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Flock license plate readers

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Flock license plate readers
Basic Information
Release Year 2017
Product Type Cameras, Security, Surveillance
In Production Yes
Official Website https://www.flocksafety.com/products/license-plate-readers

Flock License Plate Readers (previously known as Flock Safety Falcon[1]), are a network of AI-powered surveillance cameras that record vehicle data for law enforcement agencies. The system operates in over 5,000 communities across 49 U.S. states.[2] According to the company's own marketing materials, Flock performs over 20 billion vehicle scans monthly.[3]

Consumer impact summary

Freedom

Residents and taxpayers have no mechanism to opt out of Flock Safety's surveillance network. The cameras operate 24/7 in public spaces, recording all passing vehicles regardless of consent. They are also placed on private premises like universities, hospitals, businesses, and neighborhood associations, which often share this data with law enforcement.[4] This data can later be integrated into predictive police platforms like Palantir.[5]

Unlike traditional security cameras that may be avoided by choosing different routes, Flock's expanding network of over 40,000 cameras makes avoidance increasingly difficult.[6] The system uses AI to create "Vehicle Fingerprints" that identify vehicles by characteristics beyond license plates, including make, model, color, aftermarket parts, window stickers, and roof racks.[7]

Privacy

While Flock Safety claims their system doesn't violate Fourth Amendment rights because "license plates are not personal information,"[8] federal courts have challenged this interpretation. In February 2024, a federal judge ruled that a lawsuit challenging Norfolk, Virginia's use of 172 Flock cameras could proceed, finding that plaintiffs had plausibly alleged the system creates a "detailed chronicle of a person's physical presence compiled every day."[9]

Data collected includes location history that can reveal sensitive information about medical visits, religious attendance, political activities, and personal associations. While Flock states data is deleted after 30 days, contracts grant them "perpetual, worldwide, royalty-free license" to use anonymized data indefinitely.[10] The system shares data across a network of over 4,800 law enforcement agencies nationally.[11]

"Anonymized Data"

While Flock's Terms and Conditions define "Anonymized Data" as customer data that is "permanently stripped of identifying details and any potential personally identifiable information" and is rendered so that a person or entity "can no longer be identified directly or indirectly," this definition includes information such as vehicle make, model, color, location patterns, and other non–license-plate attributes. [10]

Privacy researchers caution that mobility datasets labeled as "anonymized" can still be re-identified. A 2013 MIT study found that just four spatio-temporal points uniquely identified 95% of individuals in an anonymized location dataset.[12] Multiple peer-reviewed studies from 2018-2024 demonstrate that "anonymized" vehicle location data can be re-identified with high accuracy. A 2022 study showed researchers could re-identify drivers from raw vehicle network data with 97% accuracy by exploiting interdependencies in sensor measurements.[13] Research published in the Journal of Computer Science and Technology (2022) found that even 3-4 location points can uniquely identify individuals.[14]

Business model

Flock operates on a subscription model charging municipalities and law enforcement agencies $2,500 per camera annually plus installation costs.[15] Private businesses including Home Depot, Lowe's, and FedEx also deploy cameras, sharing data with law enforcement.[16][4] Contracts include automatic renewal clauses and limit municipal oversight capabilities, with cities unable to audit system operations or control how other agencies use shared data.[17]

Market control

Flock Safety has rapidly expanded to become a dominant force in automated license plate recognition, operating in 49 states with over 40,000 cameras deployed. The company's network effect creates pressure for additional jurisdictions to join, as law enforcement effectiveness depends on network coverage. Several states have begun restricting access following privacy violations, with California, Illinois, and New York limiting data sharing after immigration and abortion-related tracking incidents.[18]

Premise of a "license plate camera"

While marketed as an automatic license plate reader (ALPR) system,[19] Flock's cameras capture comprehensive vehicle and occupant data beyond license plates. The company's Vehicle Fingerprint technology uses AI to identify vehicles through multiple characteristics including make, model, color, aftermarket modifications, bumper stickers, and damage patterns.[20]

Internal documentation reveals the system can detect and search for specific objects inside vehicles, including pets, packages, and the number of occupants.[21] Law enforcement can search for vehicles based on partial information such as "sedan with Christmas tree on roof" or "truck with ladder rack."[22]

Patent for person identification by race and physical characteristics

A U.S. Patent granted to Flock Group Inc. in August 2022 reveals the company has developed & patented technology to identify & classify people based on race, gender, & other physical characteristics.[23] Patent US 11,416,545 B1 describes a system that goes beyond vehicle identification to analyze human subjects captured in surveillance footage.

According to the patent documentation, when the system identifies a human being in captured footage, it uses neural network modules specifically configured to classify people by "male, female, race, etc." The patent further describes using additional neural networks to identify clothing types, estimate height & weight, & other physical characteristics of individuals.[23] The system can then store this classification data in searchable databases, allowing law enforcement to query for people based on these physical attributes.

The patent shows that Flock's technology is designed to create comprehensive profiles that can track individuals across multiple camera locations by matching physical characteristics. While Flock publicly markets its products as "license plate readers" focused on vehicles, this patent demonstrates the company has developed capabilities for detailed human surveillance & classification by protected characteristics including race and gender.[23]

Privacy advocates have raised concerns that this technology could enable discriminatory policing practices &racial profiling at scale. The ability to search for people by race or other physical characteristics across a network of thousands of cameras is a large expansion of surveillance capabilities beyond what is typically disclosed in Flock's public marketing materials.[24]

Constitutional challenges

Multiple lawsuits challenge Flock's warrantless surveillance as violating Fourth Amendment protections. In Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Baltimore Police Department, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that persistent aerial surveillance violated reasonable expectations of privacy.[25] Legal experts argue this precedent applies to Flock's ground-based network creating similar comprehensive tracking capabilities.[26]

Norfolk, Virginia residents filed suit in 2023 arguing the city's 172 Flock cameras constitute mass surveillance without probable cause. The lawsuit cites Carpenter v. United States, where the Supreme Court ruled that persistent location tracking requires a warrant.[9] A federal judge allowed the case to proceed, rejecting the city's motion to dismiss.[27]

State legislation

Several states have enacted restrictions on ALPR use. Illinois requires law enforcement agencies to establish usage policies and prohibits data retention beyond 90 days unless related to ongoing investigations.[28] New Hampshire banned ALPR use entirely except for specific toll collection purposes.[29]

California's SB 34 requires law enforcement to establish privacy policies, conduct annual audits, and delete non-hit data within 60 days.[30] However, enforcement remains inconsistent, with a 2020 state audit finding widespread non-compliance.[31]

Notable incidents

Immigration enforcement controversy

Internal emails obtained through FOIA requests revealed Flock provided Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) real-time access to track vehicles across sanctuary cities, contradicting public statements about limiting federal agency access.[32] Following public outcry, Flock restricted ICE access in California, Illinois, and several other states, though access continues in most jurisdictions.[33]

Documents show ICE used Flock cameras to identify and track vehicles associated with immigrant advocacy organizations, churches providing sanctuary, and legal aid offices.[34] In one case, ICE tracked a vehicle from a church in Oakland to a residential address, leading to an enforcement action.[35]

Abortion access surveillance

After Roe v. Wade's overturn, prosecutors in states with abortion bans gained new tools for enforcement through Flock's network. Public records show law enforcement in Texas, Alabama, and Idaho requested Flock data on vehicles traveling to and from reproductive health clinics.[36]

Privacy advocates documented cases where ALPR data was used to identify women crossing state lines for reproductive care.[37] In response, some states enacted "shield laws" prohibiting the use of ALPR data for abortion-related prosecutions.[38]

Data breaches and misuse

A 2024 investigation revealed Flock employees accessed customer data without authorization, including running searches on romantic partners, neighbors, and journalists.[39] Internal audits found over 200 instances of inappropriate access between 2022-2024, though Flock claims to have implemented additional access controls.[40]

Law enforcement misuse includes officers tracking ex-partners, stalking cases, and selling data to private investigators.[41] A Detroit officer was terminated after using Flock to track his ex-wife's movements for six months.[42]

Security vulnerabilities

Flock Safety self-disclosed critical vulnerabilities in Q2 2025 and submitted them to MITRE for inclusion in the National Vulnerability Database.[43] Vulnerabilities in similar ALPR systems have included hardcoded passwords and unencrypted data storage.[44]

This marks the third major ALPR security disclosure in a decade. In 2015, EFF investigators found over 100 ALPR cameras unsecured on the internet. The most serious documented breach occurred in 2019 when a cyberattack compromised Perceptics, LLC, a CBP subcontractor, exposing 105,000 license plate images and 184,000 traveler facial images.[45]

Government accountability and oversight

State audit findings

California State Auditor's February 2020 investigation found Los Angeles Police Department, with a 320 million image database, had no ALPR-specific policy at all. The audit found 96% of agencies claim to have policies, but most are incomplete. Data retention periods varied wildly with no justification. LAPD maintained a minimum five-year retention period, yet couldn't demonstrate that images stored for years had investigative value. The audit found that 99.9% of the 320 million images Los Angeles stores are for vehicles that were not on a hot list when the image was made.[46]

New Jersey provides a contrasting model with mandatory annual audits of all 523 law enforcement agencies. The 2024 audit reported only two significant violations, both involving users who hadn't completed required training.[47]

A Government Technology analysis found that agencies often fail to audit ALPR systems regularly, leaving them "open to abuse by neglecting to institute sufficient oversight."[48]

Cost-benefit analysis

Arizona Department of Transportation's 2008 study of generic ALPR technology (predating Flock Safety by nine years) estimated $9.98 million for a hypothetical statewide ALPR system. The projected benefit-to-cost ratio of 9.6:1 came entirely from registration and insurance compliance, not crime reduction.[49]

Colorado's Office of Research and Statistics reported that while ALPR systems are expanding, independent academic research contradicts vendor claims. A 2011 George Mason University study concluded ALPRs "do not achieve a prevention or deterrent effect" on crime.[50]

Oakland Police Department reported 182 arrests from ALPR in the first year, representing 1.4% of homicides, robberies, burglaries, and firearm assaults. The Northern California Regional Intelligence Center states approximately 1-2 vehicles out of 1,000 initiate alerts—a hit rate of just 0.1-0.2%.[51]

Camera locations

The locations of many Flock Cameras have been mapped by the OpenStreetMap project. A viewer of the locations of these cameras is located here: https://deflock.me/map

Cease and desist to Deflock.me

DeFlock.me is a website allowing users to log and view the locations of ALPRs, such as Flock products. On January 30th, 2025, Flock sent a cease and desist notice to the owner of DeFlock demanding the name of the website be changed to exclude the company's brand name. The letter also stated that "the Website also implies that various license plate readers are vulnerable to security hacks. . ." which Flock alleged ". . . provides a false impression about the security of Flock Products." [52]

References

  1. ↑ "Falcon". Flock Safety. Archived from the original on 2024-12-06. Retrieved 2024-12-06.
  2. ↑ Hamid, Sarah; Alajaji, Rindala (2025-06-27). "Flock Safety's Feature Updates Cannot Make Automated License Plate Readers Safe". Electronic Frontier Foundation. Archived from the original on 2025-06-28. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  3. ↑ "Flock Safety". Flock Safety. Archived from the original on 26 Aug 2025. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 Brewster, Thomas (2024-06-19). "FedEx's Secretive Police Force Is Helping Cops Build An AI Car Surveillance Network". Forbes. Archived from the original on 2024-06-19. Retrieved 2025-08-25.
  5. ↑ Rettberg, Jill Walker (September 11, 2023). Machine Vision: How Algorithms are Changing the Way We See the World. Google Books: John Wiley & Sons. pp. 45–46.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: date and year (link)
  6. ↑ "Find Nearby ALPRs". DeFlock. Archived from the original on 2025-07-28. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  7. ↑ Stanley, Jay (23 July 2025). "Surveillance Company Flock Now Using AI to Report Us to Police if it Thinks Our Movement Patterns Are "Suspicious"". American Civil Liberties Union. Archived from the original on 14 Aug 2025. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  8. ↑ "Privacy & Ethics". Flock Safety. Archived from the original on 2025-08-23. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 King, Dan (2024-02-06). "Judge Rules Lawsuit Challenging Norfolk's Use of Flock Cameras Can Proceed". Institute for Justice. Archived from the original on 17 Jul 2025. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 "Terms and Conditions". Flock Safety. Archived from the original on 26 Oct 2025. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  11. ↑ Koebler, Jason (2024). "Lawsuit Argues Warrantless Use of Flock Surveillance Cameras Is Unconstitutional". 404 Media. Archived from the original on 26 Aug 2025. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  12. ↑ de Montjoye, Y.-A.; Hidalgo, C. A.; Verleysen, M.; Blondel, V. D. (2013). "Unique in the Crowd: The privacy bounds of human mobility". Scientific Reports. 3: 1376. doi:10.1038/srep01376. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  13. ↑ "Privacy-preserving vehicle trajectory matching". ScienceDirect. 2022. Retrieved 2025-10-05.
  14. ↑ Sun, She; Ma, Shuai; Song, Jing-He; Yue, Wen-Hai; Lin, Xue-Lian; Ma, Tiejun (2022). "Experiments and Analyses of Anonymization Mechanisms for Trajectory Data Publishing". Journal of Computer Science and Technology. doi:10.1007/s11390-022-2409-x. Retrieved 2025-10-05.
  15. ↑ "How much does a Flock Safety camera cost?". City of Campbell. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  16. ↑ Koebler, Jason (2025-08-06). "Home Depot and Lowe's Share Data From Hundreds of AI Cameras With Cops". 404Media. Archived from the original on 2025-08-23. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  17. ↑ "How to Pump the Brakes on Your Police Department's Use of Flock's Mass Surveillance License Plate Readers" (PDF). ACLU. 2024. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  18. ↑ "'Flock' Blocks ICE from License Plate Reader Access in Several States". Yes You Can Go. 2025. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  19. ↑ "License Plate Readers". Flock Safety. Archived from the original on 2025-08-23. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  20. ↑ "How Vehicle Fingerprint Technology Works". Flock Safety. 2023. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  21. ↑ "License Plate Surveillance Company Can Now Capture Images of Vehicle Occupants' Faces". 404 Media. 2024-05-16. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  22. ↑ "Transforming Flock: Beyond License Plate Reading to Deliver Greater Insights for Solving Crime". Flock Safety. 2023-10-16. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  23. ↑ 23.0 23.1 23.2 "System and Method for Object Based Query of Video Content Captured by a Dynamic Surveillance Network" (PDF). United States Patent and Trademark Office. 2022-08-16. Retrieved 2025-01-21. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |inventor= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |patent= ignored (help)
  24. ↑ "Atlas of Surveillance: Flock Safety". Electronic Frontier Foundation. 2024-04-15. Retrieved 2025-01-21.
  25. ↑ "Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Baltimore Police Department". Electronic Frontier Foundation. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  26. ↑ "Carpenter and the Evolving Fourth Amendment" (PDF). Georgetown Law. 2023. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  27. ↑ "Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Baltimore Police Department". CourtListener. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  28. ↑ "Illinois Compiled Statutes - Freedom from Drone Surveillance Act". Illinois General Assembly. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  29. ↑ "RSA 236:130 Automated License Plate Recognition". New Hampshire General Court. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  30. ↑ "SB-34 Automated license plate recognition systems: use of data". California Legislative Information. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  31. ↑ "Automated License Plate Readers". California State Auditor. 2020-02. Retrieved 2025-08-23. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  32. ↑ "Surveillance firm provided ICE access to license plate reader systems". The Guardian. 2024-07-15. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  33. ↑ "How Flock Safety is Building a Surveillance Network for ICE". Electronic Frontier Foundation. 2024-03-28. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  34. ↑ "ICE Surveillance of Immigrants and Advocates". American Oversight. 2024. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  35. ↑ "ACLU Obtains Records Showing ICE Using License Plate Readers in Sanctuary Cities". ACLU of Northern California. 2024. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  36. ↑ "License Plate Readers Are Creating a US-Wide Database of More Than Just Cars". Vice. 2023. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  37. ↑ "Reproductive Surveillance in Post-Roe America". Surveillance Watch. 2024. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  38. ↑ "State Shield Laws and Reproductive Privacy". Center for Reproductive Rights. 2024. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  39. ↑ "Flock Safety Employees Caught Misusing Access to Surveillance Network". Wired. 2024. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  40. ↑ "Audit Reveals Hundreds of Flock Safety Privacy Violations". Techdirt. 2024-05-15. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  41. ↑ "When License Plate Readers Become Tools for Stalking". Associated Press. 2024. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  42. ↑ "Detroit Officer Fired for Using City Cameras to Track Ex-Wife". Detroit News. 2024-03. Retrieved 2025-08-23. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  43. ↑ "Proactive Security Disclosure Q2 2025". Flock Safety. 2025. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  44. ↑ "New ALPR Vulnerabilities Prove Mass Surveillance Is a Public Safety Threat". Electronic Frontier Foundation. 2024-06-18. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  45. ↑ "Maker of US border's license-plate scanning tech ransacked by hacker, blueprints and files dumped online • The Register". Department of Homeland Security OIG. 2019-05-23. Retrieved 2025-10-05.
  46. ↑ "Automated License Plate Readers". California State Auditor. 2020-02-13. Retrieved 2025-10-05.
  47. ↑ "2024 Audit of Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR) Data" (PDF). New Jersey State Police. 2024. Retrieved 2025-10-05.
  48. ↑ "ALPR Audit Takeaways: What We Learned About Policy Gaps". Government Technology. 2024. Retrieved 2025-10-05.
  49. ↑ "Automated License Plate Recognition Technology Implementation Report" (PDF). Arizona Department of Transportation. 2008-06-01. Retrieved 2025-10-05.
  50. ↑ "Automated License Plate Readers (In Detail)" (PDF). Colorado Division of Criminal Justice. 2024-05-01. Retrieved 2025-10-05.
  51. ↑ "California Law Enforcement ALPR FAQ" (PDF). NCRIC. 2021. Retrieved 2025-10-05.
  52. ↑ "DEFLOCK"- Cease and Desist. Institute for Justice. 2025-01-30. Retrieved 2025-10-17.
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