IFT294 (talk | contribs)
m Cleaned up Starlink formatting
Found grammatical issues
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The exploit was achieved by intercepting the Starlink app's network requests which revealed the admin portal login screen. Using the "Reset password" feature of the admin portal which was hidden with javascript the hacker found an employee email off linkedin and successfully managed to login to the admin portal. Although implementing 2FA this too was entirely client-side and the modal window blocking further interaction without verification could also be hidden with javascript.  
The exploit was achieved by intercepting the Starlink app's network requests which revealed the admin portal login screen. Using the "Reset password" feature of the admin portal which was hidden with javascript the hacker found an employee email off linkedin and successfully managed to login to the admin portal. Although implementing 2FA this too was entirely client-side and the modal window blocking further interaction without verification could also be hidden with javascript.  


Inside the admin portal any employee had access to a range of personal information, largely comprised of the personal information listed below. Additionally the employee the hacker had login as had level 2 access allowing them to remotely lock, unlock, honk, issue speeding warnings and more which they demonstrated on their own and a friend's Subaru car.  
Inside the admin portal any employee can access a wide range of personal information, largely comprised of the personal information listed below. Additionally, if the employee has level 2 access, they can remotely lock, unlock, honk, issue speeding warnings and more which they demonstrated on their own and a friend's Subaru car.  


The incident was initially ethically disclosed to Subaru on 24-20-11 with a blog post detailing the exploit released on 25-23-01.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Curry |first=Sam |date=23 Jan 2025 |title=Hacking Subaru: Tracking and Controlling Cars via the STARLINK Admin Panel |url=https://samcurry.net/hacking-subaru |access-date=2025-02-19 |website=samcurry.net}}</ref>
The incident was initially ethically disclosed to Subaru on 24-20-11 with a blog post detailing the exploit released on 25-23-01.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Curry |first=Sam |date=23 Jan 2025 |title=Hacking Subaru: Tracking and Controlling Cars via the STARLINK Admin Panel |url=https://samcurry.net/hacking-subaru |access-date=2025-02-19 |website=samcurry.net}}</ref>