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| {{ombox|type=notice|text='''Userspace legal-research note by [[User:Louis|Louis Rossmann]]. Not legal advice.''' This is personal legal research, not a neutral wiki article and not a substitute for a licensed Nevada attorney.}}
| | probe [https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84679.html x] {{ombox|type=notice|text=t}} |
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| ''This is research, not legal advice, and not a substitute for a licensed Nevada attorney. Louis Rossmann is not a lawyer and is not Will Prowse's counsel. The single most important step below is retaining Nevada anti-SLAPP counsel before the 60-day special-motion clock runs.''
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| On June 1, 2026, Dragonfly Energy Corp., the maker of Battle Born Batteries, sued DIY-solar reviewer William "Will" Prowse and his company Prowse Publications LLC in Nevada state court, on four claims arising from a series of YouTube videos about the batteries.<ref name="complaint">Complaint, ''Dragonfly Energy Corp. v. William Errol Prowse IV and Prowse Publications LLC'', No. CV26-01604 (Nev. 2d Jud. Dist. Ct., Washoe County, filed June 1, 2026). The plaintiff is the operating company Dragonfly Energy Corp.; its parent, Dragonfly Energy Holdings Corp., is the SEC filer (Nasdaq: DFLI).</ref><ref name="8k">{{Cite web |url=https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1847986/000149315226026754/form8-k.htm |title=Form 8-K, Item 8.01 (Dragonfly Energy Holdings Corp.) |publisher=U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission |date=2026-06-02 |access-date=2026-06-06}}</ref> Dragonfly asks the court not only for damages but for an order barring Prowse's future statements about the batteries and requiring him to take down the videos already published. The strongest answer is procedural and fast: Nevada has one of the country's most defendant-friendly anti-SLAPP statutes, a product-safety review of a mass-market consumer battery sits close to the center of what that statute protects, and the Nevada Supreme Court has confirmed that the statute reaches every claim built on the protected speech, not only the libel count.<ref name="panik">''Panik v. TMM, Inc.'', 139 Nev. Adv. Op. 53 (2023) (anti-SLAPP protections are not limited to particular claims; the court evaluates the statements underlying the claim, not the label the plaintiff gives it). [https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2023/84679.html Opinion via Justia].</ref> A special motion to dismiss freezes discovery, forces Dragonfly to put up real proof early, and, if it succeeds, makes Dragonfly pay Prowse's legal fees plus up to $10,000.
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| == What Dragonfly actually filed ==
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| The case is in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in Washoe County (Reno), where Dragonfly is headquartered, as case number CV26-01604.<ref name="complaint" /> Dragonfly is represented by Parsons Behle & Latimer, the same firm defending the company in a separate consumer class action over the same batteries (see below). The complaint pleads four claims:
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| * '''Trade libel / business disparagement''', the central claim.
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| * '''Unfair competition / deceptive trade practices''' under the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act, NRS 598.0915.
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| * '''Intentional interference with prospective economic advantage'''.
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| * '''Injunctive relief''', pleaded as a separate count, seeking both a ban on future statements and removal of the existing videos, posts, thumbnails, and comments.<ref name="complaint" />
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| The factual core is a set of eleven YouTube videos Prowse published between December 2025 and May 2026, which Dragonfly says collectively drew more than 1.78 million views, in which he tore down and cycle-tested Battle Born batteries and concluded their terminal design is unsafe.<ref name="complaint" /> Dragonfly's framing of the dispute is worth quoting, because the defense is built around it. Its chief commercial officer, Wade Seaburg, said in the company's press release:
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| <blockquote>''"Dragonfly Energy respects and encourages good-faith product reviews, independent testing, and open technical discussion. This lawsuit is not about silencing criticism. It is about accountability when what we believe are false and misleading safety claims are presented as technical fact and amplified through monetized content."''<ref name="pr">{{Cite web |url=https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2026/06/02/3305031/0/en/Will-Prowse-Sued-by-Dragonfly-Energy-Over-Alleged-False-and-Misleading-Claims-About-Battle-Born-Batteries.html |title=Will Prowse Sued by Dragonfly Energy Over Alleged False and Misleading Claims About Battle Born Batteries |publisher=Dragonfly Energy Holdings Corp. (GlobeNewswire) |date=2026-06-02 |access-date=2026-06-06}}</ref></blockquote>
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| A plaintiff that concedes on the record that it ''"respects and encourages good-faith product reviews, independent testing, and open technical discussion"'' has admitted the public-interest character of exactly the activity it is suing over.
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| The most important admission, though, is in the complaint's own description of how the batteries work. Dragonfly pleads that the Battle Born 100Ah 12-volt battery contains a ''"thermal protection fail-safe"'': a brass terminal post, an aluminum bolt, and a layer of PA-765 ABS polymer between the brass terminal and the copper bus bar.<ref name="complaint" /> When the positive terminal overheats, the complaint says, ''"the polymer softens, the post loosens,"'' current is interrupted, and a thermal-runaway event is averted, so that ''"the loose positive terminal is not the cause of overheating; it is the consequence."''<ref name="complaint" /> In other words, Dragonfly's own pleading concedes that, by design, the terminal melts the polymer and the post comes loose under thermal stress. That concession is the spine of the truth defense: the physical behavior Prowse filmed is the behavior Dragonfly says the battery is built to perform.
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| == The documented safety record behind the dispute ==
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| For both the trade-libel and the deceptive-practices claims, Dragonfly carries the burden of proving that Prowse's safety statements are materially false, because the speech is on a matter of public concern and Prowse is the publisher of his own reporting.<ref name="hepps">''Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps'', 475 U.S. 767, 776-77 (1986) (a private-figure plaintiff suing a media defendant over speech on a matter of public concern bears the burden of proving falsity). [https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/475/767 Opinion via Cornell LII].</ref> The public record makes that burden hard to carry, because the central factual claim, that these terminals can overheat and fail, is corroborated from several independent directions and is partly conceded by Dragonfly itself.
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| '''Dragonfly concedes the mechanism.''' As above, the complaint pleads that the terminal is designed so the polymer melts and the post loosens after a thermal event.<ref name="complaint" /> The certifications Dragonfly cites point the same way: the complaint states that the 100Ah battery ''"repeatedly and consistently passed the standard's most severe short-circuit test ... due to the presence of a thermal protection fail-safe."''<ref name="complaint" /> The melt-and-disconnect behavior is, on Dragonfly's own account, how the battery passes its safety test. Whether that behavior should be called a fail-safe or a flaw is a question of engineering judgment, not a question of whether the melting happens.
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| '''Independent testing corroborates the failures.''' The technology outlet ''Hackaday'' reported on Prowse's controlled tests as they were published. A brand-new 100Ah unit's negative-terminal enclosure melted under an 80-amp discharge.<ref name="hackaday-melt">{{Cite web |url=https://hackaday.com/2026/01/16/battle-born-lfp-battery-melts-with-new-problem/ |title=Battle Born LFP Battery Melts With New Problem |publisher=Hackaday |date=2026-01-16 |access-date=2026-06-06}}</ref> A unit cycled at 49 amps, well under its 100-amp rating, drove the battery-management system into repeated disconnects while the spacer melted, and the management system ''"never puts the battery into any kind of safe mode."''<ref name="hackaday-death">{{Cite web |url=https://hackaday.com/2026/03/19/studying-a-battle-born-lfp-batterys-death-under-controlled-conditions/ |title=Studying a Battle Born LFP Battery's Death Under Controlled Conditions |publisher=Hackaday |date=2026-03-19 |access-date=2026-06-06}}</ref> A 300-amp industrial unit ''"failed violently with a cell venting and the loose BMS rattling around in the case."''<ref name="hackaday-autopsy">{{Cite web |url=https://hackaday.com/2026/02/16/performing-an-autopsy-on-15-dead-battle-born-lfp-batteries/ |title=Performing an Autopsy on 15 Dead Battle Born LFP Batteries |publisher=Hackaday |date=2026-02-16 |access-date=2026-06-06}}</ref> An earlier RV-industry report documented a field unit whose positive-terminal connection had worked loose and was measured at more than 200 degrees Fahrenheit with arcing inside the case.<ref name="rvtravel">{{Cite web |url=https://www.rvtravel.com/troubles-battle-born-batteries-youtuber-questions-safety-1240b/ |title=Troubles with Battle Born batteries? YouTuber questions safety |publisher=RV Travel |date=2025-12-18 |access-date=2026-06-06}}</ref>
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| '''Consumers have sued over the same defect.''' On February 13, 2026, a putative consumer class action, ''Berdner v. Dragonfly Energy Holdings Corp.'', was filed in Sonoma County, California, and later removed to federal court.<ref name="berdner">''Berdner v. Dragonfly Energy Holdings Corp.'', No. 3:26-cv-03855 (N.D. Cal.), removed April 30, 2026 from Sonoma County Superior Court No. 26CV01247. [https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/73278488/berdner-v-dragonfly-energy-holdings-corp/ Docket via CourtListener].</ref> In Dragonfly's own words, in its annual report, the plaintiffs ''"allege that the products share a uniform design defect related to the positive terminal connection that can result in overheating, premature failure, and safety risk."''<ref name="10k2025">{{Cite web |url=https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1847986/000149315226013635/form10-k.htm |title=Form 10-K (fiscal year 2025), Legal Proceedings and Note on Warranty Obligations |publisher=Dragonfly Energy Holdings Corp. / U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission |date=2026-03-30 |access-date=2026-06-06}}</ref><ref name="10q2026">{{Cite web |url=https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1847986/000149315226023103/form10-q.htm |title=Form 10-Q (quarter ended March 31, 2026), Legal Proceedings |publisher=Dragonfly Energy Holdings Corp. / U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission |date=2026-05-14 |access-date=2026-06-06}}</ref> That is a separate set of plaintiffs, represented by separate counsel, describing the same positive-terminal failure on the same battery line that Prowse described.
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| '''Dragonfly's own SEC filings disclose the risk.''' In its annual report, Dragonfly warns investors that ''"[l]ithium-ion battery cells have been observed to catch fire or release smoke and flame,"'' and that a product defect ''"could subject us to lawsuits, product recalls, or redesign efforts."''<ref name="10k2024">{{Cite web |url=https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1847986/000164117225001755/form10-k.htm |title=Form 10-K (fiscal year 2024), Item 1A Risk Factors |publisher=Dragonfly Energy Holdings Corp. / U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission |date=2025-03-31 |access-date=2026-06-06}}</ref> The company's estimated warranty obligation rose from $307,000 at the end of 2023 to $514,000 at the end of 2024 to $867,000 at the end of 2025.<ref name="10k2025" /><ref name="10k2024" />
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| No federal regulator has issued a recall or safety action on these batteries, and the defense does not claim one. The point is narrower and it is enough: the core message that these packs can overheat and fail at the terminal is substantially true, corroborated by independent testing, by a separate consumer class action, and by Dragonfly's own disclosures, and conceded in part by the complaint itself. Substantial truth is a complete defense, and the closest precedent is a manufacturer that sued a product-review organization over a critical test and lost, because sharp criticism of a product is ''"commonplace in the forum of robust debate."''<ref name="bose">''Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.'', 466 U.S. 485, 513 (1984). [https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/466/485/ Opinion via Justia].</ref> When the contested statement is a reviewer's evaluation of a product he tested, the Ninth Circuit has held a plaintiff simply cannot carry the falsity burden: ''"[a] reasonable jury could not find that Unelko met its burden of proving falsity by a preponderance of the evidence."''<ref name="unelko">''Unelko Corp. v. Rooney'', 912 F.2d 1049, 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 1990). [https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/912/1049/ Opinion via Justia].</ref>
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| == Prowse's own history with these batteries ==
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| Dragonfly's theory of motive is that Prowse turned on the batteries only after the money stopped. The dated record, including Dragonfly's own pleading, is more complicated than that narrative.
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| Prowse first tore down a Battle Born battery in November 2019, and praised it. The complaint quotes him from that video: ''"This passes all of the tests. Okay. Finally, we have a good battery. I can actually recommend it."''<ref name="complaint" /> The complaint also concedes that this 2019 video was unpaid and that Battle Born was unaware of it before he posted it.<ref name="complaint" /> Dragonfly pleads that an affiliate relationship ran from January 2019 to October 2025, that it paid Prowse a total of about $206,000 over those years, and that it deactivated his affiliate link in October 2025.<ref name="complaint" />
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| The complaint's own chronology does not line up cleanly with "criticism only after the deal ended." Dragonfly pleads that ''"[i]n August of 2025, Prowse began posting negative comments about Battle Born ... [and] began asking his forum members to send him defective or failed Battle Born Batteries,"'' and that it deactivated his affiliate link in October 2025 ''"[i]n response to the growing negativity."''<ref name="complaint" /> On Dragonfly's own pleading, then, the criticism began while the affiliate relationship was still in place, and the company ended the relationship because of the criticism, not the other way around.
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| When Dragonfly suggested his early teardowns used abused or pre-damaged batteries, Prowse answered the point on camera by buying a new battery and cycling it within the manufacturer's stated ratings, and it failed; the independent ''Hackaday'' coverage of that controlled test reported the same result.<ref name="hackaday-melt" /><ref name="hackaday-death" /> Throughout, he tore the batteries down on camera and published his underlying cycle-testing data for anyone to download, which is the factual record his conclusions rest on.
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| == Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute is the primary shield ==
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| Nevada's anti-SLAPP law (NRS 41.635 through 41.670) exists to kill exactly this kind of suit early, and the Nevada Supreme Court has confirmed it reaches all four of Dragonfly's claims, not just the libel count, because the question is whether the claims are based on protected good-faith communication, not what the plaintiff labels them.<ref name="panik" />
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| '''The protected category.''' NRS 41.637 defines a "good faith communication in furtherance of ... the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern." Its fourth category covers a communication made in direct connection with an issue of public interest in a public forum, so long as it is truthful or made without knowledge of its falsehood.<ref name="nrs41637">Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.637. {{Cite web |url=https://www.leg.state.nv.us/nrs/nrs-041.html |title=NRS Chapter 41 |publisher=Nevada Legislature |access-date=2026-06-06}}</ref> A YouTube channel and the diysolarforum.com message board are public forums; fire and thermal-runaway risk in a product Dragonfly says it has deployed more than 400,000 times is an issue of public interest.<ref name="complaint" />
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| '''The special motion and the clock.''' NRS 41.660 authorizes a special motion to dismiss, which must be filed within 60 days after service of the complaint, a deadline the court may extend only for good cause.<ref name="nrs41660">Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.660. {{Cite web |url=https://www.leg.state.nv.us/nrs/nrs-041.html |title=NRS Chapter 41 |publisher=Nevada Legislature |access-date=2026-06-06}}</ref> The 60-day window, measured from the date Prowse is personally served, is the most important date in the case.
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| '''Burden shifting and the discovery stay.''' On the motion, the defendant first shows by a preponderance that the claim is based on a protected good-faith communication; the burden then flips to the plaintiff to show, with prima facie evidence, a probability of prevailing.<ref name="nrs41660" /> Filing the motion stays discovery while it, and any appeal, is pending.<ref name="nrs41660" /> That defeats the usual playbook of a well-funded plaintiff: Dragonfly cannot bury Prowse in depositions and document demands to raise his costs while the motion is decided. The Nevada Supreme Court reviews these rulings de novo and has confirmed the two-prong structure.<ref name="coker">''Coker v. Sassone'', 135 Nev. 8, 432 P.3d 746 (2019). [https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/nv-supreme-court/1975279.html Opinion via FindLaw].</ref>
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| '''The downside for Dragonfly.''' If Prowse wins the motion, the court must award him reasonable costs and attorney's fees, may award up to $10,000 on top of that, and a denial is immediately appealable, which keeps the discovery stay in place during the appeal.<ref name="nrs41670">Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.670. {{Cite web |url=https://www.leg.state.nv.us/nrs/nrs-041.html |title=NRS Chapter 41 |publisher=Nevada Legislature |access-date=2026-06-06}}</ref><ref name="john">''John v. Douglas County School District'', 125 Nev. 746, 219 P.3d 1276 (2009).</ref>
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| '''A battery review is an issue of public interest.''' Nevada uses the guiding principles in ''Shapiro v. Welt'' to decide that question, asking among other things whether the subject concerns a substantial number of people rather than a purely personal grievance.<ref name="shapiro">''Shapiro v. Welt'', 133 Nev. 35, 389 P.3d 262 (2017). [https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2017/67363.html Opinion via Justia].</ref> Dragonfly's own marketing answers it: the company states it has deployed more than 400,000 batteries across RV, marine, off-grid, and heavy-duty applications.<ref name="complaint" /> Online consumer reviews get the same treatment in the case law, because ''"consumer information that goes beyond a particular interaction between the parties and implicates matters of public concern that can affect many people is generally deemed to involve an issue of public interest."''<ref name="wong">''Wong v. Jing'', 189 Cal. App. 4th 1354, 1366, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 747 (2010). [https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5809824/wong-v-jing/ Opinion via CourtListener].</ref><ref name="chaker">''Chaker v. Mateo'', 209 Cal. App. 4th 1138, 1146, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 496 (2012). [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=chaker+v+mateo Opinion via Google Scholar].</ref>
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| '''Meeting prong one.''' Prowse's initial showing can be made largely by his own sworn declaration laying out his methodology and stating that he believed his conclusions were true when he published, which Nevada case law treats as sufficient at prong one absent conflicting evidence.<ref name="stark">''Stark v. Lackey'', 136 Nev. 38, 458 P.3d 342 (2020). [https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2020/74449.html Opinion via Justia].</ref>
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| == The trade libel claim has built-in weak points ==
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| By suing for trade libel rather than personal defamation, Dragonfly took on a heavier burden. Nevada business disparagement requires a false and disparaging statement, unprivileged publication, malice, and special damages.<ref name="ccsd">''Clark County School District v. Virtual Education Software, Inc.'', 125 Nev. 374, 385-87, 213 P.3d 496 (2009). [https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/nv-supreme-court/1290127.html Opinion via FindLaw].</ref>
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| '''Special damages must be pleaded with specifics.''' This is the soft spot in the complaint. Special damages in a disparagement case are not presumed; they must be pleaded with specificity under Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 9(g).<ref name="pardee">''Pardee Homes of Nevada v. Wolfram'', 135 Nev. 173, 444 P.3d 423 (2019) (cited for the general rule that special damages must satisfy NRCP 9(g)). [https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2019/72371.html Opinion via Justia].</ref> Dragonfly's complaint pleads only an aggregate ''"drop-off"'' in sales, OEM customers it does not name, and a high ''"volume of calls,"'' with no particular lost sale, no canceled order tied to a particular statement, and no dollar figure.<ref name="complaint" /> The closest precedent is the structural twin of this case: in ''Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union'', a vehicle maker sued a consumer-review organization over a critical test, and the court dismissed every product-disparagement claim because the maker pleaded its losses in the aggregate, holding that the claim ''"requires pleading and proof of special damages in the form of pecuniary loss"'' and that the claims ''"fail to allege special damages with the specificity required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(g)."''<ref name="isuzu">''Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.'', 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1047, 1050 (C.D. Cal. 1998). [https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp2/12/1035/2459176/ Opinion via Justia].</ref> Courts apply the rule routinely, dismissing trade-libel claims that plead lost sales without naming the customers and transactions lost, and as recently as September 2025 a court granted summary judgment against a disparagement plaintiff that could not prove specific lost transactions.<ref name="mms">''MMS Trading Co. Pty Ltd. v. Hutton Toys, LLC'', No. 1:20-cv-01360-SJB, 2021 WL 1193947 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2021).</ref><ref name="sorihin">''Sorihin v. Sea Queen II'', No. 3:16-cv-05422-JST, 2017 WL 1102865 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2017).</ref><ref name="doublediamond">''Double Diamond Distribution, Ltd. v. Crocs, Inc.'', No. 1:23-cv-01790-PAB-KAS, Slip Op. at 14-16 (D. Colo. Sept. 24, 2025).</ref>
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| '''Fact versus opinion.''' A conclusion drawn out loud from facts shown to the audience is opinion, not a false statement of fact.<ref name="milkovich">''Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.'', 497 U.S. 1, 18-19, 20 (1990). [https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/497/1 Opinion via Cornell LII].</ref> The controlling Nevada authority on this exact pattern is ''PETA v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd.'', where the claimed defamation came packaged with the videotape that showed the audience the very conduct being criticized, and the statements were protected because the facts were on the tape for the viewer to judge:
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| <blockquote>''everyone involved has seen the "movie"; and all the facts upon which opinions were based were "disclosed" in the videotape itself...''</blockquote><ref name="berosini">''PETA v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd.'', 111 Nev. 615, 625, 895 P.2d 1269 (1995). [https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2259559/peta-v-bobby-berosini-ltd/ Opinion via CourtListener].</ref> That is Prowse's case almost on all fours. He shows his teardown, his test rig, and his data on camera, then says the pack is unsafe, and a viewer can look at the same footage and disagree, which is the test for protected opinion.<ref name="partington">''Partington v. Bugliosi'', 56 F.3d 1147, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1995). [https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/697361/ Opinion via CourtListener].</ref> A technical conclusion drawn from data the speaker put in front of the audience is not the kind of "fact" that can be proven false in a defamation case, as the Second Circuit held for disclosed scientific data in ''ONY, Inc. v. Cornerstone Therapeutics'' and the Third Circuit held for a conclusion drawn from nonfraudulent published data in ''Pacira''.<ref name="ony">''ONY, Inc. v. Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc.'', 720 F.3d 490, 492, 498 (2d Cir. 2013). [https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/12-2414/12-2414-2013-06-26.html Opinion via Justia].</ref><ref name="pacira">''Pacira Biosciences, Inc. v. American Society of Anesthesiologists, Inc.'', 583 F. Supp. 3d 654, 658 (D.N.J. 2022), aff'd, 63 F.4th 240 (3d Cir. 2023). [https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9386553/ Opinion via CourtListener].</ref> Dragonfly's complaint concedes the point in passing when it pleads that ''"Prowse's own published data from the video shows that the battery delivers full-rated capacity under proper conditions,"'' an acknowledgment that the data was published for the audience to weigh.<ref name="complaint" />
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| '''Truth, and who has to prove it.''' Truth is a complete defense, and for public-concern speech the burden of proving falsity is the plaintiff's, not the speaker's.<ref name="hepps" /> Dragonfly does not get to demand that Prowse prove his tests were perfect; it has to prove the core message, that these packs can overheat and fail dangerously, is materially false, against the record described above.
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| '''Actual malice is a state of mind about truth, not a motive.''' Dragonfly's whole narrative rests on financial motive, but the Supreme Court has drawn the line three times. A profit motive does not prove actual malice, or the body of First Amendment libel law ''"would be little more than empty vessels."''<ref name="hartehanks">''Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton'', 491 U.S. 657, 667 (1989). [https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/491/657 Opinion via Cornell LII].</ref> Spite and ill will are not actual malice.<ref name="masson">''Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.'', 501 U.S. 496, 510-11 (1991). [https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/501/496 Opinion via Cornell LII].</ref> And lower courts have rejected the precise profit-and-grudge mix Dragonfly pleads: ''"[e]vidence of a defendant's ill will, desire to injure, or political or profit motive does not suffice."''<ref name="campbell">''Campbell v. Citizens for an Honest Gov't, Inc.'', 255 F.3d 560, 569 (8th Cir. 2001). [https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/255/560/ Opinion via Justia].</ref> Nevada applies the same definition, requiring that the speaker entertained serious doubts about the truth.<ref name="pegasus">''Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc.'', 118 Nev. 706, 718-19, 57 P.3d 82 (2002). [https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2002/36462.html Opinion via Justia].</ref>
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| == The deceptive-trade-practices claim is the libel claim relabeled ==
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| The second count, under the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act, fails for three independent reasons.
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| First, the statute does not reach a reviewer. NRS 598.0915 defines a "deceptive trade practice" only when committed ''"in the course of his or her business or occupation,"'' and the disparagement subsection targets a person who ''"[d]isparages the goods, services or business of another person by false or misleading representation of fact"'' in that course of business, meaning a competing seller, not a third-party critic.<ref name="nrs598">Nev. Rev. Stat. § 598.0915. {{Cite web |url=https://www.leg.state.nv.us/nrs/nrs-598.html |title=NRS Chapter 598 (Deceptive Trade Practices) |publisher=Nevada Legislature |access-date=2026-06-06}}</ref> Prowse is not in the business of selling batteries. A reviewer who evaluates a product he does not sell is not engaged in commercial advertising or promotion at all.<ref name="tobinick">''Tobinick v. Novella'', 848 F.3d 935, 950 (11th Cir. 2017) (a critic's commentary is not "commercial advertising or promotion" where the defendant is not a competitor proposing a transaction). [https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/15-14889/15-14889-2017-02-15.html Opinion via Justia].</ref>
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| Second, a plaintiff cannot escape the First Amendment by relabeling a libel claim. The constitutional limits that protect speech ''"apply to all claims whose gravamen is the alleged injurious falsehood of a statement,"'' and a plaintiff ''"may not use related causes of action to avoid the constitutional requisites of a defamation claim."''<ref name="blatty">''Blatty v. New York Times Co.'', 42 Cal. 3d 1033, 1042-45, 728 P.2d 1177 (1986). [https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/42/1033.html Opinion via Justia].</ref><ref name="farah">''Farah v. Esquire Magazine'', 736 F.3d 528, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting ''Moldea v. New York Times Co.''). [https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/12-7055/12-7055-2013-11-26.html Opinion via Justia].</ref> The Ninth Circuit applied that rule to a product-review case, holding that the disparagement and tortious-interference counts ''"are subject to the same first amendment requirements that govern actions for defamation,"'' and the Tenth Circuit reached the same result for business-tort claims built on protected opinion.<ref name="unelko" /><ref name="jeffco">''Jefferson County School District No. R-1 v. Moody's Investor's Services, Inc.'', 175 F.3d 848, 857, 860-61 (10th Cir. 1999). [https://www.courtlistener.com/c/F.3d/175/848/ Opinion via CourtListener].</ref> The deceptive-practices count is the trade-libel count by another name, and it inherits the same falsity burden, the same opinion protection, and the same fate.
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| Third, the anti-SLAPP statute reaches it anyway, because the Nevada Supreme Court looks at the protected statements underlying a claim rather than the claim's label.<ref name="panik" />
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| == The interference claim rises and falls with the libel claim ==
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| The third count, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, requires Dragonfly to prove a prospective relationship, the defendant's knowledge of it, intent to harm by preventing it, the absence of privilege or justification, and resulting harm.<ref name="amerco">''In re Amerco Derivative Litigation'', 127 Nev. 196, 226-27, 252 P.3d 681 (2011). [https://www.courtlistener.com/c/Nev./127/196/ Opinion via CourtListener].</ref><ref name="consolgen">''Consolidated Generator-Nevada, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co.'', 114 Nev. 1304, 1311-12, 971 P.2d 1251 (1998). [https://www.courtlistener.com/c/P.2d/971/1251/ Opinion via CourtListener].</ref><ref name="wichinsky">''Wichinsky v. Mosa'', 109 Nev. 84, 87-88, 847 P.2d 727 (1993). [https://www.courtlistener.com/c/Nev./109/84/ Opinion via CourtListener].</ref>
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| The fourth element is where the claim breaks. Constitutionally protected speech cannot be the wrongful means that supplies the "absence of privilege or justification," because the First Amendment bars tort liability for the economic consequences of protected speech. The Supreme Court reversed a state-court interference judgment built on protected boycott advocacy, holding that ''"[s]peech does not lose its protected character ... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into action."''<ref name="claiborne">''NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.'', 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982). [https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/458/886 Opinion via Cornell LII].</ref> An interference claim built on the same publication as a failed defamation claim falls with it, because its gravamen is still the alleged injurious falsehood of a statement.<ref name="blatty" /><ref name="unelko" /> If Dragonfly cannot prove Prowse's statements were false and made with the required fault, it cannot convert the same speech into a damages award by calling it interference.
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| == The affiliate money is a distraction, not a claim ==
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| Dragonfly leans on the roughly $206,000 in past affiliate commissions and banner advertising, the earlier praise, and a statement it attributes to Prowse in an April 2026 video that the only thing he received from the company was ''"four free batteries."''<ref name="complaint" /> None of that is a defense-killer.
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| First, motive is not falsity. Whether Prowse profited from ad revenue or once took affiliate fees has nothing to do with whether a pack actually overheats; at most it bears on malice, which only matters if Dragonfly first proves the statements false.
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| Second, the alleged denial is collateral. Trade libel must rest on a false statement about the plaintiff's product, not about the speaker's own affairs. Nevada defines the tort as injurious falsehoods ''"aimed at the business's goods or services,"'' and the Ninth Circuit states the same boundary the Nevada Supreme Court adopted, that trade libel is ''"not directed at the plaintiff's personal reputation but rather at the goods a plaintiff sells."''<ref name="ccsd" /><ref name="aetna">''Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Centennial Insurance Co.'', 838 F.2d 346, 351 (9th Cir. 1988). [https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/838/346/ Opinion via Justia].</ref> A statement by Prowse about whether he had an affiliate relationship is a statement about Prowse, not about the battery, and it fails the "of and concerning the product" requirement that limits this tort.<ref name="blatty" /> A defendant may also invoke anti-SLAPP protection even while disputing that he made the specific statement attributed to him.<ref name="spirtos">''Spirtos v. Yemenidjian'', 137 Nev. 711, 499 P.3d 611 (2021). [https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2021/80138.html Opinion via Justia].</ref>
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| == The injunction and takedown request is an unconstitutional prior restraint ==
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| Dragonfly's fourth count asks the court both to bar Prowse from making ''"further"'' statements it considers false and to order him to remove the videos, posts, thumbnails, and comments he has already published.<ref name="complaint" /> Both halves are controlled by Nevada Supreme Court authority, and both lose. In ''Weller v. Eighth Judicial District Court'', the court vacated a preliminary injunction that barred a speaker from making "false or defamatory" statements, holding that such a pre-merits order is an unconstitutional prior restraint because it ''"freezes [the speaker's] ability to exercise her freedom-of-speech rights."''<ref name="weller">''Weller v. Eighth Judicial District Court'', 136 Nev. 269, 273, 476 P.3d 833 (2020). [https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4791921/weller-vs-dist-ct-riley/ Opinion via CourtListener].</ref> The federal baseline is the same: an individual's interest in being free from public criticism of his business does not ''"warrant[] use of the injunctive power of a court,"'' and prior restraints carry a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality.<ref name="keefe">''Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe'', 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971). [https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/402/415 Opinion via Cornell LII].</ref> Federal appellate courts have vacated injunctions phrased against "defamatory" speech as prior restraints, on the settled maxim that ''"equity will not enjoin a libel."''<ref name="metopera">''Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Local 100'', 239 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2001). [https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/239/172/ Opinion via Justia].</ref><ref name="kramer">''Kramer v. Thompson'', 947 F.2d 666 (3d Cir. 1991). [https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/947/666/ Opinion via Justia].</ref> The narrow exception some courts recognize reaches only specific statements already adjudicated false after a full trial, which is the opposite of what Dragonfly seeks.<ref name="kinney">''Kinney v. Barnes'', 443 S.W.3d 87, 94 (Tex. 2014). [https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5444791/kinney-v-barnes/ Opinion via CourtListener].</ref> The demand to take down videos that no court has found false is, if anything, the broader and more clearly unconstitutional half of the request.
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| == Why this stays in Nevada state court ==
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| Dragonfly is a Nevada citizen, and Prowse and Prowse Publications LLC are pleaded as Nevada citizens as well.<ref name="complaint" /> With both sides in the same state there is no complete diversity, so the case cannot be removed to federal court and stays in state court, where Nevada applies the full anti-SLAPP statute, including the automatic discovery stay and the preponderance standard, without the federal-court complications that have tangled anti-SLAPP motions in the Ninth Circuit.
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| == Claim by claim ==
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| '''Trade libel (count one).''' The falsity charge runs into the plaintiff's burden of proof and the reviewer-truth line of ''Bose'' and ''Unelko'', against a record that is substantially true and partly conceded by the complaint.<ref name="hepps" /><ref name="bose" /><ref name="unelko" /><ref name="complaint" /> The "abusive testing" charge runs into the disclosed-facts opinion doctrine of ''Berosini'' and ''Partington'', because Prowse tore the batteries down on camera and published his data.<ref name="berosini" /><ref name="partington" /> The malice-by-money charge runs into the rule that motive is not actual malice.<ref name="hartehanks" /><ref name="masson" /><ref name="campbell" /> The special-damages charge runs into the ''Isuzu'' pleading line, because Dragonfly pleads only aggregate harm.<ref name="isuzu" /><ref name="complaint" />
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| '''Deceptive trade practices (count two).''' Outside the statute, which reaches deceptive practices by a seller in the course of business, not a reviewer's commentary, and barred by the rule against relabeling a libel claim, and reachable by the anti-SLAPP motion regardless.<ref name="nrs598" /><ref name="tobinick" /><ref name="blatty" /><ref name="panik" />
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