Editing Microsoft’s E-Mail Suspension at the International Criminal Court — A Wake-up Call for Digital Sovereignty

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| Company    = Microsoft
| StartDate  = 2025-05-19
| Status     = Active
| ArticleType= Product / Service
| Description = When vendor dependence meets geopolitics: what happens when a major cloud provider withdraws service from an international court, and what this means for institutional autonomy and digital sovereignty
}}
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==Background==
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==Incident==
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===What happened?===
On 19 May 2025, it was reported that Microsoft blocked or suspended the email account of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, Karim Khan, following US-imposed sanctions against the Court. :contentReference[oaicite:0]{index=0}  
This sparked debate about the dependence of state and international institutions on major cloud service providers headquartered outside their jurisdiction.

===Stakeholders===
* Affected institution: International Criminal Court (ICC)  
* Service provider: Microsoft Corporation  
* External actor: United States government (sanctions regime)  
* Broader affected: Public authorities, educational institutions, organisations relying on cloud services for critical operations

==Microsoft’s response==
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Microsoft publicly denied fully suspending services to the ICC, stating that it remained in contact with the Court and that its services “were never terminated”. :contentReference[oaicite:1]{index=1}  
The company announced increased investments in European infrastructure and a “European security program” in the wake of the incident. :contentReference[oaicite:2]{index=2}  

==Legal / Governance Issues==
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The incident highlights critical issues:  
* Vendor dependency and lack of digital sovereignty for institutions relying on third-party cloud services  
* Jurisdictional risk where a vendor subject to another state’s sanctions may affect service availability  
* Transparency and continuity obligations for organisations hosting critical data or services externally  

==Consumer / Institutional Response==
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Reactions included calls from European digital-sovereignty associations (e.g., OSBA) for alternatives to large US-based cloud providers. :contentReference[oaicite:3]{index=3}  
Many organisations began reassessing cloud-service vendor risk, contractual fallback mechanisms and local or regional hosting options.

==References==
* Stefan Krempl, *“Criminal Court: Microsoft’s email block a wake-up call for digital sovereignty”*, heise online, 19 May 2025. Available at: https://www.heise.de/en/news/Criminal-Court-Microsoft-s-email-block-a-wake-up-call-for-digital-sovereignty-10387383.html (accessed 18 October 2025) :contentReference[oaicite:4]{index=4}  
* Stefan Krempl, *“Microsoft denies mail blockade at the International Criminal Court”*, heise online, 5 June 2025. Available at: https://www.heise.de/en/news/Microsoft-denies-mail-blockade-at-the-International-Criminal-Court-10429628.html (accessed 18 October 2025) :contentReference[oaicite:5]{index=5}  
* *“Microsoft’s email shutdown of ICC prosecutor fuels EU fears of US tech blackmail”*, Euractiv, 28 May 2025. Available at: https://www.euractiv.com/news/microsofts-email-shutdown-of-icc-prosecutor-fuels-eu-fears-of-us-tech-blackmail/ (accessed 18 October 2025) :contentReference[oaicite:6]{index=6}  

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