Intel Management Engine: Difference between revisions
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The '''Intel Management Engine (ME)''' is an embedded microcontroller integrated into Intel's chipsets since 2008. From version 11 onwards, it runs a (closed-source) modified version of [https://www.minix3.org/ MINIX] as its operating system.<ref name=":4">{{Cite web |date=2023-09-26 |title=What is Intel® Management Engine? |url=https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/support/articles/000008927/software/chipset-software.html |url-status=live |access-date=2026-02-04 |publisher=Intel}}</ref><ref name=":5">{{Cite web |last=Ermolov |first=Mark |last2=Goryachy |first2=Maxim |date=28 Aug 2017 |title=Disabling Intel ME 11 via undocumented mode |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201201175708/ | The '''[[Intel]] Management Engine (ME)''' is an embedded microcontroller integrated into Intel's chipsets since 2008. From version 11 onwards, it runs a (closed-source) modified version of [https://www.minix3.org/ MINIX] as its operating system.<ref name=":4">{{Cite web |date=2023-09-26 |title=What is Intel® Management Engine? |url=https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/support/articles/000008927/software/chipset-software.html |url-status=live |access-date=2026-02-04 |publisher=Intel |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260206083837/https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/support/articles/000008927/software/chipset-software.html |archive-date=6 Feb 2026}}</ref><ref name=":5">{{Cite web |last=Ermolov |first=Mark |last2=Goryachy |first2=Maxim |date=28 Aug 2017 |title=Disabling Intel ME 11 via undocumented mode |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201201175708/https://blog.ptsecurity.com/2017/08/disabling-intel-me.html?m=1 |url-status=dead |access-date=2026-02-04 |website=Positive Technologies}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Tanenbaum |first=Andrew S. |title=An Open Letter to Intel |url=https://www.cs.vu.nl/~ast/intel/ |url-status=live |access-date=2026-02-04 |website=www.cs.vu.nl |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260216044755/https://www.cs.vu.nl/~ast/intel/ |archive-date=16 Feb 2026}}</ref>. | ||
The ME is able to access the LAN adapter, giving it access to networks the system is connected to, both wired and wireless.<ref name=":6">{{Cite web |date=2021-02-18 |title=Getting Started with Intel® Active Management Technology |url=https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/guide/getting-started-with-active-management-technology.html |access-date=2026-02-04 |publisher=Intel}}</ref> | The ME is able to access the LAN adapter, giving it access to networks the system is connected to, both wired and wireless.<ref name=":6">{{Cite web |date=2021-02-18 |title=Getting Started with Intel® Active Management Technology |url=https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/guide/getting-started-with-active-management-technology.html |access-date=2026-02-04 |publisher=Intel |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260124123736/https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/guide/getting-started-with-active-management-technology.html |archive-date=24 Jan 2026}}</ref> | ||
The power state of the ME is independent from the rest of the system, allowing it to run while the system is turned off, assuming that the system is still receiving power.<ref name=":4" /> | The power state of the ME is independent from the rest of the system, allowing it to run while the system is turned off, assuming that the system is still receiving power.<ref name=":4" /> | ||
Additionally, Intel ME also contains several measures to check if it's been tampered with. These include being inaccessible to the machine BIOS or OS, scanning the entire machine every 30 minutes to verify if signature is signed (otherwise shutting down the system)<sup>[source?]</sup>, and making it exceptionally difficult to reverse engineer. | |||
Additionally, Intel ME also contains several measures to check if it's been tampered with. These include being inaccessible to the machine BIOS or OS, scanning the entire machine every 30 minutes to verify if signature is signed (otherwise shutting down the system), and making it exceptionally difficult to reverse engineer. | |||
==Intel AMT== | ==Intel AMT== | ||
One of the services utilizing the capabilities of the Intel ME is '''Intel Active Management (AMT)'''. It is part of a set of technologies marketed as Intel vPro. Intel AMT is built into most modern Intel CPUs, including but not limited to the Intel Core i5, Intel Core i7, Intel Core M, and Intel Xeon series. The AMT has full access to the system and can bypass system firewalls<ref name=":6" /><ref>{{Cite web |date=2021-01-05 |title=Intel® Active Management Technology Developers Guide |url=https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/docs/active-management-technology/developer-guide/2021/overview.html |url-status=live |access-date=2026-02-04 |publisher=Intel}}</ref>. | One of the services utilizing the capabilities of the Intel ME is '''Intel Active Management (AMT)'''. It is part of a set of technologies marketed as Intel vPro. Intel AMT is built into most modern Intel CPUs, including but not limited to the Intel Core i5, Intel Core i7, Intel Core M, and Intel Xeon series. The AMT has full access to the system and can bypass system firewalls.<ref name=":6" /><ref>{{Cite web |date=2021-01-05 |title=Intel® Active Management Technology Developers Guide |url=https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/docs/active-management-technology/developer-guide/2021/overview.html |url-status=live |access-date=2026-02-04 |publisher=Intel |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260108162104/https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/docs/active-management-technology/developer-guide/2021/overview.html |archive-date=8 Jan 2026}}</ref> By default, AMT is enabled, on supported chips. AMT support is listed under the "Security & Reliability" section on the intel product website ([https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/products/sku/230496/intel-core-i913900k-processor-36m-cache-up-to-5-80-ghz/specifications.html example]). | ||
[[File:Intel ME boot sequence.png|alt=Intel ME Boot Sequence for Laptops/Computers |thumb|Booting Process]] | |||
AMT allows remote management of the system by using the ME's network access, exposing 2 ports through which commands can be issued. Some of the many features of the AMT are:<ref name=":6" /> | AMT allows remote management of the system by using the ME's network access, exposing 2 ports through which commands can be issued. Some of the many features of the AMT are:<ref name=":6" /> | ||
* Access to hardware information | *Access to hardware information | ||
* Remote power control | *Remote power control | ||
* [https://software.intel.com/sites/manageability/HLAPI_Documentation/default.htm?turl=Documents%2Fbootcontrol.htm Boot control] | *[https://software.intel.com/sites/manageability/HLAPI_Documentation/default.htm?turl=Documents%2Fbootcontrol.htm Boot control] | ||
* Wake-on-LAN/Wake on wireless LAN | *Wake-on-LAN/Wake on wireless LAN | ||
* Remote Schedule Maintenance (outside firewall) | *Remote Schedule Maintenance (outside firewall) | ||
* KVM (keyboard, video, mouse) remote control | *KVM (keyboard, video, mouse) remote control | ||
* Updating firmware | *Updating firmware | ||
==Security== | ==Security== | ||
| Line 42: | Line 40: | ||
|- | |- | ||
|2009 | |2009 | ||
| | |A "Ring -3 Rootkit" for the Q35 chipset was demonstrated by Invisible Things Lab, allowing an attacker to execute code, even when Intel AMT was disabled in the BIOS.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Tereshkin |first=Alexander |last2=Wojtczuk |first2=Rafal |date=29 Jul 2009 |title=Introducing Ring -3 Rootkits |url=https://blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-09/TERESHKIN/BHUSA09-Tereshkin-Ring3Rootkit-SLIDES.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20251205092502/https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-09/TERESHKIN/BHUSA09-Tereshkin-Ring3Rootkit-SLIDES.pdf |archive-date=2025-12-05 |access-date=2026-02-04 |publisher=Blackhat}}</ref> The bug was subsequently patched by Intel.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2008-08-26 |title=Intel patches the Q35 bug |url=https://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.com/2008/08/intel-patches-q35-bug.html |url-status=live |access-date=2026-02-03 |website=The Invisible Things Lab's blog |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260213213756/https://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.com/2008/08/intel-patches-q35-bug.html |archive-date=13 Feb 2026}}</ref> | ||
|CVE | |'''No CVE''' | ||
|- | |- | ||
|2010 | |2010 | ||
|An individual by the name of Vassilios Vereris discovered an bypass that allow attackers to remotely enable Intel AMT.<ref name=":0" | |An individual by the name of Vassilios Vereris discovered an bypass that allow attackers to remotely enable Intel AMT.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web |date=2026-02-03 |title=Disabling Intel ME in Firmware |url=https://ecrsecurity.com/files/DisableIntelME.pdf |url-status=live |access-date=2026-02-03 |website=ecrsecurity |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260213213756/https://ecrsecurity.com/files/DisableIntelME.pdf |archive-date=13 Feb 2026}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Ververis |first=Vassilios |year=2010 |title=Security Evaluation of Intel's Active Management Technology |url=https://ia801400.us.archive.org/35/items/100402-vassilios-ververis-with-cover/100402-Vassilios_Ververis-with-cover.pdf |website=archive.org}}</ref> | ||
|''' | |'''No CVE''' | ||
|- | |- | ||
|2017 | |2017 | ||
|Discovered by Maksim Malyutin from Embedi, a bug in Intel AMT allows | |Discovered by Maksim Malyutin from Embedi, a bug in Intel AMT allows a hacker to gain admin privileges from a remote location.<ref name=":0" /> Reportedly, Intel was aware of this more than 5 years prior to the report SemiAccurate gave to Intel, however it was dismissed for unknown reasons.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Demerjian |first=Charlie |date=2017-05-01 |title=Remote security exploit in all 2008+ Intel platforms |url=https://www.semiaccurate.com/2017/05/01/remote-security-exploit-2008-intel-platforms/ |url-status=live |access-date=2026-02-03 |website=SemiAccurate |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260113060109/https://www.semiaccurate.com/2017/05/01/remote-security-exploit-2008-intel-platforms/ |archive-date=13 Jan 2026}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Armasu |first=Lucian |date=2017-05-02 |title=Intel AMT Vulnerability Shows Intel’s Management Engine Can Be Dangerous |url=https://www.tomshardware.com/news/intel-amt-vulnerability-me-dangerous,34300.html |url-status=live |access-date=2026-02-03 |website=Tom's Hardware |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20251231170416/https://www.tomshardware.com/news/intel-amt-vulnerability-me-dangerous%2C34300.html |archive-date=31 Dec 2025}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-01-11 |title=The Vulnerability Uncovered |url=https://umatechnology.org/intel-amt-vulnerability-business-laptops-can-be-exploited-in-mere-seconds/ |url-status=live |access-date=2026-02-03 |website=UMA Technology |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20250615173651/https://umatechnology.org/intel-amt-vulnerability-business-laptops-can-be-exploited-in-mere-seconds/ |archive-date=15 Jun 2025}}</ref> | ||
|CVE-2017-5689.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2017-05-02 |title=CVE-2017-5689 Detail |url=https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2017-5689 |url-status=live |access-date=2026-02-03 |website=Nist}}</ref> | |CVE-2017-5689.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2017-05-02 |title=CVE-2017-5689 Detail |url=https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2017-5689 |url-status=live |access-date=2026-02-03 |website=Nist |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260124194726/https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2017-5689 |archive-date=24 Jan 2026}}</ref> | ||
|- | |- | ||
|2018 | |2018 | ||
|Researchers at F-Secure discovered an exploit regarding Intel AMT that allows | |Researchers at F-Secure discovered an exploit regarding Intel AMT that allows a hacker with physical access to the machine to bypass the user, BIOS, Bitlocker, and TPM passwords in a matter of 30 seconds. This bug is more severe against corporate laptops.<ref name=":3">{{Cite web |last=Waldman |first=Arielle |date=2020-09-09 |title=Intel patches critical flaw in Active Management Technology |url=https://www.techtarget.com/searchsecurity/news/252488831/Intel-patches-critical-flaw-in-Active-Management-Technology |url-status=live |access-date=2026-02-03 |website=TechTarget |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260117014328/https://www.techtarget.com/searchsecurity/news/252488831/Intel-patches-critical-flaw-in-Active-Management-Technology |archive-date=17 Jan 2026}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Ashford |first=Warwick |date=2018-01-18 |title=F-Secure highlights another critical Intel security issue |url=https://www.computerweekly.com/news/450433078/F-secure-highlights-another-critical-Intel-security-issue |url-status=live |access-date=2026-02-03 |website=TechTarget |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20250806153514/https://www.computerweekly.com/news/450433078/F-secure-highlights-another-critical-Intel-security-issue |archive-date=6 Aug 2025}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Subramaniam |first=Vaidyanathan |date=2018-01-14 |title=Gone in 30 seconds: New Intel AMT exploit is scarier than you can ever fathom |url=https://www.notebookcheck.net/Gone-in-30-seconds-New-Intel-AMT-exploit-is-scarier-than-you-can-ever-fathom.278216.0.html |url-status=live |access-date=2026-02-03 |website=Notebook Check |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260108083120/https://www.notebookcheck.net/Gone-in-30-seconds-New-Intel-AMT-exploit-is-scarier-than-you-can-ever-fathom.278216.0.html |archive-date=8 Jan 2026}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Armasu |first=Lucian |date=2018-01-12 |title=Intel AMT Allows BitLocker Bypass In Under A Minute |url=https://www.tomshardware.com/news/intel-amt-bitlocker-bios-bypass,36321.html |url-status=live |access-date=2026-02-03 |website=Tom's Hardware |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260213213757/https://www.tomshardware.com/news/intel-amt-bitlocker-bios-bypass,36321.html |archive-date=13 Feb 2026}}</ref> | ||
| | |'''No CVE''' | ||
|- | |- | ||
|2020 | |2020 | ||
|Several vulnerabilities were found in Intel AMT | |Several vulnerabilities were found in Intel AMT, allowing hackers to add a root kit.<ref name=":3" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Larabe |first=Michael |date=2020-09-08 |title=Intel AMT Hit By Another "Critical" Security Vulnerability |url=https://www.semiaccurate.com/2016/01/20/intel-puts-out-secure-cpus-based-on-insecurity/ |url-status=live |access-date=2026-02-03 |website=phoronix |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260108035650/https://www.semiaccurate.com/2016/01/20/intel-puts-out-secure-cpus-based-on-insecurity/ |archive-date=8 Jan 2026}}</ref> | ||
|CVE 2020-0535<ref>{{Cite web | | |CVE 2020-0535<ref>{{Cite web |author=National Vulnerability Database |date=2020-06-15 |title=CVE-2020-0535 Detail |url=https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0535 |url-status=live |access-date=2026-02-03 |website=nist.gov |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260104090546/https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0535 |archive-date=4 Jan 2026}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |author=National Vulnerability Database |date=2020-06-15 |title=CVE-2020-0531 |url=https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0531 |url-status=live |access-date=2026-02-03 |website=Nist |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20250822152535/https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0531 |archive-date=22 Aug 2025}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |author=Intel |date=2020-11-10 |title=2020.2 IPU – Intel® CSME, SPS, TXE, AMT and DAL Advisory |url=https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00391.html |url-status=live |access-date=2026-02-03 |website=Intel |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20251201040922/https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00391.html |archive-date=1 Dec 2025}}</ref> | ||
|} | |} | ||
==Hidden Deals== | ==Hidden Deals== | ||
Around 2017, an undocumented flag was discovered that, when set, disables a large portion of the ME. This feature appears to have been requested by the NSA.<ref name=":5" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Claburn |first=Thomas |date=29 Aug 2017 |title=Intel ME controller chip has secret kill switch |url=https://www.theregister.com/2017/08/29/intel_management_engine_can_be_disabled/ |url-status=live |access-date=2026-02-04 |website=The Register}}</ref> | Around 2017, an undocumented flag was discovered that, when set, disables a large portion of the ME. This feature appears to have been requested by the NSA.<ref name=":5" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Claburn |first=Thomas |date=29 Aug 2017 |title=Intel ME controller chip has secret kill switch |url=https://www.theregister.com/2017/08/29/intel_management_engine_can_be_disabled/ |url-status=live |access-date=2026-02-04 |website=The Register |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260101025135/https://www.theregister.com/2017/08/29/intel_management_engine_can_be_disabled/ |archive-date=1 Jan 2026}}</ref> | ||
==Tools and Tips== | ==Tools and Tips== | ||
There is no official method to disable the ME, however there have been tools and tips developed to allow (partially) disabling the ME.<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":1">{{Cite web |title=Intel’s Management Engine |url=https://puri.sm/learn/intel-me/ |url-status=live |access-date=2026-02-04 |publisher=Purism |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20251203020638/https://puri.sm/learn/intel-me/ |archive-date=3 Dec 2025}}</ref> | |||
*[https://github.com/corna/me_cleaner ME Cleaner Tool] | *[https://github.com/corna/me_cleaner ME Cleaner Tool] | ||
*Using an CPU or Computer made before 2008 | *Using an CPU or Computer made before 2008 | ||
*Buying Computers with Intel ME | *Buying Computers with Intel ME disabled like [https://puri.sm/ Purism]<ref name=":1" /> and [https://system76.com/ System76] | ||
==See also== | ==See also== | ||
*[[ | *[[AMD Platform Security Processor]] | ||
*[[Intel CPUs stability issue]] | *[[Intel CPUs stability issue]] | ||
==References== | ==References== | ||
<references /> | <references /> | ||
[[Category:{{PAGENAME}}]] | [[Category:{{PAGENAME}}]] | ||
[[Category:Intel]] | |||
Latest revision as of 20:44, 5 March 2026
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| Basic Information | |
|---|---|
| Release Year | 2008 |
| Product Type | Surveillance, Security, Computers, Articles in Need of Additional Work |
| In Production | Yes |
| Official Website | https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/homepage.html |
The Intel Management Engine (ME) is an embedded microcontroller integrated into Intel's chipsets since 2008. From version 11 onwards, it runs a (closed-source) modified version of MINIX as its operating system.[1][2][3].
The ME is able to access the LAN adapter, giving it access to networks the system is connected to, both wired and wireless.[4]
The power state of the ME is independent from the rest of the system, allowing it to run while the system is turned off, assuming that the system is still receiving power.[1]
Additionally, Intel ME also contains several measures to check if it's been tampered with. These include being inaccessible to the machine BIOS or OS, scanning the entire machine every 30 minutes to verify if signature is signed (otherwise shutting down the system)[source?], and making it exceptionally difficult to reverse engineer.
Intel AMT
[edit | edit source]One of the services utilizing the capabilities of the Intel ME is Intel Active Management (AMT). It is part of a set of technologies marketed as Intel vPro. Intel AMT is built into most modern Intel CPUs, including but not limited to the Intel Core i5, Intel Core i7, Intel Core M, and Intel Xeon series. The AMT has full access to the system and can bypass system firewalls.[4][5] By default, AMT is enabled, on supported chips. AMT support is listed under the "Security & Reliability" section on the intel product website (example).

AMT allows remote management of the system by using the ME's network access, exposing 2 ports through which commands can be issued. Some of the many features of the AMT are:[4]
- Access to hardware information
- Remote power control
- Boot control
- Wake-on-LAN/Wake on wireless LAN
- Remote Schedule Maintenance (outside firewall)
- KVM (keyboard, video, mouse) remote control
- Updating firmware
Security
[edit | edit source]Intel ME follows security by obscurity, a concept that if people are unable to view the code, then it makes it more secure, however it's known to be ineffective and posing a huge security risks. Leaves many of these vulnerabilities unpatchable.
| Date | Description | CVE |
| 2009 | A "Ring -3 Rootkit" for the Q35 chipset was demonstrated by Invisible Things Lab, allowing an attacker to execute code, even when Intel AMT was disabled in the BIOS.[6] The bug was subsequently patched by Intel.[7] | No CVE |
| 2010 | An individual by the name of Vassilios Vereris discovered an bypass that allow attackers to remotely enable Intel AMT.[8][9] | No CVE |
| 2017 | Discovered by Maksim Malyutin from Embedi, a bug in Intel AMT allows a hacker to gain admin privileges from a remote location.[8] Reportedly, Intel was aware of this more than 5 years prior to the report SemiAccurate gave to Intel, however it was dismissed for unknown reasons.[10][11][12] | CVE-2017-5689.[13] |
| 2018 | Researchers at F-Secure discovered an exploit regarding Intel AMT that allows a hacker with physical access to the machine to bypass the user, BIOS, Bitlocker, and TPM passwords in a matter of 30 seconds. This bug is more severe against corporate laptops.[14][15][16][17] | No CVE |
| 2020 | Several vulnerabilities were found in Intel AMT, allowing hackers to add a root kit.[14][18] | CVE 2020-0535[19][20][21] |
Hidden Deals
[edit | edit source]Around 2017, an undocumented flag was discovered that, when set, disables a large portion of the ME. This feature appears to have been requested by the NSA.[2][22]
Tools and Tips
[edit | edit source]There is no official method to disable the ME, however there have been tools and tips developed to allow (partially) disabling the ME.[8][23]
- ME Cleaner Tool
- Using an CPU or Computer made before 2008
- Buying Computers with Intel ME disabled like Purism[23] and System76
See also
[edit | edit source]References
[edit | edit source]- ↑ 1.0 1.1 "What is Intel® Management Engine?". Intel. 2023-09-26. Archived from the original on 6 Feb 2026. Retrieved 2026-02-04.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 Ermolov, Mark; Goryachy, Maxim (28 Aug 2017). "Disabling Intel ME 11 via undocumented mode". Positive Technologies. Retrieved 2026-02-04.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ↑ Tanenbaum, Andrew S. "An Open Letter to Intel". www.cs.vu.nl. Archived from the original on 16 Feb 2026. Retrieved 2026-02-04.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 "Getting Started with Intel® Active Management Technology". Intel. 2021-02-18. Archived from the original on 24 Jan 2026. Retrieved 2026-02-04.
- ↑ "Intel® Active Management Technology Developers Guide". Intel. 2021-01-05. Archived from the original on 8 Jan 2026. Retrieved 2026-02-04.
- ↑ Tereshkin, Alexander; Wojtczuk, Rafal (29 Jul 2009). "Introducing Ring -3 Rootkits" (PDF). Blackhat. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2025-12-05. Retrieved 2026-02-04.
- ↑ "Intel patches the Q35 bug". The Invisible Things Lab's blog. 2008-08-26. Archived from the original on 13 Feb 2026. Retrieved 2026-02-03.
- ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 "Disabling Intel ME in Firmware" (PDF). ecrsecurity. 2026-02-03. Archived (PDF) from the original on 13 Feb 2026. Retrieved 2026-02-03.
- ↑ Ververis, Vassilios (2010). "Security Evaluation of Intel's Active Management Technology" (PDF). archive.org.
- ↑ Demerjian, Charlie (2017-05-01). "Remote security exploit in all 2008+ Intel platforms". SemiAccurate. Archived from the original on 13 Jan 2026. Retrieved 2026-02-03.
- ↑ Armasu, Lucian (2017-05-02). "Intel AMT Vulnerability Shows Intel's Management Engine Can Be Dangerous". Tom's Hardware. Archived from the original on 31 Dec 2025. Retrieved 2026-02-03.
- ↑ "The Vulnerability Uncovered". UMA Technology. 2025-01-11. Archived from the original on 15 Jun 2025. Retrieved 2026-02-03.
- ↑ "CVE-2017-5689 Detail". Nist. 2017-05-02. Archived from the original on 24 Jan 2026. Retrieved 2026-02-03.
- ↑ 14.0 14.1 Waldman, Arielle (2020-09-09). "Intel patches critical flaw in Active Management Technology". TechTarget. Archived from the original on 17 Jan 2026. Retrieved 2026-02-03.
- ↑ Ashford, Warwick (2018-01-18). "F-Secure highlights another critical Intel security issue". TechTarget. Archived from the original on 6 Aug 2025. Retrieved 2026-02-03.
- ↑ Subramaniam, Vaidyanathan (2018-01-14). "Gone in 30 seconds: New Intel AMT exploit is scarier than you can ever fathom". Notebook Check. Archived from the original on 8 Jan 2026. Retrieved 2026-02-03.
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- ↑ National Vulnerability Database (2020-06-15). "CVE-2020-0531". Nist. Archived from the original on 22 Aug 2025. Retrieved 2026-02-03.
- ↑ Intel (2020-11-10). "2020.2 IPU – Intel® CSME, SPS, TXE, AMT and DAL Advisory". Intel. Archived from the original on 1 Dec 2025. Retrieved 2026-02-03.
- ↑ Claburn, Thomas (29 Aug 2017). "Intel ME controller chip has secret kill switch". The Register. Archived from the original on 1 Jan 2026. Retrieved 2026-02-04.
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