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/373/1199/474311/ Archived])</ref> and did not result in a company breakup.<ref>[https://www.seattletimes.com/business/microsoft/long-antitrust-saga-ends-for-microsoft/ "Long antitrust saga ends for Microsoft"] - seattletimes.com - accessed 2025-01-29 ([http://web.archive.org/web/20251201140124/https://www.seattletimes.com/business/microsoft/long-antitrust-saga-ends-for-microsoft/ Archived])</ref> | The case was eventually settled<ref>[https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/503541/dl "Final judgment of US v. Microsoft"] - justice.gov - accessed 2025-01-29 ([http://web.archive.org/web/20250713154704/https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/503541/dl Archived])</ref><ref>[https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/373/1199/474311/ "Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Ex Rel., Appellant, v. Microsoft Corporation"] - law.justia.com - accessed 2025-01-29 ([http://web.archive.org/web/20250813044241/https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/373/1199/474311/ Archived])</ref> and did not result in a company breakup.<ref>[https://www.seattletimes.com/business/microsoft/long-antitrust-saga-ends-for-microsoft/ "Long antitrust saga ends for Microsoft"] - seattletimes.com - accessed 2025-01-29 ([http://web.archive.org/web/20251201140124/https://www.seattletimes.com/business/microsoft/long-antitrust-saga-ends-for-microsoft/ Archived])</ref> | ||
Section III.H of the Consent Decree<ref>[https://www.justice.gov/atr/microsoft-consent-decree-compliance-advisory-august-1-2003-us-v-microsoft "Microsoft Consent Decree Compliance Advisory - August 1, 2003 : U.S. V. Microsoft"] - justice.gov - accessed 2025-01-29 ([http://web.archive.org/web/20260211182935/https://www.justice.gov/atr/microsoft-consent-decree-compliance-advisory-august-1-2003-us-v-microsoft Archived])</ref> required ''Microsoft'' to "allow end users and OEMs to enable or remove access to all middleware products, including web browsers, e-mail clients, and media players through a readily accessible, centralized mechanism." End users and | Section III.H of the Consent Decree<ref>[https://www.justice.gov/atr/microsoft-consent-decree-compliance-advisory-august-1-2003-us-v-microsoft "Microsoft Consent Decree Compliance Advisory - August 1, 2003 : U.S. V. Microsoft"] - justice.gov - accessed 2025-01-29 ([http://web.archive.org/web/20260211182935/https://www.justice.gov/atr/microsoft-consent-decree-compliance-advisory-august-1-2003-us-v-microsoft Archived])</ref> required ''Microsoft'' to "allow end users and OEMs to enable or remove access to all middleware products, including web browsers, e-mail clients, and media players through a readily accessible, centralized mechanism." End users and original equipment manufacturers should be able "to specify a non-Microsoft middleware product as the default middleware product to be launched in place of the corresponding Microsoft middleware product." | ||
In the case ''United States v.'' Microsoft Corp'''''.''','' 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000),<ref>[https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp2/87/30/2307082/ "United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000)"] - law.justia.com - accessed 2025-01-29 ([http://web.archive.org/web/20250812193258/https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp2/87/30/2307082/ Archived])</ref> Microsoft's conduct in totality was described as a "deliberate assault upon entrepreneurial efforts that, could well have enabled the introduction of competition into the market for [[Intel]]-compatible PC operating systems". Furthermore, "Microsoft's anti-competitive actions trammeled the competitive process through which the computer software industry generally stimulates innovation and conduces to the optimum benefit of consumers." | In the case ''United States v.'' Microsoft Corp'''''.''','' 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000),<ref>[https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp2/87/30/2307082/ "United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000)"] - law.justia.com - accessed 2025-01-29 ([http://web.archive.org/web/20250812193258/https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp2/87/30/2307082/ Archived])</ref> Microsoft's conduct in totality was described as a "deliberate assault upon entrepreneurial efforts that, could well have enabled the introduction of competition into the market for [[Intel]]-compatible PC operating systems". Furthermore, "Microsoft's anti-competitive actions trammeled the competitive process through which the computer software industry generally stimulates innovation and conduces to the optimum benefit of consumers." | ||