Flock license plate readers: Difference between revisions
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Residents and taxpayers have no mechanism to opt out of [[Flock Safety]]'s surveillance network. The cameras operate 24/7 in public spaces, recording all passing vehicles regardless of consent. They are also placed on private premises like universities, hospitals, businesses, and neighborhood associations, which often share this data with law enforcement.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web |last=Brewster |first=Thomas |date=19 Jun 2024 |title=FedEx's Secretive Police Force Is Helping Cops Build An AI Car Surveillance Network |url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2024/06/19/fedex-police-help-cops-build-an-ai-car-surveillance-network/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240619112629/https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2024/06/19/fedex-police-help-cops-build-an-ai-car-surveillance-network/ |archive-date=19 Jun 2024 |access-date=25 Aug 2025 |website=Forbes}}</ref> This data can later be integrated into predictive police platforms like {{Wplink|Palantir Technologies|Palantir}}.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Rettberg |first=Jill Walker |title=Machine Vision: How Algorithms are Changing the Way We See the World |date=11 Sep 2023 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons. |year=2023 |location=Google Books |pages=45-46 |language=English}}</ref> | Residents and taxpayers have no mechanism to opt out of [[Flock Safety]]'s surveillance network. The cameras operate 24/7 in public spaces, recording all passing vehicles regardless of consent. They are also placed on private premises like universities, hospitals, businesses, and neighborhood associations, which often share this data with law enforcement.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web |last=Brewster |first=Thomas |date=19 Jun 2024 |title=FedEx's Secretive Police Force Is Helping Cops Build An AI Car Surveillance Network |url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2024/06/19/fedex-police-help-cops-build-an-ai-car-surveillance-network/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240619112629/https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2024/06/19/fedex-police-help-cops-build-an-ai-car-surveillance-network/ |archive-date=19 Jun 2024 |access-date=25 Aug 2025 |website=Forbes}}</ref> This data can later be integrated into predictive police platforms like {{Wplink|Palantir Technologies|Palantir}}.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Rettberg |first=Jill Walker |title=Machine Vision: How Algorithms are Changing the Way We See the World |date=11 Sep 2023 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons. |year=2023 |location=Google Books |pages=45-46 |language=English}}</ref> | ||
Unlike traditional security cameras that may be avoided by choosing different routes, Flock's expanding network of over 100,000 cameras makes avoidance increasingly difficult.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Eyes On Flock |url=https://eyesonflock.com/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20251008230140/https://eyesonflock.com/ |archive-date=8 Oct 2025 |access-date=9 Dec 2025 |work=Eyes On Flock}}</ref> The system uses AI to create '' | Unlike traditional security cameras that may be avoided by choosing different routes, Flock's expanding network of over 100,000 cameras makes avoidance increasingly difficult.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Eyes On Flock |url=https://eyesonflock.com/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20251008230140/https://eyesonflock.com/ |archive-date=8 Oct 2025 |access-date=9 Dec 2025 |work=Eyes On Flock}}</ref> The system uses AI to create ''Vehicle [[Device fingerprint|Fingerprints]]'' that identify vehicles by characteristics beyond license plates, including make, model, color, aftermarket parts, window stickers, and roof racks.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Stanley |first=Jay |date=23 Jul 2025 |title=Surveillance Company Flock Now Using AI to Report Us to Police if it Thinks Our Movement Patterns Are "Suspicious" |url=https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/surveillance-company-flock-now-using-ai-to-report-us-to-police-if-it-thinks-our-movement-patterns-are-suspicious |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250814053755/https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/surveillance-company-flock-now-using-ai-to-report-us-to-police-if-it-thinks-our-movement-patterns-are-suspicious |archive-date=14 Aug 2025 |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |website=American Civil Liberties Union}}</ref> | ||
====Privacy==== | ====Privacy==== | ||
While Flock Safety claims their system doesn't violate Fourth Amendment rights because '' | While Flock Safety claims their system doesn't violate Fourth Amendment rights because ''license plates are not personal information,''<ref name="Flock-PE">{{Cite web |title=Privacy & Ethics |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/privacy-ethics |url-status=usurped |archive-url=https://archive.ph/OP55p |archive-date=23 Aug 2025 |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=Flock Safety}}</ref> federal courts have challenged this interpretation. In February 2024, a federal judge ruled that a lawsuit challenging Norfolk, Virginia's use of 172 Flock cameras could proceed, finding that plaintiffs had plausibly alleged the system creates a ''detailed chronicle of a person's physical presence compiled every day.''<ref name="norfolk">{{Cite web |last=King |first=Dan |date=6 Feb 2024 |title=Judge Rules Lawsuit Challenging Norfolk's Use of Flock Cameras Can Proceed |url=https://ij.org/press-release/judge-rules-lawsuit-challenging-norfolks-use-of-flock-cameras-can-proceed/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250717001536/https://ij.org/press-release/judge-rules-lawsuit-challenging-norfolks-use-of-flock-cameras-can-proceed/ |archive-date=17 Jul 2025 |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=Institute for Justice}}</ref> | ||
Data collected includes location history that can reveal sensitive information about medical visits, religious attendance, political activities, and personal associations. While Flock states data is deleted after 30 days, contracts grant them '' | Data collected includes location history that can reveal sensitive information about medical visits, religious attendance, political activities, and personal associations. While Flock states data is deleted after 30 days, contracts grant them ''perpetual, worldwide, royalty-free license'' to use anonymized data indefinitely.<ref name=":1">{{Cite web |title=Terms and Conditions |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/terms-and-conditions |url-status=deviated |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/I7lWc |archive-date=20 May 2026 |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=Flock Safety}}</ref> The system shares data across a network of over 4,800 law enforcement agencies nationally.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Koebler |first=Jason |date=2024 |title=Lawsuit Argues Warrantless Use of Flock Surveillance Cameras Is Unconstitutional |url=https://www.404media.co/lawsuit-argues-warrantless-use-of-flock-surveillance-cameras-is-unconstitutional/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250826013458/https://www.404media.co/lawsuit-argues-warrantless-use-of-flock-surveillance-cameras-is-unconstitutional/ |archive-date=26 Aug 2025 |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=404 Media}}</ref> | ||
====="Anonymized Data"===== | ====="Anonymized Data"===== | ||
While Flock's Terms and Conditions define "Anonymized Data" as customer data that is '' | While Flock's Terms and Conditions define "Anonymized Data" as customer data that is ''permanently stripped of identifying details and any potential personally identifiable information'' and is rendered so that a person or entity ''can no longer be identified directly or indirectly,'' this definition includes information such as vehicle make, model, color, location patterns, and other non-license-plate attributes.<ref name=":1" /> | ||
Privacy researchers caution that mobility datasets labeled as "anonymized" can still be re-identified. A 2013 MIT study found that just four spatio-temporal points uniquely identified 95% of individuals in an anonymized location dataset.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=de Montjoye |first=Y.-A. |last2=Hidalgo |first2=C. A. |last3=Verleysen |first3=M. |last4=Blondel |first4=V. D. |year=2013 |title=Unique in the Crowd: The privacy bounds of human mobility |url=https://www.nature.com/articles/srep01376 |journal=Scientific Reports |volume=3 |pages=1376 |doi=10.1038/srep01376 |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260220062804/https://www.nature.com/articles/srep01376 |archive-date=20 Feb 2026}}</ref> Multiple peer-reviewed studies from 2018-2024 demonstrate that "anonymized" vehicle location data can be re-identified with high accuracy. A 2022 study showed researchers could re-identify drivers from raw vehicle network data with 97% accuracy by exploiting inter-dependencies in sensor measurements.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167404822002139 |title=Privacy-preserving vehicle trajectory matching |website=ScienceDirect |date=2022 |access-date=5 Oct 2025 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20240415115116/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167404822002139 |archive-date=15 Apr 2024}}</ref> Research published in the Journal of Computer Science and Technology (2022) found that even three to four location points can uniquely identify individuals.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Sun |first=She |last2=Ma |first2=Shuai |last3=Song |first3=Jing-He |last4=Yue |first4=Wen-Hai |last5=Lin |first5=Xue-Lian |last6=Ma |first6=Tiejun |date=2022 |title=Experiments and Analyses of Anonymization Mechanisms for Trajectory Data Publishing |url=https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11390-022-2409-x |journal=Journal of Computer Science and Technology |doi=10.1007/s11390-022-2409-x |access-date=5 Oct 2025 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20240804052830/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11390-022-2409-x |archive-date=4 Aug 2024}}</ref> | Privacy researchers caution that mobility datasets labeled as "anonymized" can still be re-identified. A 2013 MIT study found that just four spatio-temporal points uniquely identified 95% of individuals in an anonymized location dataset.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=de Montjoye |first=Y.-A. |last2=Hidalgo |first2=C. A. |last3=Verleysen |first3=M. |last4=Blondel |first4=V. D. |year=2013 |title=Unique in the Crowd: The privacy bounds of human mobility |url=https://www.nature.com/articles/srep01376 |journal=Scientific Reports |volume=3 |pages=1376 |doi=10.1038/srep01376 |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260220062804/https://www.nature.com/articles/srep01376 |archive-date=20 Feb 2026}}</ref> Multiple peer-reviewed studies from 2018-2024 demonstrate that "anonymized" vehicle location data can be re-identified with high accuracy. A 2022 study showed researchers could re-identify drivers from raw vehicle network data with 97% accuracy by exploiting inter-dependencies in sensor measurements.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167404822002139 |title=Privacy-preserving vehicle trajectory matching |website=ScienceDirect |date=2022 |access-date=5 Oct 2025 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20240415115116/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167404822002139 |archive-date=15 Apr 2024}}</ref> Research published in the Journal of Computer Science and Technology (2022) found that even three to four location points can uniquely identify individuals.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Sun |first=She |last2=Ma |first2=Shuai |last3=Song |first3=Jing-He |last4=Yue |first4=Wen-Hai |last5=Lin |first5=Xue-Lian |last6=Ma |first6=Tiejun |date=2022 |title=Experiments and Analyses of Anonymization Mechanisms for Trajectory Data Publishing |url=https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11390-022-2409-x |journal=Journal of Computer Science and Technology |doi=10.1007/s11390-022-2409-x |access-date=5 Oct 2025 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20240804052830/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11390-022-2409-x |archive-date=4 Aug 2024}}</ref> | ||
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===Premise of a "license plate camera"=== | ===Premise of a "license plate camera"=== | ||
While marketed as "license plate readers,"' Flock cameras use what the company calls "Vehicle Fingerprint" technology which tracks vehicles using characteristics beyond just license plates. The system catalogs vehicles based on numerous distinguishing features including make, model, color, bumper stickers, dents, damage patterns, roof racks, aftermarket modifications such as wheels or spoilers, window stickers, and even mismatching paint colors.<ref name=":2">{{Cite web |date= |title=LPR Cameras |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/products/license-plate-readers |url-status=usurped |archive-url=https://archive.ph/YWYB6 |archive-date=25 Aug 2025 |access-date=26 Oct 2025 |work=Flock Safety}}</ref>. According to Flock's own marketing materials, the system can identify vehicles even when license plates cannot be captured, advertised as turning "images into actionable evidence | While marketed as "license plate readers,"' Flock cameras use what the company calls "Vehicle Fingerprint" technology which tracks vehicles using characteristics beyond just license plates. The system catalogs vehicles based on numerous distinguishing features including make, model, color, bumper stickers, dents, damage patterns, roof racks, aftermarket modifications such as wheels or spoilers, window stickers, and even mismatching paint colors.<ref name=":2">{{Cite web |date= |title=LPR Cameras |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/products/license-plate-readers |url-status=usurped |archive-url=https://archive.ph/YWYB6 |archive-date=25 Aug 2025 |access-date=26 Oct 2025 |work=Flock Safety}}</ref>. According to Flock's own marketing materials, the system can identify vehicles even when license plates cannot be captured, advertised as turning "images into actionable evidence, no plate required."<ref>{{Cite web |title=License Plate Readers |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/products/license-plate-readers |url-status=usurped |archive-url=https://archive.ph/YWYB6 |archive-date=25 Aug 2025 |access-date=23 Aug 2025 |work=Flock Safety}}</ref> | ||
Flock claims this capability is '' | Flock claims this capability is ''unique among ALPR systems'' and allows law enforcement to search for vehicles based on these characteristics even without a visible license plate. | ||
This technology changes the nature of the surveillance from license plate reading to comprehensive vehicle tracking. A person could still be tracked by the unique combination of their vehicle's physical characteristics. The Electronic Frontier Foundation warns that these '' | This technology changes the nature of the surveillance from license plate reading to comprehensive vehicle tracking. A person could still be tracked by the unique combination of their vehicle's physical characteristics. The Electronic Frontier Foundation warns that these ''vehicle fingerprints'' could flag vehicles based on political bumper stickers, revealing ''information on the political or social views of the driver,'' or economic indicators like rust or damage, potentially "endangering anyone who might not feel the need (or have the income required) to keep their car in perfect shape."<ref>{{Cite web |date=2020-09-14 |title=Things to Know Before Your Neighborhood Installs an Automated License Plate Reader |url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/09/flock-license-plate-reader-homeowners-association-safe-problems |access-date=2025-08-23 |work=Electronic Frontier Foundation |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260221033709/https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/09/flock-license-plate-reader-homeowners-association-safe-problems |archive-date=21 Feb 2026}}</ref> | ||
Privacy advocates note that this expanded tracking capability makes the term '' | Privacy advocates note that this expanded tracking capability makes the term ''license plate reader'' misleading, as Flock systems create detailed vehicle profiles that persist even without readable plates. It turns any distinguishing feature of a vehicle into a tracking identifier.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Stop Flock |url=https://www.stopflock.com/ |access-date=2025-08-23 |work=Stop Flock |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20251222060644/https://stopflock.com/ |archive-date=22 Dec 2025}}</ref> | ||
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According to the patent documentation, when the system identifies a human being in captured footage, it uses neural network modules specifically configured to classify people by "male, female, race, etc." The patent further describes using additional neural networks to identify clothing types, estimate height and weight, and other physical characteristics of individuals.<ref name="patent11416545" /> The system can then store this classification data in searchable databases, allowing law enforcement to query for people based on these physical attributes. | According to the patent documentation, when the system identifies a human being in captured footage, it uses neural network modules specifically configured to classify people by "male, female, race, etc." The patent further describes using additional neural networks to identify clothing types, estimate height and weight, and other physical characteristics of individuals.<ref name="patent11416545" /> The system can then store this classification data in searchable databases, allowing law enforcement to query for people based on these physical attributes. | ||
The patent shows that Flock's technology is designed to create comprehensive profiles that can track individuals across multiple camera locations by matching physical characteristics. While Flock publicly markets its products as '' | The patent shows that Flock's technology is designed to create comprehensive profiles that can track individuals across multiple camera locations by matching physical characteristics. While Flock publicly markets its products as ''license plate readers'' focused on vehicles, this patent demonstrates the company has developed capabilities for detailed human surveillance and classification by protected characteristics including race and gender.<ref name="patent11416545" /> | ||
Privacy and civil-liberties advocates have warned that biometric/appearance-based identification and | Privacy and civil-liberties advocates have warned that biometric/appearance-based identification and classification, especially along race and gender lines, can enable discriminatory policing and amplify harms from demographic bias and misidentification.<ref>{{Cite web |title=How is Face Recognition Surveillance Technology Racist? |website=American Civil Liberties Union |date=2020-06-16 |url=https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/how-is-face-recognition-surveillance-technology-racist |access-date=2026-02-20 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260223045330/https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/how-is-face-recognition-surveillance-technology-racist |archive-date=23 Feb 2026}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=NIST Study Evaluates Effects of Race, Age, Sex on Face Recognition Software |website=National Institute of Standards and Technology |date=2019-12-19 |url=https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2019/12/nist-study-evaluates-effects-race-age-sex-face-recognition-software |access-date=2026-02-20 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260213231602/https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2019/12/nist-study-evaluates-effects-race-age-sex-face-recognition-software |archive-date=13 Feb 2026}}</ref> In that context, the Flock Group patent’s explicit discussion of classifying people by attributes including “race” and “male/female” suggests capabilities that extend beyond vehicle identification.<ref>{{Cite web |title=US11416545B1 - System and method for object based query of video content captured by a dynamic surveillance network |website=Google Patents |date=2022-08-16 |url=https://patents.google.com/patent/US11416545B1 |access-date=2026-02-20 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260204132539/https://patents.google.com/patent/US11416545B1 |archive-date=4 Feb 2026}}</ref> | ||
==Legal challenges== | ==Legal challenges== | ||
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===Norfolk federal lawsuit ''(February 2025)''=== | ===Norfolk federal lawsuit ''(February 2025)''=== | ||
In February 2025, Chief Judge Mark S. Davis of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Norfolk's motion to dismiss a landmark Fourth Amendment lawsuit. The case involves two residents whose vehicles were tracked 526 times in 4.5 months and 849 times over the same period, figures revealed in a September 2025 court filing.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/virginia-police-used-flock-cameras-track-driver-safety-lawsuit-surveil-rcna230399|title=Virginia police used Flock cameras to track driver 526 times in 4 months, lawsuit says|work=NBC News|date=2025-09-18|access-date=2025-08-23 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260220002237/https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/virginia-police-used-flock-cameras-track-driver-safety-lawsuit-surveil-rcna230399 |archive-date=20 Feb 2026}}</ref> Norfolk installed 172 Flock Safety cameras in 2023 at a cost of $430,000-$516,000 annually. Police Chief Mark Talbot stated the goal was making it '' | In February 2025, Chief Judge Mark S. Davis of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Norfolk's motion to dismiss a landmark Fourth Amendment lawsuit. The case involves two residents whose vehicles were tracked 526 times in 4.5 months and 849 times over the same period, figures revealed in a September 2025 court filing.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/virginia-police-used-flock-cameras-track-driver-safety-lawsuit-surveil-rcna230399|title=Virginia police used Flock cameras to track driver 526 times in 4 months, lawsuit says|work=NBC News|date=2025-09-18|access-date=2025-08-23 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260220002237/https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/virginia-police-used-flock-cameras-track-driver-safety-lawsuit-surveil-rcna230399 |archive-date=20 Feb 2026}}</ref> Norfolk installed 172 Flock Safety cameras in 2023 at a cost of $430,000-$516,000 annually. Police Chief Mark Talbot stated the goal was making it ''difficult to drive anywhere of any distance without running into a camera somewhere.''<ref name="norfolk" /> | ||
Judge Davis's ruling relied on ''Carpenter v. United States'', the 2018 Supreme Court decision requiring warrants for historical cell phone location data. The court found Norfolk's ALPR network "notably similar" to the surveillance the Supreme Court deemed unconstitutional. However, courts remain divided. In November 2024, Senior U.S. District Judge Robert E. Payne in the same district denied a motion to suppress Flock evidence, holding that three vehicle snapshots don't constitute "persistent surveillance" requiring a warrant.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://valawyersweekly.com/2024/11/11/mosaic-theory-rejected-flock-camera-evidence-does-not-violate-fourth-amendment/|title='Mosaic theory' rejected: Flock camera evidence does not violate Fourth Amendment|website=Virginia Lawyers Weekly|date=2024-11-11|access-date=2025-10-05 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20251208113511/https://valawyersweekly.com/2024/11/11/mosaic-theory-rejected-flock-camera-evidence-does-not-violate-fourth-amendment/ |archive-date=8 Dec 2025}}</ref> | Judge Davis's ruling relied on ''Carpenter v. United States'', the 2018 Supreme Court decision requiring warrants for historical cell phone location data. The court found Norfolk's ALPR network "notably similar" to the surveillance the Supreme Court deemed unconstitutional. However, courts remain divided. In November 2024, Senior U.S. District Judge Robert E. Payne in the same district denied a motion to suppress Flock evidence, holding that three vehicle snapshots don't constitute "persistent surveillance" requiring a warrant.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://valawyersweekly.com/2024/11/11/mosaic-theory-rejected-flock-camera-evidence-does-not-violate-fourth-amendment/|title='Mosaic theory' rejected: Flock camera evidence does not violate Fourth Amendment|website=Virginia Lawyers Weekly|date=2024-11-11|access-date=2025-10-05 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20251208113511/https://valawyersweekly.com/2024/11/11/mosaic-theory-rejected-flock-camera-evidence-does-not-violate-fourth-amendment/ |archive-date=8 Dec 2025}}</ref> | ||
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==Notable incidents== | ==Notable incidents== | ||
====Illinois audit findings ('' | ====Illinois audit findings (''2024-2025'')==== | ||
Illinois Secretary of State Alexi Giannoulias announced in late August 2024 that Flock Safety violated state law by allowing U.S. Customs and Border Protection to access Illinois license plate data for immigration enforcement.<ref>{{cite web |date=2024-08-25 |title=Flock Safety's Response to Illinois LPR Data Use and Out-of-State Sharing Concerns |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/blog/flock-safetys-response-to-illinois-lpr-data-use-and-out-of-state-sharing-concerns |url-status=live |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/XNzcS |archive-date=5 May 2026 |access-date=2025-10-05 |website=Flock Safety}}</ref> The audit of 12 local law enforcement agencies revealed unauthorized pilot programs with CBP and Homeland Security Investigations, violating Illinois law prohibiting data sharing for immigration enforcement, gender-affirming care investigations, and abortion-related matters. Following the audit, 47 out-of-state agencies were removed from access to Illinois data.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.govtech.com/biz/flock-pledges-changes-after-illinois-data-sharing-accusation|title=Flock Pledges Changes After Illinois Data-Sharing Accusation|website=Government Technology|date=2024-08-15|access-date=2025-10-05 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260220002252/https://www.govtech.com/biz/flock-pledges-changes-after-illinois-data-sharing-accusation |archive-date=20 Feb 2026}}</ref> | Illinois Secretary of State Alexi Giannoulias announced in late August 2024 that Flock Safety violated state law by allowing U.S. Customs and Border Protection to access Illinois license plate data for immigration enforcement.<ref>{{cite web |date=2024-08-25 |title=Flock Safety's Response to Illinois LPR Data Use and Out-of-State Sharing Concerns |url=https://www.flocksafety.com/blog/flock-safetys-response-to-illinois-lpr-data-use-and-out-of-state-sharing-concerns |url-status=live |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/XNzcS |archive-date=5 May 2026 |access-date=2025-10-05 |website=Flock Safety}}</ref> The audit of 12 local law enforcement agencies revealed unauthorized pilot programs with CBP and Homeland Security Investigations, violating Illinois law prohibiting data sharing for immigration enforcement, gender-affirming care investigations, and abortion-related matters. Following the audit, 47 out-of-state agencies were removed from access to Illinois data.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.govtech.com/biz/flock-pledges-changes-after-illinois-data-sharing-accusation|title=Flock Pledges Changes After Illinois Data-Sharing Accusation|website=Government Technology|date=2024-08-15|access-date=2025-10-05 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260220002252/https://www.govtech.com/biz/flock-pledges-changes-after-illinois-data-sharing-accusation |archive-date=20 Feb 2026}}</ref> | ||
Mount Prospect, Illinois reported 262 immigration-related license plate reader searches in just the first few months of 2025. A Palos Heights detective shared Flock login credentials with a DEA agent who conducted 28 unauthorized searches of Oak Park ALPR data explicitly labeled "immigration violation."<ref name="dea">{{Cite web|url=https://unraveledpress.com/a-dea-agent-used-an-illinois-police-officers-flock-license-plate-reader-password-for-unauthorized-immigration-enforcement-searches/|title=DEA agent used Illinois cop's Flock license plate reader password for immigration enforcement searches|work=Unraveled Press|date=2025|access-date=2025-08-23 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260218115628/https://unraveledpress.com/a-dea-agent-used-an-illinois-police-officers-flock-license-plate-reader-password-for-unauthorized-immigration-enforcement-searches/ |archive-date=18 Feb 2026}}</ref> | Mount Prospect, Illinois reported 262 immigration-related license plate reader searches in just the first few months of 2025. A Palos Heights detective shared Flock login credentials with a DEA agent who conducted 28 unauthorized searches of Oak Park ALPR data explicitly labeled "immigration violation."<ref name="dea">{{Cite web|url=https://unraveledpress.com/a-dea-agent-used-an-illinois-police-officers-flock-license-plate-reader-password-for-unauthorized-immigration-enforcement-searches/|title=DEA agent used Illinois cop's Flock license plate reader password for immigration enforcement searches|work=Unraveled Press|date=2025|access-date=2025-08-23 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260218115628/https://unraveledpress.com/a-dea-agent-used-an-illinois-police-officers-flock-license-plate-reader-password-for-unauthorized-immigration-enforcement-searches/ |archive-date=18 Feb 2026}}</ref> | ||
====California violations ('' | ====California violations (''2015-2025'')==== | ||
California passed Senate Bill 34<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://calmatters.digitaldemocracy.org/bills/ca_201520160sb34|title=Senate Bill 34|access-date=2025-08-27 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260114051856/https://calmatters.digitaldemocracy.org/bills/ca_201520160sb34 |archive-date=14 Jan 2026}}</ref> in 2015 to limit how California police departments can use and share data collected from these cameras with other state's and federal law enforcement agencies. These limits have been found to be violated on several occasions with little enforcement or consequences for the misusing departments<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://sfstandard.com/2025/07/23/california-police-sharing-flock-license-plate-data/|access-date=2025-08-27|title=California cops are breaking surveillance laws|website=San Francisco Standard|date=2025-07-23 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260118202113/https://sfstandard.com/2025/07/23/california-police-sharing-flock-license-plate-data/ |archive-date=18 Jan 2026}}</ref>. | California passed Senate Bill 34<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://calmatters.digitaldemocracy.org/bills/ca_201520160sb34|title=Senate Bill 34|access-date=2025-08-27 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260114051856/https://calmatters.digitaldemocracy.org/bills/ca_201520160sb34 |archive-date=14 Jan 2026}}</ref> in 2015 to limit how California police departments can use and share data collected from these cameras with other state's and federal law enforcement agencies. These limits have been found to be violated on several occasions with little enforcement or consequences for the misusing departments<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://sfstandard.com/2025/07/23/california-police-sharing-flock-license-plate-data/|access-date=2025-08-27|title=California cops are breaking surveillance laws|website=San Francisco Standard|date=2025-07-23 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260118202113/https://sfstandard.com/2025/07/23/california-police-sharing-flock-license-plate-data/ |archive-date=18 Jan 2026}}</ref>. | ||
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Oak Park, Illinois terminated their contract entirely following the Illinois investigation into illegal data sharing.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Heffernan |first=Brendan |title=Oak Park terminates Flock license plate reader contract |url=https://www.oakpark.com/2025/08/07/oak-park-terminates-flock-license-plate-reader-contract/ |website=Wednesday Journal |date=7 Aug 2025 |access-date=6 May 2026 |url-status=live |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260218115622/https://www.oakpark.com/2025/08/07/oak-park-terminates-flock-license-plate-reader-contract/ |archive-date=18 Feb 2026}}</ref> | Oak Park, Illinois terminated their contract entirely following the Illinois investigation into illegal data sharing.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Heffernan |first=Brendan |title=Oak Park terminates Flock license plate reader contract |url=https://www.oakpark.com/2025/08/07/oak-park-terminates-flock-license-plate-reader-contract/ |website=Wednesday Journal |date=7 Aug 2025 |access-date=6 May 2026 |url-status=live |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260218115622/https://www.oakpark.com/2025/08/07/oak-park-terminates-flock-license-plate-reader-contract/ |archive-date=18 Feb 2026}}</ref> | ||
The city of Hillsborough in North Carolina cancelled its Flock contract due to privacy concerns, removing the five cameras that, up to that point, had been installed. The removal of all Flock cameras was confirmed on 3 | The city of Hillsborough in North Carolina cancelled its Flock contract due to privacy concerns, removing the five cameras that, up to that point, had been installed. The removal of all Flock cameras was confirmed on December 3, 2025.<ref>{{Cite web |author= |title=Hillsborough Cancels Contract for License Plate Reader Cameras |url=https://www.hillsboroughnc.gov/Home/Components/News/News/856/14 |website=Hillsborough, North Carolina |date=28 Oct 2025 |access-date=6 May 2026 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20251207193719/https://www.hillsboroughnc.gov/Home/Components/News/News/856/14 |archive-date=7 Dec 2025}}</ref> | ||
The city of Verona in Wisconsin covered Flock cameras after cancelling its contract in November 2025, and as of February 2026 was still waiting for Flock to physically remove the cameras.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Holmes |first=Isiah |title=Verona has waited months for Flock cameras to come down after canceling contract |url=https://wisconsinexaminer.com/2026/02/02/verona-expected-to-begin-work-to-removing-flock-cameras/ |website=Wisconsin Examiner |date=2 Feb 2026 |access-date=6 May 2026 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260203102308/wisconsinexaminer.com/2026/02/02/verona-expected-to-begin-work-to-removing-flock-cameras/ |archive-date=3 Feb 2026}}</ref> | The city of Verona in Wisconsin covered Flock cameras after cancelling its contract in November 2025, and as of February 2026 was still waiting for Flock to physically remove the cameras.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Holmes |first=Isiah |title=Verona has waited months for Flock cameras to come down after canceling contract |url=https://wisconsinexaminer.com/2026/02/02/verona-expected-to-begin-work-to-removing-flock-cameras/ |website=Wisconsin Examiner |date=2 Feb 2026 |access-date=6 May 2026 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260203102308/wisconsinexaminer.com/2026/02/02/verona-expected-to-begin-work-to-removing-flock-cameras/ |archive-date=3 Feb 2026}}</ref> | ||
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Colorado's Office of Research and Statistics reported that while ALPR systems are expanding, independent academic research contradicts vendor claims. A 2011 George Mason University study concluded ALPRs "do not achieve a prevention or deterrent effect" on crime.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/ors/Docs/Briefs/2024-05_InDetail-ALPR.pdf |title=Automated License Plate Readers (In Detail) |website=Colorado Division of Criminal Justice |date=1 May 2024 |access-date=5 Oct 2025 |format=PDF |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20251212210653/https://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/ors/Docs/Briefs/2024-05_InDetail-ALPR.pdf |archive-date=12 Dec 2025}}</ref> | Colorado's Office of Research and Statistics reported that while ALPR systems are expanding, independent academic research contradicts vendor claims. A 2011 George Mason University study concluded ALPRs "do not achieve a prevention or deterrent effect" on crime.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/ors/Docs/Briefs/2024-05_InDetail-ALPR.pdf |title=Automated License Plate Readers (In Detail) |website=Colorado Division of Criminal Justice |date=1 May 2024 |access-date=5 Oct 2025 |format=PDF |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20251212210653/https://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/ors/Docs/Briefs/2024-05_InDetail-ALPR.pdf |archive-date=12 Dec 2025}}</ref> | ||
Oakland Police Department reported 182 arrests from ALPR in the first year, representing 1.4% of homicides, robberies, burglaries, and firearm assaults. The Northern California Regional Intelligence Center states approximately 1-2 vehicles out of 1,000 initiate alerts | Oakland Police Department reported 182 arrests from ALPR in the first year, representing 1.4% of homicides, robberies, burglaries, and firearm assaults. The Northern California Regional Intelligence Center states approximately 1-2 vehicles out of 1,000 initiate alerts, a hit rate of just 0.1-0.2%.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://ncric.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/California-Law-Enforcement-ALPR-FAQ.pdf |title=California Law Enforcement ALPR FAQ |website=NCRIC |date=2021 |access-date=5 Oct 2025 |format=PDF |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260219214745/https://ncric.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/California-Law-Enforcement-ALPR-FAQ.pdf |archive-date=19 Feb 2026}}</ref> | ||
===Denver camera lapse (April 2026)=== | |||
Denver's Flock contract expired on March 31, 2026. On a 7-6 vote, with Council member Amanda Sandoval voting in favor, the City Council approved a $150,000 one-year contract with Axon for 50 replacement license-plate-reading cameras.<ref name="denverite-axon">{{Cite web |last=Harris |first=Kyle |date=March 31, 2026 |title=Denver City Council narrowly approves Axon license-plate camera contract as Flock deal expires |url=https://denverite.com/2026/03/31/denver-license-plate-readers-axon-contract-city-council/ |access-date=June 14, 2026 |website=Denverite |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260402025512/https://denverite.com/2026/03/31/denver-license-plate-readers-axon-contract-city-council/ |archive-date=April 2, 2026}}</ref><ref name="dengazette-axon">{{Cite web |last=Grigsby |first=Stephanie |date=March 31, 2026 |title=Denver council narrowly approves deal with Axon |url=https://www.denvergazette.com/2026/03/31/denver-council-narrowly-approves-deal-with-axon/ |access-date=June 14, 2026 |website=Denver Gazette |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260512204900/https://www.denvergazette.com/2026/03/31/denver-council-narrowly-approves-deal-with-axon/ |archive-date=May 12, 2026}}</ref> Denverite reported that the city's more than 100 public Flock cameras were already gone and that the Axon cameras would be installed in the coming weeks, while private Flock cameras remained in operation throughout Denver; the Colorado Sun reported that the city decommissioned and removed all 110 Flock cameras as the contract expired.<ref name="denverite-axon" /><ref name="cosun-sb70">{{Cite web |last=Prentzel |first=Olivia |date=April 21, 2026 |title=Senate Bill 70 would regulate Colorado surveillance technology |url=https://coloradosun.com/2026/04/21/senate-bill-70-colorado-surveillance-technology/ |access-date=June 14, 2026 |website=The Colorado Sun |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260614200342/https://coloradosun.com/2026/04/21/senate-bill-70-colorado-surveillance-technology/ |archive-date=June 14, 2026}}</ref> | |||
Motor vehicle theft in Denver fell from about 430 reports in April 2025 to about 301 in April 2026, roughly a 30% decrease, during the month the city's Flock network was offline (Denver Open Data, pulled June 14, 2026).<ref name="denver-opendata">{{Cite web |title=Crime (Denver Police Department offenses) |url=https://opendata-geospatialdenver.hub.arcgis.com/datasets/geospatialDenver::crime |access-date=June 14, 2026 |website=Denver Open Data}}</ref> 9NEWS, which obtained the data through a public-records request, reported 439 vehicles stolen in April 2025 (cameras on) versus 313 in April 2026 (cameras off), a 29% decrease, and a drop in auto-theft cases cleared by arrest from 13% to 3%.<ref name="9news-lapse">{{Cite web |last=Soicher |first=Spencer |date=June 12, 2026 |title=Denver's license plate cameras went dark for a month. Auto theft dropped 29% anyway |url=https://www.9news.com/article/news/local/local-politics/denvers-license-plate-cameras-auto-theft-dropped/73-73295672-9b03-45c2-a4c0-a38355ed84bb |access-date=June 14, 2026 |publisher=9NEWS (KUSA)}}</ref> The comparison covers a single month and a small sample, and the year-over-year change cannot be attributed to the camera lapse alone. | |||
[[File:Denver Open Data crime dataset DPD NIBRS.png|thumb|center|upright=2.4|Denver Open Data's Denver Police Department crime dataset, the NIBRS offense feed queried for the April auto-theft counts that fell about 30% year over year while the city's Flock network was offline.<ref name="denver-opendata" />]] | |||
The Colorado Auto Theft Prevention Authority's Cale Gould has cautioned against attributing the statewide auto-theft decline to any single cause, telling the Denver Gazette in May 2024, ''It wasn't one thing that changed, but collectively everything,'' and crediting factors that include 2023 changes to Colorado law such as Senate Bill 23-097.<ref name="dengazette-catpa">{{Cite web |last=Del Puerto |first=Luige |date=May 6, 2024 |title=Colorado law cracking down on car theft credited for sharp decline |url=https://www.denvergazette.com/2024/05/06/colorado-law-cracking-down-on-car-theft-credited-for-sharp-decline-b244948e-0b35-11ef-b004-a314cf440531/ |access-date=June 14, 2026 |website=Denver Gazette |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260614200710/https://www.denvergazette.com/2024/05/06/colorado-law-cracking-down-on-car-theft-credited-for-sharp-decline-b244948e-0b35-11ef-b004-a314cf440531/ |archive-date=June 14, 2026}}</ref><ref name="sb23-097">{{Cite web |title=SB23-097: Motor Vehicle Theft / Unauthorized Use |url=https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/sb23-097 |access-date=June 14, 2026 |website=Colorado General Assembly |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260614200854/https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/sb23-097 |archive-date=June 14, 2026}}</ref> The American Civil Liberties Union of Colorado noted that the Axon replacement cameras would not be operational for several weeks after the March 2026 vote.<ref name="aclu-co-axon">{{Cite web |title=Denver City Council approves new Axon contract to replace Flock despite community concerns and calls for a no vote |url=https://www.aclu-co.org/news/denver-city-council-approves-new-axon-contract-to-replace-flock-despite-community-concerns-and-calls-for-a-no-vote/ |access-date=June 14, 2026 |website=ACLU of Colorado |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260614200713/https://www.aclu-co.org/news/denver-city-council-approves-new-axon-contract-to-replace-flock-despite-community-concerns-and-calls-for-a-no-vote/ |archive-date=June 14, 2026}}</ref> | |||
[[File:ACLU Colorado Denver Axon Flock replacement statement.png|thumb|center|upright=2.4|The ACLU of Colorado said Denver's 110 Flock cameras were removed and the 50 replacement Axon cameras would not be operational for several weeks after the March 2026 vote.<ref name="aclu-co-axon" />]] | |||
===Mountain View Findings=== | ===Mountain View Findings=== | ||
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====Cease and desist to DeFlock.me==== | ====Cease and desist to DeFlock.me==== | ||
DeFlock.org (formerly DeFlock.me) is a website allowing users to log and view the locations of ALPRs, such as Flock products. On 30 | DeFlock.org (formerly DeFlock.me) is a website allowing users to log and view the locations of ALPRs, such as Flock products. On January 30, 2025, Flock sent a cease and desist notice to the owner of DeFlock demanding the name of the website be changed to exclude the company's brand name. The letter also stated that "the Website also implies that various license plate readers are vulnerable to security hacks [...]" which Flock alleged "[...] provides a false impression about the security of Flock Products."<ref>{{Cite web |last=Matz |first=Sarah M. |title=2025 01 31 DEFLOCK CD final |url=https://www.eff.org/files/2025/02/26/2025_01_31_deflock_cd_ex-3.pdf |website=Electronic Frontier Foundation |date=30 Jan 2025 |access-date=27 Oct 2025 |url-status=live |format=PDF |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20251020035804/https://www.eff.org/files/2025/02/26/2025_01_31_deflock_cd_ex-3.pdf |archive-date=20 Oct 2025}}</ref> | ||
==External links== | ==External links== | ||