Chat Control: Difference between revisions
No edit summary |
archived some refs |
||
| Line 10: | Line 10: | ||
In 2021, the EU passed the Regulation (EU) [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1232/oj 2021/1232] ('''"Chat Control 1.0"''') on a temporary derogation from certain provisions of ePrivacy Directive [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2002/58/oj 2002/58/EC] (''ePD'') allowing providers to scan communications indiscriminately if they choose so. | In 2021, the EU passed the Regulation (EU) [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1232/oj 2021/1232] ('''"Chat Control 1.0"''') on a temporary derogation from certain provisions of ePrivacy Directive [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2002/58/oj 2002/58/EC] (''ePD'') allowing providers to scan communications indiscriminately if they choose so. | ||
So far, only unencrypted US communication services make use of these provisions. In March 2026, the European Parliament rejected a second extension of the regulation – the temporary directive provisions expired on the 03 April 2026. However [[Google]], [[Meta]], [[Microsoft]] and [[Snap]] announced that they will continue indiscriminate and warrentless scanning of private messages.<ref> | So far, only unencrypted US communication services make use of these provisions. In March 2026, the European Parliament rejected a second extension of the regulation – the temporary directive provisions expired on the 03 April 2026. However [[Google]], [[Meta]], [[Microsoft]] and [[Snap]] announced that they will continue indiscriminate and warrentless scanning of private messages.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/posts/chat-control/ |title=Chat Control: The EU’s CSAM scanner proposal |first=Patrick |last=Breyer |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260527162313/https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/posts/chat-control/ |archive-date=2026-05-27}}</ref> | ||
On 11 May 2022 the European Commission presented a proposal ('''"Chat Control 2.0"''') which would have made chat control searching mandatory for all e-mail and messenger providers and would even have applied to so far securely end-to-end encrypted communication services. The regulation is expected to be adopted in July 2026, with possible amendments.{{UpdateNeeded|reason=Current status uncertain|date=May 2026}} | On 11 May 2022 the European Commission presented a proposal ('''"Chat Control 2.0"''') which would have made chat control searching mandatory for all e-mail and messenger providers and would even have applied to so far securely end-to-end encrypted communication services. The regulation is expected to be adopted in July 2026, with possible amendments.{{UpdateNeeded|reason=Current status uncertain|date=May 2026}} | ||
| Line 19: | Line 19: | ||
By virtue of the legistation, all platforms would legally be required to surveil all private digital communications, thus nullifying the efficacy of {{wplink|End-to-end_encryption|end-to-end encryption}} (E2EE) and violating fundamental rights to privacy. | By virtue of the legistation, all platforms would legally be required to surveil all private digital communications, thus nullifying the efficacy of {{wplink|End-to-end_encryption|end-to-end encryption}} (E2EE) and violating fundamental rights to privacy. | ||
On February 26, 2026, the first negotiations of Chat Control begun. <ref>{{Cite web |title=Today, the final negotiations on Chat Control 2.0 begin. |url=https://mastodon.online/@mullvadnet/116137711661598894 |url-status=live |date=26 Feb 2026 |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/fahub |archive-date=7 Apr 2026}}</ref> | On February 26, 2026, the first negotiations of Chat Control begun. <ref>{{Cite web |author=@[email protected] |title=Today, the final negotiations on Chat Control 2.0 begin. |url=https://mastodon.online/@mullvadnet/116137711661598894 |url-status=live |date=26 Feb 2026 |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/fahub |archive-date=7 Apr 2026}}</ref> | ||
==Background== | ==Background== | ||
The legislation was proposed by the European Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson on 11 May 2022.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL laying down rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse |url=https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2022%3A209%3AFIN |url-status=live |date=11 May 2022}}</ref> | The legislation was proposed by the European Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson on 11 May 2022.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL laying down rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse |url=https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2022%3A209%3AFIN |url-status=live |date=11 May 2022}}</ref> | ||
The European Commission was found to be targeting people in the Netherlands to sway them in favor of chat control.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-12-13 |title=Political Microtargeting by EU Commission illegal |url=https://noyb.eu/en/political-microtargeting-eu-commission-illegal |url-status=live |access-date=2026-06-08 |website=noyb}}</ref> | The European Commission was found to be targeting people in the Netherlands to sway them in favor of chat control.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-12-13 |title=Political Microtargeting by EU Commission illegal |url=https://noyb.eu/en/political-microtargeting-eu-commission-illegal |url-status=live |access-date=2026-06-08 |website=noyb |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260309154519/https://noyb.eu/en/political-microtargeting-eu-commission-illegal |archive-date=2026-03-09}}</ref> | ||
==Consumer response== | ==Consumer response== | ||
| Line 33: | Line 33: | ||
<blockquote>Critics declare this form of preemptive mass surveillance not only a threat to privacy, (cyber)security and the right to freedom of expression but as danger to democracy in general.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Why chat control is so dangerous |url=https://edri.org/our-work/why-chat-control-is-so-dangerous/ |url-status=live |date=17 Nov 2021 |website=Edri}}</ref></blockquote> | <blockquote>Critics declare this form of preemptive mass surveillance not only a threat to privacy, (cyber)security and the right to freedom of expression but as danger to democracy in general.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Why chat control is so dangerous |url=https://edri.org/our-work/why-chat-control-is-so-dangerous/ |url-status=live |date=17 Nov 2021 |website=Edri}}</ref></blockquote> | ||
<blockquote>Chat Control is chat surveillance and functions by having access to everything on a device with indiscriminate monitoring of everything.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Chat Control is Back on the Menu in the EU. It Still Must Be Stopped |url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/09/chat-control-back-menu-eu-it-still-must-be-stopped-0 |url-status=live |date=29 Sep 2025 |website=Eff}}</ref></blockquote> | <blockquote>Chat Control is chat surveillance and functions by having access to everything on a device with indiscriminate monitoring of everything.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Chat Control is Back on the Menu in the EU. It Still Must Be Stopped |url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/09/chat-control-back-menu-eu-it-still-must-be-stopped-0 |url-status=live |date=29 Sep 2025 |website=Eff |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260326041121/https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/09/chat-control-back-menu-eu-it-still-must-be-stopped-0 |archive-date=2026-03-26}}</ref></blockquote> | ||
<blockquote>Many proposals earlier this year required the scanning and detection of illicit content on all services, including private messaging apps such as [[WhatsApp]] and [[Signal]]. This requirement would fundamentally break end-to-end encryption.<ref>{{Cite web |title=After Years of Controversy, the EU's Chat Control Nears Its Final Hurdle: What to Know |url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/12/after-years-controversy-eus-chat-control-nears-its-final-hurdle-what-know |url-status=live |date=3 Dec 2025 |website=Eff}}</ref></blockquote> | <blockquote>Many proposals earlier this year required the scanning and detection of illicit content on all services, including private messaging apps such as [[WhatsApp]] and [[Signal]]. This requirement would fundamentally break end-to-end encryption.<ref>{{Cite web |title=After Years of Controversy, the EU's Chat Control Nears Its Final Hurdle: What to Know |url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/12/after-years-controversy-eus-chat-control-nears-its-final-hurdle-what-know |url-status=live |date=3 Dec 2025 |website=Eff |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260512223913/https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/12/after-years-controversy-eus-chat-control-nears-its-final-hurdle-what-know |archive-date=2026-05-12}}</ref></blockquote> | ||
Academic criticism has also focused on the technical feasibility and constitutional implications of mandatory client-side scanning. | Academic criticism has also focused on the technical feasibility and constitutional implications of mandatory client-side scanning. | ||
<blockquote>We find that [Client-Side Scanning] CSS is problematic because they can rarely fulfil their purposes, as seen with antivirus software. [...] We also find that CSS in general would likely violate the Right to a Fair Trial, Right to Privacy and Freedom of Expression.<ref>{{Cite web |title=YASM (Yet Another Surveillance Mechanism) |url=https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.14601 |url-status=live |date=29 May 2022 |website=Arxiv, Cornell University}}</ref></blockquote> | <blockquote>We find that [Client-Side Scanning] CSS is problematic because they can rarely fulfil their purposes, as seen with antivirus software. [...] We also find that CSS in general would likely violate the Right to a Fair Trial, Right to Privacy and Freedom of Expression.<ref>{{Cite web |title=YASM (Yet Another Surveillance Mechanism) |url=https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.14601 |url-status=live |date=29 May 2022 |website=Arxiv, Cornell University |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260216091908/https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.14601 |archive-date=2026-02-16}}</ref></blockquote> | ||
==See also== | ==See also== | ||