User:Louis/sandbox dfli publish test: Difference between revisions

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 By suing for trade libel rather than personal defamation, Dragonfly took on a heavier burden. Nevada business disparagement requires a false and disparaging statement, unprivileged publication, malice, and special damages.<ref name="ccsd">''Clark County School District v. Virtual Education Software, Inc.'', 125 Nev. 374, 385-87, 213 P.3d 496 (2009). [https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/nv-supreme-court/1290127.html Opinion via FindLaw].</ref>
+'''Special damages must be pleaded with specifics.''' This is the soft spot in the complaint. Special damages in a disparagement case are not presumed; they must be pleaded with specificity under Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 9(g).<ref name="pardee">''Pardee Homes of Nevada v. Wolfram'', 135 Nev. 173, 444 P.3d 423 (2019) (cited for the general rule that special damages must satisfy NRCP 9(g)). [https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2019/72371.html Opinion via Justia].</ref> Dragonfly's complaint pleads only an aggregate ''"drop-off"'' in sales, OEM customers it does not name, and a high ''"volume of calls,"'' with no particular lost sale, no canceled order tied to a particular statement, and no dollar figure.<ref name="complaint" /> The closest precedent is the structural twin of this case: in ''Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union'', a vehicle maker sued a consumer-review organization over a critical test, and the court dismissed every product-disparagement claim because the maker pleaded its losses in the aggregate, holding that the claim ''"requires pleading and proof of special damages in the form of pecuniary loss"'' and that the claims ''"fail to allege special damages with the specificity required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(g)."''<ref name="isuzu">''Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.'', 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1047, 1050 (C.D. Cal. 1998). [https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp2/12/1035/2459176/ Opinion via Justia].</ref> Courts apply the rule routinely, dismissing trade-libel claims that plead lost sales without naming the customers and transactions lost, and as recently as September 2025 a court granted summary judgment against a disparagement plaintiff that could not prove specific lost transactions.<ref name="mms">''MMS Trading Co. Pty Ltd. v. Hutton Toys, LLC'', No. 1:20-cv-01360-SJB, 2021 WL 1193947 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2021).</ref><ref name="sorihin">''Sorihin v. Sea Queen II'', No. 3:16-cv-05422-JST, 2017 WL 1102865 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2017).</ref><ref name="doublediamond">''Double Diamond Distribution, Ltd. v. Crocs, Inc.'', No. 1:23-cv-01790-PAB-KAS, Slip Op. at 14-16 (D. Colo. Sept. 24, 2025).</ref>
+'''Fact versus opinion.''' A conclusion drawn out loud from facts shown to the audience is opinion, not a false statement of fact.<ref name="milkovich">''Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.'', 497 U.S. 1, 18-19, 20 (1990). [https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/497/1 Opinion via Cornell LII].</ref> The controlling Nevada authority on this exact pattern is ''PETA v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd.'', where the claimed defamation came packaged with the videotape that showed the audience the very conduct being criticized, and the statements were protected because the facts were on the tape for the viewer to judge: