Xiaomi: Difference between revisions
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Most of the data is sent to servers in Singapore which belong to Chinese tech giant [[Alibaba]] Cloud. Users can verify themselves which connections are made by using the connection log feature in an app such as No Root Firewall, [https://github.com/M66B/NetGuard NetGuard] or [https://f-droid.org/packages/net.kollnig.missioncontrol.fdroid/ Tracker Control]. This shows the phones sometimes suddenly becoming very "chatty", even in the middle of the night. | Most of the data is sent to servers in Singapore which belong to Chinese tech giant [[Alibaba]] Cloud. Users can verify themselves which connections are made by using the connection log feature in an app such as No Root Firewall, [https://github.com/M66B/NetGuard NetGuard] or [https://f-droid.org/packages/net.kollnig.missioncontrol.fdroid/ Tracker Control]. This shows the phones sometimes suddenly becoming very "chatty", even in the middle of the night. | ||
The only way to mitigate this is to use a [[wikipedia:List_of_custom_Android_distributions|custom "ROM"]] such as [https://www.e.foundation /e/] or [ | The only way to mitigate this is to use a [[wikipedia:List_of_custom_Android_distributions|custom "ROM"]] such as [https://www.e.foundation /e/] or [[wikipedia:LineageOS|LineageOS]]. Users who do not have the technical skill to do this should use an app like [https://f-droid.org/packages/net.kollnig.missioncontrol.fdroid/ Tracker Control] from the F-Droid store to limit connections and use an alternate browser such as [[Firefox]] (Google Play Store) or [https://f-droid.org/de/packages/org.mozilla.fennec_fdroid/ Fennec] (F-Droid store). Built-in applications should be avoided as much as possible. | ||
===Links to the Chinese government=== | ===Links to the Chinese government=== | ||
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The notifications in question was emitted by Xiaomi's system Browser app and led users to a replica of the original Tagesschau website, which contained an investment scam. | The notifications in question was emitted by Xiaomi's system Browser app and led users to a replica of the original Tagesschau website, which contained an investment scam. | ||
Stiftung Warentest cites Xiaomi representatives stating the incident was being taken seriously and investigated internally. They also state that Xiaomi is "working with a series of global content providers, which my vary by region or country, to deliver push messages to users".<ref>{{Cite web |date=2026-02-27 |title=Fake News auf Xiaomi-Handys [Fake news on Xiaomi phones] |url=https://www.test.de/Smartphones-Fake-News-auf-Xiaomi-Handys-6284169-0/ |archive-url=https://archive. | Stiftung Warentest cites Xiaomi representatives stating the incident was being taken seriously and investigated internally. They also state that Xiaomi is "working with a series of global content providers, which my vary by region or country, to deliver push messages to users".<ref>{{Cite web |date=2026-02-27 |title=Fake News auf Xiaomi-Handys [Fake news on Xiaomi phones] |url=https://www.test.de/Smartphones-Fake-News-auf-Xiaomi-Handys-6284169-0/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260227022153/https://www.test.de/Smartphones-Fake-News-auf-Xiaomi-Handys-6284169-0/ |archive-date=2026-02-27 |access-date=2026-03-06 |website=Stiftung Warentest}}</ref> | ||
The incident raises concerns about Chinese state actors having the ability to distribute fake news or propaganda in other countries via phone notifications. However, there is currently no evidence of this actually being exploited in practice. | The incident raises concerns about Chinese state actors having the ability to distribute fake news or propaganda in other countries via phone notifications. However, there is currently no evidence of this actually being exploited in practice. | ||