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Flock license plate readers

Revision as of 15:07, 4 November 2025 by Beanie Bo (talk | contribs) (→Legal challenges)


Flock License Plate Readers (previously known as Flock Safety Falcon[1]), are a network of AI-powered surveillance cameras that record vehicle data for law enforcement agencies. The system operates in over 5,000 communities across 49 states in the U.S.A.[2] According to the company's own marketing materials, Flock performs over 20 billion vehicle scans monthly.[3]

Flock license plate readers
Basic Information
Release Year 2017
Product Type Cameras, Security, Surveillance
In Production Yes
Official Website https://www.flocksafety.com/products/license-plate-readers

Consumer impact summary

Freedom

Residents and taxpayers have no mechanism to opt out of Flock Safety's surveillance network. The cameras operate 24/7 in public spaces, recording all passing vehicles regardless of consent. They are also placed on private premises like universities, hospitals, businesses, and neighborhood associations, which often share this data with law enforcement.[4] This data can later be integrated into predictive police platforms like Palantir.[5]

Unlike traditional security cameras that may be avoided by choosing different routes, Flock's expanding network of over 40,000 cameras makes avoidance increasingly difficult.[6] The system uses AI to create "Vehicle Fingerprints" that identify vehicles by characteristics beyond license plates, including make, model, color, aftermarket parts, window stickers, and roof racks.[7]

Privacy

While Flock Safety claims their system doesn't violate Fourth Amendment rights because "license plates are not personal information,"[8] federal courts have challenged this interpretation. In February 2024, a federal judge ruled that a lawsuit challenging Norfolk, Virginia's use of 172 Flock cameras could proceed, finding that plaintiffs had plausibly alleged the system creates a "detailed chronicle of a person's physical presence compiled every day."[9]

Data collected includes location history that can reveal sensitive information about medical visits, religious attendance, political activities, and personal associations. While Flock states data is deleted after 30 days, contracts grant them "perpetual, worldwide, royalty-free license" to use anonymized data indefinitely.[10] The system shares data across a network of over 4,800 law enforcement agencies nationally.[11]

"Anonymized Data"

While Flock's Terms and Conditions define "Anonymized Data" as customer data that is "permanently stripped of identifying details and any potential personally identifiable information" and is rendered so that a person or entity "can no longer be identified directly or indirectly," this definition includes information such as vehicle make, model, color, location patterns, and other non–license-plate attributes.[10]

Privacy researchers caution that mobility datasets labeled as "anonymized" can still be re-identified. A 2013 MIT study found that just four spatio-temporal points uniquely identified 95% of individuals in an anonymized location dataset.[12] Multiple peer-reviewed studies from 2018-2024 demonstrate that "anonymized" vehicle location data can be re-identified with high accuracy. A 2022 study showed researchers could re-identify drivers from raw vehicle network data with 97% accuracy by exploiting inter-dependencies in sensor measurements.[13] Research published in the Journal of Computer Science and Technology (2022) found that even three to four location points can uniquely identify individuals.[14]

Business model

Flock operates on a subscription model charging municipalities and law enforcement agencies $2,500 USD per camera annually plus installation costs.[15] Private businesses including Home Depot, Lowe's, and FedEx also deploy cameras, sharing data with law enforcement.[16][4] Contracts include automatic renewal clauses and limit municipal oversight capabilities, with cities unable to audit system operations or control how other agencies use shared data.[17]

Market control

Flock Safety has rapidly expanded to become a dominant force in automated license plate recognition, operating in 49 states with over 40,000 cameras deployed. The company's network effect creates pressure for additional jurisdictions to join, as law enforcement effectiveness depends on network coverage. Several states have begun restricting access following privacy violations, with California, Illinois, and New York limiting data sharing after immigration and abortion-related tracking incidents.[18]

Premise of a "license plate camera"

While marketed as "license plate readers,"' Flock cameras use what the company calls "Vehicle Fingerprint" technology which tracks vehicles using characteristics beyond just license plates. The system catalogs vehicles based on numerous distinguishing features including make, model, color, bumper stickers, dents, damage patterns, roof racks, aftermarket modifications such as wheels or spoilers, window stickers, and even mismatching paint colors.[19][20][21]. According to Flock's own marketing materials, the system can identify vehicles even when license plates cannot be captured, advertised as turning "images into actionable evidence — no plate required."[22]

Flock claims this capability is "unique among ALPR systems" and allows law enforcement to search for vehicles based on these characteristics even without a visible license plate.

This technology changes the nature of the surveillance from license plate reading to comprehensive vehicle tracking. A person could still be tracked by the unique combination of their vehicle's physical characteristics. The Electronic Frontier Foundation warns that these "vehicle fingerprints" could flag vehicles based on political bumper stickers, revealing "information on the political or social views of the driver," or economic indicators like rust or damage, potentially "endangering anyone who might not feel the need (or have the income required) to keep their car in perfect shape."[23]

Privacy advocates note that this expanded tracking capability makes the term "license plate reader" misleading, as Flock systems create detailed vehicle profiles that persist even without readable plates. It turns any distinguishing feature of a vehicle into a tracking identifier.[24]

Patent for person identification by race and physical characteristics

A U.S. Patent granted to Flock Group Inc. in August 2022 reveals the company has developed and patented technology to identify and classify people based on race, gender, and other physical characteristics.[25] Patent US 11,416,545 B1 describes a system that goes beyond vehicle identification to analyze human subjects captured in surveillance footage.

According to the patent documentation, when the system identifies a human being in captured footage, it uses neural network modules specifically configured to classify people by "male, female, race, etc." The patent further describes using additional neural networks to identify clothing types, estimate height and weight, and other physical characteristics of individuals.[25] The system can then store this classification data in searchable databases, allowing law enforcement to query for people based on these physical attributes.

The patent shows that Flock's technology is designed to create comprehensive profiles that can track individuals across multiple camera locations by matching physical characteristics. While Flock publicly markets its products as "license plate readers" focused on vehicles, this patent demonstrates the company has developed capabilities for detailed human surveillance and classification by protected characteristics including race and gender.[25]

Privacy advocates have raised concerns that this technology could enable discriminatory policing practices and racial profiling at scale.[citation needed] The ability to search for people by race or other physical characteristics across a network of thousands of cameras is a large expansion of surveillance capabilities beyond what is typically disclosed in Flock's public marketing materials.[citation needed]

Norfolk federal lawsuit

In February 2025, Chief Judge Mark S. Davis of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Norfolk's motion to dismiss a landmark Fourth Amendment lawsuit. The case involves two residents whose vehicles were tracked 526 times in 4.5 months and 849 times over the same period, figures revealed in a September 2025 court filing.[26] Norfolk installed 172 Flock Safety cameras in 2023 at a cost of $430,000-$516,000 annually. Police Chief Mark Talbot stated the goal was making it "difficult to drive anywhere of any distance without running into a camera somewhere."[9]

Judge Davis's ruling relied on Carpenter v. United States, the 2018 Supreme Court decision requiring warrants for historical cell phone location data. The court found Norfolk's ALPR network "notably similar" to the surveillance the Supreme Court deemed unconstitutional. However, courts remain divided. In November 2024, Senior U.S. District Judge Robert E. Payne in the same district denied a motion to suppress Flock evidence, holding that three vehicle snapshots don't constitute "persistent surveillance" requiring a warrant.[27]

Virginia state courts show similar disagreement. Norfolk Circuit Court Judge Jamilah LeCruise granted a suppression motion in May 2024, finding that the breadth of Flock cameras covering Norfolk requires a warrant.[28] Yet three other Norfolk circuit court judges denied similar motions in 2024.

State regulatory landscape

Only 16 states have enacted any form of ALPR regulation as of 2024 according to University of Michigan research.[29] Virginia enacted House Bill 2724 in 2025 creating annual reporting requirements.[30] Illinois Public Act 103-0540 explicitly prohibits use for reproductive healthcare punishment and immigration investigations.[31]

Illinois prohibits law enforcement agencies from sharing ALPR data with other jurisdictions in relation to a person's immigration status.[32] New Hampshire requires a three-minute purge of data from ALPR use with the exception of ongoing investigations. [33]

California’s SB 34 requires public agencies using ALPR systems to implement usage and privacy policies as well as limits to data sharing. [34] However, enforcement remains inconsistent, with a 2020 state audit finding widespread non-compliance.[35]

Notable incidents

Immigration enforcement controversy

Internal emails obtained through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests revealed Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) were able to track vehicles across sanctuary cities by requesting access from local law enforcement agencies.[36] Following public outcry, Flock restricted ICE access in California, Illinois, and several other states, though access continues in most jurisdictions.[citation needed]

Abortion access surveillance

After Roe v. Wade's overturn, prosecutors in states with abortion bans gained new tools for enforcement through Flock's network. Public records show law enforcement in Texas requested Flock data on vehicles traveling to and from reproductive health clinics.[37]

Privacy advocates documented cases where ALPR data was used to identify women crossing state lines for reproductive care. In response, some states enacted "shield laws" prohibiting the use of ALPR data for abortion-related prosecutions.[34][citation needed]

Data breaches and misuse

Law enforcement misuse includes officers tracking ex-partners. A Kansas officer used Flock to track his ex-wife's movements for six months.[38]

Security vulnerabilities

In 2025, Flock Safety reported security vulnerabilities in its devices and submitted them to MITRE for inclusion in the National Vulnerability Database, including issues such as hard-coded credentials and improper access controls.[39][40] Similar security concerns have affected other ALPR systems, including exposure of default passwords and unencrypted data storage.[41]

This represents one of several major security disclosures in the past decade. In 2015, the Electronic Frontier Foundation documented more than 100 ALPR cameras accessible on the open internet, often without passwords or proper configuration.[41] A more serious documented breach occurred in 2019, when Perceptics, LLC, a subcontractor for U.S. Customs and Border Protection, exposed approximately 105,000 license plate images and 184,000 traveler facial images.[42]

Government accountability and oversight

State audit findings

California State Auditor's February 2020 investigation found the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), with a 320 million image database, had no ALPR-specific policy at all. The audit found 96% of agencies claim to have policies, but most are incomplete. Data retention periods varied wildly with no justification. LAPD maintained a minimum five-year retention period, yet couldn't demonstrate that images stored for years had investigative value. The audit found that 99.9% of the 320 million images Los Angeles stores are for vehicles that were not on a "hot list" when the image was made.[43]

New Jersey provides a contrasting model with mandatory annual audits of all 523 law enforcement agencies. The 2024 audit reported only two significant violations, both involving users who hadn't completed required training.[44]

A Government Technology analysis found that agencies often fail to audit ALPR systems regularly, leaving them "open to abuse by neglecting to institute sufficient oversight."[45]

Cost-benefit analysis

Arizona Department of Transportation's 2008 study of generic ALPR technology (predating Flock Safety by nine years) estimated $9.98 million for a hypothetical statewide ALPR system. The projected benefit-to-cost ratio of 9.6:1 came entirely from registration and insurance compliance, not crime reduction.[46]

Colorado's Office of Research and Statistics reported that while ALPR systems are expanding, independent academic research contradicts vendor claims. A 2011 George Mason University study concluded ALPRs "do not achieve a prevention or deterrent effect" on crime.[47]

Oakland Police Department reported 182 arrests from ALPR in the first year, representing 1.4% of homicides, robberies, burglaries, and firearm assaults. The Northern California Regional Intelligence Center states approximately 1-2 vehicles out of 1,000 initiate alerts — a hit rate of just 0.1-0.2%.[48]

Camera locations

The locations of many Flock Cameras have been mapped by the OpenStreetMap project. A viewer of the locations of these cameras is located here: ALPR Map | DeFlock

Cease and desist to DeFlock.me

DeFlock.me is a website allowing users to log and view the locations of ALPRs, such as Flock products. On 30 January 2025, Flock sent a cease and desist notice to the owner of DeFlock demanding the name of the website be changed to exclude the company's brand name. The letter also stated that "the Website also implies that various license plate readers are vulnerable to security hacks [...]" which Flock alleged "[...] provides a false impression about the security of Flock Products."[49]

References

  1. ↑ "Falcon". Flock Safety. Archived from the original on 6 Dec 2024. Retrieved 6 Dec 2024.
  2. ↑ Hamid, Sarah; Alajaji, Rindala (27 Jun 2025). "Flock Safety's Feature Updates Cannot Make Automated License Plate Readers Safe". Electronic Frontier Foundation. Archived from the original on 28 Jun 2025. Retrieved 23 Aug 2025.
  3. ↑ "Flock Safety". Flock Safety. Archived from the original on 26 Aug 2025. Retrieved 23 Aug 2025.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 Brewster, Thomas (19 Jun 2024). "FedEx's Secretive Police Force Is Helping Cops Build An AI Car Surveillance Network". Forbes. Archived from the original on 19 Jun 2024. Retrieved 25 Aug 2025.
  5. ↑ Rettberg, Jill Walker (11 Sep 2023). Machine Vision: How Algorithms are Changing the Way We See the World. Google Books: John Wiley & Sons. pp. 45–46.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: date and year (link)
  6. ↑ "Find Nearby ALPRs". DeFlock. Archived from the original on 2025-07-28. Retrieved 23 Aug 2025.
  7. ↑ Stanley, Jay (23 Jul 2025). "Surveillance Company Flock Now Using AI to Report Us to Police if it Thinks Our Movement Patterns Are "Suspicious"". American Civil Liberties Union. Archived from the original on 14 Aug 2025. Retrieved 23 Aug 2025.
  8. ↑ "Privacy & Ethics". Flock Safety. Archived from the original on 23 Aug 2025. Retrieved 23 Aug 2025.
  9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 King, Dan (6 Feb 2024). "Judge Rules Lawsuit Challenging Norfolk's Use of Flock Cameras Can Proceed". Institute for Justice. Archived from the original on 17 Jul 2025. Retrieved 23 Aug 2025.
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 "Terms and Conditions". Flock Safety. Archived from the original on 26 Oct 2025. Retrieved 23 Aug 2025.
  11. ↑ Koebler, Jason (2024). "Lawsuit Argues Warrantless Use of Flock Surveillance Cameras Is Unconstitutional". 404 Media. Archived from the original on 26 Aug 2025. Retrieved 23 Aug 2025.
  12. ↑ de Montjoye, Y.-A.; Hidalgo, C. A.; Verleysen, M.; Blondel, V. D. (2013). "Unique in the Crowd: The privacy bounds of human mobility". Scientific Reports. 3: 1376. doi:10.1038/srep01376. Retrieved 23 Aug 2025.
  13. ↑ "Privacy-preserving vehicle trajectory matching". ScienceDirect. 2022. Retrieved 5 Oct 2025.
  14. ↑ Sun, She; Ma, Shuai; Song, Jing-He; Yue, Wen-Hai; Lin, Xue-Lian; Ma, Tiejun (2022). "Experiments and Analyses of Anonymization Mechanisms for Trajectory Data Publishing". Journal of Computer Science and Technology. doi:10.1007/s11390-022-2409-x. Retrieved 5 Oct 2025.
  15. ↑ "How much does a Flock Safety camera cost?". City of Campbell. Retrieved 23 Aug 2025.
  16. ↑ Koebler, Jason (6 Aug 2025). "Home Depot and Lowe's Share Data From Hundreds of AI Cameras With Cops". 404 Media. Archived from the original on 23 Aug 2025. Retrieved 23 Aug 2025.
  17. ↑ "How to Pump the Brakes on Your Police Department's Use of Flock's Mass Surveillance License Plate Readers" (PDF). American Civil Liberties Union. 2024. Retrieved 23 Aug 2025.
  18. ↑ "'Flock' Blocks ICE from License Plate Reader Access in Several States". Yes You Can Go. 2025. Retrieved 23 Aug 2025.
  19. ↑ Harwell, Drew (2021-10-22). "Flock license plate readers spark controversy in Golden, Colo". The Washington Post. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  20. ↑ "Flock Safety ALPR". City of Campbell. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  21. ↑ "LPR Cameras". Flock Safety. Retrieved 26 Oct 2025.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  22. ↑ "License Plate Readers". Flock Safety. Archived from the original on 23 Aug 2025. Retrieved 23 Aug 2025.
  23. ↑ "Things to Know Before Your Neighborhood Installs an Automated License Plate Reader". Electronic Frontier Foundation. 2020-09-14. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  24. ↑ "Stop Flock". Stop Flock. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  25. ↑ 25.0 25.1 25.2 Langley, Garrett; Feury, Matt (16 Aug 2022). "System and Method for Object Based Query of Video Content Captured by a Dynamic Surveillance Network" (PDF). United States Patent and Trademark Office. Retrieved 21 Jan 2025.
  26. ↑ "Virginia police used Flock cameras to track driver 526 times in 4 months, lawsuit says". NBC News. 2025-09-18. Retrieved 2025-08-23.
  27. ↑ "'Mosaic theory' rejected: Flock camera evidence does not violate Fourth Amendment". Virginia Lawyers Weekly. 2024-11-11. Retrieved 2025-10-05.
  28. ↑ "Virginia Judge Rejects ALPR Evidence Without Warrant". Government Technology. 2024-05-15. Retrieved 2025-10-05.
  29. ↑ "Automated License Plate Readers widely used, subject to abuse". University of Michigan. 2023. Retrieved 2025-10-05.
  30. ↑ "2024 VSCC Annual Report - Law Enforcement Use of ALPR" (PDF). Virginia State Crime Commission. 2024. Retrieved 2025-10-05.
  31. ↑ "Public Act 103-0540". Illinois General Assembly. 2024. Retrieved 2025-10-05.
  32. ↑ "Public Act 103-0540" (PDF). Illinois General Assembly. Retrieved 23 Aug 2025.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  33. ↑ "261:75-b Use of Number Plate Scanning Devices Regulated". New Hampshire General Court. Retrieved 23 Aug 2025.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  34. ↑ 34.0 34.1 "SB-34 Automated license plate recognition systems: use of data". California Legislative Information. Retrieved 23 Aug 2025.
  35. ↑ "Automated License Plate Readers". California State Auditor. 13 Feb 2020. Retrieved 23 Aug 2025.
  36. ↑ "Reported: ICE using automated license-plate-reader cameras for immigration enforcement via state/local police". Immigration Policy Tracking Project. 27 May 2025. Retrieved 23 Aug 2025.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  37. ↑ Maass, Dave (7 Oct 2025). "Flock Safety and Texas Sheriff Claimed License Plate Search Was for a Missing Person. It Was an Abortion Investigation". Electronic Frontier Foundation. Retrieved 2025-08-23.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  38. ↑ Tucker, Hailey (31 Oct 2022). "Kechi officer stalking incident prompts concerns about WPD 'FLOCK' technology". KWCH 12 News.
  39. ↑ https://www.flocksafety.com/blog/gunshot-detection-and-license-plate-reader-security-alert. {{cite web}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  40. ↑ https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2025-59403/. {{cite web}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  41. ↑ 41.0 41.1 Quintin, Cooper (28 Oct 2015). "License Plate Readers Exposed! How Public Safety Agencies Responded to Major Vulnerabilities in Vehicle Surveillance Tech". Electronic Frontier Foundation.
  42. ↑ https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-09/OIG-20-71-Sep20.pdf. {{cite web}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  43. ↑ "Automated License Plate Readers". California State Auditor. 13 Feb 2020. Retrieved 5 Oct 2025.
  44. ↑ "2024 Audit of Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR) Data" (PDF). New Jersey State Police. 2024. Retrieved 5 Oct 2025.
  45. ↑ "ALPR Audit Takeaways: What We Learned About Policy Gaps". Government Technology. 2024. Retrieved 5 Oct 2025.
  46. ↑ "Automated License Plate Recognition Technology Implementation Report" (PDF). Arizona Department of Transportation. 1 Jun 2008. Retrieved 5 Oct 2025.
  47. ↑ "Automated License Plate Readers (In Detail)" (PDF). Colorado Division of Criminal Justice. 1 May 2024. Retrieved 5 Oct 2025.
  48. ↑ "California Law Enforcement ALPR FAQ" (PDF). NCRIC. 2021. Retrieved 5 Oct 2025.
  49. ↑ Matz, Sarah M. (30 Jan 2025). "2025 01 31 DEFLOCK CD final" (PDF). Electronic Frontier Foundation. Retrieved 27 Oct 2025.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
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