Chat Control: Difference between revisions
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By virtue of the legistation, all platforms would legally be required to surveil all private digital communications, thus nullifying the efficacy of {{wplink|End-to-end_encryption|end-to-end encryption}} (E2EE) and violating fundamental rights to privacy. | By virtue of the legistation, all platforms would legally be required to surveil all private digital communications, thus nullifying the efficacy of {{wplink|End-to-end_encryption|end-to-end encryption}} (E2EE) and violating fundamental rights to privacy. | ||
On February 26, 2026, the first negotiations of Chat Control begun. <ref>{{Cite web |title=Today, the final negotiations on Chat Control 2.0 begin. |url=https://mastodon.online/@mullvadnet/116137711661598894 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/fahub |archive-date=7 Apr 2026}}</ref> | On February 26, 2026, the first negotiations of Chat Control begun. <ref>{{Cite web |title=Today, the final negotiations on Chat Control 2.0 begin. |url=https://mastodon.online/@mullvadnet/116137711661598894 |url-status=live |date=26 Feb 2026 |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/fahub |archive-date=7 Apr 2026}}</ref> | ||
==Background== | ==Background== | ||
The legislation was proposed by the European Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson on 11 May 2022. | The legislation was proposed by the European Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson on 11 May 2022.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL laying down rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse |url=https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2022%3A209%3AFIN |url-status=live |date=11 May 2022}}</ref> | ||
==Consumer response== | ==Consumer response== | ||
{{Ph-I-ConR}} | {{Ph-I-ConR}} | ||
The European Data Protection Board (EDPB) and the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) jointly warned on 29 July 2022 that the proposal may present more risks than benefits. | |||
<blockquote>The EDPB and EDPS consider that the Proposal, in its current form, may present more risks to individuals, and, by extension, to society at large, than to the criminals pursued for CSAM.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Proposal to combat child sexual abuse online presents serious risks for fundamental rights |url=https://www.edpb.europa.eu/news/news/2022/proposal-combat-child-sexual-abuse-online-presents-serious-risks-fundamental-rights_en |url-status=live |date=29 July 2022 |website=Europa}}</ref></blockquote> | |||
Numerous digital rights organizations, including European Digital Rights (EDRi), and Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), have criticized the legislation as incompatible with secure encryption and proportionality requirements under EU law. | |||
<blockquote>Critics declare this form of preemptive mass surveillance not only a threat to privacy, (cyber)security and the right to freedom of expression but as danger to democracy in general.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Why chat control is so dangerous |url=https://edri.org/our-work/why-chat-control-is-so-dangerous/ |url-status=live |date=17 Nov 2021 |website=Edri}}</ref></blockquote> | |||
<blockquote>Chat Control is chat surveillance and functions by having access to everything on a device with indiscriminate monitoring of everything.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Chat Control is Back on the Menu in the EU. It Still Must Be Stopped |url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/09/chat-control-back-menu-eu-it-still-must-be-stopped-0 |url-status=live |date=29 Sep 2025 |website=Eff}}</ref></blockquote> | |||
<blockquote>Many proposals earlier this year required the scanning and detection of illicit content on all services, including private messaging apps such as [[WhatsApp]] and [[Signal]]. This requirement would fundamentally break end-to-end encryption.<ref>{{Cite web |title=After Years of Controversy, the EU's Chat Control Nears Its Final Hurdle: What to Know |url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/12/after-years-controversy-eus-chat-control-nears-its-final-hurdle-what-know |url-status=live |date=3 Dec 2025 |website=Eff}}</ref></blockquote> | |||
Academic criticism has also focused on the technical feasibility and constitutional implications of mandatory client-side scanning. | |||
<blockquote>We find that [Client-Side Scanning] CSS is problematic because they can rarely fulfil their purposes, as seen with antivirus software. [...] We also find that CSS in general would likely violate the Right to a Fair Trial, Right to Privacy and Freedom of Expression.<ref>{{Cite web |title=YASM (Yet Another Surveillance Mechanism) |url=https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.14601 |url-status=live |date=29 May 2022 |website=Arxiv, Cornell University}}</ref></blockquote> | |||
==See also== | ==See also== | ||
Revision as of 14:42, 20 May 2026
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In 2021, the EU passed the Regulation (EU) 2021/1232 ("Chat Control 1.0") on a temporary derogation from certain provisions of ePrivacy Directive 2002/58/EC (ePD) allowing providers to scan communications indiscriminately if they choose so.
So far, only unencrypted US communication services make use of these provisions. In March 2026, the European Parliament rejected a second extension of the regulation – the temporary directive provisions expired on the 3rd of April 2026. However Google, Meta, Microsoft and Snap announced that they will continue indiscriminate and warrentless scanning of private messages.[1]
On 11 May 2022 the European Commission presented a proposal ("Chat Control 2.0") which would have made chat control searching mandatory for all e-mail and messenger providers and would even have applied to so far securely end-to-end encrypted communication services. The regulation is expected to be adopted in July 2026, with possible amendments.[update needed]
Chat Control 2.0
The Regulation to Prevent and Combat Child Sexual Abuse (Child Sexual Abuse Regulation, or CSAR), or most commonly known as Chat Control, is a proposed European Union regulation that aims to combat child sexual abuse material (CSAM) through mass surveillance by digital platforms.
By virtue of the legistation, all platforms would legally be required to surveil all private digital communications, thus nullifying the efficacy of end-to-end encryption (E2EE) and violating fundamental rights to privacy.
On February 26, 2026, the first negotiations of Chat Control begun. [2]
Background
The legislation was proposed by the European Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson on 11 May 2022.[3]
Consumer response
The European Data Protection Board (EDPB) and the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) jointly warned on 29 July 2022 that the proposal may present more risks than benefits.
The EDPB and EDPS consider that the Proposal, in its current form, may present more risks to individuals, and, by extension, to society at large, than to the criminals pursued for CSAM.[4]
Numerous digital rights organizations, including European Digital Rights (EDRi), and Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), have criticized the legislation as incompatible with secure encryption and proportionality requirements under EU law.
Critics declare this form of preemptive mass surveillance not only a threat to privacy, (cyber)security and the right to freedom of expression but as danger to democracy in general.[5]
Chat Control is chat surveillance and functions by having access to everything on a device with indiscriminate monitoring of everything.[6]
Many proposals earlier this year required the scanning and detection of illicit content on all services, including private messaging apps such as WhatsApp and Signal. This requirement would fundamentally break end-to-end encryption.[7]
Academic criticism has also focused on the technical feasibility and constitutional implications of mandatory client-side scanning.
We find that [Client-Side Scanning] CSS is problematic because they can rarely fulfil their purposes, as seen with antivirus software. [...] We also find that CSS in general would likely violate the Right to a Fair Trial, Right to Privacy and Freedom of Expression.[8]
See also
References
- ↑ Chat Control: The EU’s CSAM scanner proposal – Patrick Breyer
- ↑ "Today, the final negotiations on Chat Control 2.0 begin". 26 Feb 2026. Archived from the original on 7 Apr 2026.
- ↑ "Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL laying down rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse". 11 May 2022.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ↑ "Proposal to combat child sexual abuse online presents serious risks for fundamental rights". Europa. 29 July 2022.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ↑ "Why chat control is so dangerous". Edri. 17 Nov 2021.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ↑ "Chat Control is Back on the Menu in the EU. It Still Must Be Stopped". Eff. 29 Sep 2025.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ↑ "After Years of Controversy, the EU's Chat Control Nears Its Final Hurdle: What to Know". Eff. 3 Dec 2025.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ↑ "YASM (Yet Another Surveillance Mechanism)". Arxiv, Cornell University. 29 May 2022.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)